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THE STATE OF THE DISCIPLINE*

V. O. KEY, JR.
Harvard University

When the turn of fate brings to a man the honor of speaking on this occasion, he is likely to review the remarks of his predecessors. Their practice, I find, has been, in the main, to address themselves to one or the other of two kinds of themes. They discourse either upon a substantive problem within their own specialty or upon a matter of common concern to us as members of the same profession. As our interests have become more diverse, the second alternative seems to have been followed with greater frequency. My decision to consider in my remarks the state of our discipline has, therefore, the support of precedent if not the merit of prudence.

The burden of my argument may be stated briefly and bluntly. It is that the demands upon our profession have grown more rapidly than has the content of our discipline. We are, in a sense, the victims of our own success. The achievements of our profession arouse expectations that our discipline enables us to meet only imperfectly. If we are to narrow the gap between our knowledge and our responsibilities, we must devote greater resources in manpower and ingenuity to the systematic analysis of the phenomena of politics.

I

The weight of the demands on our discipline may be sensed from a quick review of the growth of the activities of our profession. As each of us concentrates his energies upon his own narrow interests, we do not, I believe, commonly appreciate the range and extent of our concerns as a profession. An incidental but incontestable inference from a broad view of our profession must also be that its accomplishments, whatever our misgivings about them may be, have been impressive.

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* Presidential address, delivered at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, St. Louis, Missouri, September 4, 1958.

The development that has affected the majority of us most directly has been the growth in our teaching tasks. In but a short period as time goes we have assumed a principal role in undergraduate instruction in our colleges and universities. Each year the senior classes include around 6,000 young men and women whose major studies have been in political science.[1] How many tens of thousands of non-majors are enrolled in our courses only the registrars, and perhaps the textbook publishers, know.

The peculiar place of civic studies in American society assigns to us responsibilities that are not easily fulfilled. We are looked to for the training of community leaders, for the instillment of a sense of civic duty, and for the transmission of an understanding of the world of politics. Perhaps we can take some credit for the sprinkling of the leadership echelons of American society with persons of high civic literacy. And perhaps we may also be held accountable for some of the less imposing aspects of American community leadership. I can only remark in passing that we know far too little about just what are the effects of our efforts in this area and that a critical examination of our program and performance in undergraduate teaching is in order.

The variety of demands imposed upon us in our teaching role makes plain enough the magnitude of our task in keeping our discipline abreast of the necessities. Our teaching obligations place upon us requirements far more trying than those that confront a relatively simple discipline, such as, for example, economics or nuclear physics. We must be prepared to expound the inner realities of governmental systems from India to Russia, to Latin America, to Australia. We must have sage observations to make on the relations among all the nations of the earth. We must be able to cope with the niceties of municipal administration and the profundities of the political philosophers. Our coverage must extend from the grand problems of the organization of authority in the national state to the factors affecting the vote of union members in Keokuk in 1958.

Although we tend to regard ours as primarily a teaching profession, in recent decades more and more of us have become public servants. Probably not more than two-thirds of the Ph. D.'s in political science are employed by colleges and universities.[2] Over one-half of the M.A.'s in our field are employed by governmental agencies. A substantial proportion of our number is thus now engaged in public administration. Others apply the materials of our discipline in staff roles for congressional committees and state legislatures. All this is in marked contrast with the rarity of public employment of political scientists only a few decades ago and is a measure of the enlarged role of our profession.

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[1] The Office of Education reported for 1955–56 that 5,670 bachelors' degrees were conferred in political science; 554, in international Relations.—*Earned Degrees Conferred by Higher Educational Institutions, 1955–56* (Circular No. 499), p. 19.

[2] One recent survey fixes this percentage at 76.7, with the warning that the respondents included a disproportionately high number of teachers.—*Personnel Resources in the Social Sciences and Humanities* (Department of Labor Bulletin No. 1169), pp. 95, 129.

We contribute a steady flow of recruits to the public service. In other ways, too, the applications of political science in public policy and public administration have multiplied. Members of our profession have moved in considerable number into the staffs of research organizations concerned with national and international affairs, bureaus of municipal reresearch, taxpayers associations, and other like private agencies.

The demands upon those of our number in these applied phases of political science are quite as diverse as are those that vex the teaching branch of the profession. Yet the applied political scientist must be possessed of an outlook, of skills, and perhaps of substantive knowledge not relevant, or at least not essential, in teaching. There can be no doubt that we have opportunities to develop our discipline better to meet these needs. Nevertheless, over the long run our impact upon public affairs has been far more powerful than we commonly realize. Many well settled governmental practices were but a few decades ago regarded as impractical schemes emanating from the ivory tower.

II

These comments touch only the broadest aspects of the responsibilities in teaching and in application that have been assumed by our profession as it has grown in stature. They involve problems of the gravest import; and they involve matters of endless variety and puzzling intricacy.

The nature of our fulfillment of all these responsibilities rests upon the nature of our discipline. Ultimately the quality of our teaching, our efficacy as public servants, and the wisdom of our work as consultants and advisors in the applications of political science depend upon the quality of the content of our discipline. A bit of artistry and devotion is helpful in teaching; courage and a sturdy stomach fortify a public servant; and a modicum of cunning contributes to the making of an effective applied political scientist. Yet all these characteristics, useful as they may be, do not enable us to rise far above the body of knowledge with which we are equipped.

Our most urgent problem consists in the enlargement, improvement, and refinement of that body of knowledge. In that respect ours may be only the common lot of all branches of learning. Yet the primacy of politics in the determination of the conditions of life gives warrant for a critical rating of our needs. Advances in our discipline can be quickly converted into advances in all aspects of our work—teaching, administration, application.

Those who would blueprint a strategy for the acceleration of the development of any field of knowledge should proceed most tentatively. Perhaps we can have to some degree programs of planned invention, but in the main the enlargement of human understanding is a mysterious process that probably includes a large component of chance. The insights of an original mind may color an entire discipline for decades and scores of lesser men may preoccupy themselves in verification, refinement, and imitation. Or bits of inquiry by painstaking and plodding workers may gradually piece themselves together and at some stage cumulate into a broad advance on a wide front. Or a chain of inquiry started by a Frenchman, continued by a Briton, and picked up by an American may eventuate in a striking finding entirely uncontemplated at the beginning of the sequence. Or a new concept, perhaps borrowed from another discipline, will permeate a field of learning and throw into new and illuminating perspective old ideas and old bodies of data. Or a new technique of observation may open up entirely new lines of inquiry and permit new approaches to old questions.

Given the erratic and various processes of growth of human knowledge, we are justified in viewing with reserve those who contend that with their approach they command the only road to the advancement of human understanding. Nevertheless, it is perhaps feasible to indicate some broad directions in which the application of effort would most probably strengthen our discipline.

At times the specialties that make up our discipline seem to be flying apart, yet over the past few decades a major tendency has been an intellectual unification of all its elements. This unification has been no grand codification of our lore. Rather, common concepts and common outlooks have to a degree been adopted by all parts of the discipline. One of our colleagues has called this the "politicization" of the discipline.[3] In outlook the unification has been behavioral.[4] Although many of our colleagues would deny that they have been touched by the behavioral approach, I can only invite you to compare their work with that of their predecessors of 25 years ago. These tendencies toward unification facilitate communication among workers in all branches of the discipline, stimulate new interpretations of old data, and increase the chances of getting ahead by bringing, in effect, more manpower to bear on the same problem. On occasion even now an expert in municipal administration can learn something from a specialist in international relations and vice versa. The further identification and analysis of the common elements of all aspects of our discipline hold, I believe, opportunity for building a base for broad and perhaps rapid advance.

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[3] Dwight Waldo, *Political Science in the United States of America* (Paris: UNESCO, 1956).

[4] The following characterization of our discipline could not have been made a few decades ago: "Allowing for local variants, political science in the United States today may be said to focus on *political behavior* in the widest sense of the term. And this is true in varying degree of all contemporary political scientists, whatever their own specialized field may be. . . ."—Peter H. Odegard, "A New Look at Leviathan," in *Frontiers of Knowledge in the Study of Man*, edited by Lynn White, Jr. (New York: Harper, 1956).

As most of the branches of our discipline come to be characterized by a focus on political behavior, instead of the unique qualities of constitutions, charters, or practices, it becomes embarrassingly apparent that we need to exert ourselves to move from the description of the particular toward the formulation of modest general propositions. A modest general proposition need not deal with a modest or insignificant problem. Our work still bears the marks of its origins in history and in law, disciplines dedicated in peculiar degree to the analysis of the particular. Our journals are still in large measure filled with treatments of particular events, institutions, practices. Often these are well done, even ingeniously done, yet they add absolutely nothing new by way of general idea. They stand alone as isolated accounts of peculiar events or situations. They remain unconnected with what has been learned before; from their nature they will remain unconnected with what is learned later.

Lest I be misunderstood, I should say that to recognize our need for more work leading to modest general propositions is not to urge the construction of grand hypotheses to encompass all political action. Those who yearn for the psychic satisfactions of such systems underestimate the incorrigibility of the data with which we deal. In addition, I should explicitly observe that we shall always have to be concerned in great degree with the particular. The demands upon us, both in teaching and in application, tend to be for diagnosis and analysis of the unique rather than for dicovery and exposition of the general rule. Nevertheless, without a body of general knowledge, one must grapple with the unique situation with no weapon better than his bare hands.

We probably have a larger body of general propositions in our literature than we assume. But much of this knowledge is inchoate, poorly articulated, rarely tested adequately. An incidental consequence of this state of affairs is that in its training each generation of our profession must almost recapitulate the history of the discipline. And another consequence for the advance of the discipline is that the form of our knowledge requires that we dedicate not inconsiderable effort to the rediscovery of what was in reality already known before.

I am well aware that in these remarks I have made some tacit assumptions about the nature of the political process which are at variance with the thesis that we are doomed to ignorance of the ways of man. Our analytical schemes must, to be sure, make provision for the accidental, the erratic, the unique. And we must be forever alert to the possibility that the verified general proposition of one era may not hold at a later time. Political systems have a plasticity; they also have an inertia. We have demonstrated well enough that political knowledge that retains a validity even for a generation or so has great utility as mankind endeavors to elevate itself by its bootstraps.

These comments should not be regarded as a reiteration of the ancient complaint that we have too much "mere description." Perhaps the advance of knowledge in all fields is associated with the contrivance of ways and means to achieve more perfect description. We have, in fact, ample reason for dissatisfaction with our techniques of observation and description as well as with the tenuous relationship of descriptive work to theoretical endeavors.

It seems to be requiring an inordinate amount of time for us to develop techniques of observation supplementary to the skills in legal and documentary analysis which for so long sufficed to meet our needs. When we began to venture out of the libraries and to study political action at first hand we went equipped with nothing more than whatever common sense and native ingenuity we possessed. Those qualities are admirable, and always in short supply, but they are not enough.

Our colleagues in other social sciences, notably in sociology, social psychology, and cultural anthropology have far surpassed us in the contrivance of techniques of observation. Many of those techniques readily adapt themselves to problems traditionally the concern of political scientists. That adaptability has been turned to advantage by our colleagues in other fields as their interests have led them into the study of political behavior and institutions. The consequence has been that a goodly proportion of the significant advances of recent years in several of our specialties have been the contribution of men not professionally political scientists.

The survey research technique provides an example of a handy means for coping with questions about which we have been limited to excogitation for lack of a workable method of observation. Yet few indeed are the political scientists who have a command of survey technique. The problems of its adaptation to the study of political questions have by no means been completely solved, but political scientists are slow to exploit its possibilities.[5] Consider, for example, what might be done with this instrument in that field to which we have most ready access but about which we probably know least, namely, local government and politics.

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[5] I have touched upon some of the problems of adaptation of such techniques to the traditional problems of politics in "Strategy in Research on Public Affairs," *Items*, Vol. 10 (1956), pp. 29–32.

On the whole we close our minds to problems of method and technique. This permits us to take a smug attitude toward the absurdities occasionally committed in the name of method. It also assures that we rarely come to grips with the fundamental question of how we go about pushing back the limits of our knowledge. Method without substance may be sterile, but substance without method is only fortuitously substantial. Technique and method in themselves perhaps may not generate many new ideas, but they are most handy for verification or, as occurs with melancholy frequency, disproof. And new techniques and methods often make it possible to raise new kinds of substantive questions.

Perhaps most of these worries about the state of our discipline relate in one way or another to the place of political theory in our studies. In an earlier day the place of political theory could be readily comprehended. It amounted to the history of political thought, an eminently respectable branch of intellectual history. It found an autonomous place in political science and could be pursued without influence upon, and without being influenced by, other branches of political science. The development of our discipline had merely brought it into loose academic alliance with various other specialties.

As the segments of political science have come to be, if not cemented together, at least infused by common terminology and common concepts, the question comes to be asked what relevance has political theory for other branches of political science. Most current work in political theory is, I suppose, in the tradition of historical analysis. Our theorists, or so it seems to me, nowadays manifest a sharpened sophistication in their analysis and exegesis of the classics of political thought. Yet among our theorists there seems also to be developing a view that a radical reorientation of their focus of attention may be in order if they are to contribute to the growth of the discipline. They are bestirring themselves, but I must confess to some bewilderment as I attempt to discern where they are leading us. In my mellower moods I lean to the forecast that the confusing cross currents in contemporary theory will turn out to have served usefully as probes in the process of trial and error by which we feel our way along the path ahead. The topic could be dismissed with that hopeful observation, but I shall comment on the odd relation that prevails between theoretical and empirical work, a matter that bears in a major way upon the advance of our discipline.

That relation tends to be one of antagonism, if not hostility, but its characteristic most significant for the present discussion is the supposition that theoretical and empirical work are separable. Extremely rare is the piece of work by a theoretician which seeks to indicate lines of potential convergence between theoretical and empirical inquiry.[6] And it is almost solely among the older, and perhaps wiser, theorists that one finds occasional reflective consideration of the problems of knitting together theoretical and empirical work.[7] More commonly a separateness prevails. The extreme doctrine seems to hold that theorists should work in isolation both from empirical inquiry and from the empirical world of politics.

The only reason for mentioning such disputation is that it points to some real problems—and opportunities—for the advance of our discipline. I doubt whether in its present stage of development our discipline contains adequate foundation for a genuinely fruitful division of labor between theoretical and empirical workers. (I am, of course, not using the term theory in the sense of history of political thought.) For the specialist in theory to be creative he must be able to work from a foundation of more or less established propositions from which extrapolations may be made by logical procedures. Such hypothetical extensions of old knowledge may then be subjected to empirical test. And the sequence may then recur as the cumulation of knowledge proceeds.

The present chaotic state of our knowledge hardly suffices to permit an operative separation into specialized hands of these two kinds of intellectual processes. Both kinds of work need to be carried on, if not simultaneously in the same mind, then in the closest collaboration. And that collaboration rarely occurs. Most exceptional is the piece of theoretical writing that has the slightest use for the empirical worker, and the occurrence of reports of empirical work usable by the theorist may be equally infrequent.

I must take note of signs that forces are at work to close the gap between theoretical and empirical work, a tendency which, if carried for enough, would make the two indistinguishable and greatly expedite the development of our discipline. Our empirical work would become less irrelevant theoretically and our theoretical work less naive empirically. Such changes require time, but the opportunities for young men and women who wish to help bring them about are extraordinary.

While an impatience with the rate of development of our discipline is justified, I should say that I do not share the attitude of self-flagellation adopted by those of our colleagues who are overwhelmed by the massiveness of our collective ignorance. Our profession has built up a body of knowledge that is substantial indeed. That accomplishment we tend to forget as we are awed by the unsolved questions that confront us. One can also confidently assert that the quality of our research has mightily improved. To those who doubt this judgment I can only recommend a careful perusal of a few volumes of the *American Political Science Review* as it appeared around 1920. That is a trying but encouraging exercise.

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[6] For one of the exceptions, see Oliver Garceau, "Research in the Political Process," this REVIEW, Vol. 45 (1951), pp. 69–85.

[7] For two such considerations, see Frederick M. Watkins, "Political Theory as a Datum of Political Science," and Carl J. Friedrich, "Political Philosophy and the Science of Politics," in *Approaches to the Study of Politics*, edited by Roland Young (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1958).

III

The quality of our work may have improved, but there can be no doubt that the development of our discipline lags behind our requirements. A basic limiting factor is the amount of manpower that we allocate to the business of research and inquiry. Precisely what that quantity is one cannot say, but it is plain enough that we devote the most meager resources to the tasks of political inquiry.

One clue to the productivity of the profession is provided by a check on the publications of those receiving Ph.D.'s in political science and international relations in the years 1935, 1936, and 1937. Of this sample:

At least one-fourth have not been heard from since they received their Ph.D.'s; their theses were not published; nor have they helped to fatten the periodicals.

One-sixth appeared in the periodicals at least once or twice over a twenty-year period.

About a third have published a book (in some cases the thesis) and in some instances in addition an article or more during the first couple of decades of their career.

About a fifth have produced at least two books, although this count includes theses, textbooks, collections of readings, and other items that would scarcely be regarded as books by a knowledgeable dean as he considered a proposal for promotion.[8]

I hasten to say that the moral of all this is not that every Ph. D. should be a prolific contributor to the literature of our discipline. The specialization of labor among us dictates that some of us do one kind of work and others another. The meaning of the data rather is that we allocate the most inadequate resources to the labor of inquiry essential to the development of our discipline. Inspection of the detailed bibliographies underlying my proportions can only yield the impression that extremely few of us manage to make significant contributions to the content of our discipline. From my examination of my sample, I would judge, by what seem to me to be latitudinarian standards, that not over 10 per cent had made such contributions. I should say that I have far more confidence in the 10 per cent estimate than I would in an identification of the individuals making up the 10 per cent. Over the long pull a single article may turn out to be a more enduring addition to our knowledge than a shelf of books.

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[8] The bibliographical check was of those persons (except Orientals) listed in *Doctoral Dissertations Accepted by American Universities* for 1934–35, 1935–36, and 1936–37, under the categories political science and international law and relations.

If my ratio based on a sample from the mid-thirties continues to prevail, we may forecast that of the 250 or so Ph.D.'s added to the supply this year, not more than 25 will during their careers make significant contributions to the substance of our discipline. I have the impression that the work of the new crop is distinctly superior to that of my sample from the mid-thirties; I am far less certain that any larger proportion will make durable additions to our knowledge. In fact, a sharp increase is occurring in the proportion of Ph. D.'s turned out by those institutions whose graduates had in my sample an especially low record of scholarly production.

IV

The conventions that govern discourses of this sort dictate that diagnosis should be followed by recommendations for action. Such prescriptions should be rooted in extended deliberation, and I have meditated upon the problem at some length. About the only proposition on which I have formed an obstinate conviction is that there is not much to be gained by appointing a committee to look into the state of the discipline. Yet, if you concur in the view of the pivotal importance of elevating the quality of the content of our discipline, two areas offer obvious opportunity for exertions by each of us individually.

The first of these is in the area of graduate instruction. The quality, nature, and objectives of graduate instruction differ widely among the 40 or so institutions offering Ph.D. degrees in political science. Yet it does not require an extensive survey of their varying practices to know that probably no single department offers truly adequate training in the problems of research in our field. Some departments have, to be sure, attempted to bring their instruction abreast of the new possibilities. Nevertheless, we have some distance to go if we are to have graduate instruction suitable to produce a larger number of political scientists adequately equipped to advance the discipline. This appraisal conflicts, of course, with the occasional plea that is heard for training leading to a teaching degree. What we now have is in fact by and large a teaching degree. A critical need of our discipline is for more, and far more rigorous, research training. The graduate department that first manages to orient itself in this direction and to staff itself for that purpose will exert a pervasive influence on American political science.

A second area in which the exercise of individual initiative can contribute to the long-run advance of our discipline is that of recruitment of young men and women into our profession. Such vocational guidance—or proselyting—must, however, be discriminating as well as diligent. We need in some way or another to draw more recruits who will turn out to be genuinely creative scholars. The enlistment of even a score more such persons per year would mightily reenforce the propulsive power behind the growing edge of our discipline.

I do not underestimate the difficulties either in the early identification of such talent or in its attraction to our trade. The competition for talent among academic disciplines and among all professions is sharp and will become sharper. All branches of the academic profession are handicapped in this competition in ways too well known to require exposition here. Yet I am confident that we can in good faith more strongly advise many of the best of our students to follow a career of scholarship.

To many young men and women the academic profession offers opportunities, both economic and intellectual, that cannot be matched by alternative careers. No other profession has so nearly removed the economic bars to entrance for persons of exceptional talent. Moreover, I doubt that other lines of endeavor are so well organized to expedite the advancement of exceptional talent as is the world of higher education. Let an instructor in the most remote college demonstrate sufficient quality to make himself even slightly visible, and dossiers on him will begin to build up in the files of recruiting officers from the Atlantic to the Pacific. Our own branch of the academic profession seems to me to hold special promise for young men with high potentials in research. Such persons can quickly make their mark, given the opportunities for the development of our discipline.

In short, our profession has a special attractiveness for the talent we need most, namely, those persons who can ultimately become contributors to the development of our discipline. We need to bring that attractiveness persuasively to the attention of young persons with curiosities about the nature of politics, with fortunate mixtures of methodicalness and imagination, with an impetuous drive disciplined by the persistence to pursue a problem to its end, and with the hope of youth tinctured by a precocious maturity of judgment. As we succeed in attracting a bit more than our share of such talent, the intellectual development of our discipline will take care of itself.

VARIOUS MEANINGS OF "THEORY"*

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So many discussions go astray because the same words are used in different senses by adherents of different points of view that it seems imperative to start practically every discussion by clarifying the meanings of terms. Yet this problem is easier posed than solved. We in academic life owe understandable allegiance to erudition and to elegance of expression, and all too often we take a definition to be adequate (in the sense of clarifying meaning) if it sounds well. More is required, of course. Clarification of meaning (whether couched in formal definitions or in illustrative examples) takes place only if the terms defined are actually geared to the experience of the people concerned. This is a serious problem, because the experiences of people, although they overlap, can be widely disparate. Particularly among us in academic life the disparity may be quite wide. For our experience is very largely the experience of thinking, and thinking is tempered by language in the broadest sense, that is, by the way ideas are organized. And various ways of organizing ideas are imposed on us by our disciplines. Discipline means constraint. Discipline is essential for any organized activity. And so in academic disciplines, "discipline" means constraint on the mode of thought. It prescribes the repertoire of concepts, the patterns of classification, the rules of evidence, and the etiquette of discourse.

Cross-disciplinary endeavor, therefore, depends on the ability of the participants to think in terms of more than one language—a feat more difficult than the ability to think, say, both in English and French, because the languages of the disciplines vary not only in their vocabularies and grammars (as ordinary languages do) but also in deeper aspects, whose meaning I hope can be conveyed by the phrase, "principles of organizing thought."

I

Our concern here is the role of theory. I will first try to convey the experiences behind this term characteristic of the exact sciences (which I will define by their predominant thought patterns). Here I am on sure ground, because this is the field in which I myself have been "disciplined." Afterwards I will try to convey the experiences behind the term "theory" in other than exact sciences, particularly in the social sciences. Here I can only give my impressions. I am neither a political scientist nor a psychologist (to give two examples of "non-exact" sciences), and so I have not been properly disciplined to speak with authority on the way a term like "theory" is used there. My remarks are to be taken only as an account of how the thinking of social scientists and others about theory appears to someone who thinks of theory in terms imposed by the discipline of exact science.

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* A paper read at the 1958 annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, St. Louis, Missouri, September, 1958.

In the exact sciences, a theory is a collection of theorems. This concept of theory is also a partial definition of an exact science. It is the *entire* definition of any self-contained branch of mathematics. Some maintain, however, that mathematics is not a science, because it makes no assertions about the observable world. Whether one demands that a science must necessarily make assertions about the outside world is a matter of taste. I tend to accept this limitation on what is to be called a "science" and thus I agree to exclude mathematics from the sciences. What then is an exact science?

To begin with, it is a collection of theorems (to be presently defined); but the theorems have to be translatable into assertions about the tangible world and these assertions should be verifiable within certain limits of accuracy. The theorems are what makes a science exact; the accuracy of the assertions is what makes it successful.

Next we define a theorem. A theorem is a proposition which is a strict logical consequence of certain definitions and other propositions. The validity of a theorem, then, usually depends on the validity of other theorems. This tracing of antecedents goes on until the rock bottom is reached . . . assertions which are not proved but simply assumed, and terms which are not defined but simply listed. In a mathematical system it is unnecessary (in fact, impossible) either to prove these basic assumptions (the postulates) or to define the basic terms. This is what Bertrand Russell meant when he said that in mathematics we never know what we are talking about, nor whether what we are saying is true. In logic, the situation is exactly the same. Indeed logic is often taken to be a branch of mathematics or vice versa.

According to our criterion for science, however, we demand that some of the terms used in a science be related extensionally to referents and at least some of the assertions be empirically verifiable. I say some, not necessarily all, and this is an important point to which I will return.

Practically all the exact sciences we know are mathematical or at least highly mathematicized. This is by no means an indication of some supernatural power inherent in mathematics but rather of the propensity of mathematicians for preempting new territories and of adjusting and extending mathematical methods so as to be able to deal with different content areas. The central fact is that a necessary adjunct of an exact science is a set of completely rigid rules of deduction. It is the rigidity of these rules, not the accuracy of the assertions or precision of measurements, which makes an exact science. Now wherever there are such rules, a symbolism is invented as a purely mnemonic device. Wherever a symbolic notation occurs coupled with rules of deduction, *i.e.*, of manipulating the symbols, the mathematician steps in and assumes jurisdiction over the territory, or else the practitioners of the newly invented system of symbol manipulation are called mathematicians. This is what account for the all-pervasiveness of "mathematics" in the exact sciences.

II

I will now describe in greater detail by an illustrative example what is meant by a theory in an exact science. Specifically I will take a problem from mechanics, the earliest and one of the most successful of the exact sciences.

Consider a pendulum, that is, a weight supported by a string. The problem is to "explain" its motion. Immediately the question arises, what one means by "explain"? Obviously any explanation will contain statements introduced by "because" in reply to questions starting with "why." But what kind of questions are these? They are likely to be determined by what is observed about the pendulum. What is observed, in turn, will depend on what is singled out for observation. A question like "Why does the pendulum move around?" is so vague that it frustrates any attempt to answer it. Or, viewed in another way, it is trivially easy to answer, *because* it is so vague. One might say, for instance, that the pendulum moves around because there are forces acting on it.

The first task of an exact science, therefore, is to make the questions precise. The question "Why does the pendulum move *as it does?*" is more to the point. But the phrase "as it does" now lays the questioner open to a counter-question: "What do you mean, 'as it does'?" This is a challenge to describe how in fact the pendulum does move, and this temporarily turns the attention away from an "explanation" toward description. To explain anything we must first circumscribe just what we are going to explain.

The first problem, then, is to *describe* the motion of the pendulum. This immediately introduces a motivation to simplify the situation. If the pendulum is constrained only by the string, its bobbing about will appear at first too chaotic to yield to a systematic description. Let us therefore constrain the pendulum to move in one plane, the way clock pendulums move. Now it moves just "back and forth."

But "back and forth" is still too crude a description. How can we make it more precise? Here is where the fundamental orientation of mechanics (of motion) as an exact science begins to direct one's methods of observation. This orientation prescribes what shall be of prime interest in any investigation of motion. If a moving object can be specified at any given moment by its position, the description of motion consists of associating a sequence of positions with a sequence of moments of time. In the simplest case, the position can be uniquely specified by a single number, and, of course, time can also be so specified. The position of the pendulum bob, for example, can be specified by the angle of deflection (positive or negative) from the plumb line, or else equally well by the horizontal displacement of the center of the bob from the position of rest. A complete description of the motion, then, will be given by a table specifying the deflection at each moment of time. Such a table is called a mathematical function.

It can be demonstrated by experiment that the mathematical function $x = A \sin (mt)$ will very nearly, but not quite, describe the motion of the pendulum. Here x is the horizontal deflection of the bob, A is the maximum deflection, t is time, and m is a certain constant to be presently discussed. The qualification "not quite" is of paramount importance, as we shall see. First, however, let us see what we mean when we say that a mathematical function describes a set of data.

Actually a set of data in which values of two variables are related can be represented by a set of points in the plane, as many points as there have been readings. In particular, suppose one took only three readings of the pendulum position and got three points on a graph whose axes are displacement *vs.* time. A mathematical function will "describe" these data if the curve corresponding to the function can be passed through these points. Now a circle or a parabola can always be passed through any three (non-collinear) points, and so can many other kinds of curves. All of them, then, can be said to "describe" this limited set of data. Of course, if more readings are taken, the additional points may not lie on the same curve. However, given any number of points, a great many curves can be made to fit them, which is to say that a great many equations can describe the data, indeed exactly, not approximately. Why, then, is the particular function $x = A \sin (mt)$ chosen, even though it does *not* describe the data exactly?

This function is chosen because it does more than describe the data. It *explains* the data in the sense of "explanation" as it is used in an exact science. And the discrepancies between it and the data are accounted for by the inadequacies of the fundamental assumptions in terms of which the explanation is made.

The fundamental assumptions concern the general laws which supposedly govern the motion of a body subjected to forces. In the case of the pendulum, we can from the geometry of the situation analyze the forces acting on the bob, hence *derive* the mathematical form of the motion. The equation above gives the derived (idealized) motion of an idealized body in an idealized environment. The discrepancy between the idealized and the actual state of affairs is supposed to account for the discrepancies between the prescribed and the realized motion. Some of these idealizing assumptions are as follows:

1. The supporting string or rod is supposed to have no mass.
2. No friction or air resistance acts on the pendulum.
3. The bob is assumed to have mass but no extension.
4. The (small) horizontal displacement is supposed to be proportional to the angle of displacement.

Etc.

All of these assumptions are false. Yet the physicist continues to make them. Why? In return for sacrificing precision (precision must in any event be sacrificed wherever measurements are involved), he gains simplicity and, what is more important, he gets at the fundamentals (almost in the Platonic sense of the word) of the situation. This allows him to subsume a great many phenomena under a single scheme. For example, the assumed laws of motion and idealized properties of the pendulum allow the physicist to derive *from the same set of postulates* the following additional relations:

1. The period of the pendulum will be independent of the mass of the pendulum.

2. Within limits, it will be independent of the amplitude of oscillation.
3. For large amplitudes, the period will become dependent on the amplitude, and the precise nature of this dependence can be predicted.
4. The period will be directly proportional to the square root of the length of the pendulum.
5. The period will be inversely proportional to the square root of the acceleration of gravity. This relation explains the meaning of the constant m in the equation of the pendulum's motion. The constant involves the square root of the ratio of the acceleration of gravity to the length of the pendulum.
6. The horizontal velocity of the pendulum will be given by the function $v = mA \cos(mt)$.
7. The same scheme can be extended to the spherical pendulum, *i.e.*, one not constrained to a single plane. That is to say, from the same set of assumptions one can get many additional results, for instance, the precession of the plane of rotation of the spherical pendulum, etc. Indeed, all the observed motions of the heavenly bodies are derived from exactly the same three or four assumptions about motion which are supposed to underlie the swinging of a simple pendulum.

The story of the pendulum illustrates the power of the mathematical model. A mathematical model is much more than a description of events in terms of the mathematical relations among the variables. It is rather a set of assumptions often referring to a highly idealized situation, from which assumptions the relations to be observed are *derived*, to be compared with observations. Agreement with observations corroborates the model. Most important for corroboration is the prediction of *other* relationships, perhaps not hitherto observed. At any rate, the more are the relationships derived, and the fewer are the relationships assumed, the more powerful is the model. A trivial model does no more than lead to relationships which observations had suggested in the first place. Such a model penetrates no deeper than the observational level and is therefore purely descriptive, not explanatory. It simply restates in other terms what has been observed.

The method just outlined is applicable to many widely disparate exact sciences, though the content, of course, will be different in each case. In mechanics, for example, the fundamental assumptions have to do with the laws of motion. In mathematical genetics, another exact science in the sense defined, but not as successful as mechanics, the fundamental assumptions have to do with something quite different, namely the re-shuffling, segregation, and recombination in sexually reproducing organisms of entities supposed to be carriers of separate inherited traits. In this science, the laws governing these events are assumed to be not laws of mechanics or of electrodynamics or of thermodynamics but "laws of chance." For these too an exact mathematical theory exists. And on the basis of it, given certain combinations of genotypes, certain patterns of mating, certain linkages among the genes upon the chromosomes, certain selection pressures exerted by the environment, etc., the distributions of the genotypes and of the phenotypes in the succeeding generations can be computed. Here too discrepancies between prediction and observation are unavoidable, because of the idealizing assumptions which cannot be avoided. But the principle of investigation is the same as in theoretical mechanics. One derives a collection of theorems about how things should happen under idealized conditions. The discrepancies are attributed to the imperfections in the assumptions, and in the initial observations. The discrepancies provide the leverage for further refinements of the theory.

Economics may be viewed in the same light. The assumptions here have to do (in the classical picture) with the relations between price levels, supply, demand, maximization of profit (or expected profit) by the so called "economic man," etc. The mathematical scheme being given, predictions on the basis of initial observations can be made. In mathematical economics agreement between theory and observation is not often good, and many are led to dismiss mathematical methods in economics on this ground. In the light of what has been said, such an attitude is not justifiable. The predictive power of mathematical meteorology, especially in its early stages, was also quite poor. Yet there was never any question that air currents, temperature gradients, and all the other conditions studied in meteorology are subject to the strict laws of physics. The low success of primitive meteorology is entirely attributable to the complexity of the phenomena compared with the drastically simplified assumptions which it was still possible to handle mathematically. Crude meteorology was merely a stage in the development of more refined and more successful meteorology. The original conceptual scheme was correct. Only the tools had to be sharpened.

Thus the bluntness of the available mathematical tools is not a sufficient ground for rejecting them in principle. It is an entirely different matter if the question is raised whether the tools applied are the right *kind* of tools. As is conceded by all who understand the mathematical method, its power is enormous where it can be applied. The big question is, where can it be applied? Clarification is needed here. For many, mathematics means classical mathematics, that is, the mathematics of eighteenth-century physics, derived from the differential and integral calculus. As pointed out, the range of logical disciplines now called "mathematics" has enormously increased, both in techniques and in the variety of conceptualizations, so that any inadequacy of classical mathematics for dealing with problems of social science can by no means be taken as an indication of the inapplicability of mathematics in principle.

Nevertheless, let us first examine the conditions that must be fulfilled in order that classical mathematical methods may be utilized to advantage in theoretical social science.

III

First, there must be sharply defined, quantitative variables singled out for study. In the mechanics of motion, we have seen that position and time were fundamental. Actually there are three fundamental kinds of quantities in mechanics, from which all others are derived: length, time, and mass. Nor is there any question (in classical mechanics) how these quantities are to be measured. In other branches of physics, there are other quantities, for example heat and temperature in thermodynamics, electric charge current, and strength of electric and magnetic fields in electrodynamics, etc. Where probability theory is used, the fundamental quantities are frequencies of occurrence of events or of "types," and so on. In pursuing the question to what extent a quantitative variable can be sharply defined, a most important problem looms: the problem of recognition.

Note that the problem is trivial in mechanics. To determine the position of an object, we must, of course, recognize the object in all positions, but this is ordinarily so easy as to present no problem. As we pass from physics to chemistry, the problem of recognition becomes more important. For example, before quantities or concentrations of substances can be measured, the substances must be recognized. To be sure, there are unambiguous rules for recognizing substances by their "properties," and to the extent that the "properties" are defined in terms of classical physical measurements, the problem of recognition is solved. But it makes itself known.

As we pass to biology, the problem of recognition becomes even more serious. It now takes special training, sometimes quite prolonged, to tell one type of organism from another, one tissue from another, to interpret what is seen through a microscope, etc.

In the behavioral sciences, the problem of recognition becomes paramount. Since these sciences have only recently arisen from the humanities, their terms are derived largely from common sense and from intuitive notions at best, and from deeply rooted pre-scientific notions and prejudices at worst. Outside of science, no need may be felt to endow terms with operational meanings: one's intuitive meaning seems to suffice on the basis of the universal naive assumption that the other's perceptions are like one's own, or else something is wrong with the other's perceptions. Where there is no consensus on recognition, there can, of course, be no question of quantification or measurement, and so the first requirement of exact (or mathematical) science seems to be not fulfilled. Some workers in behavioral sciences feel that this difficulty precludes in principle the extension of mathematical methods to behavioral science.

The other condition usually assumed necessary for an exact science is this. Given a set of unambiguously measurable variables, one must be able to choose some assumptions about how they are related which reasonably reflect "reality." It is conceded, of course, that only an idealization of reality can be reflected in any finite set of assumptions, but it is maintained that the idealization should at least come close to reality. In mechanics, this condition is fulfilled. True, there is no such thing as frictionless motion, a perfectly rigid body, extensionless mass, etc., but these idealizations are in many instances well enough "approached" by reality. Once a set of assumptions is chosen, the mathematics required to derive theorems and conclusions from them must be amenable to being handled by the human mind. Again, it is maintained by some that even if unambiguous variables could be singled out (as they are in economics) and even if reasonably accurate assumptions could be made, the resulting mathematical system would be too unwieldy to be useful—there are too many relevant variables, and they are too intricately interwoven to permit treatment by existing mathematical techniques.

When it is proposed to simplify the situation by holding all but a few variables constant, it is pointed out (quite correctly) that, first, in many fields of investigation this is practically impossible: one cannot experiment with national economics or with real political systems; second, even where experimentation is possible, controlled conditions introduce distortions of such magnitude as to make extrapolations from controlled to natural situations, *i.e.*, from *in vitro* to *in situ* (to use the physiologist's terms), worthless.

Now I will develop what I want to say further along two lines. First I want to recognize to a certain extent the justice of the criticism of *premature* uses of mathematics in the social sciences and thereby the inevitability of an entirely different conception of "theory" and of the notion of a model, which have arisen in social science. But then I want to point out the limitations of this conception and its underlying assumption concerning the nature and function of mathematical methods and of mathematics itself.

IV

There are social scientists who understand the nature and the importance of the operational definition. Whether motivated by a hope of an ultimate possibility of mathematization of their disciplines (they are more likely to criticize premature mathematization, not mathematization in principle), or because they have been caught up by the spirit of positivism, which has become dominant in modern systematic thought, they undertook the task of creating a sound and consistent terminology of social science, particularly in sociology.

This task, however, would be trivial, if it were confined to a compilation of a glossary, no matter how "operational" the definitions in it. For definitions are arbitrary—they are no more than agreements on how to use terms. Implicit in the work of Parsons and of Levy (to name two workers who recognize the importance of systematization) are not only attempts to map observable events on terms (which is what is done in operational definitions). Their main efforts are directed toward selecting events and combining them in such a fashion as to make the terms applied to these combinations fruitful in the development of a social theory which eventually is to become a collection of theorems—statements in "if so . . . then so" terms.

They ask, for example, in effect, "What is a social action?" Given a certain philosophic orientation, questions like this can be appallingly misunderstood. Traditional philosophy is cluttered with questions of this type where the implicit assumption is that behind each word in use there must be a reality, and that the business of the philosopher is to discover it, so that making a "proper definition" is tantamount to establishing a truth. It has always been the curse of philosophy (until this curse was lifted by the logical positivists) to assume that entities called politics, society, power, welfare, tyranny, democracy, milieu, progress, etc., actually exist, just as cats, icebergs, coffee pots, and grains of wheat exist, and that each has an essence discoverable by proper application of reason and observation. I add observation, because I am speaking not only of the Platonists but also of the Aristotelians.

Now I certainly am not trying to say what is often said in vulgarized versions of the logical positivist position, namely that "concrete" objects certainly exist while "abstractions" don't. A "cat" is no less an abstraction than "progress," when you come to think of it. The problem is not one of existence but one of consensus. Not what *is* a cat, but what easily recognizable objects shall be *called* cats, is the first question. Because agreement is comparatively easy to reach on this question, we can pass immediately to the study of the cats themselves, their "nature," if you wish. But where agreement is not easy, that is, where one cannot immediately agree on an easily recognizable class of events which shall be subsumed under the term "democracy" or "status" or "power," it is futile to pass to the study of these supposed entities.

The systematizers understand in varying degrees the nature of this semantic problem, and they try to come to grips with it. They ask in effect, "What sort of thing shall we *call* a social action?" Consensus is not easy to reach, because the various definitions will presumably have different consequences. "Social action" once defined will presumably be a key term in some social science discipline. It will (hopefully) appear in the theorems of future theory. Therefore its particular definition serves to focus attention on the component events from which the definition is compounded. It may or may not be fruitful to focus attention on this or that combination of events. Hence the problem of definition becomes a "theoretical" problem, something which is often difficult for the natural scientist to recognize.

In the same spirit we can interpret the question "What is a political act?" "What is an economic act?" This search for primary, supposedly elemental, acts is itself inspired by the role of the atom concept in chemistry (as Easton points out). It is not so much a question of whether these "elementary particles" exist: just naming them does not confer existence. It is rather a question of whether our observations can be so organized that the *assumption* that they exist gives us a heuristic and predictive advantage. Incidentally, this is the only sense in which the so called "elementary particles" of physics can be said to exist.

We have, then, so far two distinct meanings of theory. For the natural, especially the physical scientist, theory, as we have said, is a collection of derived theorems tested in the process of predicting events from observed conditions. The physical scientist is able to address himself to problems of this sort, because for him the problems of recognition, of definition, and of meaningful classification either do not exist or have been largely solved. For the social scientist, all too often, the latter kinds of problems are central. The social scientist's aim, therefore, must be lower than that of the physicist.

It is often difficult to concede that one's aims are lower. So there are social scientists who will insist instead that their aims are "different." They are likely to say that they aim at "understanding" events, not at predicting them. For the physical scientist, however, "understanding" is synonymous with prediction. For this reason the physical scientist is likely to become impatient with the social scientist's distinction between the two. Moreover, the physical scientist often associates so called "understanding" (divorced from predictive ability) with ancient philosophical "explanations" which were unsurpassed in their vagueness or in tautological triviality. For this reason, too, the physical scientist often looks upon social science down his nose. And also for this reason, some investigators, usually those with physical science backgrounds, in an attempt to be constructive (that is, willing to extend to social science the power and respectability of the physical sciences) try to take the bull by the horns and to construct mathematical models of social behavior or of historical process wherever quantifiable variables can be found, not bothering too much with the question of whether these variables are germane to the sort of thing social science is trying to do.

The success of these attempts is spotty but by no means negligible. But because it is spotty, and because the relevance of the results to the important questions of social science is uncertain and (let's face it) because many social scientists do not read mathematics and for this reason develop defensive attitudes toward its methods, there is a reaction in the social science camp. This reaction is largely, I think, the source of the disclaimer to the effect that social science is not interested in prediction but only in "understanding." When asked what the proponents of "understanding" mean by it, they are in difficulties. It is as difficult to convey the meaning of "understanding" (in its subjective sense, as it is used here) as it is to convey the meaning of "appreciation" or of "perception." Yet these words are full of "meaning," of sorts. All of us "know" what they mean in the same sense that we "know" what vinegar smells like or how velvet feels. Pressing the issue of "meaning" of understanding is not fair in this situation. But it is fair to raise the question whether it is proper to give the name "science" to an activity which aims only at subjective understanding of this sort.

This is not a rhetorical question. I am not at all sure that the answer is categorically "no," although I suspect that I prefer "no" to "yes." Yet there is no denying that this intuitive organization of perception (akin to appreciation) is an important component in the psychology of science. Without it I doubt whether any but utilitarian motivation would exist for scientific activity, and I doubt whether science could get very far on utilitarian motives alone.

We have, then, a third meaning of "theory" in the attempts of social scientists (these attempts are no longer tolerated in physical science) to achieve and to impart intuitive understanding of social behavior, of the nature of institutions, of political systems, of cultures, and such matters. The language of such theory is largely metaphorical, although a great deal of factual material may be brought "in support." To "support" a theory in this context means at best to marshal factual material (historical and political events, case histories, etc.) in such a way that the reader who views this "evidence" through the metaphors, concepts, and definitions of which the "theory" is constructed will have the experience of "understanding." There is no need to say that even such attempts at concretization are often lacking in the writings of social scientists.

You may gather that as I mention concepts of theory farther and farther from those which enjoy hegemony in the physical science, I am becoming more and more sceptical about the scientific worth of such concepts. To a certain extent this is true, but I do not wish to draw a sharp line anywhere. The "worth" of a theory is not calculable by a set of cut and dried criteria any more than a man's worth as a member of the community is calculable in terms of how much he produces. In particular, metaphor and analogy, although they cannot be accepted as scientific "explanations," are sometimes important aids in the sense that they prepare the mind to make more precise investigations. It is in this sense that the so-called "models" of the non-exact sciences are to be appreciated. They are like the diagrams of geometry, neither necessary nor sufficient for the sort of proof that mathematical rigor demands, but often helpful for the eventual construction of such proofs.

There is also a branch of psychology which partakes in this sort of theorizing, namely, "depth psychology," to which the Freudian system also belongs. This branch of psychology is singularly poor in predictive capacity, either deterministic or statistical. Nor are there many attempts to make its terms operational, similar to the attempts of the systematizers in sociology. The aim is intuitive understanding of what makes up personality (another term which is only intuitively understood). It is strange for me, whose habitat is mathematics, to say this, but I think that depth psychology, particularly the contribution of Freud, is the richest area of behavioral science. I only regret that the disparity between the soft-heads and the hard-heads is so great that it is difficult for them to lay out a common program in which intuitive insights can be translated into strict deductions and verifiable generalizations.

V

There is still a fourth sense in which theory is used, in particular "political theory," namely in the normative, value-laden sense. In this sense, political theory would be concerned, for example, with the question of what is the best form of government. I have been specifically warned to avoid this issue on the gound that too much ink has already been shed over it. To some it seems that concern with what "ought to be" is farthest removed from science, which properly concerns itself with "what is." I will take serious issue with this position.

Whatever I know of the situation in political science is, of course, largely hearsay. In particular I take advantage of learning about the ideas of men whose books I have not read from the very few books on political science which I have read. Thus whatever I know about the ideas of James Bryce I have read in a book by Easton. Easton tells me that Bryce felt that generalization must be firmly rooted in "fact." He also shows how the idea is carried to extremes in some sections of American political science. This "hyperfactualism," as Easton calls it, is, of course, quite understandable. The passage from undisciplined speculation, left over from the times when all science was rooted in philosophy, to militant empiricism has occurred in so many sciences as to suggest the operation of a law. In physical science hyperfactualism died on the vine. It might have proliferated if Francis Bacon's recommendations were ever carried out. But the greatest scientist who was Bacon's contemporary happened to be Galileo Galilei, and he chose a different path. If he had taken "facts" too seriously and too meticulously, he could never have enunciated the general law of falling bodies, because it would never account for the falling of leaves from trees, nor for the fall of rain drops, which between them account for probably 99 per cent of the falling that ever occurs on this planet. Neither leaves nor rain drops follow Galileo's law even approximately. Therefore his law is factually false. But it is true nevertheless, in a deeper sense. Without such ideally true and factually false laws, mathematical physics would have never left the ground.

Galileo's was, in a way, a normative theory. It described not how bodies fell but how they ought to fall under idealized conditions. In this sense one can well see how a theory can be normative and yet truly scientific. The idea of a truly scientific normative theory of action is not to pontificate about morality but to prescribe a correct course of action on the basis of a given desiderata, and in certain (usually idealized) conditions. Such a theory may not have any "practical value," because the idealized conditions may never obtain, but it may have immense heuristic value. In particular, it may through its underlying analysis of the fundamentals of the situation impart to the social scientist just the part of intuitive understanding of an area of investigation that he is seeking.

An example *par excellence* of this sort is game theory, a mathematical structure, which for the most part deals with situations which seem exceedingly remote from the subject matter of social science. However, centuries of scientific experience should have taught us that remoteness of a theory from a particular content area is no indication of its relevance or irrelevance. The fever which derives its name from "bad air" was not really understood until the events in the life of a certain mosquito became known. The harnessing of natural forces owes a tremendous lot to the ancients' curiosity about the anomalous behavior of amber and to one man's logical analysis of an experiment, which had been designed for no other reason than to determine the earth's motion relative to "absolute space."

The relevance of game theory to social science, particularly to political science (although originally the most direct applications were thought to be to economics) resides in the circumstance that game theory distills the logical essence of the situation which Catlin has termed the political act, namely a desire to fulfill an act of will in a context where conflict with others' desires to fulfill their acts of will is to be expected.

Interpreted in a physical context, the metaphor "conflict of forces" calls for some sort of equilibrium theory. Such a theory can be and has been developed purely metaphorically. The concepts of "force," "pressure," "balance of power," "leverage," "stability," "instability," are mostly terms borrowed from physics. Descriptions of conflict situations in these terms sound like descriptions of physical systems. But of course the analogy is a metaphorical, not a logical, one, *i.e.*, the similarity is felt intuitively, not derived as a consequence of an isomorphism between two situations. Therefore metaphorical models of conflict, although they may be valuable for a variety of reasons, cannot be expected to yield logically compelling theorems, let alone theorems translatable into predictions.

There have been attempts to construct real mathematical models of conflict by utilizing the conceptual apparatus of classical mathematics. One such attempt, a very ambitious one, was undertaken by the late Lewis F. Richardson, who cast international rivalries in terms of differential equations and interpreted the stabilities and instabilities of the resulting systems of equations as the stabilities or instabilities of certain international situations. Since Richardson's theory is mathematical, its conclusions are definitive and compelling. In this they have an advantage over the metaphorical theories of the same sort. Its success as a predictive theory is, as would be expected, extremely limited. One set of data was fitted very well by the assumptions of the model, namely the arms expenditures of the two coalitions during the armament race preceding World War I. But even this extremely good fit is not impressive, since there are too many free parameters in the model and the points to be fitted are too few. One could at this point recall our previous argument that a mathematical theory always begins by treating an idealized situation and this beginning serves as a point of departure for greater refinements.

VI

The merits of game theory, however, are of quite another kind. It too deals with idealized situations; in particular it assumes "perfectly rational players." But it departs radically from earlier attempts to cast behavior into models of the mathematical physics type in one very important respect. The older models assumed the metaphysical basis of mechanics. That is, they described systems whose "states" were determined by a causality operating on the "here and now," the way physical states are determined. The state of any physical system is a consequence of the immediately preceding state in accordance with the laws governing infinitesimal changes of state.

In contrast, game theory is primarily a decision theory. It too casts situations into sequences of states. But each successive state is determined by a decision made by a rational being who foresees all possible outcomes and chooses a course of action, which in some way is likely to yield the best outcome under the circumstances. The phrase "under the circumstances" is crucial, for here game theory goes to the real heart of the matter. Each decison maker controls only a part of the situation. In making his decisions, he is aware that other decision makers whose "interests" may be opposed to his also make "rational decisions," and moreover take into account the decisions which *he* is likely to make. No physical theory treats of such situations.

Whereas the mathematical theories of behavior borrowed from the methods of physics (and often chemistry) depend for their success on the special assumptions concerning the interaction of variables and on the possibility of measuring certain key parameters, game theory is largely independent of special assumptions and measurements.

The independence from measurements is achieved by simply by-passing the problem. The only numerical variables are "utilities," *i.e.*, degrees of preference by the several decision makers for the various possible outcomes, and these are simply regarded as given. Independence from special assumptions obtains, because game theory is entirely "normative." It assumes "complete rationality" of the decision makers.

To some workers in game theory, particularly those who are oriented to social science applications, the most interesting results are paradoxically those which show up the inadequacies of game theory, *i.e.*, the indeterminacies of results based on the indeterminacy of the concept of "rationality" in all but the simplest of situations.

To illustrate, let us examine two game-like situations, in the first of which "rationality" can be satisfactorily defined, but not in the second. Suppose two decision makers have two courses of action each. Each of the four pairs of choices leads to an outcome which is denoted by a pair of "pay-offs," that is utilities accruing to each player. The situation can be represented by a 2×2 matrix. The first player chooses one of two rows; the second, one of two columns. The entries in the matrix are the pay-offs to the first and second players respectively, as in Figure 1.

$$\begin{bmatrix} 0, 0 & 3, -3 \\ 1, -1 & 2, -2 \end{bmatrix}$$

FIG. 1

Note that the pay-offs in this case all add up to zero, *i.e.*, what the first player wins, the second loses. These games are called zero-sum.

This game has a "solution" which prescribes a "rational" choice to each player, namely for the first player to choose the second row, and for the second player the first column. This is so, because the first player can obviously guarantee for himself a win of 1, and the second player can *prevent* him from winning more than one, even if each choice is made without knowledge of the other's choice. Here a true "balance of power" exists, but note that this balance is not analogous to any physical balance of "opposing forces." It is a balance based on the *logic* of the situation, involving rational decisions.

The "solution" is much less definite in our next example, shown in Figure 2.

$$\begin{bmatrix} 1, 1 & -2, 2 \\ 2, -2 & -1, -1 \end{bmatrix}$$

FIG. 2

Here the pay-offs do not add to zero. Such a game is called non-zero sum. If we follow the first player's "rational" reasoning, we must concede that he should choose the second row because *no matter which* column the second player chooses, he is better off by choosing the second row. By symmetry, the second column is the second player's "best" choice. But this pair of "best" choices results in a loss to both players (−1, −1), whereas their "worst" choices would have given both a win. Obviously "self interest" is not a self-evident concept.

Agreement between the players to choose first row, first column would be considered "rational" in this case. But admitting agreements of this sort leads to questions of coalition formation, an immensely fertile field in game theory and a very difficult one, because of the ambiguities which plague the concepts of "power," "self-interest," "rationality," etc.—terms taken for granted in much discussion of individual and social behavior, but which game theory has undertaken to define with mathematical precision, and was led into formidable conceptual difficulties in consequence.

The central problem in game theory thus appears to be logical analysis, specifically logical analysis of situations in which common sense often fails. Where such logical analysis can be pushed to a definitive conclusion, the theory of games can be considered a normative theory. For example, the equilibrium solution of a two-person zero-sum game is essentially a prescription to two rational players how to choose their strategies.

But sometimes no such conclusion can be reached on the basis of existing concepts. The following extremely instructive example is taken not from game theory proper but from closely allied investigations. I shall cast it in terms likely to be of interest to political scientists.

Suppose three men, *A*, *B*, *C*, rank three courses of action, *X*, *Y*, *Z*, according to their preference 1, 2, 3. Let their rankings be displayed in the matrix shown in Figure 3.

	X	*Y*	*Z*
A	1	2	3
B	2	3	1
C	3	1	2

FIG. 3

What is a fair compromise? Suppose we apply the majority rule to paired comparisons. Noting that *X* is preferred to *Y* by *A* and *B* (a majority) and *Y* to *Z* by *A* and *C* (again a majority), we are tempted to assign to *X*, *Y*, and *Z* the ranks 1, 2, 3 respectively. However, this violates the majority rule in the case of X and Z, because Z is preferred to X by B and C (again a majority!).

Kenneth Arrow has shown that such impasses are *certain* to arise wherever more than 2 persons rank more than 2 alternatives; that moreover no decision rule except those which seem undesirable in a democracy, such as dictatorial or entirely arbitrary prescriptions, can be assigned which do not contain inherent contradictions of the sort just noted.

The methods of such analyses, like the methods of game theory, are those of exact science. The situations portrayed certainly remind us of political situations. They involve conflicts of interest, advantages of coalition, social decision rules, in other instances also arbitration schemes, calculation of power indices, etc. Here, then, is an exact science, seemingly applicable to politics (or perhaps, economics). But what does "applicable" mean? If it is taken to mean as involving the possibility of translating the theorems into predictions about human behavior, I am afraid it is stretching the imagination to call game theory "applicable."

The conditions of translatability are not met. Situations are seldom so clear-cut as to be describable in terms of a few "alternatives"; preferences are never so clear as to be measured in utilities; men are seldom rational. In this sense game theory fares no better than the classical mathematical models of behavior borrowed from physics and chemistry.

But in another sense, game theory and similarly oriented investigations are a genuine step forward. For they have burst through the framework of thought imposed by physical science on those who wished to apply mathematical methods to behavioral science. The floodgates have opened and a torrent of entirely new concepts has rushed by. I wish to note in passing that a flourishing terminology is more often a calamity in a rhetorically oriented discipline than an indication of its richness. Vagueness allows undisciplined proliferation and duplication, often providing a mask of erudition for lack of originality and insight. Not so in exact science. There concepts hold their own only if they provide points of anchorage for genuine theorems, not simply for rhetorical speculation.

But what good is it, the empiricist is bound to ask; which is his perfect right. No hide-bound answer can be given. Only if one believes that far reaching and deep-digging logical analysis is essential in any discipline which aspires to the status of science, will one be satisfied with the answer that game theory is an example of such an analysis, that it is of relevance to political science because its fundamental concepts are idealizations of what political science is about, namely decisions made amid partly conflicting and partly coincident interests of rational, calculating beings. Theory of this sort represents one of two poles. The other is meticulous empiricism, of the kind espoused by Bryce, by most historians, and by the positivists of Jerome Frank's persuasion in legal thought. The arguments of the empiricists are well known. They are worthy arguments. The arguments in favor of pure theory are much harder to present because social scientists do not often come into contact with really powerful pure theories, the kind that grow on mathematical soil. One can only say that their worth has been amply demonstrated elsewhere. The physicist might spend thousands of years studying the behavior of ocean waves on a beach in most meticulous detail; in the end he would be no wiser than before with regard to what is essential in wave motion.

The really profound understanding of waves is quite independent of observing any real waves. For that matter, the most important waves in our lives are not even observable directly—I am referring to the waves which underlie our entire telecommunication system and also subatomic events.

It is these kinds of essences which pure theory seeks. It goes without saying that *ultimately* the findings of theory must somehow be translated into real predictions and observations. But to demand this too soon is not wise. It would be like demanding cash payment in every business transaction. Such "hard-headedness," although aimed at security, would actually disrupt the system of credit on which any complex economy must depend to a great degree.

Theory, then, is like a system of credit. One has a right to demand that *somewhere* there are assets to back up the transactions. But, as often as not, these assets may be in the future, and the very act of questioning their existence may set in motion a chain reaction which will preclude their existence.

This is what I meant by the statement that not every conclusion of an exact theory has to be translatable into observation. In the case of the recent constructions of exact theories of presumed relevance to social science, we will do well to extend to them the most liberal credit. After all, in our society the thinker's time comes cheap.

THE RELEVANCE OF NORMS TO POLITICAL DESCRIPTION*

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The dangers that arise when norms and personal values intrude upon scientific work are familiar to every political scientist—so familiar, that nowadays the dangers are likely to be shrugged off with undeserved contempt. "The 'cult of objectivity' has passed in social science," one writer has recently proclaimed;[1] and David Easton declares, less dramatically, that even though he assumes that "factual and moral propositions are logically heterogeneous, this does not mean that in practice it is possible to discover a proposition which expresses only a sentiment or states only a factual relationship."[2] In context, such remarks may be perfectly innocent. They stir up embarrassing associations, however, and merge with certain streams of thought that would wash away the distinction between facts and values, in the belief that this is the way to make values respectable again, or as a consequence, perhaps, of a failure of nerve—which may be only fatigue—in the defense of "objectivity."

I

Since I wish to argue in this paper that there are ways in which normative considerations enlarge our understanding of politics, it is important that I should at the outset disavow any intention of condoning attempts to sabotage the distinction between facts and values. It is false sophistication to belittle the distinction. There are (and this is one of the chief points involved in the distinction) all kinds of descriptive statements in political science that imply neither favorable nor unfavorable value-judgments upon the phenomena described: for example, the statement, which I take from David B. Truman, that "Avoiding any commitment, especially an open or continuing commitment, to a particular party organization or faction is generally characteristic of interest group politics."[3] Such a statement may be accepted equally by those who favor this characteristic of interest group politics; by those who disfavor it; by those who are indifferent.

On the other hand (and this is another point involved in the distinction), there is a real and constant danger that political prejudices, from which no man can be sure he is free, will lead political scientists to suppress or distort some of the facts which such descriptive statements might convey. One man may exaggerate the stabilizing effects of constitutional checks and judicial review, because they have obstructed attempts to modify privileges which he enjoys; another man may describe quite thoroughly the multitude of pressures that certain interest groups generate, but underplay the parallels in the case of organized labor, which he would persuade himself behaves more democratically and more responsibly.

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[1] Richard W. Taylor, in his introductory essay to the collection, *Life, Language, Law: Essays in Honor of Arthur F. Bentley* (1957), p. 16.

[2] *The Political System* (1953), p. 224. It is doubtful that we would really want to say that a locution expressed a *proposition* if all that it did was "express a sentiment."

[3] *The Governmental Process* (1951), p. 296.

This is a danger that can be coped with. We may grant that everyone perceives the political scene differently, that he is a unique person, with a history of experiences different from other people's histories. We may grant that since everyone is a participant in politics (or potential participant) as well as an observer, we may expect people to describe politics in ways distorted by differences in political values. It does not follow that the descriptions of a political phenomenon put forward by one man or another will be affected by these differences: they may be too subtle to show up in what will after all be a limited number of statements made upon a given topic.

But suppose they do show up. Do we have to put up with the bias on either side, and the attendant conflict of testimony? Of course not. We invoke the canons of scientific method; we demand consistency and clarification and repeated tests by different observers; we require that the evidence from all sides be pooled and new evidence gathered. This process of criticism is not infallible; but if the statements of fact that are accepted as such after methodical criticism are actually still biased in some degree, it does not mean that the distinction between fact and distortion finally fails; it means simply that the process of criticism has not been carried far enough. So we resume it, whenever we are confronted with a plausible charge of bias.

Omitting a fact does not imply any attitude toward it; nor does inflating or deflating it. Values are not the only things that lead men to make errors. But it is sometimes argued that in asserting any statement whatever, some value-judgments are implied; and in one sense of "imply," this is true. When Truman made the statement which I have quoted, he did imply that he judged the fact which he was describing to be worth noticing. Furthermore, if he had asserted the statement as part of a rigorously systematized theory, I think it would be fair to say that he had implied that he valued the statement and the theory, taken together, favorably, according to the norms embodied in our concept of "a good scientific theory," namely: consistency, simplicity, scope, predictive reliability, fertility. But favoring the statement in this way is wholly different from favoring the existence of the phenomenon which it describes: *no* implication, of any sort, runs from the statement quoted to the latter kind of favoring.[4]

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[4] In Chapter VII of *Scientific Explanation* (1955), R. B. Braithwaite expounds a theory according to which the choice between statistical hypotheses depends upon "the gains or losses occasioned by choosing one or the other of these hypotheses when it is true or when it is false." Following Wald, Braithwaite holds that on the basis of these expected gains or losses we can develop "prudential strategies" for choosing between hypotheses; and, drawing, like Wald, upon the theory of games, he argues that these

Having made my disavowals, I may perhaps permit myself to make a gesture of my own toward putting ethics in the respectable light it deserves. It would be a fallacy quite as gross from the ethical point of view as from a scientific one to argue from a value-judgment to the existence of a state of affairs whose description might, in some sense, imply the judgment; and it is just as important for the moralist as for the scientist to have an accurate view of the facts. For every ethical principle needs to be applied to the facts before they are judged good or evil—and if the facts are not correctly represented, how can the principle be correctly applied? Among those moral principles general enough to apply to, say, national policies, furthermore, the most plausible and generally used require attention to the *consequences* of policies;[5] and the more accurately and comprehensively these are known, the better founded will be the resulting judgments upon policies.

There should, therefore, be no controversy between scientists and moralists regarding the necessity of getting the undistorted facts. I shall be so bold as to go on and claim that science—in this case, political science—can profit by cooperating with ethics. When we are alarmed about bias, we think first perhaps of the dangers of commission, of strong prejudice dictating a distorted statement; and this is so worrisome that we fail to note that there are dangers of bias in excluding moral considerations, too. Writers may fail to see important facts that they would have seen if they had allowed specific moral considerations to suggest certain questions.

As nice an example as anyone could want comes to hand in a very lucid and careful article by Gottfried Haberler in the recent volume from the Committee for Economic Development on *Problems of United States Economic Development*.[6] Haberler attacks the problem of "wage-push inflation" and envisages

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strategies when fully developed will be randomized ones. He concedes that "a strategy which is the prudential one for the assignment of values to the 'utilities' by one person will not be the prudential strategy for another such assignment by another person." This raises the possibility, which Braithwaite does not sufficiently investigate, that people may differ in the statistical hypotheses which they accept or reject without being able to have recourse to common standards of scientific acceptability. I can only point out here that it is a long and complicated road from Braithwaite's theory to contesting the position I have adopted regarding the independence of facts and values. In the course of developing their strategies, people would, on Braithwaite's theory, have to consider not only the gains that they could expect from believing that a hypothesis was true when it was true, but also the losses that they would suffer from believing that it was true when it was false. Thus it is not a simple matter of believing something just because one very much wants it to be true. Furthermore, Braithwaite's theory is not the only one in the field; and whether it can be accepted will depend, I would say, on whether it can be reconciled with the position which I have defended in the text above. This is a problem which has hardly been ventilated, much less explored.

[5] Kant's categorical imperative belongs here, too, in spite of his protestations that attending to consequences was "heteronomous" and unworthy. See the fine article by Marcus G. Singer, "The Categorical Imperative," *Philosophical Review*, Vol. 63 (October, 1954), pp. 577–591.

[6] New York (1958). See "Creeping Inflation Resulting from Wage Increases in Excess of Productivity," pp. 137–146.

self-restraint on the part of labor unions as the leading practical possibility of coping with the problem, supplemented as a last resort by controls on wages. "In the long run labor itself must lose if inflation, depression, or unwanted regimentation is forced on the economy by a policy of pushing up wages faster than general productivity rises."[7]

Now the thing that is wrong both with Haberler's recommendation and (what is more important for our present purposes) with his associated picture of the political and economic scene is that he has failed to consider any fundamental questions about the present distribution of income and property. I do not suggest that labor union leaders are all zealously propagandizing for a change in that distribution. But I ask, is it realistic to expect them to practice self-restraint if they (and their followers) do not feel bound to *respect* the present pattern of distribution in its entirety? The rule of keeping pace with increases in productivity is relevant only if we assume that the present pattern of distribution is satisfactory on all sides. Now, Haberler may believe for his part that it is, or at least is one that deserves approval, and thinking about it in this connection need not change his mind; but thinking about it would have led him to a more accurate picture of the factors involved in inflation.

I turn now to elaborating the claim that political description is improved by attending to moral considerations. There is a complex of ideas, among which "function," "efficiency" and "success" are the most important, that are ubiquitous in the literature of political science. These ideas have important prescriptive features, which I shall exhibit in detail. I shall argue that political science would be impoverished if these prescriptive elements were expelled from it; and I shall try to show that, both in method and content, these elements can be treated with as much rigor and consistency as any other ideas.

II

During the last world war but one, there used to be a plaque hung up in the waiting room of the dental clinic at Camp Crowder, Missouri. The plaque announced that "The mission of the Army Dental Corps is to enable every soldier to chew the Army ration." (Perhaps the plaque is there still: I have not gone back to see.)

The word "mission," I take it, is the concept of "function" in military duty, meaning, as "function" primarily does, the task that is set for a man or a group to perform, a task set by the orders of those in authority; or perhaps by the performers themselves, in an attempt to formulate the needs and wishes of those under whose orders the task is to be carried out. (The Army Dental Corps may have had some doubts, I don't know why, about just what its contribution to the war effort was supposed to be.)

It is hardly necessary to argue that the word "function" is much used in political science; it is as familiar, and perhaps more prominent, than its running-mate and substitute, the word "role." My claim that the concepts of "efficiency" and "success" are also prominent may seem more doubtful; the words perhaps are not. But here we encounter, especially in the case of "success," whole families of evasive synonyms. I cite "efficient" and its cousin-concepts, "practical," "workable," "viable," "adequate," "responsive," "flexible," as a bridge to citing "success." To be efficient is to perform a function successfully (counting in "economy" as one of the standards of success).

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[7] *Loc. cit.*, p. 146.

There is more to "success" than "efficiency," however. To call an institution or a policy "successful," without qualification, is to imply a moral judgment; and since political scientists are (at least sporadically) shy about making moral judgments, they steer away from the word "success" and talk evasively about "equilibrium," "balance," "stability," "adjustment," "staying within safe limits," "accommodation," "integration," and the "health" and "strength" of "the system."

The use of "function" ranges over this whole complex of concepts. In a passage designed to champion "the function of the politician," Pendleton Herring identifies it with "the function of adjustment," which we know without further comment is something pretty worthwhile; Herring goes on to call it a "vital element in the politics of democracy."[8] Schattschneider declares, "Government by pressure groups is impossible. The function of planning, of integration, and over-all management of public affairs for the protection of the great interests of the nation can be handled only by a strong national party leadership supported by a well mobilized majority."[9] To perform this function would indeed be to make a success of government.

Are there not, however, ways of using the concept of "function" that do not implicate us in the moral considerations which surround the notion of success? We speak (by extension) of "function" where the task has not been set by people, or even set for intelligent beings; and whatever philosophical difficulties there may be about such a statement as "The function of the heart is to pump blood through the body," it does seem that this can be asserted without moral implications. (The heart in question may be that of a saint; or, a crocodile's.) Analogously, it seems, we might consider that human groups have various tasks set for them by the environment, and seek to identify the social institutions whose function it is to accomplish these tasks; and we can do this without making even so elementary a moral judgment as that is a good thing for human groups to survive.

This is the "structure-functional" approach, much discussed by sociologists.[10] It promises, and may give, light simultaneously on the variety of functions performed and on the structure of the institutions that perform them; and, ultimately, it may bring into view an exact and detailed conception of what points of comparison between different societies are most significant for a general theory of social systems.

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[8] *The Politics of Democracy* (1940), p. 158.

[9] E. E. Schattschneider, *Party Government* (1942), p. 208.

[10] See R. K. Merton, *Social Theory and Social Structure* (1949); and Marion Levy, *The Structure of Society* (1952); also various works of Talcott Parsons. Dorothy Emmet, in her recent book, *Function, Purpose and Powers* (1958), gives a good extended discussion of the matters that I treat in this section; social scientists would find it, I think, both interesting and sensible.

The advantages and disadvantages of the structure-functional approach have by now been pretty fully disclosed.[11] It has been generally recognized that to say a certain function, *F*, is performed by an institution, *I*, is not to say that the given society could not exist unless *I* existed. Even if we grant that the society could not continue without *F* being performed somehow, it is clear that all sorts of other devices might be found, besides *I*, to perform it: the state police, instead of posses of deputies. Once this is clear, attempts to assimilate functional identifications to causal explanations, in which the existence of one phenomenon can be inferred from the description of other phenomena, together with the statement of the relevant natural laws, are deprived of any color of plausibility. The causal connection between the society surviving and *F* being performed does not explain why *I* should exist, rather than some alternative device.

Even in the case of biological functions, it is an error to equate statements of the form, "The function of (say, this organ) *O* is *F*," with statements about necessary conditions of the form, "(The presence and activity of) *O* is a necessary condition of *F*."[12] There might be another organ in the body, besides the heart, which also had the function of circulating blood, or which could take over the function if the heart failed. As it happens, this is not true; but it is not logically excluded by saying that the function of the heart is to pump blood through the body. It also happens that the body cannot dispense with the circulation of blood. But other functions can be dispensed with (*e.g.*, vision) or assumed by different organs (*e.g.*, voice-production, when the larynx has been removed). All that is involved in saying that "The function of *O* is *F*," is, I think, (a) that *O* normally does *F* and (b) that either nothing else normally does *F* or nothing else does *F* in such a way as to make the contribution of *O* superfluous.[13] To go on to speak of necessary and sufficient conditions is to formulate further information (and to make further assumptions specifying the case described).

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[11] See Merton, *op. cit.*; and Levy, *op. cit.* I am also drawing upon a lecture on "Functional Analysis in Social Science," given at Yale, May 9, 1958, by Carl G. Hempel. During the discussion following that lecture Professor Omar K. Moore maintained that the functional approach had been useful earlier, for example in the days of Malinowski's field work in anthropology; but that it was not helpful today, since the so-called "functionalists" are not trying to do anything so ambitious as formulate the concept of a social system from the ground up, and are, in fact, obstructing the growth of stricter theories and explanations. If the functional approach is something of an anachronism in sociology, however, it may not be so in political science; and a number of points will emerge in this and the subsequent sections of this paper that could be interpreted as reasons for thinking it is not an anachronism.

[12] Among the philosophers chargeable with this error are L. Jonathan Cohen, in "Teleological Explanation," *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, 1950–51, pp. 255–293 (cited by Miss Emmet, *op. cit.* p. 48); and Ernest Nagel, in "Teleological Explanation and Teleological Systems," reprinted in Herbert Feigl and May Brodbeck, *Readings in the Philosophy of Science* (1953), pp. 537–558. In the passage which I have in mind from the latter article, p. 541, Nagel allows, as a secondary possibility, "*O* is a necessary and sufficient condition of *F*"; this allowance does not go far enough, or even depart in the right direction.

Though identifying functions may therefore not reach so far as stating full-fledged causal laws (which involve the notions of necessary and sufficient conditions), it is nevertheless a useful step toward doing the latter, and at least approximately locates the causal relationships that need to be studied. There may even be psychological advantages in postponing direct attempts at causal laws and in trying instead for functional descriptions as a first step—in asking, given an institution, "What does this contribute to the persistence of the whole system?", "What would be left undone if this were discarded?", or "If this entirely succeeded in doing what it now does in part, what other activities would it help or hinder?"; or, knowing that in one society there is a specialized institution for doing *F*, in asking what institutions there were for doing it in this other one. Some of these questions are not, of course, peculiar to the structure-functional approach; but the series of questions, taken as a whole does suggest a natural and inviting way of going about the business of investigating society, a way which is bound to be profitable if it is pursued strenuously, and which is furthermore very familiar.

It is the approach which Herring, for example, seems to have taken when he was led to the view that national party conventions—those irrational and overexuberant gatherings—were of some use after all, since they dramatize the choice of candidates for an electorate that would otherwise be largely uninterested, and at the same time help generate unity and enthusiasm among the party workers.[14] This information is absent from Schattschneider's brief treatment of the topic,[15] and it may be taken, I think, as an instance of the profit to be gained from seeking to discover unexpected functions even for institutions that at first sight seem nearly useless.

Political science deals, in the case of modern constitutional states, with institutions that have planned functions; and it can therefore in many instances use "function" descriptively in another way, besides the way taken in the structure-functional approach. The paradigm for this further descriptive use is, in fact, a more suitable illustration of the general concept of function than the biological examples which have interested sociologists. For we may take as the paradigm in this case such a statement as, "The function of the carburetor is to mix air and gasoline." There is no mystery about teleology here; we are frankly talking about a device which is the product of human planning (and that is why it is a more suitable paradigm). It may not be our plan, or even one that we endorse; we merely describe its results. Similarly, it is an easy and straightforward matter to specify the functions of such organs of government as the police force, the forest service, the customs bureau, and (I think) the Army Dental Corps. Their functions are the reasons, which everyone understands, why they were invented and why they are kept in being.

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[13] So for the general case, when "function" is used descriptively. In some particular cases (not biological ones), it is also implied (c) that human beings have planned that *O* should do *F*. On the other hand, when "function" is used prescriptively, (a) may drop out, as we shall see below.

[14] Herring, *op. cit.*, ch. 16.

[15] Schattschneider, *op. cit.*, pp. 157–158.

Yet, though this usage is authentically descriptive, and peculiarly appropriate in political descriptions, it is usage that puts political scientists in the way of temptations that do not visit biologists or sociologists so insistently; for it is usage that transforms quickly, and often without due notice, from description into prescription. It may not be impossible for political scientists to use "function" in a strictly descriptive sense only; but it is very unlikely that they will do so; and therefore it is very unlikely, on these gounds alone, that they can avoid entangling themselves in the moral considerations which surround the notion of success.

There are many political institutions for which either no generally accepted plans exist, or for which the plans, though accepted by those with the authority to fulfill them, and by society generally, are too vague to specify the actual activity of the institutions. When political scientists use the language of function to describe these institutions—among which are the most important of all, parties, interest groups, the courts, the legislature, the executive—they vacillate between descriptive uses of "function" and uses in which endorsement and prescription are implied. In certain contexts to insist that the function of the independent regulatory agencies is to protect consumers is at the same time to *endorse* the purpose for which the agencies were allegedly set up and to *condemn* the practice of staffing them with people more easily influenced by the industries they are supposed to regulate than by consumers' interests.

The use of "function" is often even more frankly prescriptive. Consider the statement, which V. O. Key attributes to "our political lore," but also concurs in, that "the function of the party system (is) to create circumstances under which the electorate can act," specifically by providing the electorate with a genuine choice "at times of crisis" between candidates different in "policy orientation."[16] Key is not saying, "The party system can normally be counted upon to do this." It is clear from the context, and the rest of the book, that he is rather saying, "The party system sometimes does present the electorate with genuine choices at times of crisis; ideally, it always should: let's try to arrange that it always does." He is not merely describing a plan: he is offering one.

III

The prescriptions conveyed in talk about "functions" do not come one by one, entirely independently. They are generally connected with one another, in what might be called normative *models*, which may be more or less elaborately developed in the case of different writers, and may also vary in explicitness. In such models, ideal functions will be designated for a number of actual or possible institutions, in a way coordinated by some more or less coherent set of value judgments. The models have the effect on associated descriptions of politics of encouraging stress upon the points at which observed phenomena depart from the prescribed standards: in other words, upon the ways in which the described institutions fall short of successfully performing what would ideally be their functions. This is the effect deliberately sought by Robert Dahl, whose description of the American political system in *A Preface to Demoractic Theory* is oriented by the carefully stated model of "polyarchal" democracy which he develops; and this is the way in which Schattschneider, in *Party Government*, works back and forth from his ideal of a system in which parties would be both disciplined and responsible to a description of parties as they are.

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[16] *American State Politics*, 1956, p. 12.

Making prescriptions of this sort involves raising major issues of policy and accepting liability to moral criticism. The policy of imposing a given function upon a certain institution will be successful or something less than successful. To call it a "success," without qualification, implies endorsing the policy and, if moral considerations are relevant, endorsing it morally. I say, "without qualification," because there are ways of evading the moral implications. One explains, "When I said that the policy of redistributing income was a success, I did not mean that I favored it; all I meant was that the people who got it adopted succeeded in doing what they intended to do." This refuge is not open for people who are not talking about other people's intentions or desires, but expressing their own: and this is what writers who use "function" prescriptively are doing. They must expect to meet moral objections to the functions and designations that they champion, and expect to have the prospects of successful performance surveyed from a moral point of view.

"Function" and "success" have thus led us into the midst of moral controversy, and here many of the hard-headed and positive-minded, afraid for their honor as scientists and determined to save their procedures from further defilement, will perhaps be eager to have done. They will say, let us purge our descriptions. Let us retain the facts about function that can be stated without using the concept, and see how many of them we can promote to the status of causal laws. But let us banish the prescriptive elements in disgrace; and let us never hear a word about "functions" again, unless the usage is guaranteed to be descriptive.

I shall argue later that this is neither a practical nor a reasonable program for political science; and that if it were practical, it would still not be reasonable; though I shall not contest the utility of recognizing the descriptive and prescriptive aspects of "function" for what they are, or the necessity of keeping an alert watch against mixing them up. But first I want to show, schematically, just what moral considerations are involved in the notion of success. We shall see that they can be dealt with non-committally; we shall also see that there is sufficient agreement on what *topics* are relevant for us to be able to use a schematic notion of success as a standard guide for collecting the information needed to assess the performance of functions, whether or not we wish to prescribe anything ourselves about such functions.

Such a schematic notion may be constructed by anticipating the topics which moral criticism would cite against attempts to identify success with something as primitive as mere survival, or survival without domestic violence. Governments can survive, and even survive in domestic peace, without meeting the present needs of the population or providing for future needs; and no one, I should think, would want to call a government an unqualified success under whose auspices half the population was starving. It would not be the least bit more plausible to call a government successful which (though it has muddled through thus far) is now pursuing policies that will bring ruin, through war or economic disaster, upon the population which it claims to serve. Finally, I think that a government would be generally thought to be something less than successful if it was forfeiting opportunities to bring about improvements in the life and welfare of the population, even if its people were already living under tolerable conditions.

Anticipating these topics, we must allow in our schematic notion of success for at least three chief considerations, which I shall denominate (I) justice, (II) security, and (III) progress.[17] Under each of these chief heads there will be at least three sub-heads to consider, and in each case, these three may be denominated (A) inherited rights, (B) consequences, and (C) procedures. I think that so far as this scheme goes, it is reasonably comprehensive: that is to say, it anticipates all the major lines along which objections to calling political institutions or policies successful would be brought up. If it is not comprehensive, however, that does not greatly affect my present point, which is to illustrate how an adequate schema of success may be arrived at. We could stipulate anything we liked, and may find it useful to stipulate some features of the schema; but it would hardly be sensible to rely on stipulations entirely. We do not stipulate the ways in which people are interested in the success of political institutions, and the farther we depart from ordinary language conceptions of success, the less likely will it be that our schematic notion actually accommodates common moral concerns. So it is sensible to construct the notion by marshalling the various grounds on which people build up cases in ordinary language for defending or attacking claims of success. To claim that a political institution is an unqualified success is to claim that there is information to refute all adverse cases of this kind, so far as they are relevant.

The heads and sub-heads of our scheme need brief comments. By the heading "justice," I mean to indicate the consideration of how goods (in the very broadest sense, including leisure and honors) are now distributed in society[18] a consideration to which (A) information about inherited rights is relevant—

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[17] These may be compared with, and taken to summarize, the purposes avowed in the formation of the Consitution of the United States, as set forth in the Preamble.

[18] This does not, of course, exhaust the ordinary meaning of "justice," a concept that would in fact be invoked in discussing rights and procedures under each of the three chief heads. Nevertheless, "justice" seems to be the most appropriate term for what I have in mind for the first chief head: the pattern of present sharing, considered as a moral topic.

that is to say, in this case, information about rights to income that are already enjoyed by members of the society and that have been accepted as results of past history; and also (B) information about the consequences of preserving or modifying these rights in the future, which will be based partly on information about the consequences of upholding them in the past; as well as (C) attention to the procedures by which any policy is adopted or to be applied regarding these rights and consequences.

For example, people would disagree about the success of a government which had managed to stave off revolution only by severely curtailing traditional property rights in order to distribute land and goods to the poor, and did so by "packing" the courts, which would otherwise have voided the program. Some would say that the government had been a success, because the deprivations of the proletariat outweighed the claims of property, and that the procedures used were justifiable, because the courts as well as the other parts of government should be controlled by majority opinion. Others would say that a government which had so seriously undermined the rights of private property and so flagrantly disregarded the necessity of safeguarding an independent and disinterested judiciary was very far indeed from being a success. The schematic notion of success will not settle this dispute; my point is that it shows what information is relevant to arguments on either side. On both sides, people would be talking about the same topics; and these are the topics that they would be talking about.

The word "security" appears in the second chief heading, rather than the simpler and lovelier word "peace," because a critique of political success would have, in the case of countries dependent on foreign trade, to take up the possibility of ruin in foreign trade as well as such topics as the risks of war involved in present policies, and the use of opportunities to promote peace. In this case, we may imagine that the sub-heading, "rights," would be filled out in part by considering treaty obligations inherited from the past.

The third chief head, "progress," indicates the relevance of considering how far present policies seize or forfeit opportunities to improve the condition of society, whether by increasing the output of goods, or by other means. Whether such opportunities will seem desirable depends, again, on whether the policies for seizing them invade rights, or have adverse consequences of other kinds outweighing the expected benefits, and on whether the policies can be brought to adoption without departing from fair procedures.

Now, in spite of all the confusion about moral terms, and in spite of the many other sources of moral disagreement, I would claim that very general agreement is to be expected on the proposition that the schematic notion of success just illustrated is more adequate and begs fewer questions in political connections than primitive notions about survival or survival with domestic peace.

This does not mean that I underestimate the possibilities of moral controversy in politics. The agreement that I am claiming is not a very ambitious one. It does not, for one thing, imply agreement about the foundations of ethics: people who have a natural law theory about those foundations, with or without theological ramifications; people whose theories about foundations are naturalistic, metaphysical, intuitionist, or non-cognitive; and people who have no theory at all about the justification of moral principles, can all agree that to consider fully the success of political institutions and policies involves considering the topics laid out in the schematic notion. One could even subscribe to a theory that since moral judgments state nothing, but merely express emotions, therefore there was never any reason, outside of his personal inclination to do so, why a man should accept one moral judgment rather than another; one would thereby impeach his own moral judgments, and deprive all those whom he persuaded to adopt his theory of any means of discrediting the most outrageous judgments conceivable.[19] One could still agree that the topics laid out in the schematic notion of success were those that people thought it important to consider.

On the other hand, the schematic notion is designed to abstract from agreements and disagreements about the success of any particular institutions or policies. Approaching the topics of the schema with one set of moral principles, people may condemn a government as unjust, reckless, and improvident; other people, invoking another set of moral principles, may find it none of these things, and count it a success. They would both be using the same schema. I have not specified that they must consider the survival of any institution, even their own sovereign government, essential; I have not even tried to indicate how the various topics laid out in the schema should be weighted. Finally, I am not claiming that the schematic notion illustrated is an entirely *satisfactory* representation of the meaning of "success." I am just claiming that there would be general agreement among thinking people that it is more adequate than the primitive notions mentioned.

If the agreement is so limited, however, what shall we have accomplished in getting it? I think several things. Limited as the agreement may be, it gives grounds for believing that the field of ethical discourse is not quite so wildly confused as sophisticated people tend to think—that it is even to some degree

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[19] The theory mentioned is what many people have in mind when they speak of the "emotive" theory of ethics, attributing it to A. J. Ayer, *Language, Truth, and Logic* (1936; 2d ed., 1946), and C. L. Stevenson, *Ethics and Language* (1945). It is not their theory, however; nor do I know of anyone who champions it. Both Ayer and Stevenson recognize that most of the judgments seriously considered in ethical discourse state facts as well as express emotions or commands; and they neither deny that there are reasons generally held to have precedence over personal inclinations as grounds for accepting or rejecting moral judgments, nor do they commit the absurdity of making such a denial as an incident of making moral judgments of their own. It is true that both of them grossly underrate the importance of these other reasons, and of such moves in ordinary ethical discourse as to discredit a moral judgment by showing that it does not conform to the received necessary conditions for valid moral judgments (such as consistency and disinterestedness), and *merely* expresses a personal emotion. Nor is their theory adequate to explaining our attachment to such criteria. For a more adequate explanation, see Stephen Toulmin, *The Place of Reason in Ethics* (1950).

"structured."[20] In the second place, the schematic notion shows what I meant when I spoke earlier of "systematic attention" to the moral considerations involved in the notion of success; and it shows how this systematic attention can be given without pronouncing moral judgments, if one wishes to refrain. For, in the course of describing a given political institution, a man may attempt to state the facts that fall under the schematic headings, and note their relevance to judging whether or not the institution is a success; and where he has no information to give on one of the schematic topics, he may give notice of the omission.

This does not involve him in making moral judgments of his own. It only requires him to provide certain points of information which his listeners are likely to find valuable, though in doing so, of course, he may have the effect of encouraging or discouraging *them* from making specific moral judgments about the institution described. Hence it is especially important that he should caution them about the topics which he has not canvassed, and thus forestall their making judgments prematurely.

If he himself wishes to arrive at a judgment of success, then he will want to give all the topics in the schema extended consideration. He will be impelled to increase his information in each of these directions, and to define a moral position regarding the facts that he has marshalled. Furthermore, he will want to consider alternative ways of performing the functions he discovers for the institution which he is evaluating, for it would substantially qualify his judgment that the present institution is a success if he knew there were practical alternative devices which were likely to be even more successful. Thus he will be led to consider prescriptive suggestions about functions and normative models.

Again, he might consider them non-committally; whether he does so or not, the schematic notion of success is the relevant guide for marshalling information. All the principles that might be relevantly invoked under the headings of justice, security, and progress to assess the success of a going political system would also be relevant to criticizing the success of a normative model, the only difference being that in the one case a going thing is being judged, and in the other, a plan that may not yet be fully in effect.

We might imagine there would be as many normative models as there are political scientists who care to go in for that sort of thing. (Or more: one or more for every member of society; and, perhaps, in addition, some that are championed by groups without being identical with those offered by any of the members of the groups.) But to insist on such differences is just another way of exaggerating the prevalence of ethical disagreement. It is improbable, on sociological grounds, that the normative models offered by different participants in one political system will be wholly disparate; and even more improbable that there will be so great a variation in the models offered by the only set of people who in fact are likely to propose models, professional students of politics who have had the same sort of training and who are in constant intercourse with one another, that more than a handful of substantially different models would have to be distinguished.

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[20] It is easy to exaggerate the extent of disagreements relating to ethics. If one starts with certain questions—questions about foundations, for example, or hard cases in which received principles notoriously conflict—a disturbing picture of hopeless confusion emerges very promptly. Things are bad; but not so bad as that. The trick, both in theorizing about ethics and in doing it, is to raise questions in the order that will maximize agreement, and (I would guess) no philosopher has yet brought the trick off completely. I think David Hume came nearest.

When Key introduces his remarks on the functions of the party system by referring to "our political lore," he is making a significant allusion to the way in which normative models characteristically originate. They are not invented suddenly out of nothing; they represent instead attempts to express what are acknowledged to be traditional conceptions, modifying them in part, no doubt, but still resting on a core of received values. If this is so, it is not surprising that we should find an identity between the framework for criticizing normative models and the schematic notion of success, which has been derived from the same tradition.

IV

Many political scientists will still, perhaps, prefer to have as little as possible to do with normative models, or with the prescriptive features of the complex of ideas associated with "function," "efficiency," and "success"; and it may be said that political scientists generally confront a choice between two possible programs: first, the program, already mentioned, of inhibiting themselves from any prescriptive uses of "function," and from any attempt to judge themselves the success of political institutions; and second, a program that would tolerate prescriptions regarding function, asking only that ultimately a clear distinction be drawn between ideals and facts. The second program does entail risks of confusion which the first does not; and the confusion, between value judgments and descriptive propositions, will have to be cleared up in detail as a preliminary to constructing exact descriptive theories. Nevertheless, I wish to argue that the second program is a reasonable and practical one; and that the first is not.

Even if political scientists wanted to dispense with the notions of "function" and "success," their audiences would force the ideas upon them. For the success which various political institutions enjoy in performing the functions that may be attributed to them is a matter of primary interest to non-professional students of politics, and to the political agents whom the scientists may seek to inform and advise. There will be a demand that advice, however disinterested, be couched in the language of "function" and "success." Furthermore, political scientists are themselves political agents, with hopes and fears about politics; and as agents, they will be under a constant temptation to use this convenient and persuasive language prescriptively.

These factors are reinforced by the circumstance that a large part of political activity consists in challenging the success of present institutions and in prescribing new functions, or in defending old prescriptions and championing the institutions affected by them. Indeed, one general way of describing what politics is, at least in a democracy, is to describe it as the process by which the population prescribes the functions that the organs of government are to perform. It will be a rare man who describes this process without taking some part in it, especially when he *is* a concerned participant in other roles; and he is unlikely to have many imitators. I therefore conclude that the program of prescriptive self-denial is not practical.

But it is not reasonable, either, because it denies us information, as well as indulgence in ethics. Even if political science had (as it does not as yet) a systematic theoretical framework, with a place for proving every true causal law as a theorem of the system, not all of those places would be filled.[21] Now suppose someone proposes that a certain institution have a given function. We *may* be able to read off the effects of conferring that function upon it from theorems already known; but there is no guarantee that we shall be able to do so. In very many cases, such prescriptions suggest causal antecedents that have not yet been tried out; and in these cases, we enlarge the system in the course of considering the proposed functions. In the present state of political science, the superabundance of causal hypotheses not yet formulated or investigated must be even more impressive; and hence the likelihood of obtaining new information from trying out the causal propositions implied by novel prescriptions, even more appreciable.

It is, furthermore, the very information that we are most interested in as supporters of political science. The chief thing that we want our observations of politics to do for us is to furnish us with guidance in our political activities. The new information which prescriptions provoke us to obtain enlarges our knowledge of *unrealized political possibilities*, and hence extends the scope of political choice in directions some of which may be more attractive than any we have known of or taken before. The importance of the schematic notion of success can now be made plain. We want to know not merely about possibilities—about novel functions and new normative models; we want to know about the possibilities of success, and so not only will the investigation of these possibilities be prompted by moral considerations (namely, those from which prescriptions about functions and policies spring): we would not allow that the investigation was complete until it had given as much illumination as we could get on the moral topics laid out in the schematic notion of success.

There is, finally, yet another way in which political scientists help increase information by allowing themselves to make prescriptions. Recommendations like Key's and Schattschneider's regarding the party system indicate to the public that there are informed students of politics to whom just these recommended possibilities seem of crucial importance. Recommendations are not statements of fact; but it is a fact that these things are recommended, and by just these people. In a world in which we must rely on experts, information about the recommendations of political scientists is bound to count for something in the political picture. In this case, political scientists add to the picture of facts by creating new ones.

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[21] It could not, I think, be proved that all the logically distinct theorems that could be derived from the given axioms had in fact been derived and written down. Even a very simple logical system allows us to state infinitely many well-formed formulas, and which of these could be interpreted as causal laws could not be determined in advance. We would have to formulate them one by one and see.

I conclude, therefore, that it is reasonable for political scientists to go on making prescriptions of function and evaluations of success. That does not mean that all political scientists must do this as an incident of all their work. Some may never do it; others may go no farther than a non-committal use of the schematic notion of success; and those who do go farther must expect a distinction to be drawn between the descriptive and prescriptive elements of their studies.

The distinction does not disgrace the prescriptive elements, or leave us with nothing more to do about them. There are even useful ways of making systems out of them, as precise and specific as any system that we construct out of the descriptive elements from which for some purposes we wish to separate them. I shall try, in closing, to say a few words about recent developments in *deontic logic*, which is symbolic logic especially designed to embody normative concepts; in doing so, I shall be relying upon the work of my colleague Alan R. Anderson.[22]

A deontic logic is in the first place an instrument for studying the logical relationships between deontic notions, such as "permitted," "forbidden," and "obligatory." There are certain analogies between these notions and the notions of possibility and necessity, and one way of constructing a deontic logic is to exploit these analogies, first expanding the usual stock of logical operators (signs of negation, implication, etc.) to include an operator for possibility; then the notions of necessity and impossibility can be defined by this expanded stock, and the notions of permission, prohibition, and obligation by the expanded stock, taken together with a proposition describing the sanction or sanctions with which violations of the norms are penalized. With suitable definitions and axioms, one can go on to prove theorems that can be understood as showing the form of rigorously valid moral arguments.

For example, one of the theorems of Anderson's system of OM is $C(KOCpqNMq)(Fp)$.[23] Here C is the logical operator for implication; K signifies conjunction, N negation, and M possibility. O and F are deontic operators signifying obligation and prohibition respectively; and p and q are propositional variables, for which specific descriptions of actions or states of affairs may be substituted. The theorem may be rendered in English as meaning, "If it is obligatory that we should do q if we do p, and it is impossible to do q, then it is forbidden to do p"—that is to say, sanctions of some sort will be imposed if p is done.[24]

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[22] Especially upon his monograph, *The Formal Analysis of Normative Systems* (1956, Yale Interaction Laboratory). See also A. R. Anderson and O. K. Moore, "The Formal Analysis of Normative Concepts," *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 22 (February 1957), pp. 9–17.

[23] This expression is given, following Anderson, in the so-called Polish notation. It could be rendered (again adding operators to the basic stock) equally well in the more familiar, but typographically more demanding, notation of *Principia Mathematica*.

Such theorems are representative of a deontic logic in the "molecular" stage, in which a propositional calculus is provided as the basic framework for the logic as a whole. Work is in progress toward a theory of quantification, incorporating operators for "all" and "some," which will permit "atomic" analysis of normative systems, allowing one to distinguish, for example, between obligations imposed on every member of society and obligations imposed only on the members of specified groups, or on members holding specified offices. Anderson expects, for use at this stage, to adopt a certain concept of "responsibility" as primary. Possibly the concept of "function" could be used instead;[25] in any case, it will be possible to express prescriptions about political function.

There may be disagreement about whether a given system of deontic logic has actually succeeded in explicating the deontic notions which it incorporates. For example, another theorem of *OM* is $C(KOpOCKpqr)(OCqr)$, which Professor von Wright, who demonstrated it in an earlier system, would render in English as, "If doing two things, the first of which we ought to do, commits us to do a third thing, then doing the second thing alone commits us to do the third thing." In English, at any rate, this is a hard saying, and it may provoke criticism of the translation; or, as well, of the axioms and definitions from which the theorem is derived. Revision of these axioms and definitions would produce alternative systems of deontic logic, some of which might possibly express the basic normative concepts of a given language or a given social group more aptly than OM.

The main normative differences between political scientists, I suspect, are of a less subtle kind, which does not so much affect the system of deontic logic used, as the use to which any given system would be put. In making prescriptions about function, we may conceive of political scientists as differing, first, in regard to the sanctions they wish employed; and, second, in respect to the particular actions and states of affairs they wish to see permitted, forbidden, or made obligatory. The axiomatic systems produced by formulating these differences exactly will represent the different normative models with which the scientists are working, though in many cases, the models will not in fact have been developed at all systematically; and in some cases, there will be inconsistencies in a single man's thinking that will suggest he is trying to work simultaneously with more than one model. The relation of any such axiomatized model to the system of deontic logic in terms of which it has been formulated may be regarded as that of a separate system all of whose deductions are validated by theorems of deontic logic; in other words, the system of deontic logic certifies that the arguments of the axiomatized model are correct—but not that their content is true.

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[24] Anderson's illustration is that we should not borrow money when it is impossible for us to repay it.

[25] By coincidence, a quantified logical calculus is called a "functional calculus"; this usage springs from the mathematical concept of function, not the social and political one.

If we agree to use a system of deontic logic to axiomatize normative models, we give ourselves a head start toward identifying exactly the normative differences between different schools of political theory; for we clear up at the beginning any possibilities of confusion about the logical relations of the deontic notions. This seems, in fact, to be taking up questions in an order likely to show the full extent of existing agreements about ethics, before it begins showing disagreements. It may appear further that most of the differences between the normative models actually influencing American political science are trivial. But whether they are so or not, there is no way of seeing for sure what they are, together with their logical ramifications, short of constructing an exact systematic representation of each normative model.

This means a great deal of work. The labor involved, in fact, would be enormous; it could be accomplished only by subdividing it, and coordinating the efforts of a great number of workers. And this presents a political problem, to which, as a visitor from another discipline, I invite your scientific attention. The results to be expected if such work is done are of the highest value; yet there is a problem of organizing a coordinated effort without interfering with the freedom of scholars and scientists to choose their own tasks. This freedom extends, unfortunately, to being able to choose doing again some tried subjects from the received repertory. If political scientists can find an attractive way out of this dilemma, they will, I expect, have performed a very useful function for themselves; and they will have done a service for the world of learning which I know, would be of special benefit to philosophers, too.

THE STUDY OF JUDICIAL DECISION-MAKING AS AN ASPECT OF POLITICAL BEHAVIOR*

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In a recent essay, Richard Snyder has stated that: "[A] paradox in political science is the lack . . . of any systematic attention to the analysis of the decision-making behavior of judges."[1] It is not my purpose to argue either for or against the particular frame of reference for decision-making analysis advocated by Snyder. I do believe, however, that he has correctly identified the approach—the analysis of judicial decision-making as an aspect of political behavior—which is most likely to command the focus of interest and activity of the coming generation of political scientists whose substantive concern is with the study of political problems in the area of our discipline traditionally known as public law.

The concept "political behavior" remains sufficiently novel within the public law fraternity to impose something of an obligation to make clear what I have in mind in using the term. I shall borrow from David B. Truman who, in a Brookings Lecture not long ago, defined the "behavioral sciences" as "those bodies of knowledge, in whatever academic department they may be found, that provide or aspire to provide 'verified principles' of human behavior through the use of methods of inquiry similar to those of the natural sciences."[2] Truman noted that the research techniques that have characterized developments in the behavioral sciences during the period since 1930 include: (1) the sample survey; (2) experimentation in group dynamics (and, in particular, sociometric analysis of interaction and influence structure in small groups); (3) communications content analysis; and (4) the theory of games.[3] I shall omit consideration of the sample survey, which is discussed, together with several examples of its application to the study of judicial behavior, in a recent paper;[4] but I shall present

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[1] Richard C. Snyder, "A Decision-Making Approach to the Study of Political Phenomena," in Roland Young (ed.), *Approaches to the Study of Politics* (Evanston: Northwestern University, 1958), p. 13. *Cf.* Foster H. Sherwood, "The Role of Public Law in Political Science," *ibid.*, p. 87: "public law [has] all but disappeared as a recognized object of study for political science." Sherwood adds, p. 89, that public law, properly conceived as a body of relevant *political data*, "is within political science, and not at its borders."

[2] David B. Truman, "The Impact on Political Science of the Revolution in the Behavioral Sciences," in *Research Frontiers in Politics and Government: Brookings Lectures, 1955* (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1955), p. 203.

[3] *Ibid.*, pp. 204–208, 214.

[4] Joseph Tanenhaus, "The Uses and Limitations of Social Science Methods in Analyzing Judicial Behavior" (presented at a panel of the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, September 7, 1956; mimeo., 22 pages plus footnotes and appendices.)

some uses of the other three, with the objective of illustrating the kinds of questions about judicial behavior that can be investigated with the aid of these tools. First, however, I wish to direct attention to a neglected aspect of judicial decision-making, the analysis of which requires no sophisticated methods of measurement but simply counting. None of the examples will be developed in more than a sketchy and somewhat fragmentary manner; I have attempted a fuller exposition elsewhere.[5]

I. THE ANALYSIS OF SUMMARY DECISION-MAKING

One area conspicuously neglected by political scientists is that of the summary decision-making processes of courts. I shall use the United States Supreme Court as an example. Perhaps one reason for our neglect of 90 percent of this Court's decisions is our distaste for quantification—except, of course, for the use of lawyer-like quantification such as citator systems—although the only feasible method for handling up to 2000 decisions a year is quantitative. Our attempt to understand "the Court's work" on the basis of the hundred or so cases in which decisions are accompanied by formal opinions is as inadequate as would be a description of icebergs relying only upon the visible portion above water. As Jack Peltason has pointed out, we do not limit our investigations of the legislative process to a perusal of the *Congressional Record.*[6]

Unfortunately, we cannot rely upon the official reports of the Court's summary decision-making. The data given in the Annual Reports of the Attorney General focus upon the successes of the Solicitor General as the principal litigant before the Court; and the Annual Reports of the Director of the Administrative Office of United States Courts do not supply the data needed to answer most of the important questions that might be asked about the political behavior of the Court. For example, we might well be curious as to how far a Court which has been so insistent that the summary decision-making of administrators,[7] the President,[8] and the Congress[9] shall comport with the rule of law, itself practices what it preaches. To be specific, the Judges' Bill of 1926 purports to make the Court's certiorari jurisidiction *discretionary,* while the limited appeals jurisdiction is supposed to be *obligatory.* For almost two decades, articles in the law reviews have been pointing out that the Court was in the process of making its appeals jurisdiction almost as discretionary, in practice, as certiorari jurisdiction, especially in the dismissal of appeals from state courts for "want of a substantial federal question." Any reader of these, noticing that the textbooks copy the statute on this point, and wanting to investigate, would soon discover that the Director reports the data on denials of certiorari, but that the analogous information about summary dismissal of appeals reposes—if anywhere—in a statistical category innocently labelled "Appeals and reviews by certiorari disposed of *on the merits*."[10] He would next discover that this category is a catch-all which includes appeals disposed of after argument as formal cases; appeals decided on the merits, both with and without argument, as per curiam cases; appeals dismissed (*i.e.*, denied review) with or (usually) without argument, by per curiam orders; and certiorari cases disposed of, both with or without argument, as formal or per curiam cases. He could not even discover the number of dismissed appeals without making an independent count directly from the case reports.

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[5] Glendon A. Schubert, *Quantitative Analysis of Judicial Behavior,* to be published shortly under the joint auspices of the Bureau of Social and Political Research, Michigan State University and the Free Press.

[6] Jack Peltason, *Federal Courts in the Political Process* (New York, 1955), pp. 1–2. *Cf.* Sherwood, *op. cit.,* p. 88.

[7] Peters v. Hobby, 349 U.S. 331 (1955); Hannegan v. Esquire, 327 U.S. 146 (1946).

[8] Cole v. Young, 351 U.S. 536 (1956); Youngstown Sheet & Tube v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).

[9] Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957); Sacher v. United States, 356 U.S. 576 (1958).

A related question has come to the attention of political scientists, no doubt due in no small meaure to Mr. Justice Frankfurter's repeated essays on the subject: whether the denial of certiorari has substantive significance. A recent law note has suggested,[11] and an analysis of four recent terms of the Court confirms that the question is broader than Frankfurter has revealed. In effect, there appears to be an equation such that the summary *denial* of certiorari (in either federal or state cases) is functionally equivalent to the summary *dismissal* of appeals from state courts which is equivalent to the summary *affirmance* on appeals from federal district counts. Moreover, there appears to be a second equation, such that *formal* reversals on appeals from federal district courts are equivalent to the *summary* reversals on appeals from state courts. I shall not attempt to prove these equations at this time, but only suggest that, if true, they relate to significant uniformities in the behavior of the Supreme Court as the administrative head of a federal system of adjudication.

II. BLOC ANALYSIS

We are all familiar with Pritchett's studies of dissenting votes and bloc affiliations on the Supreme Court. I shall not use the derisive term "box scores," which appears to be particularly popular among those political scientists whose research experience with quantitative methods begins and ends with the aphorism that "Thinkers don't count, and counters don't think." Although Pritchett's work is methodologically quite simple, he has done far more than merely to count heads. His quantitative studies have aided him in making highly perceptive and sophisticated interpretations of the voting behavior of the justices, and he has taken a long stride in the direction of a group dynamics approach to Supreme Court decision-making.

The surprising thing is that, in a profession of political "scientists," no one appears to have tried to replicate Pritchett's experiments. No one has criticized or suggested improvements in his methods,[11a] or applied them to study other

[10] Emphasis added. See, *e.g.*, the 1957 *Annual Report*.

[11] Note, *Harvard Law Review*, Vol. 69 (February, 1956), pp. 712–713.

[11a] There have been critics outside the profession; see Pritchett, *op. cit.*, fn. 13, below, pp. 189, 191, 275.

periods in the Supreme Court's history, or to study the work of other courts.

I shall confine my remarks about bloc analysis to three points. In the first place, Pritchett has used two basic kinds of tables: those which analyze paired agreement in dissent (see, *e.g.*, Figure 1); and those which present paired agreement in both assent and dissent in divided decisions, expressed as a percentage of total paired participation (Figure 2). It is also possible to construct dissent tables which focus upon marginal decisions only (Figure 3), and to construct tables of paired agreement in assent in divided decisions (Figure 4). Tables of marginal dissents reveal significant patterns of voting behavior that would otherwise be missed. During the 1953–1956 Terms, for instance, Clark cast his dissenting votes about equally with the left and with the right wings of the Court (Figure 1); but he was definitely affiliated with the left bloc of Black-Douglas-Warren in marginal dissents (Figure 3). Assent tables help, in the interpretation of dissent tables and tables of over-all interagreement, to determine the locus of decisive power within the Court. Libertarians may deride Clark, for instance, for the uninspired quality of his judicial writing—to say nothing of the content of his views—but bloc analysis of recent terms shows him to have been the most powerful justice on the Court—with the possible exception of the

	Douglas	Black	Warren	Clark	Minton	Reed	Burton	Frankfurter	Harlan
Douglas	(19)	72	37	13	11	6	11	12	4
Black	72	(2)	37	10	6	2	2	13	2
Warren	37	37		12	3	4	3	2	
Clark	13	10	12	(2)	7	13	16	4	3
Minton	11	6	3	7		30	26	9	10
Reed	6	2	4	13	30	(5)	33	10	14
Burton	11	2	3	16	26	33	(3)	28	29
Frankfurter	12	13	2	4	9	10	28	(5)	41
Harlan	4	2		3	10	14	29	41	(6)
Total dissents:	113	82	44	41	52*	62*	79	76	61*

INDEX OF COHESION

IC[Left] = .611

IC[Center] = .489

IC[Right] = .478

FIG. 1. Dissenting Blocs on the Warren Court, 1953–1956 Terms

* Minton, Reed, and Harlan each served for less than four complete terms of the Court. Jackson, Brennan, and Whittaker, each of whom served a single term or less during the period covered, have been deleted from this computation, and also from Figures 2–4 for the same reason. Numbers in parentheses denote instances in which the justice is in "paired agreement" with himself, viz., his solo dissents.

Chief Justices—in terms of participation in winning majority coalitions,[11b] and by no means a conservative in relation to his colleagues. Bloc analysis also confirms the journalistic observation[12] that Clark votes as an acolyte to the Chief Justice on the far right of the Court under Vinson[13] and slightly left of center under Warren and immediately to his right (Figures 1–4).

In the second place, bloc identification does not need to be intuitive, but can be placed upon an objective basis by the use of standard indices to denote the presence and composition of blocs. In my own experiments in the use of bloc analysis, I have developed three such indices, which I offer tentatively until someone else comes up with something better. For the analysis of dissent tables, I suggest an Index of Cohesion, which is the ratio of the mean of the included dissenting pairs, in a postulated bloc, to the mean of the total dissents (for the period of time under investigation) of the included justices. It is, in other words, a decimal fraction which results from dividing the average of the dissenting participation of the included justices into the average of agreement among the included pairs. This index assumes that a justice can affect the over-

	Douglas	Black	Warren	Clark	Minton	Reed	Burton	Frankfurter	Harlan
Douglas		80	67	50	34	30	31	34	30
Black	80		77	58	44	37	36	46	31
Warren	67	77		76	54	55	53	55	42
Clark	50	58	76		64	68	65	55	46
Minton	34	44	54	64		74	61	54	49
Reed	30	37	55	68	74		71	48	51
Burton	31	36	53	65	61	71		61	65
Frankfurter	34	46	55	55	54	48	61		80
Harlan	30	31	42	46	49	51	65	80	
% of assent:	70	78	88	89	81	80	79	80	71

INDEX OF INTERAGREEMENT

II[Left] = .747

II[Center] = .673

II[Right] = .687

II(Wa-C) = .760

FIG. 2. Interagreement in Split Decisions of the Warren Court, 1953–1956 Terms, in percentages

all cohesion of a dissenting bloc significantly only to the extent that both his rate of interagreement with other members of the bloc, and his volume of dissent, are high. On the basis of limited empirical application, I consider an Index of Cohesion of .50 or greater to be high; .40–.49 to be moderate; and less than .40 to be low. In Figure 1, for instance, the Index of Cohesion for the Left Bloc = 1/3 (146) ÷ 1/3 (239) = .611, which is quite high.

[11b] In describing Clark as "powerful," I employ the concept of "power" as defined by the Shapley-Shubik index, a probability measure of the extent to which any justice's votes were pivotal in the winning majority coalition which controlled the decisions. See below, fn. 28, *op. cit.*

[12] *Time Magazine*, Vol. LXVII, No. 26 (June 25, 1956), p. 14.

[13] C. Herman Pritchett, *Civil Liberties and the Vinson Court* (Chicago, 1954), p. 183.

For the analysis of assent tables, one might consider an Index of Adhesion, defined as the ratio of the mean of the included pairs to the total number of split decisions under investigation. This index measures the extent to which the justices combine to form a dominant majority bloc. Because of the non-participatants, the assent matrix which this index measures is not necessarily the converse of the dissent matrix for a given period. Apart from the difference in the matrices to which they apply, the Index of Adhesion differs from the Index of Cohesion in two respects: (1) the denominator of the IA is a constant for any measurement of a given matrix, while the denominator of the IC is a variable; and (2) the denominator of the IA is always much larger than the denominator of the IC, since no justice dissents all the time. (The highest level of dissent on the Supreme Court during the past decade appears to be Douglas's 51 percent during the 1952 Term.) I consider an IA of .60 or more to be high; .50 to .59 to be moderate; and less than .50 to be low. An IA of less than .50 for a pair or bloc would signify that the justices concerned had participated together in the majority in less than half of the split decisions of the Court for the period under

	Douglas	Black	Warren	Clark	Minton	Reed	Burton	Frankfurter	Harlan
Douglas		26	20	10	7	2	6	6	1
Black	26		18	10	4	2	1	4	
Warren	20	18		12	2	3	3	2	
Clark	10	10	12			7	5	2	
Minton	7	4	2			9	15	5	7
Reed	2	2	3	7	9		15	4	5
Burton	6	1	3	5	15	15		13	14
Frankfurter	6	4	2	2	5	4	13		10
Harlan	1				7	5	14	10	
Total dissents:	34	28	24	19	22*	19*	29	20	14*

INDEX OF COHESION

IC[Left] = .610

IC[Center] = .557

IC[Right] = .587

FIG. 3. Dissenting Blocs in Marginal Decisions of the Warren Court, 1953–1956 Terms

* See Figure 1.

examination. The IA for the Left Bloc in Figure 4 =1/3 (401)÷256=.522, which is moderate.

For the tables of over-all interagreement, which are expressed in percentages, the average of the ratios of the included pairs can be used as an Index of Interagreement, with .70 or better considered high, .60–.69 moderate, and less than .60 low. For the Left Bloc in Figure 2, the Index of Interagreement=1/3 (2.24)=.747, which is high.

	Douglas	Black	Warren	Clark	Frankfurter	Burton	Reed	Minton	Harlan
Douglas		122	130	109	73	67	52	46	42
Black	122		149	129	98	87	66	66	43
Warren	130	149		173	135	131	102	88	64
Clark	109	129	173		130	144	114	97	68
Frankfurter	73	98	135	130		124	83	80	79
Burton	67	87	131	144	124		107	90	70
Reed	52	66	102	114	83	107		92	36
Minton	46	66	88	97	80	90	92		23
Harlan	42	43	64	68	79	70	36	23	
Total assents:	141	163	209	204	176	176	135*	117*	93*

Total decisions=256

INDEX OF ADHESION

IA[Left]=.522

IA[Center]=.545

IA(Wa-C)=.676

FIG. 4. Participation in the Majority in Split Decisions of the Warren Court, 1953–1956 Terms

* See Figure 1.

Although bloc analysis appears to have been applied only to the United States Supreme Court, I think that fruitful applications can be made to state courts. In order to test this notion, I have made a bloc analysis of four recent terms of the Michigan Supreme Court. The 1954–1957 Terms were chosen, because it was during this interval that Governor Williams, near the end of a decade in office, finally succeeded in placing on the Court a majority of like-minded Democrats. Bloc analysis of recent periods of the United States Supreme Court shows no relationship between partisan affiliation and bloc composition and voting behavior. In recent Terms, for instance, we find Democrat Black and Republican Warren on the left wing, and "Independent" Frankfurter and Republican Harlan on the right wing. The most interesting finding from bloc analysis of the Michigan Supreme Court was the perfect correlation between political party affiliation and bloc composition and voting behavior during the 1956 and 1957 Terms, after the Williams justices accrued in sufficient numbers to begin to take over control of the court (see Figure 5).[14] This finding, in turn, raises interesting questions about the relative impact upon judicial behavior of appointment for life as compared with election for fixed terms.

III. SCALOGRAM ANALYSIS

Scalogram analysis, or cumulative scaling, offers probably the easiest research technique to use as well as the most widely applicable of those surveyed in this paper. The method for constructing scales of judicial cases can be stated in terms of fixed, objective procedures, too lengthy for development here.[15] In essence, scale analysis measures the presence of a single dominant variable in a set of additional data. Assume, *e.g.*, that several related cases decided on the merits by the Court have asked questions of the justices to which they should have responded consistently if they understood the questions to relate to a single basic issue. Scalogram analysis provides a technique for arranging both the cases and the respondent justices in uniquely determined rank orders. Moreover, it can tell us both how consistent and how intense the underlying attitudes of the respective individual justices, and of the Court as a collective group, have been.

		Smith	Black	Edwards	Voelker	Kelly	Dethmers	Carr	Sharpe
Smith	(Dem.)		9	9	7			1	1
Black	(Dem.)	9	(1)	9	8			1	1
Edwards	(Dem.)	9	9		7	1	1	1	
Voelker	(Dem.)	7	8	7					
Kelly	(Rep.)			1		(1)	8	11	10
Dethmers	(Rep.)			1		8		12	12
Carr	(Rep.)	1	1	1		11	12		23
Sharpe	*	1	1			10	12	23	
Total dissents:		8	12	10	10	12	13	25	25

INDEX OF COHESION

IC[Left] = .830

IC[Right] = .675

FIG. 5. Dissenting Blocs on the Michigan Supreme Court, 1957 Term

* Although Sharpe originally was elected to the court as a Democrat in 1933, he was not so regarded in the mid-'fifties; nor did the Williams Administration consider that Justice Sharpe served in any sense as a spokesman for its views and policies.

It happens that the fifteen "right to counsel" cases decided by the Supreme

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[14] Majority control was not actually achieved until January 1, 1958, when Governor Williams' Attorney General, Thomas Kavanaugh, replaced expatriate-Democrat Sharpe.

[15] For a detailed explanation, see *op. cit.* above, note 5, ch. 5.

Scale Scores	Respondent's Name Case:	Smith v. O'Grady, 312 U.S. 329 (1941)	White v. Ragen, 324 U.S. 760 (1945)*	Lutz v. Ragen, 324 U.S. 760 (1945)*	Hawk v. Olson, 326 U.S. 271 (1945)	DeMeerleer v. Mich., 329 U.S. 663 (1947)*	House v. Mayo, 324 U.S. 42 (1945)*	Williams v. Kaiser, 323 U.S. 471 (1945)	Tomkins v. Missouri, 323 U.S. 485 (1945)	Rice v. Olson, 324 U.S. 786 (1945)	Carter v. Illinois, 329 U.S. 173 (1946)	Foster v. Illinois, 332 U.S. 134 (1947)	Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942)	Canizio v. New York, 327 U.S. 82 (1946)	Avery v. Alabama, 308 U.S. 444 (1940)	Total votes per justice	Total inconsistencies per justice
	Scale Position:	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14		
13	Murphy	(+)	(+)	(+)	(+)	(+)	(+)	(+)	(+)	(+)	'+')	+)	+)	'+')		13	0
13	Rutledge		(+)	(+)	(+)	(+)	(+)	(+)	(+)	(+)	+)	'+')		'+')		11	0
12	Black	('+')	(+)	(+)	(+)	(+)	(+)	(+)	(+)	('+')	+)	'+')	'+')	('−')	('−')	14	0
12	Douglas	(+)	(+)	(+)	(+)	(+)	(+)	('+')	('+')	(+)	'+')	+)	+)	(−)	(−)	14	0
9	Reed	(+)	(+)	(+)	('+')	(+)	(+)	(+)	(+)	(+)	(−)	(−)	(−)	(−)	(−)	14	0
9	Stone	(+)	(+)	(+)	(+)		(+)	(+)	(+)	(+)			(−)	(−)	(−)	11	0
8	Jackson		(+)	(+)	Y	(+)	(+)	(+)	(+)	−)	(−)	(−)	(−)	Y		10	0
6	Frankfurter	(+)	(+)	(+)	(+)	(+)	(+)	'−')	'−')	'−')	('−')	('−')	(−)	(−)	(−)	14	0
5	Vinson					(+)					(−)	(−)				3	0
5	Burton				(+)	(+)					(−)	(−)		(−)		5	0
3	Roberts	(+)	+	+			−	−)	−)	−)			('−')		(−)	9	0
1	Hughes	(+)													(−)	2	0
0	McReynolds														(−)	1	0
0	Byrnes												(−)			1	0
	Division of votes: +	8	9	9	8	9	8	7	7	6	4	4	3	2	0	122	
	−	0	0	0	0	0	1	2	2	3	5	5	6	6	8		
	Number of inconsistencies per case:	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		0

* Per curiam decision.

$$CR = 1 - \frac{0}{62} = 1.000$$

FIG. 6. A Scalogram of the "Right to Counsel" Cases, 1940–1947

Court from the 1940 Term through the end of the 1947 Term[16] form that empirical rarity, a perfect scale, so I shall use it as an example (Figure 6). The cases can be arranged in an order such that, it is assumed, the cases to the left of the scale are most seriously damaging to the claimed rights and interests of the defendants, and those to the right of the scale least so. Here the question the justices are asked to answer is: "How sympathetic are you to claims of the right to counsel under the Fourteenth Amendment?" Or we can conceptualize the cases as raising a set of questions of this order: "Do you approve when a criminal defendant in a state court is denied counsel to the extent of *X?*" "Do you approve when he is denied counsel to the extent of $X+Y$?," "to the extent of $X+Y+Z$?"—and so on. In this particular example the cases ranged from several, to the left of the scale, in which the Court voted unanimously in favor of the defendants' claims, to the case at the right of the scale which found even Black and Douglas joining in a unanimous decision against the defendant. Murphy and Rutledge have the highest scale scores; neither of them ever voted against a right to counsel claim. Frankfurter voted, with perfect consistency, in favor of defendants in the first six cases along the scale, and against defendants in the remaining eight. We can readily rank, on the basis of their voting participation, all of the members of the Court during the eight-year period. But we can do more than this, we can also predict how they should have voted in the cases in which they did not participate.

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[16] This particular period was chosen because it includes the "source group" cases in the article by Fred Kort to be discussed below. See ftn. 20, *infra*.

In fact, scalogram theory postulates that, knowing the scale of cases and the scale scores of the justices, we should be able to predict all votes in all cases comprising the scale. If any justices voted inconsistently in some cases, the degree of their inconsistency can be measured by a Coefficient of Reproducibility, which is the decimal fraction resulting from the subtraction, from unity, of the number of inconsistent votes divided by the total number of votes in all cases except those decided unanimously or with a single dissenting vote.[17] It is conventional, based upon experience in analyzing other types of data, to consider a CR of .900 or better to be evidence of unidimensionality in a scale. I have followed the convention, although ultimately the question whether scales with CR's of .900 are acceptable for the analysis of Supreme Court decision-making must await considerably more experimentation than appears to have taken place to date. The CR for the right-to-counsel cases of our example was, of course, 1.000.

It may be either fool's or beginner's luck, but every hypothesis that I have tested thus far has resulted in an acceptable scale. The subject matter of these scales includes: (a) Federal Employers' Liability Act evidentiary cases since 1942; (b) aliens' claims since 1950; (c) all the split decisions of the 1936 Term—the term of the "Court-packing" controversy; (d) the right to counsel cases since 1940; and (e) the search and seizure csaes, both federal and state, since 1937. On the other hand, it is easy to state inappropriate hypotheses which lead to unacceptable scales, as the report of the experiments of a sociologist demonstrates.[18]

The matrix of the scalogram can readily include supplementary information of considerable value in the interpretation of the data. In addition to the votes of the justices, the scalogram can show who wrote, and who joined in the majority opinion; which justices concurred and/or wrote concurring opinions; and which justices dissented and/or wrote dissenting opinions.[19]

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[17] The reason for excluding unanimous and near-unanimous decisions from the denominator of the fraction is the much greater probability that there will be no inconsistent votes in such decisions than in those in which the Court is more divided. (The CR for unanimous decisions must, of course, be 1.000.) See Warren S. Torgerson, *Theory and Methods of Scaling* (New York, 1958), p. 324.

[18] Jessie Barnard, "Dimensions and Axes of Supreme Court Decisions," *Social Forces,* Vol. 34 (October, 1955), pp. 19–27.

Scalograms of judicial decisions focus attention upon the justices whose voting has been least, or most, consistent; and cases displaying inconsistent votes are pinpointed. Such clues may suggest, in the attitudes of inconsistent justices, the possible presence of a secondary variable and, as regards inconsistent cases, the additional possibility that a case has been misclassified.

I should like to offer just one more example of the kinds of hypotheses that can be tested by scalogram analysis. The Court's "official" doctrine in the right-to-counsel cases is familiar enough: that the Constitution unequivocally requires representation by counsel in state criminal trials only for capital offenses. Scalogram analysis demonstrates conclusively that the Court has been just as consistent, and just as favorable, in non-capital as in capital cases. The Court has decided $66\frac{2}{3}$ percent of the right to counsel cases involving non-capital offenses, and $62\frac{1}{2}$ percent of the capital-offense cases, in favor of defendants, and the coefficients of reproducibility for the two subscales are both very high: .962 and .972. Which among the Court's many other doctrines may be confirmed, and which may be deflated by scalogram analysis, one cannot predict on *a priori* grounds; but I am confident that cumulative scaling offers a most powerful analytic tool for the study of the Supreme Court.[20]

IV. CONTENT ANALYSIS

Content analysis can be used as the basis for more precise description of "value" as well as "fact" assertions in judicial opinions; but since no study of content analysis of judicial values has as yet been published, I shall limit my remarks to fact analysis. A short time ago, Fred Kort described in this REVIEW a method for content analysis of facts in a set of Supreme Court opinions, together with a mathematical formula for processing the derived numerical data.[21] He reported the results of an experiment in which he divided the right to counsel cases chronologically into two groups, and in which he predicted successfully how the Court would decide the later group of cases on the basis of his analysis of the earlier group. More recently an econometrician has sharply criticized the theoretical assumptions which might support such a method as Kort used, and Kort has replied.[22] My own views regarding this controversy have been developed elsewhere at greater length than can be set forth here.[22a] Irrespective of specific defects in Kort's method and notwithstanding any personal scepticism as to its utility, I think that Kort's venture represents a serious and thought-provoking attempt to apply content analysis and mathematical procedures to the study of judicial decision-making, and I do not see how we can avoid learning something from his efforts.

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[19] I have used the following symbols in Figures 6 to 8:
+ = Voted in favor of the defendant
— = Voted against the defendant
‘ ’ = Wrote opinion
( ) = Joined in the Opinion of the Court
(= Joined in concurring opinion
) = Joined in dissenting opinion
Y = Did not participate in the decision (a blank cell signifies that the justice was not a member of the Court at the time the case was decided).
[ ] Denotes an inconsistent vote
For example, the composite symbol (‘+’) means that the justice wrote the Opinion of the Court in a case decided by a majority of positive votes. Or, if a justice joined in a dissenting opinion written by another justice, in a case decided by a negative majority (*i.e.,* voting against the defendant), the appropriate combination of symbols to signify his position would be +).

[20] For two recent reports of applications of cumulative scaling to the analysis of legislative voting, see Charles D. Farris, "A Method of Determining Ideological Groupings in the Congress," *Journal of Politics,* Vol. 20 (May, 1958), pp. 308–338 and George M. Belknap, "A Method for Analyzing Legislative Behavior," *Midwest Journal of Political Science,* Vol. 2 (November, 1958), pp. 377–402.

For present purposes, I shall limit my remarks to two points. First, I have applied Kort's method to the analysis of the search and seizure cases of the past two decades. I treated those decided during the first decade as what Kort terms the "source group," and I divided the decisions since 1947 into a federal test group and a state test group. I found it possible to predict from the source group (which consisted, of course, exclusively of federal cases) to the federal test group, but not to the state test group. Now, perhaps I should confess that I lumped together cases involving statutory interpretation (wire-tapping cases) and those raising constitutional issues under the Fourth (or Fourteenth) Amendments. I did this on the assumption that if, as Kort presumes, the decisions of the justices were determined by the cumulative impact of factors harmful to defendants, I could safely disregard such doctrinal nuances as the legal aftermath of the *Olmstead* case.[23] By the same token, however, it seemed not unreasonable to assume that the "facts" should speak with equal authority for Supreme Court justices whether the defendant has been tried in a state or in a federal court. This leaves me with the question: if his method is theoretically sound, why should the prediction fail so completely for the state test group?[24] I believe that Kort would reply that my assumption *is* unreasonable, since we should anticipate consistency of decisions only in regard to the application of the same rule of law. From this point of view, my experiment confirms the Court's own contention that the requirements of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment are substantially less rigorous than the "more specific" norms supplied by the Fourth Amendment.

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[21] Fred Kort, "Predicting Supreme Court Decisions Mathematically: A Quantitative Analysis of the 'Right to Counsel' Cases," this REVIEW, Vol. 51 (March, 1957), pp. 1–12.

[22] Franklin M. Fisher, "The Mathematical Analysis of Supreme Court Decisions: The Use and Abuse of Quantitative Methods," this REVIEW, Vol. 52 (June, 1958), pp. 321–338; Fred Kort, "Reply to Fisher's *Mathematical Analysis of Supreme Court Decisions*," *ibid.*, pp. 339–348.

[22a] *Op. cit.*, fn. 5 above, ch. 5, Appendix E: "Statistical Inference and Judicial Behavior: A Comment Upon the Kort-Fisher Mélange."

[23] Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).

[24] According to the prediction, all six of the state search and seizure cases should have been decided in favor of the defendants; in fact, only one of the six was a pro decision.

The other aspect of Kort's method I shall comment upon here has to do with the relationship between Kort's results and those obtained by scalogram analysis. Kort assigns weights to both source and test group cases. Indeed, the purpose of his content analysis and mathematical operations is to arrive at a set of what he calls "composite values," or numerical weights, for the cases. His basic prediction is that all pro cases (*i.e.*, those decided in favor of defendants) will have higher weights than any of the con cases (*i.e.*, those decided against defendants); and that all cases in the test group with scores equal to or higher than that of the lowest pro case in the source group will be decided pro; conversely, all cases in the test group with scores equal to or less than that of the highest con case in the source group will be decided con. He thus arrives at a numerical scale for all of the cases under investigation.

It is possible, of course, to arrange the right to counsel cases that Kort analyzed, and the search and seizure cases that I analyzed, in a scale according to Kort's system of weights; and to compare the resulting pseudo-scales of the justices' votes with the scales obtained by direct scalogram analysis. This can be done for the entire group of right to counsel (or search and seizure) cases, and also for sub-groups such as the source and test groups. We find that the Coefficients of Reproducibility for the Kort pseudo-scales are lower than those of the direct scalograms; but several of the Kort pseudo-scales have CR's that are acceptable, and the others are in the .800's. The highest correlation between a Kort pseudo-scale and the corresponding Guttman scale appeared in the source group of search and seizure cases (Figures 7 and 8). The CR's for these scales are identical and exceptionally high—.988—with only a single (and the same) inconsistent vote appearing in each scale. The rank correlation coefficient[25] for this scale and its corresponding pseudo-scale is .920 at a confidence level of considerably better than one percent (.00004). With the exception of the state test group of the search and seizure cases, the rank correlation coefficients for the corresponding pairs of Guttman scales and Kort pseudo-scales, for the various groupings of right to counsel and search and seizure cases, all were .765 or better at confidence levels of not less than .0002. Moreover, I believe that slight modifications in Kort's method would result in an even closer numerical approximation of cumulative scales.

These findings suggest two conclusions: (1) Kort's method worked success-

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[25] I used Kendall's tau (beta) formula, which takes tied ranks into consideration, for the computation of these rank correlation coefficients. The formula is:

$$\tau_b = \frac{S}{\sqrt{\{\frac{1}{2}n(n-1) - T\}}\sqrt{\{\frac{1}{2}n(n-1) - U}}; \quad T = \tfrac{1}{2}\sum_t t(t-1); \quad U = \tfrac{1}{2}\sum_u u(u-1).$$

For an explanation of the method, see Maurice A. Kendall, *Rank Correlation Methods* (London: Chas. Griffin, 1948 ed.), pp. 4–5, 17–18, 25–27, 40–43. The formula is presented at p. 26.

Scale Scores	Respondent's Name	Case: Scale Position:	Weiss v. U.S., 308 U.S. 321 (1939)	Nardone v. U.S., 308 U.S. 338 (1939)	Nardone v. U.S., 302 U.S. 379 (1937)	U.S. v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581 (1948)	McDonald v. U.S., 335 U.S. 451 (1948)	Johnson v. U.S., 333 U.S. 10 (1948)	Trupiano v. U.S., 334 U.S. 699 (1948)	Goldstein v. U.S., 316 U.S. 114 (1942)	Goldman v. U.S., 316 U.S. 129 (1942)	Davis v. U.S., 328 U.S. 582 (1946)	Zap v. U.S., 328 U.S. 624 (1946)	Harris v. U.S., 331 U.S. 145 (1947)	Scher v. U.S., 305 U.S. 251 (1938)	Total votes per justice	Total inconsistencies per justice
			1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13		
12	Frankfurter		(+)	('+')		(+)	(+)	(+)	(+)	+)	+)	'+')	'+')	'+')		11	0
12	Murphy					(+)	(+)	(+)	('+')	'+')	'+')	+)	+)	'+')		9	0
12	Rutledge					(+)	(+)	(+)	(+)			'+')	+)	+)		7	0
12	Jackson					('+')	('+'	('+')	(+)			Y	Y	'+')		5	0
9	Stone		(+)	(+)	(+)					+)	+)				(−)	6	0
7	Douglas		(+)	(+)		(+)	('+')	(+)	(+)	(−)	(−)	('−')	('−')	(−)		11	0
5	Black		(+)	(+)	(+)	[−]	+	−	−)	(−)	(−)	(−)	(−)	(−)	(−)	13	1
4	Burton					(+)	'−')	−	−			(−)	(−)	(−)		7	0
4	Reed		(+)	Y		(+)	−)	−	−	(−)	(−)	(−)	(−)	(−)	(−)	11	0
3	Hughes		(+)	(+)	(+)										(−)	4	0
3	Butler		(+)	(+)	(+)										(−)	4	0
3	Roberts		('+')	(+)	('+')					('−')	('−')				(−)	6	0
3	Cardozo				(+)											1	0
3	Brandeis				(+)										(−)	2	0
1	McReynolds		(+)	−	−)										('−')	4	0
0	Byrnes									(−)	(−)					2	0
0	Vinson					−	−)	−	'−')					('−')		5	0
0	Sutherland				'−')											1	0
Division of votes:		+	9	7	7	7	6	5	5	3	3	3	3	4	0	109	
		−	0	1	2	2	3	4	4	5	5	4	4	5	8		
Number of inconsistencies per case:			0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		1

$$CR = 1 - \frac{1}{84} = .988$$

FIG. 7: A Scalogram of Federal Search and Seizure Cases, 1937–1948

fully on the right to counsel cases and on the federal search and seizure cases because each of these sets of cases happens to be in a scalar relationship; and (2) Kort appears to have discovered a mathematical technique for approximating cumulative scales.[26] At least, the relating of Kort's method to scalogram analy-

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[26] *Cf.* Robert N. Ford's discussion of "simple scaling" in M. W. Riley, J. W. Riley, and J. Toby, *Sociological Studies in Scale Analysis* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press,

Scale Scores	Respondent's Name	Case: Weiss v. U.S., 308 U.S. 321 (1939)	Nardone v. U.S., 308 U.S. 338 (1939)	U.S. v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581 (1948)	Nardone v. U.S., 302 U.S. 379 (1937)	McDonald v. U.S., 335 U.S. 451 (1948)	Johnson v. U.S., 333 U.S. 10 (1948)	Trupiano v. U.S., 334 U.S. 699 (1948)	Davis v. U.S., 328 U.S. 582 (1946)	Harris v. U.S., 331 U.S. 145 (1947)	Goldstein v. U.S., 316 U.S. 114 (1942)	Goldman v. U.S., 316 U.S. 129 (1942)	Zap v. U.S., 328 U.S. 624 (1946)	Scher v. U.S., 305 U.S. 251 (1938)	Total votes per justice	Total inconsistencies per justice
	Composite Values:	300.2	240.1	237.7	224.5	202.4	194.0	180.7	173.6	172.6	171.5	155.8	152.4	143.6		
	Position on Figure 7	1	2	4	3	5	6	7	10	12	8	9	11	13		
	Scale Position:	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13		
12	Frankfurter	(+)	('+')	(+)		(+)	(+)	(+)	'+')	'+')	+)	+)	'+')		11	0
12	Murphy			(+)		(+)	(+)	('+')	+)	'+')	'+')	'+')	+)		9	0
12	Rutledge			(+)		(+)	(+)	(+)	'+')	+)			+)		7	0
11	Stone	(+)	(+)		(+)						+)	+)		(−)	6	0
9	Jackson			('+')		('+'	('+')	(+)	Y	'+')			Y		5	0
7	Douglas	(+)	(+)	(+)		('+')	(+)	(+)	('−')	(−)	(−)	(−)	('−')		11	0
5	Black	(+)	(+)	[−]	(+)	+	−	−)	(−)	(−)	(−)	(−)	(−)	(−)	13	1
4	Hughes	(+)	(+)		(+)									(−)	4	0
4	Butler	(+)	(+)		(+)									(−)	4	0
4	Roberts	('+')	(+)		('+')						('−')	('−')		(−)	6	0
4	Cardozo				(+)										1	0
4	Brandeis				(+)									(−)	2	0
3	Burton			(+)		'−')	−	−	(−)	(−)			(−)		7	0
3	Reed	(+)	Y	(+)		−)	−	−	(−)	(−)	(−)	(−)	(−)	(−)	11	0
1	McReynolds	(+)	−		−)									('−')	4	0
0	Byrnes										(−)	(−)			2	0
0	Vinson			−		−)	−	'−')		('−')					5	0
0	Sutherland				'−')										1	0
Division of votes:	+	9	7	7	7	6	5	5	3	4	3	3	3	0	109	
	−	0	1	2	2	3	4	4	4	5	5	5	4	8		
Number of inconsistencies per case:		0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		1

$$CR = 1 - \frac{1}{84} = .988$$

FIG. 8. A Pseudo-Scale, According to Composite (Kort) values, of Federal Search and Seizure Cases, 1937–1948

1954), pp. 297–298. Ford shows that when the simple sum of correct responses is substituted for scale scores (in a study involving a small number of questions and a large number of respondents), the resulting ranks for 96 per cent of the respondents did not deviate by more than one rank from scale ranks derived from scale scores.

sis is sufficiently interesting to warrant further experimentation in which both methods are applied together to other sets of data.

V. GAME ANALYSIS

The judicial process is tailor-made for investigation by the theory of games. Whatever may be their obligations as officers of courts, attorneys frequently play the role of competing gamesmen, and the model of the two-person zero-sum game certainly can be applied to many trials. The two examples that I should like to describe briefly, however, involve the application of game theory to the analysis of the behavior of Supreme Court justices. I hope that I will be forgiven if I forego any attempt to explain game theory and its basic concepts, and simply describe the two games.[27]

The first of these I shall call the Hughberts Game. During the 1936 Term, the Court was divided between a three-justice liberal bloc and a four-justice conservative bloc, with Hughberts (Hughes and Roberts) in the middle. If we assume that, in the face of Roosevelt's attack upon the Court, the Chief Justice —with the support of Roberts—wished to maximize both his own authority within the Court and the degree of unanimity in the Court's decisions, while at the same time directing the Court to as liberal a course of decision as possible in order to forestall the possibility of the more drastic reforms proposed by the President, game theory can tell us how Hughberts should vote if he—I shall consider Hughes and Roberts to be a single player from now on—were to behave rationally in order to realize these objectives. A game must have a payoff which can be expressed in numerical terms, and for this purpose I have used the Shapley-Shubik empirical power index[28] in order to be able to compare the Court's actual voting behavior with the imputed utilities (*i.e.*, the payoff) postulated by the game model. Simply stated, the Shapley-Shubik index measures the extent to which each justice shared in the power of decision, which is defined as the probability of his having been pivotal in the winning coalition.

The left bloc and the right bloc are each defined as players in the game, which is three-person and zero-sum. Hughberts has a pure strategy, which in essence requires that he form a coalition with the Left when possible, that he form a coalition with the Right when splintering or non-participation makes it impossible for him to form a winning coalition with the Left, and that he always join the coalition of the Left and the Right when the other players do not choose to adopt conflicting strategies. In fact, the voting behavior of Hughes and Roberts conforms very closely to the prescriptions of the game model (Figure 9). In terms of the empirical payoff, the four-justice right bloc, the three-justice left bloc, and the two-justice center bloc are all approximately equal in power:

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[27] For an extended discussion of the theory, written by mathematicians for a social science audience, see R. Duncan Luce and Howard Raiffa, *Games and Decisions* (New York: Wiley, 1957).

[28] L. S. Shapley and Martin Shubik, "A Method for Evaluating the Distribution of Power in a Committee System," this REVIEW, Vol. 48 (September, 1954), pp. 791–792.

	The Left		*Hughberts*		*The Right*	
	Brandeis	.1312	Hughes	.1600	VanDevanter	.0957
	Cardozo	.1264	Roberts	.1536	Sutherland	.0864
	Stone	.1054			Butler	.0742
					McReynolds	.0672
Totals		.3630		.3136		.3235
Expected power:		.3333		.3333		.3333
Difference:		+.0297		−.0197		−.0098

It is easy to demonstrate that in a three-person simple majoritarian game, equality of power is imputed among the players. It is by no means a self-evident proposition, however, that among nine justices each casting a single and equal vote, two justices can be just as powerful as four justices.

I shall call the other example the Certiorari Game. Do Supreme Court justices combine into a bloc with the deliberate objective of forcing upon the rest of the Court the consideration of an issue which the bloc wants decided in a particular way? The data for the game consist of the decisions of the Supreme Court, both jurisdictional and on the merits, in Federal Employers' Liability Act evidentiary cases since 1942. The basic assumption is that a certiorari bloc was functioning throughout this period, although the number of justices affiliating with the bloc varied at different times and an antagonist player (Frankfurter) in opposition to the certiorari bloc entered the game (as such) only during the latter stages of the play. In order to simplify the discussion, let us confine our attention to the first period of the game, comprising the 1942–1948 Terms.

At that time, the certiorari bloc consisted of Murphy, Rutledge, Black, and Douglas. If we assume that the objective of the bloc was to maximize the number of decisions favorable to workmen's claims, game theory can prescribe how the bloc should behave rationally in order to accomplish this objective. Four justices are adequate to grant certiorari, but not (normally) to decide cases on the merits. It is assumed that, during this period, the remaining five justices had no fixed predisposition either towards or against the claimants. The only question in these cases is whether the trial court correctly evaluated the evidence; the cases turn, in other words, on questions of fact rather than law. Typically, they fall into two categories: (a) the trial court directs a judgment for the defendant railroad, on the ground that the evidence is insufficient for the case to go to a jury, or else the court directs a judgment for the defendant notwithstanding a jury verdict for the plaintiff; or (b) the trial judge enters a judgment for the plaintiff on the basis of a jury verdict. In either event, the decision of the trial court has been affirmed or reversed by a court of appeals, and either the plaintiff workman or the defendant railroad has petitioned the Supreme Court for certiorari. It is assumed that, since these cases turn only on the evaluation of evidence, there is an equal chance that any of the five uncom-

HUGHBERTS
(2 votes)

THE LEFT (3 votes)		+	−		THE RIGHT (4 votes)
	+	(3/9, 2/9, 4/9) [96] 2 (R) 1 (Bu, M) 1 (M) 1 (M)[St] 1 (Su)	(3/7, 0, 4/7) [0]	+	
	+	(3/5, 2/5, 0) [6] 1 [St, V]	(0, 1/3, 2/3) [4] 1 (H) 1 [St] 1 (R) 1 [Br, St]	−	
	−	(0, 1/3, 2/3) [5] 3 [St] 1 (Br) 1 (H, Br)[St]	(3/5, 2/5, 0) [8] 1 (M) 1 (V)[St]	+	
	−	(3/7, 0, 4/7) [0]	(3/9, 2/9, 4/9) [76] 2 (Bu, M) 1 (Bu) 1 (Br, R) 1 (M) 1 (M)[St]	−	

FIG. 9. Payoff Matrix for the Hughberts Game

Legend: The symbols + and − designate the players' strategies:
+ = voting for affirmance of the lower court's decision
− = voting for reversal of the lower court's decision

The imputations for partitioning of the payoff among the players, according to the intersection of strategies, are given within parentheses at the top of each cell.

The number of decisions falling within each cell is given in brackets. The number of decisions, in each cell, in which there were deviations from the blocs, are itemized. Justices who defected from their respective blocs are shown in parentheses, and those who failed to participate in particular decisions are shown in brackets, according to the following key:

Br = Brandeis
C = Cardozo
St = Stone
H = Hughes
R = Roberts
M = McReynolds
Bu = Butler
Su = Sutherland
V = VanDevanter

(Mr. Justice Cardozo did not deviate from the voting position attributed to the left bloc in any of the 195 decisions of the 1936 Term.)

mitted justices will vote either for or against a claimant if the court of appeals has disagreed with the trial court. Therefore, since the certiorari bloc needs to pick up only one additional favorable vote on the merits, the chances of its doing so should be 31/32, for the only permutation of the five uncommitted members on which the bloc could lose would be for all five of the other justices to vote against the claimant. The certiorari bloc has a pure strategy: never to vote in favor of petitions filed by railroads, always to vote to grant certiorari in cases in which review is sought by workers *and* in which an appellate court has reversed a judgment in favor of the plaintiff, and always to vote for the petitioner on the merits. *If* the certiorari bloc follows its pure stratgy, the Court should decide 97 percent of the cases in favor of the claimants. If the bloc departs from its pure strategy, it can expect to win a smaller proportion of victories on the merits, because it has played irrationally.

As a matter of fact, the payoff to the certiorari bloc during this period was 92 percent (12 pro decisions and 1 con) in cases in which the bloc adhered to its pure strategy; of the 11 cases in which the bloc departed from its pure strategy by voting to grant certiorari for petitioners who had been two-time losers in the courts below, 8 were pro and 3 were con, for a payoff of only 73 percent. In later periods of the game, the bloc adhered much more closely to its pure strategy, and consequently enjoyed greater success. During the present period, the bloc consists of five justices, so the expected payoff is 100 percent. As a matter of fact, the bloc lost one of the fourteen cases decided on the merits during the 1956 and 1957 Terms, perhaps because the bloc, a little power drunk, became careless and granted certiorari in a case so frivolous that even the bloc members joined in the unanimous decision against the claimant.[29] An alternative explanation for this deviant decision might be that the certiorari bloc was not being irrational, but rather that it *deliberately* accepted jurisdiction with the expectation that the decision would go unanimously against the workman, for the public relations objective of countering criticism that it *always* favored workmen.[30]

VI. CONCLUSION

I hope that I may have succeeded in suggesting some of the kinds of hypotheses that may be worth looking into if we are willing to consider adding other strings to our bow, instead of limiting ourselves to the traditional workways in public law. In addition to the many political scientists who will doubtless continue to pursue the legal, historical and philosophical approaches to the study of public law, those who may have, or may develop, an interest in the quantitative approach to the study of judicial behavior will find a great deal of work awaiting their attention.

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[29] Herdman v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co., 352 U.S. 518 (1957).

[30] See, *e.g.*, William H. DeParcq, "The Supreme Court and the Federal Employers' Liability Act, 1956–1957 Term," *Texas Law Review*, Vol. 36 (December, 1957) pp. 145–156; and Thomas Gibbs Gee, "A Dissenting Postscript or, Notes from Underground," *ibid.*, pp. 157–160.

POLITICAL SCIENCE AND SCIENCE FICTION

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I want to dissent initially from the rather constricting frame of reference that Schubert has established in his paper. He has every right in the world to set rhetorical snares, but I have no intention of walking into them. If I may summarize, Schubert asserts that he is a spokesman for a radical new direction in the study of public law, claiming that the old ways are moribund. He further urges that we should look with envy at the creative function of the social psychologists who supplied the Supreme Court with the banners it carried in *Brown* v. *Board of Education* while we were bumbling around with historical and philosophical trivia. He concludes that instead of wasting our time with talmudic disputations on whether the Supreme Court reached the "right" or the "wrong" decisions in specific cases, we should settle down to build a firm "scientific" foundation for our discipline.

Not the least amusing aspect of this indictment is that I find myself billed as the defender of the *ancien régime*, as the de Maistre of public law. Therefore, for the benetfit of the young and impressionistic, let me break loose from Schubert's rhetorical trap: I too think that much of the research done in public law—and, for that matter, in political science generally—has been trivial. But I insist that this triviality has been due to the lack of ideas, not "scientific method." It is admittedly more difficult to unmask banality when it is draped in algebraic disguise than when it is set forth in English, or Sociologese, but excoriating banality in whatever guise it may appear is the task we must undertake if political science is to fulfill its creative function. It was formerly alleged that when a scholar came to a weak point in his argument, he threw in a Greek quotation; now it often appears to me that he breaks out into calculus.

But before going into the science-fiction quality of much current work in political behavior, I would like to deal briefly with the Supreme Court and the social psychologists. "Social scientists" have been cheering the Court because in the segregation cases the Justices seemingly abandoned the unscientific tradition in jurisprudence and rested their decision on the firm bedrock of "science." The shades of Bentham and Comte have no doubt joined in this claque.

But with all due regard for "the vanguard of the public law proletariat," I would insist that this was not the first time the Justices based an opinion on the latest insights of contemporary social science (allowing only for purposes of argument that this *was* indeed the rationale of their decision). On the contrary, *Plessy* v. *Ferguson* was suffused with the racist principles of the social scientists of the 1890's.[1] This, by our present-day standards, was "bad" social science, accepting as it did the doctrine of innate racial differences; but it was social science nonetheless. Viewed in this light, the great merit of Justice Harlan's dissent in *Plessy* was that, despite his acceptance of innate racial differences, he refused to write that "science" into law. In effect, he stated that even if the Negro belonged to a different (and the implication was always inferior) species from the white, he was entitled to the same constitutional rights.

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[1] See John P. Roche, "The Future of Separate But Equal," *Phylon*, Vol. 12 (1951), p. 219.

I think that the Supreme Court in *Brown* v. *Board of Education* could have profited from Harlan's example by making it clear that the ground on which segregation was condemned was moral, not utilitarian. Segregation was banned because it was incompatible with the moral precepts of a democratic society, not because it led to inefficient education. Even if psychologists conclusively "proved"—as some are now doing—that segregation led to *efficient* education, the real gravamen of the indictment would have been the same: the practice violated personal rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. But the Court, by invoking the *imprimatur* of science for its holding, seriously compromised its moral posture.

And what about the "science" that was utilized? What was the nature of the social psychological evidence that the Court listed in its famous footnote? Here I am afraid the "scientific method" was conspicuous by its absence. Disregarding Myrdal's sprawling *corpus* of undigested data, which is about as scientific as the *Columbia Encyclopedia*, the studies cited were prepared by men who must be considered advocates rather than disinterested analysts. Professor Isidor Chein, for example, later stated:

> "I can here testify on behalf of the expert witnesses in the segregation cases that nobody asked us for the base on which we reached our conclusions. I might add that, in another case, I pointed out . . . that whereas I had an opinion on a certain matter I did not know whether I could marshal sufficient scientific evidence to support that opinion. I was told in reply that this was all that the court was interested in, my opinion—that the presumption is that, if I qualify as an expert, my *opinion* carries weight that is not carried by ordinary opinion."[2]

Professor Edmond Cahn has discussed this matter persuasively in two trenchant articles; I therefore see no point in elaborating it further except to note my suspicion that had not the "empirical" tests employed by Professor Kenneth Clark demonstrated the inherent inequality of segregated education, he would have changed the tests.[3] Professor Clark was social-science consultant to the NAACP and a dedicated opponent of segregation.

Note that I am not condemning these men or their objectives. I am merely suggesting that the scientific method is not autonomous but depends on the value structure of its employers. Indeed, no scientist dealing with "race" in his scientific capacity could go any further by way of generalization than to state that no evidence to date supports the doctrine of innate racial characteristics. The conviction that racial equality is sound public policy is moral, not scientific.

Finally, to wind up this discussion of the wonder-working providences of social science in the school desegregation litigation, only a *naif*—or perhaps a southern politician—could believe that the Supreme Court ruled the way it did in *Brown* v. *Board of Education* because the Justices had absorbed some social psychological reprints. Surely we know enough by now, even though our information is based on hopelessly traditional scholarship, to recognize the *a posteriori* function of footnotes in Supreme Court decisions.

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[2] Cited by Edmond Cahn, "The Lawyer, The Social Psychologist, and The Truth," *New York University Law Review*, Vol. 31, (1956) pp. 182, 186.

[3] Professor Clark's "empirical" evidence is discussed in Cahn, "A Dangerous Myth in the School Segregation Cases," *New York University Law Review*, Vol. 30 (1955), pp. 150, 161–165.

Now with respect to the broader questions raised by Schubert's paper, I must confess that "The Study of Judicial Decision-Making as an Aspect of Political Behavior" is superior to most efforts in this genre that have appeared in recent years. Not only is it clear that Schubert is acquainted with the traditional virtues, or vices, of public law, but he has also spared us the full explication of the "Shapley-Shubik empirical power index" and the "coefficient of reproducibility." Moreover, he has not added a veneer of sociological *argot* to his presentation.

My remarks here are therefore not so much aimed at Schubert's paper as at the "new look" in political science of which this analysis is a relatively moderate example. I object to the spell of numerology which seems to have fallen over the study of politics, and my objections do not run against the techniques but against the basic assumptions of the new Establishment. I am not by any means anti-empirical. The study of data, their classification and measurement whenever possible in as precise a fashion as is feasible, is patently crucial to the examination of political behavior. I have nothing but admiration for the quantitative skill of, *inter alia*, David Butler, V. O. Key, Angus Campbell, and Leon Epstein. What I object to is not quantification, but bogus quantification, the assumption that one can create a measurable thing merely by assigning it a numerical symbol. No one in his sense doubts that we can tabulate Republican votes, but does it follow that we can count Oedipus complexes on the same easy basis? The first calculation involves counting heads; the second, measuring their content. Logically any analyst is within his rights to postulate that voting Republican is proof of Oedipal tendencies, but no one need take him seriously. If he proceeds on the basis of his premise to announce that there were in November, 1956, at least 35,585,316 Americans with Oedipus complexes, he is on secure ground in terms of formal logic, but in real terms he has engaged in pseudo-empiricism. In short, the absurdity of logical premises, providing they are not internally inconsistent, in no way impairs the validity of the logical proof.

There is nothing wicked about proving absurd propositions, nor in building elaborate methodological superstructures on self-validating foundations, but there is no reason why these exercises should be considered relevant to the study of politics. Method is indeed important to the political scientist, but we must beware of the mad dream—worthy of H. G. Wells—of the autonomous "Methodology" which will clank along forever in a value-free vacuum and eliminate once and for all the knotty problems of belief and subjective insight. Our major concern, I submit, is with premises, and particularly with the premises about human nature on which systems are constructed.

Take the study of the Supreme Court and right to counsel cases in which the ingenious Kort fulfilled the alchemist's dream by converting legal dross into scientific gold.[4] From the objective voting behavior of Supreme Court Justices, he has drawn certain uniformities of a mathematical character, and posited certain mathematical principles which enable prediction of their future action in similar cases. Schubert endorses Kort's work and utilizes the same general method with respect to search and siezure cases. What interests me here is the misuse of what I understand to be the canon of contemporary science, and the self-validating character of the fundamental assumptions about the nature of the judicial process.

Briefly, Schubert and Kort seem to have confused the scientist with the bookmaker. The scientist deals in prediction only in statistical terms, *i.e.*, on the basis of adequate samples, and never engages in the *hubris* of trying to predict the behavior of individual units. A careful student of voting behavior may talk cautiously of predispositions which emerge statistically in the cases of, say, white Protestants who live in Bronxville, New York. He would, however, blench at the thought of predicting the vote of any one individual in this category. Thus when Schubert, Kort, *et al.* invoke the authority of science for predicting the actions of a few judges on the basis of statistically trivial samples, they are in a tradition that owes more to the racing form than to the work of Fermi, Heisenberg, or Einstein. This interpretation of science seems to be founded on an epistemological lag, on a belated dedication to a mechanistic science which has long been transcended by the physical sciences. At a time when pioneers in the physical sciences sound more like poets and metaphysicians than like hard-boiled empiricists, the "social scientists" have taken to worshipping at the tomb of Isaac Newton.

Moreover, when Kort and Schubert set up their analytical propositions, it appears to me that they egregiously perpetrate the fallacy of *petitio principii*, that is, they assume the validity of the premise that must be proved if their statements are to be more than exercises in formal logic. Again let it be understood that they have every right to set up abstract analytical models, but it is equally the right of the reader to demand that these paradigms be relevant to the analysis of real judges engaged in real litigation. To be precise, the use of content analysis to set up a scale of mathematical determinants of judicial action is predicated on the assumption that judicial decision-making is at root a process that proceeds mathematically. Similarly, the use of game theory for analytical purposes takes for granted what in reality must be demonstrated: that judges are gamesmen.

Indeed it is possible that the judicial process is a dignified variation of Black Jack, but until some substantive evidence is adduced to demonstrate that judges do think this way, I can not take the proposition seriously. And until our behaviorist colleagues concern themselves with this level of analysis, instead of spinning out their methodological webs on the insecure mooring of "as if" propositions, their labors are essentially marginal to the concerns of political science.

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[4] Fred Kort, "Predicting Supreme Court Decisions Mathematically," this REVIEW, Vol. 51 (1957), p. 1.

INTENTION AND VOTING TURNOUT*

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Past voting turnout studies almost always have been static analyses. Usually they have described the relationship between participation rates and the demographic attributes, attitudes, and social experiences of members of the electorate. Since each such study ordinarily is based on a single cross-sectional survey or on statistics referring to the Election Day period alone, both turnout and its determinants are derived at the same point of time, only simultaneous correlations are possible, and the analyst cannot show how turnout is affected by temporally prior conditions.

The development of multi-wave panel interviews in modern social research permits the study of attitude change, decision-making, and action over time. By re-interviewing the same respondents at intervals, political sociologists already have discovered much about how voters decide their candidate choices during the course of an election campaign. A panel design permits such process analysis not only of candidate preference but also of turnout and non-voting. Elsewhere I have reported certain basic patterns by which voters' pre-election attitudes, social influences, and role prescriptions determine their turnout rates on Election Day.[1] In this paper I shall describe certain conditions under which pre-election intention to vote is subsequently executed at various turnout rates.

This paper is one of the publications of the Regional Panels Project. The data were gathered in 1950 by cooperating regional survey organizations, under the sponsorship of the American Association of Public Opinion Research. Before the midterm election in that year, respondents were interviewed in Colorado, Iowa, Minnesota, and Washington. Most of them were reinterviewed after Election Day. The results subsequently were analyzed and now are being published by the Bureau of Applied Social Research, Columbia University.[2] Since it is a two-wave panel study, this project can yield information on the dynamics of translating intention into turnout, which no single-wave survey can. The Regional Panels Project has additional advantages arising from the use of a common questionnaire with four independent samples. If we claim discovery of a relationship, we can test its existence in four independent samples and need not await future replication to gain confirmation. For simplicity in presentation, our tables will combine data from all available states, but most of the findings occur independently in each sample. Since our samples do not perfectly represent the populations of the United States or of specific regions, we do not claim that the numbers in our tables are perfectly accurate estimates of the numerical rates of American voting behavior; but our data can demonstrate the existence of systems of relationships among variables.

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[1] My chapter in a book on Congressional voting behavior edited by William N. McPhee and scheduled for publication by The Free Press in 1959.

[2] The principal publication is McPhee (ed.), *ibid.* Earlier findings appear in the Freeman and Showel articles and in the A.A.P.O.R. roundtable, all in *The Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. 15, pp. 703–714 and 805–807; and Vol. 17, pp. 288–292. See also William A. Glaser, "The Family and Voting Turnout," forthcoming paper.

I. THE EXECUTION OF TURNOUT INTENTION

Some general principles about intention can be inferred from the over-all picture of how the Regional Panels respondents acted upon their pre-election plans. Table I combines all four states, but the same pattern appears in each state individually.

TABLE I. FEWER PEOPLE VOTE THAN INTENDED TO VOTE EARLIER IN THE CAMPAIGN

Intention in October	Turnout Behavior on Election Day					
	Voted		Did Not Vote		October	N
	%	N	%	N	Totals %	
Will go	67	(898)	14	(192)	81	(1090)
Undecided	2	(27)	3	(33)	5	(60)
Probably won't go	2	(29)	12	(169)	14	(198)
Election day totals	71	(954)	29	(394)	100	(1348)

As a comparison of the absolute numbers in the cells of the turnover table shows, the number of persons who defect from a positive intention to vote greatly exceeds the number of those who turned out without expecting to beforehand—*i.e.*, 192 as against 29. A comparison of the marginal frequencies shows that the aggregate turnout rate in November is lower than the intention rate in October. This negative trend appears commonly in other political panel studies, where intention to vote is overstated at the beginning of the campaign and steadily erodes thereafter.[3]

The discrepancy between turnout intention and execution is not in itself surprising and follows from the very nature of the act. In America voting is expected, and so most persons can establish tentative self-perceptions of themselves as "good citizens" by telling pre-election interviewers that they intend to vote. But for the individual, turnout is conducted with almost no publicity and is enforced by few sanctions; all such kinds of social action are unstable in execution. Another reason for the net loss in turnout intention is that most Americans perceive voting as a kind of semi-spectator activity rather than a serious involvement of their interests. In other sorts of social behavior, as an act involves more obvious and serious consequences for the individual, his expression of intention becomes more realistic and more stable.[4] Throughout this paper, we shall find that the greater the feeling of involvement in the election campaign, the more likely the voter will fulfill a positive intention to vote.

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[3] Bernard Berelson, *et al.*, *Voting* (Chicago, 1954), p. 31.

Any analysis in social research aims to uncover relationships and then to elaborate them by discovering the specifying conditions under which they differentially occur. Consequently we search next for some of the conditions associated with differential rates of turnout. Section II will examine intergroup differences in execution, and the two subsequent sections will investigate how different degrees of social influence and psychological involvement produce different rates.

Ideally, any special sector of social action—such as political behavior—should be explicable by deduction from generally applicable principles of sociology and psychology. Elsewhere I have summarized the various relationships which have been found to exist between intention and action in different areas of behavior. The characteristics of people relate in systematic fashion to their intentions at one time, the trends between intention and action at two successive times, the total amount of instability in their fulfilment of their intentions, the rates at which they execute an intention to act, and the rates at which they deviate from an intention not to act.[5]

On the basis of our data, the execution of turnout intention consistently falls into certain types among all the various possible relationships between intention and action. The voting behavior described in the succeeding sections of this paper adheres to the following rules:

A. *Intention.* Voters with the strongest motivations, social influences, and role prescriptions express the highest rates of turnout intention before the election.

B. *Trend.* All categories of voters decline from their aggregate intention rates to some extent, but some do so more than others. The strongest motivation, social stimuli, and role prescriptions—which are associated with the highest intention rates—also exercise greater

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[4] For example, in rough proportion to the relative prices of their various desired purchases, consumers tend to plan their shopping more soberly, and their expressed intentions more clearly predict their behavior. George Katona, *Psychological Analysis of Economic Behavior* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1951), pp. 82–83. For an act as serious as moving one's residence, the intention to move diverges greatly from the desire to move, and the former predicts mobility far more accurately than the latter. Peter H. Rossi, *Why Families Move* (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1955), Ch. VI. In the case of electoral participation, obviously people make no such clearcut distinction between "intention to vote" and "desire to vote." All such findings corroborate the familiar principle in psychology that the more an intention corresponds to a central need of the organism, the less likely it will be forgotten. For a development of this idea, see Kurt Lewin, *Intention, Will and Need,* in David Rapaport (editor), *Organization and Pathology of Thought* (New York, Columbia University Press, 1951), Chapter 5. Our questionnaire items asking about intention did not remind the respondent about the barriers which might subsequently confront him, and voting turnout is the kind of action where the penalties for acting (resulting from neglect of some rival commitment) often exceed the penalties against abstention. On the weakness of questionnaire items which fail to confront the respondent with future dilemmas, see John Dollard, "Under What Conditions Do Opinions Predict Behavior?", *Public Opinion Quarterly,* Volume 12 (Winter 1948–1949), p. 632.

[5] My paper in Paul F. Lazarsfeld, *et al.* (eds.), *The Panel Method* (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1959).

"braking" influence on this tendency to decline. The largest declines characterize the voters with the weakest predispositions.

C. *Turnover.* The aggregate amount of instability in executing intention is a sum of individual deviations from positive intentions to vote plus individual reversals of intentions to abstain. Systematic differences in turnover fail to appear in our data. Sometimes the more strongly motivated and influenced type of voter reveals the greatest amount of change, sometimes the most weakly predisposed groups have the highest turnover.

D. *Executing a positive intention to vote.* The stronger the motivations, social stimuli, and role prescriptions, the more likely the voter will carry out a previously expressed intention to participate. Types of voters with the weakest predispositions are most likely to desert such an intention.

E. *Reversing an intention to abstain.* According to Tables II and III the social categories of voters possessing the strongest systems of predispositions are the persons most likely to desert prior abstention plans. Some exceptions occur in Table IV, when individual attitudes are singled out. In these special cases, sometimes reversals of abstention plans occur most frequently among the weakly predisposed, usually as a consequence of a larger amount of instability among them.

F. *Turnout.* People with the strongest motivations, social influences, and role prescriptions not only have the highest pre-election intention rates, but also they reveal the highest turnout frequencies. As a result of the differential execution of positive intentions to vote, the intergroup differences in turnout are larger than the earlier differences in intention.

II. DEMOGRAPHIC BACKGROUND VARIABLES

Tables II, III, and IV present the relevant data for respondents classified according to the social statuses, social influences, and attitudes elicited by our questionnaire. Appendix I explains the meaning of the numerical entries in the tables, and Appendix II describes the indexes used for classifying voters.

Certain consistent patterns in the execution of intention are manifested in some of the social statuses in Table II. Men, older people, and higher status voters have the highest intention rates, the smallest negative trends, and the highest turnout frequencies. In addition, these social categories are most likely to carry out an intention to vote, and they are most likely to reverse an intention to abstain. Conversely, women, the young, and lower class people have the lowest intention rates, show the largest declines in aggregate voting intention, register the weakest executions of positive intentions, maintain most firmly their intentions to abstain, and have the lowest final turnout rates. Cross-sectional surveys have previously demonstrated such social differences in final turnout behavior on Election Day; and our data show that such relationships are the final outcome of a systematic pattern which prevails throughout the campaign.

As a direct consequence of the social differences in turnout behavior, Republicans and Democrats express intentions and carry them out differently. Since party identification is associated with class and age in most regions of America, parties vary in the turnout behavior of their adherents. The entry at the bottom of Table II shows that in contrast to Democrats, Republicans have higher rates of intention and of final turnout, Republicans have a smaller negative trend and a smaller turnover, and at each level of intention Republicans vote more often.

All these differences are part of a differential involvement in American politics which demographic categories exhibit. This involvement is determined by

TABLE II. SOCIAL STATUSES, INTENTION, AND TURNOUT

Demographic Group	% Who Expressed Intention to Vote in October	% Trend	% Turnover	Total % Who Voted in Nov.	Percent Who Voted in November	
					Among Those Who Intended To Vote	Among Those Who Did Not Intend to Vote
Sex:						
Men	84 (641)	− 9	43	76	86 (536)	29 (105)
Women	78 (707)	−16	38	66	79 (554)	17 (153)
Age:						
40 and over	86 (767)	− 5	40	78	87 (656)	27 (111)
30–39	81 (333)	−15	44	60	80 (270)	24 (63)
21–29	67 (245)	−26	46	49	67 (163)	13 (82)
Socio-economic status:						
A and B	92 (115)	− 9	45	83	88 (106)	(3/9)
C	84 (642)	−13	44	73	82 (538)	26 (104)
D	71 (214)	−22	43	55	72 (152)	15 (62)
Money income of respondent's family:						
$3,000 and over	78 (213)	− 6	36	73	87 (166)	23 (47)
Less than $3,000	77 (140)	− 8	23	69	86 (108)	9 (32)
Occupation of respondent or his breadwinner:						
White collar	86 (195)	− 9	44	78	86 (168)	30 (27)
Business and farm	85 (447)	−10	44	77	85 (378)	29 (69)
Skilled labor	73 (242)	−16	32	62	80 (177)	12 (65)
Labor	76 (365)	−14	37	65	81 (277)	18 (88)
Social Class:						
Upper	88 (336)	− 8	46	81	87 (297)	33 (39)
Middle	81 (567)	−12	40	71	83 (381)	23 (106)
Lower	75 (445)	−17	39	62	78 (332)	17 (113)
Education:						
College	84 (293)	− 7	25	78	90 (246)	15 (47)
Completed high school	83 (405)	−15	48	71	80 (337)	28 (68)
Some high school	81 (221)	−21	36	64	76 (179)	12 (42)
Grade school, none	77 (425)	−10	41	69	83 (326)	24 (99)
Marital status:						
Married	81 (505)	− 7	40	76	87 (411)	27 (94)
Not married	79 (103)	−14	43	68	80 (81)	23 (22)
Religion:						
Protestant	81 (718)	−12	43	72	82 (584)	25 (134)
Catholic	85 (203)	−22	34	67	76 (173)	10 (30)
Party Identification:						
Republicans	87 (407)	− 9	39	79	87 (353)	26 (54)
Democrats	79 (584)	−16	43	66	78 (461)	21 (123)
Independents	78 (339)	−10	37	70	84 (264)	21 (75)

a series of motivations, social stimuli, and role prescriptions which men, persons over forty, and the upper class possess to a greater extent than do women, the young, and the lower class. The former more strongly than the latter are expected to vote and to think about politics as part of the behavior prescribed for their social statuses. In addition, later sections of this paper will show how the strongest values of such motives and social stimuli consistently exercise the greatest preserving effects on a positive intention to vote and often generate the greatest change in plans not to vote. Among the Regional Panels respondents, men, persons over forty, and the upper class translate intentions into turnout at the highest rates because they tend to possess the stronger values; while the lower rates of performance by women, the young, and the lower class are the reflections of the effects which weaker motives and social stimuli exercise upon intention.[6]

III. SOCIAL INFLUENCES

Table III describes the relationships and effects which various social influences exercise on the expression and execution of turnout intention. Nearly all cases follow the identical pattern.

The process may be understood clearly by intensive examination of mass media exposure as a paradigm case. The higher the exposure, the higher the intention rate in October, the higher the final turnout rate in November, and the smaller the negative trend between October and November. Among those who intended to vote, the differences in turnout rates between the persons standing at the low value and at each successively higher value on the index of mass media exposure represent the "preserving effects" which increments of exposure exercise upon a positive intention to vote. Among those who did not intend to vote, the differences in turnout rates between the low and higher index positions represent the "generating effects" by which increments of exposure induce change in a negative intention. The last two columns of Table III show that the higher the mass media exposure, the larger the preserving effects upon an intention to vote and the larger the generating effects inducing reversals of intentions not to vote.

These patterns occur in nearly every part of Table III. The stronger the social influences which might arouse an individual respondent's political awareness, then the higher the intention rate in October, the higher the turnout rate in November, the smaller the decline during the campaign, the stronger the preserving effects upon an intention to vote, and the stronger the generating effects arousing change in an intention not to vote. The only exception is a possible reversal in the generating effects associated with exposure to political conversations; and this may result from the fact that non-participants are generally far more unstable in carrying out intentions than are those persons who participate in conversations.

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[6] The distribution of motivations, social stimuli, and role prescriptions among different social statuses in the Regional Panels data is discussed and documented more fully in William N. McPhee (ed.), *op. cit.*

TABLE III. SOCIAL INFLUENCES, INTENTION AND TURNOUT

Social Influences	% Who Expressed Intention To Vote in October	% Trend	% Turnover	Total % Who Voted in Nov.	Percent Who Voted in November	
					Among Those Who Intended to Vote	Among Those Who Did Not Intend to Vote
Turnout of the rest of the respondent's household:						
All others voted	93 (229)	−7	42	87	91 (214)	(5/15)
Others divided between voting and nonvoting	85 (26)	−27	57	62	68 (22)	(1/4)
All others failed to vote	66 (97)	−52	65	32	44 (64)	9 (33)
Turnout of the respondent's spouse:						
Spouse voted	86 (139)	+1	54	87	93 (120)	47 (19)
Spouse failed to vote	79 (48)	−26	64	58	66 (38)	(3/10)
Turnout of the respondent's friends:						
Most friends voted	83 (299)	−7	35	77	88 (247)	23 (52)
Some or few friends voted	58 (65)	−11	43	52	76 (38)	19 (27)
Amount of exposure to mass media:						
High	93 (138)	−4	58	89	92 (128)	(5/10)
Medium high	88 (252)	−7	40	81	89 (221)	29 (31)
Medium low	87 (247)	−18	42	71	79 (215)	22 (32)
Low	70 (337)	−23	49	54	69 (235)	18 (102)
Participation in political conversations:						
Actively participated	90 (589)	−10	29	81	88 (528)	20 (61)
Did not actively participate	74 (753)	−15	44	63	78 (557)	22 (196)
Contacted by party representatives:	88 (214)	−12	44	78	84 (189)	28 (25)
Not contacted	80 (758)	−15	41	68	80 (608)	21 (150)

IV. ATTITUDES

Nearly the same patterns govern attitudes as well as social influences. However, as Table IV shows, variations in attitudes often are associated with eccentric fluctuations in the amount of turnover, and systematic generating effects fail to appear.

But for this irregularity, a consistent process can be found in Table IV. The stronger the attitudes denoting awareness of the campaign, then the higher the

TABLE IV. ATTITUDES, INTENTION, AND TURNOUT

Attitude	% Who Expressed Intention to Vote in October	% Trend	% Turnover	Total % Who Voted in Nov.	Percent Who Voted in November	
					Among Those Who Intended to Vote	Among Those Who Did Not Intend to Vote
Amount of interest in the campaign:						
Great deal	94 (371)	−8	27	86	91 (349)	18 (22)
Quite a lot	89 (463)	−13	56	77	82 (411)	38 (52)
Not much, none	70 (464)	−16	49	59	74 (324)	23 (140)
Amount of issue involvement:						
High	91 (181)	−2	57	89	93 (165)	50 (16)
Medium high	85 (299)	−11	32	76	86 (255)	18 (44)
Medium	81 (362)	−16	39	69	80 (295)	19 (67)
Medium low	77 (323)	−18	38	63	78 (249)	16 (74)
Low	69 (182)	−13	49	60	76 (126)	25 (56)
Amount of candidate involvement:						
High	90 (245)	−8	48	83	88 (220)	36 (25)
Medium high	91 (154)	−20	35	73	79 (140)	(2/14)
Medium	85 (274)	−16	38	71	81 (232)	19 (42)
Medium low	72 (115)	−12	51	63	77 (83)	28 (32)
Low	67 (184)	−19	44	55	73 (124)	17 (60)
Knowledge about the campaign:						
Knew name of one or both candidates	86 (211)	−4	29	82	92 (182)	21 (29)
Knew name of neither candidate	66 (158)	−13	45	58	76 (105)	21 (53)

intention rate in October, the higher the turnout rate in November, generally the lower the decline between October and November, and the stronger the preserving effects upon an intention to vote.

V. CONCLUSION

Panel analysis has enabled us to extend past knowledge about voting behavior in certain ways. We have long known that when pre-election turnout intentions or Election Day turnout are studied in separate cross-sectional surveys, men, persons over forty, the upper class and Republicans have higher rates for both intentions and for turnout than do women, the young, persons of lower status and Democrats. Panel analysis now has shown that men, persons over forty, the upper class and Republicans have the highest rates in translating their intentions into action, thus demonstrating that a consistent and continuous social process operates over time to produce differential final turnout rates among the categories in the population.

We have long known that the unequal turnout rates by sex, age, class and party identification are associated with the distributions of motivations, social stimuli, and role prescriptions among these groups. Panel analysis has shown that the strong stimuli and motivations possessed by the high-turnout group are associated with high pre-election intention rates; these stimuli and attitudes exercise strong preserving effects on a positive intention to vote; and they have effects generating change upon intentions not to vote. We have also found that the weaker predispositions possessed by the low-turnout group are associated with lower intention rates, and they exercise weaker preserving and generating effects upon intentions. Consequently the differences in turnout behavior which exist over time among persons categorized by sex, age, class and party identification can be explained by the unequal distribution of certain predispositions and experiences, and further explained by the different effects of these upon the development of turnout behavior over time.

Our findings also bear upon the familiar problem of turnout prediction, which long has interested pollsters and social scientists. Our analysis suggests certain new approaches. First of all, as section II of this paper shows, when a respondent expresses any sort of a turnout intention in a pre-election interview, the predictive significance of that intention depends on the social identity of the person. As a rough beginning, a positive intention to vote is a more accurate predictor for men, persons over forty, upper class persons and Republicans, than it is for others. An intention not to vote will be followed more consistently by the women, the young, the lower class, and Democrats, than it will by others. An intention expressed by any person so identified will have a different likelihood of resulting in turnout, according to the level of motivations and interpersonal experiences which supports it. Some social influences (such as the turnout plans of the rest of the family and the respondent's exposure to mass media) may be especially useful in turnout prediction. A comparison of Tables III and IV suggests that certain social influences exercise a more consistent patterning upon the expression and execution of intention than do the attitudes which survey analysts ordinarily examine. Pollsters' turnout scales until now usually have been weighted cross-tabulations of intention with interest and with a few other attitudes which are so similar to interest that they are redundant. Perhaps more efficient prediction can be achieved by weighted cross-tabulations involving intention, demographic identity, interest, any other attitudes essentially different from interest, and exposure to certain crucial social influences.

The results of this paper also have practical implications for the most economical use of canvassing by political parties and by civic organizations. A scarce service like the efforts of party workers—so far as they can be freely deployed—will be used wastefully if it is directed at the diligent kinds of persons who intend to vote, since very likely they will vote any way. This scarce service also will be used uneconomically if it is invested in the non-diligent types of persons who don't intend to vote, unless they can be taken bodily to the polls, since a great deal of stimulation is needed before they can be aroused.

Canvassing will be used most economically when it is aimed at those persons who are most variable in translating their intentions into action. Among people who originally plan to vote (as evidenced by registration or by responsiveness exhibited in preliminary conversations with party workers), follow-up contacts should concentrate on those who have the highest probability of defecting from their plans—*i.e.*, women, the young, the lower class, persons from all demographic groups who combine positive intentions with weak motivations, or with exposure to few social stimuli which reinforce turnout. Among people who plan not to vote, follow-up contacts should concentrate on those who have the highest probability of changing their minds—*i.e.*, legally eligible men, those over forty, upper status persons, members of all demographic groups who combine negative intentions with strong motivations, or with exposure to many politically relevant social stimuli. In practice, as is well known, canvassing is often used wastefully, since much superfluous effort is directed at members of high-turnout social categories who intend to vote and who are already certain to carry out these intentions because of social pressures and their own motivations.

Appendix I: The Entries in Tables II–IV

1. Throughout the tables, I combined all four samples for which data were available. Where the questions were not asked, one or two samples sometimes could not be included. On some topics, only one sample yielded the information. The following list indicates how many of the samples were included in the computations for each set of entries in the tables:

All four samples combined: sex, age, social class, education, party identification, participation in conversations, interest, issue involvement.

Colorado, Minnesota and Iowa combined: socio-economic status, occupation of the breadwinner, religion, mass media exposure, contact by party representatives, candidate involvement.

Washington and Iowa combined: marital status.

Washington alone: family income, turnout of the respondent's friends, knowledge about the campaign.

Minnesota alone: turnout of the rest of the respondent's household.

Iowa alone: turnout of the respondent's spouse.

2. Most of the characteristics of respondents were elicited from the pre-election interviews. Where the determining variable was a social influence which took place during the campaign or on the eve of the election itself, this information was secured in the post-election interview. Consequently, the relevant information about social statuses and attitudes summarized in Tables II and IV were elicited in the pre-election interviews, and the social stimuli presented in Table III were taken from the post-election interviews.

3. *Base numbers.* All the absolute numbers are presented explicitly in the table or may be inferred from the entries. The numbers in parentheses in the first columns of Tables II–IV are the base for both the percentage of persons who intended to vote and also the percentage of persons who actually voted. The numbers in parentheses in the two right-hand columns are the totals who intended and did not intend to vote. For example, of the 641 men, 84% (or 536) intended to vote, and 16% (or 105) did not intend to vote. Of the same 641 men, 76% finally voted. Of the 536 men who intended to vote, 86% actually

voted; and of the 105 who did not intend to vote, 29% voted. *Where the base number is less than 15, I have presented the turnout frequency as a fraction and not as a percentage.*

4. *Trend.* The index of trend shows the amount of change undergone by an aggregate group relative to the number of members who intended to vote at the time of the pre-election interview. It is computed by the following formula:

$$\frac{\text{number who voted in November} - \text{number who intended to vote in October}}{\text{number who intended to vote in October}}$$

5. *Turnover.* The index of turnover shows the total amount of deviation from early intention which occurred in the aggregate group between the pre-election interview and Election Day. It is the sum of the proportions of the two kinds of change—*i.e.*, among those who intended to vote, the proportion who failed to vote, and among those who did not intend to vote, the proportion who voted.

Appendix II: Classification of Respondents

In Tables II–IV, persons usually are classified by the responses they gave to single questionnaire items. In the cases of social class, issue involvement, candidate involvement, and mass media exposure, we combined sets of items into special indexes. They are described and used in William N. McPhee (ed.), *op. cit.* The following are brief explanations of some of these categories.

1. *Socio-eoconomic status.* The ratings A, B, C and D are the standard ones long used in polling. To interpret the meaning of these categories, our interviewers were briefed from *Interviewing for NORC* (Denver, National Opinion Research Center, 1945), pp. 62–67.

2. *Index of social class.* The respondent's education, the occupation of his family breadwinner, and his socio-economic status were combined. In the Washington sample, family income was substituted for socio-economic status.

3. *Index of issue involvement.* In the pre-election interview, all respondents in all states were asked to express agreement or disagreement with statements about five issues being discussed in the 1950 campaign. For each item they chose one response from a five-point intensity scale ranging from "strongly agree" to "strongly disagree." For purposes of the index of issue involvement, each strong feeling regardless of direction is scored 2; an opinion without strong feeling is scored 1; and no opinion is scored 0. Since each respondent answered five items, his issue involvement can vary between a maximum of 10 and a minimum of 0. The index types and their corresponding total score are: high involvement, 9 and 10; medium high, 7 and 8; medium, 5 and 6; medium low, 3 and 4; and low, 0, 1, and 2.

4. *Index of candidate involvement.* In the pre-election interview, all respondents in three states were asked to list their preferences among candidates for five leading offices and also their strength of preference. Each strong choice is scored 2; a choice with strong feeling is scored 1; and no choice is scored 0. Since five offices were cited, each respondent's candidate involvement can vary between a maximum of 10 and a minimum of 0. The index types and their corresponding total scores again are: high involvement, 9 and 10; medium high, 7 and 8; medium, 5 and 6; medium low, 3 and 4; and low, 0, and 1, and 2.

5. *Index of mass media exposure.* In the post-election interview, all respondents in three states were asked whether they had read or heard information about the campaign in four different mass media: newspapers, radio, billboards, and handbills. Responses for each channel were scored, weighted, and combined into an index with four index types. A respondent could vary from high exposure (if he read or heard political information from all or nearly all the four channels) to low exposure (if he read or heard nothing).

VOTING STATISTICS AND PRESIDENTIAL COATTAILS

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The coattail effect in presidential and congressional races was long supposed to show that the winning presidential candidate led his party to victory by adding votes to the ticket all along the line. The fact that the same party almost always won control of both houses of congress and usually also a majority of the governorships at stake at the time of a presidential victory made this a plausible theory.

More recently, the sweeping nature of such an explanation has been challenged. The first criticism of the simple theory noted that even when a presidential candidate wins, congressional candidates in some districts lead the president.[1] In these cases, presumably, the congressional candidates' coattails are more effective.

A second criticism pointed to the paradox in the assumption that if a presidential candidate leads his party by a wide margin, he is an effective candidate for the party ticket. The greater the margin, presumably, the stronger are the presidential coattails. But large margins, on the contrary, must indicate that the presidential candidate has *not* been able to transfer all of his votes to the congressional ticket; and so it would seem that the attraction of his coattails is minimal if this margin is great.[2] Thus the most significant symptom of the coattail process is straight ticket voting.

Campbell and Miller distinguished four basic types of voters in their analysis of straight and split ticket voting and the motivations of voters' choices. The most significant variable they found associated with straight ticket voting was party identification. Issue partisanship and candidate partisanship were factors of less importance but when in conflict with party identification these resulted in split ticket voting. In addition they examined the effect of ballot form and found that in states where a straight ticket vote by one marking of the ballot was not permitted, straight ticket voting decreased among the indifferent voters.[3]

Campbell and Miller secured their data through survey research methods during the 1956 campaign, which they added to information similarly gathered in 1952; they anticipated seeking verification of their conclusions in future presidential elections. It is the purpose of this paper to determine whether verification of some of these recent findings and further relevant data may be obtained through a re-examination of election statistics.

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[1] Malcolm C. Moos, *Politics, Presidents and Coattails* (Baltimore, 1952), pp. 82–118.

[2] Warren E. Miller, "Presidential Coattails: A Study in Political Myth and Methodology," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. 19 (Winter 1955–56), pp. 353–368.

[3] Angus Campbell and Warren E. Miller, "The Motivational Basis of Straight and Split Ticket Voting," this Review, Vol. 51 (June 1957), pp. 293–312.

TABLE I. COMPARISON OF STATE DEMOCRATIC PERCENTAGES OF PRESIDENTIAL AND CONGRESSIONAL VOTES: 1944

Democratic Percentage of State Congressional Vote	Roosevelt's % Lead Over Democratic Congressional Ticket			State Democratic Congressional Ticket % Lead Over Roosevelt		
	Above 6.0	From 3.0–5.9	From 0.1–2.9	From 0.1–2.9	From 3.0–5.9	Above 6.0
29.0–29.9	Maine	—	—	—	—	—
30.0–39.9	S Dak N Dak Neb Ore*	Vt	Kan	—	—	—
40.0–44.9	Minn*	Colo Iowa Wisc Wyo	—	—	—	—
45.0–49.9	—	Mass* N H* N J*	Ill* Ind* Mich* Ohio	—	—	—
50.0–54.9	Calif*	Wash* Del*	Conn* Idaho* N Y* Penna* W Va*	Mo* Ky*	—	—
55.0–59.9	—	—	—	N Mex* R I*	Md* Okla*	—
60.0–69.9	—	—	Utah*	N C*	Mont* Tenn*	Ariz* Nev*
70.0–100.0	—	—	—	S C*	Miss*	Ala* Ark* Fla* La* Ga* Tex* Va*

* Electoral votes won by Roosevelt.

I. PARTY IDENTIFICATION

In Table I, Franklin Roosevelt's percentage of each state's presidential vote in 1944 is compared to the percentage of that state's congressional vote won by Democratic nominees. The pattern so disclosed shows the President leading his congressional ticket in states that are traditionally Republican and trailing his congressional ticket in areas of traditional Democratic strength. A few of the very strong safe states of both parties, such as Vermont, Kansas, South Carolina, and Mississippi, show a close correspondence between presidential and congressional percentages. In most such states, however, the differences amount to 6 per cent or more. If we assume that traditionalism is an important element in party identification we can clearly see its effect in these data.

In general, Roosevelt led the congressional ticket where the state's Democratic congressional vote was less than 54 per cent. The closest correspondence between presidential and congressional votes occurred in states in which the Democratic congressional ticket received between 45 and 55 per cent of the state vote. In the traditionally safe states it appears that party identification is more often in conflict with issue or candidate orientations, with the result that more tickets were split. Thus in this election, using gross state totals, we find that the presidential coattails apparently are most operative where party identification or traditionalism is weakest. Since many marginal districts lie within states of this character, it is clear that the presidential coattails may be significant in determining the outcome of elections.

When gross state totals are used, the presence or absence of a straight party ballot appears to have little effect. Deviations such as Vermont, Kansas, Utah, and South Carolina can not be explained on this basis. The California deviation probably stemmed from its cross-filing system, which limited the number of Democratic candidates and made its total state congressional votes unrepresentative of the true party division.

Looking at the 1948 results, if we assume that the Truman, Wallace, and Thurmond votes are all Democratic party presidential votes, the pattern of 1944 is repeated almost identically, with 54 per cent the point at which the Democratic congressional ticket begins to lead the presidential vote.

The Eisenhower-Stevenson elections of 1952 and 1956 reveal a different pattern. For these races we need no longer rely on state totals, since district voting statistics are available for both presidential and congressional candidates.[4]

In Table II, the winning party's congressional percentages are grouped by states for 1940, 1944, and 1948, and by districts for 1952 and 1956. Within each grouping the average percentage by which the presidential candidate leads or trails his congressional running mates is calculated. Thus in 1956, in those districts in which Republican nominees for congress received less than 30 per cent of the district vote, Eisenhower led his congressional ticket on the average by 16.6 per cent.[5]

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[4] *Congressional Quarterly Almanac*, Vol. 13 (Washington, 1957), pp. 180–183.

[5] At first glance it may appear preferable to group percentages by using the presidential rather than the congressional vote as a base. Since the congressional vote seems to be more closely associated with the dominant motivational variable of party identification, it results in categories which are more homogeneous and hence involves less averaging of extreme variations.

The 1940 pattern is similar to that of 1944 and 1948 below the 50 per cent group. Above 50 per cent Roosevelt gained on the ticket, consistently in the southern and Democratically inclined border states, and spottily on the eastern seaboard and in Montana, Idaho, and Utah. We can only guess at the causes for these sectional gains. They may derive from the international issues of the campaign, or in some cases from the private utilities background of Roosevelt's opponent. For our purposes they demonstrate that the pattern of 1944 and 1948 is present and also that it may be altered to some degree by sectional issues in a particular campaign.

The pattern of 1944 and 1948 was also present in 1952, but this time the presidential candidate had an additional margin of two to four percentage points over his congressional ticket in most groups. The breaking point at which the congressional ticket began to lead Eisenhower was near 60 per cent.

TABLE II. AVERAGE PERCENTAGE BY WHICH THE WINNING PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE LEADS OR TRAILS HIS CONGRESSIONAL TICKET: 1940–1956

Winning Party Congressional Percentage	1940*	1944*	1948*‡	1952	1956
0.0	—	—	—	43.8	41.5
0.1–29.9	33.5†	18.2†	29.6†	13.1	16.6
30.0–39.9	9.4	9.4	6.9	8.5	14.7
40.0–44.9	6.7	6.2	6.5	6.5	10.7
45.0–49.9	3.4	3.2	2.1	6.0	9.0
50.0–54.9	0.3	1.8	1.4	3.8	7.4
55.0–59.9	0.8	− 2.5	− 2.0	1.3	3.8
60.0–69.9	−2.9	− 5.6	− 4.7	− 0.1	2.5
70.0–99.9	−9.6	−15.1	− 8.1	− 3.0	0.7
100.0	−4.2†	−28.8	−18.4†	−37.8	−37.7

* State rather than district averages used.

† Sample of one state.

‡ Truman, Wallace, Thurmond vote combined for Democratic presidential percentage.

In 1956 the percentage bonus for Eisenhower was between six and seven points higher than the relationship of 1944 and 1948. The point at which the GOP congressional candidates had an average lead over the president was not reached except in districts where Republican congressional nominees had no Democratic opposition.

Thus it is clear that although, as Campbell and Miller found, party identification was the most important of the three kinds of motivation in deciding voter choice in 1956, party identification was nevertheless considerably less significant in this election than in the preceding ones. To a smaller degree this was also true of the 1952 election. Candidate or issue orientation caused an unusual amount of split ticket voting in traditionally Democratic areas in these years.

We have suggested that the deviation above the 50 per cent point in the 1940 election may be accounted for on the basis of issue orientation. We might equally argue that it can be explained by candidate orientation. What is evident is that this change can not be accounted for on the basis of party identification alone.

The major finding, then, is that the importance of the three variables, party identification, issue partisanship, and candidate partisanship, changes from election to election. The one that is most regularly present, however, is party identification. A common pattern emerges for 1940, 1944 and 1948; and it is possible that this pattern is typical while those of 1952 and 1956 are unusual.

Also it is clear that the coattail effect is most crucial in competitive districts. It is probable that voter motivations in such districts have a distinctive pattern. Future research based on the survey technique might well concentrate on voter behavior in these districts. Heavily traditional districts and the one-party districts of California might be omitted from the study in order to sharpen distinctions that occur in districts crucial to the control of congress.

II. TURNOUT AND SPLIT TICKET VOTING

The 1956 district election results lend themselves to further analysis of the relationship between presidential and congressional races. The usual pattern of a greater number voting in the presidential than in the congressional races prevailed again in that year. This was true of 337 of the 363 districts having two-party congressional races (92.9 per cent). The national average turnout drop from presidential to congressional races was 4.6 per cent.

A second pattern showed the Republican congressional nominees usually receiving fewer votes than Eisenhower, and the Democratic nominees more votes than Stevenson. This was true of 298 of the 363 districts with two-party congressional races (82.1 per cent).

A third pattern was most unusual: Democratic candidates held control of the House despite the fact that the Republican presidential nominee increased his percentage over 1952 to 57.3 per cent of the total national vote.[6] Since in 82 per cent of the districts the Democratic congressional vote exceeded the Stevenson vote while the Eisenhower vote exceeded the Republican congressional vote, we may assume that the almost unprecedented Democratic congressional victory of 1956 was due in part to widespread split ticket voting.

Some of these gains, however, may also have been due to voter drop outs, *i.e.*, to Eisenhower voters who did not vote in the congressional races. To test this hypothesis, we have grouped the data according to voter drop outs between presidential and congressional races and according to the margin by which Eisenhower led his congressional ticket (Table III). The data presented are limited to competitive districts in which Republican congressional nomineees received from 40 to 59.9 per cent of the district vote. This table omits one district in Maine in which the different dates for the congressional and presidential votes led to a large variation in turnout, and eight other districts in which the congressional vote totals exceeded the presidential vote totals.

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[6] By Schattschneider's rule-of-thumb measure, Republicans should have captured around 65 per cent of the congressional seats instead of 46 per cent. E. E. Schattschneider *Party Government* (New York, 1942), pp. 75–76.

The figures in this table are for the most part somewhat lower than the national average of 4.6 per cent, which is consistent with the generally accepted finding that turnout is greater as a rule in competitive districts.[7]

The data also indicate that unusually low turnout drops between presidential and congressional races were associated with straight ticket voting only in a small part of the districts, *i.e.*, those in which Republican congressional nominees received between 40 and 49 per cent of the total vote. In other categories the amount of turnout drop was relatively constant and was not associated with a greater or a lesser degree of straight ticket voting. Indifferent voting apparently was a significant factor in only a relatively few districts. In most cases it does not account for the difference between Eisenhower and GOP congressional votes.

TABLE III. AVERAGE VOTER TURNOUT DROPS FROM PRESIDENTIAL TO CONGRESSIONAL RACES IN SELECTED DISTRICTS, 1956

Republican Percentage of District Congressional Vote	House Nominee Leads Eisenhower 0.1–4.9%	Eisenhower Leads House Nominee by:		
		0.1–4.9%	5.0–9.9%	10.0% or more
40.0–44.9	—	0.9 (4)	3.9 (9)	3.4 (16)
45.0–49.9	—	1.9 (7)	3.1 (19)	4.7 (21)
50.0–54.9	3.7 (3)*	2.5 (8)	3.0 (19)	3.8 (7)
55.0–59.9	3.0 (12)	3.2 (20)	2.3 (23)	3.4 (4)

* Number of districts in sample shown in parentheses.

Turnout drops were classified according to whether the district was in a state where a straight ticket could be voted by one mark or not. None of the fifteen districts in which the congressional nominee led Eisenhower had a straight ticket ballot. Also, seven of the eight districts in which the congressional vote was larger than the presidential vote had no straight ticket ballot. These findings suggest that a congressional nominee popular in his district can benefit most when the voters do not have the opportunity to mark a straight party ballot by one "X." When the indifferents are denied the easy ballot method of voting (straight ticket circle), the likelihood of split ticket voting increases.

In the districts in which Eisenhower and the Republican nominee received almost the same number of votes (*i.e.*, where the coattail effect was most operative), there was less of a turnout drop in those non-straight ticket states in which the nominee received less than 50 per cent of the vote. This finding was based on a very small number of cases and therefore may not be significant. It suggests the puzzling result that in some close but uphill races, voters in non-straight ticket states are less likely to skip voting for congressional candidates and nevertheless are more likely to vote a straight ticket.

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[7] See V. O. Key, *Politics, Parties and Pressure Groups*, 4th ed. (New York, 1958), pp. 630–632.

For the other categories, the number of drop outs in non-straight ticket states is slightly larger, indicating again that indifferents are more likely to overlook the congressional race where extra effort is required in marking the ballot.

In view of these findings, more attention needs to be paid to voter motivation in districts in which the underdog candidate appears to have a chance. In some of these districts, motivational patterns are affected by the closeness of the race so that the presidential coattails become more operative.

The general conclusion from this examination, however, is that voter drop out is less important in explaining the difference between Eisenhower and GOP congressional votes in 1956 than split ticket voting.

III. THE REPUBLICAN CONGRESSIONAL NOMINEE

We turn now to consider the data from the nominee's viewpoint rather than the voter's. The question is, what kinds of nominees or districts are associated with a maximization of the coattail influence in closely competitive districts?

Table II gave the average by which Eisenhower led Republican nominees classified by the GOP nominees' percentage of the vote. Variations within each group are shown more fully in Table IV, which gives the number of congressional candidates who fall upon either side of the average trend and the extent of variation from the average.

To the Republican nominee or his Democratic opponent, these variations from the group average are of considerable importance because in many cases they determine the winner of the race. The Republican nominee wants to better the group average if he can. For example, Table II indicated that Republicans receiving 45.0 to 49.9 per cent of the district vote were led by Eisenhower, on the average, by 9 per cent. In Table IV we note that this group includes 7 races in which Eisenhower led by from 15–24.9 per cent of the vote, 33 in which he led by 5–14.9 per cent, and 10 in which his margin ran only from 0.0–4.9 per cent. In these last races straight ticket voting and the coattails were most operative.

Can we tell anything statistically about GOP nominees in closely competitive districts, to determine whether any special factors, peculiar to the district or nominee, were associated with success in coattail riding? Since most of the results of this inquiry are negative they are only briefly summarized here.

First the classification of districts as rural, small-town, mid-urban, and metropolitan prepared by the *Congressional Quarterly*[8] was applied to those districts in the four groups of the 40.0–59.9 per cent range. Within each group each of the four classes of urbanization proved to be distributed evenly across the continuum. For example, the same number of rural districts within each group trailed the president by wide margins as did those that bettered the group's average, and an equal number of rural districts were close to the group average. This was true of each type of district within each percentage group of the 40–59.9 per cent range. The conclusion therefore must be that the degree of urbanization gives no clue as to whether a nominee in a particular percentage group will lead or trail the group average. This is not a significant factor in voter motivation.

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[8] *Congressional Quarterly Almanac* (Washington, 1956), Vol. 12, pp. 790–792.

The districts of the 40–59.9 per cent range were next ranked according to the number of consecutive victories won by the party that won the district in 1956. The compilation extended back through 1946, a series of six elections. So if a district was Republican in 1952 but Democratic in the next two elections, its index number was two. If it had been Republican ever since 1946, its index was six. Correlating these rankings with the Republican share of the districts' congressional vote showed some variations, but these occurred between groups rather than within groups. In the 45.0–49.9 per cent and 50.0–54.9 per cent groups, for instance, the average number of consecutive terms marked by the victory of 1956 was near four, whether the incumbent trailed the group average by a wide margin or led it. In the 40.0–44.9 and 55.0–59.9 groups the average across the continuum of each group was near 5.3 consecutive elections for the winning party of 1956. So apparently voting habits of the district are not a significant factor in explaining any coattail influence for the individual nominee in closely competitive districts.

TABLE IV. DISTRICT PERCENTAGES OF EISENHOWER AND REPUBLICAN CONGRESSIONAL NOMINEES COMPARED: 1956

Republican Percentage of District Congressional Vote	Number of Districts Eisenhower Led by:					Number of Districts Congressional Nominee Led by:				
	50.0% or more	25.0–49.9%	15.0–24.9%	5.0–14.9%	0.0–4.9%	0.0–4.9%	5.0–14.9%	15.0–24.9%	25.0–49.9%	Group Average %
0.0	22	36	10							41.5
0.1–29.9		6	8	17	1					16.6
30.0–39.9		4	24	18	5					14.7
40.0–44.9			4	22	4	1				10.7
45.0–49.9			7	33	10					9.0
50.0–54.9			5	23	10	2				7.4
55.0–59.9			1	26	20	13				3.8
60.0–69.9			2	17	44	19	3			2.5
70.0–99.9				2	8	2	2			0.7
100.0									4	−37.7
Totals	22	46	61	158	102	37	5		4	

Next, the seniority of the congressional winner of 1956 was determined, to see if it could be connected with the district voting margins.[9] The correlations revealed a mixed pattern, with a slight tendency for those Republicans with greater seniority to run closer to the Eisenhower percentages and ahead of group averages. This tendency, however, was qualified by numerous exceptions; a number of Republicans with high seniority trailed, while nominees with little or no seniority ran close to, and in a few cases ahead of, the president's percentage. High seniority on the part of the Congressional nominee, then, may to some degree be associated with high coattail riding. Another way of putting this is that in some cases candidate identification is in terms of the congressional nominee.

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[9] *Ibid.*, 1957, Vol. 13, pp. 16–20.

Next, the average margin of 1956 was plotted as a trend line and the district variations between congressional and presidential percentages within each state were spotted as a scatter diagram. In most states, most districts fell on the same side of the trend line. For example, in the state of Washington, most Republican nominees ran better than the averages of their percentage groups. In four of the seven districts of this state, in fact, Republican nominees bettered the presidential district percentages. (This occurred, it may be noted, in only 42 two-party districts in the entire nation.) Nevertheless, not all Republican nominees in Washington bettered their group percentages.

Evidently the statewide trends may exert some influence on the presidential-congressional margins, but this tendency too is one that admits numerous exceptions. Even when a large proportion of a state's districts fall on the same side of the trend line, some districts still do better than their group averages by a considerably larger margin than other districts in the same state. Here we have a voting pattern that suggests motivations based on state campaigns. Our limited data do not isolate the factor that accounts for similarities within a state; it may be a senatorial or gubernatorial campaign or perhaps an issue deeply felt within the state.

Two factors, then, appear to have some relationship to the ability of a congressional nominee in a particular percentage group to run close to the average of that group or ahead of it, the seniority of the incumbent and the statewide pattern. Neither factor is a sure indicator, however, for prediction purposes.

With these results we seem to have approached the limit beyond which election statistics cease to help in explaining the differences within percentage groups. They do, however, suggest one additional clue. When the writer examined districts in states whose politics he was fairly familiar with, he found that districts of incumbent congressmen who were acknowledged to be hard campaigners tended to vary from the group average. In such districts with Democratic incumbents, the Republican nominees trailed behind the group average; in districts with Republican incumbents, they ran ahead.

One example of this sort received national attention. Representative Keating of New York campaigned in 1956 through a local television program which several times made national news, and he ran 3.7 per cent ahead of Eisenhower in his district; this was a factor in his nomination for the Senate in 1958. Other Republicans with high seniority in the same state, John Taber and Daniel Reed, ran three and six per cent behind the president, respectively, which in both cases was a poorer showing than the group average percentage. But they also represented a more conservative brand of Republican doctrine than Keating's.

IV. CONCLUSIONS

The tentative result of these analyses is that the political statisticians who have argued that congressional races follow nation-wide patterns, and the many congressional candidates who have argued that their own campaigning is a key factor, are both to some degree correct.

A national pattern does emerge and it tends to place limits on the vote a congressman can expect to attract in relation to that of the victorious presidential candidate of his party. Where the party is traditionally weak on the congressional level, the president will run ahead. Where the party is traditionally entrenched on the congressional level, congressional candidates will lead the president. Victorious presidential candidates led their party's congressional nominees on the average in districts where those nominees received less than 54 per cent of the district vote in three of the five elections examined.

The limits so set are broad enough to permit variations which may well be the difference between victory or defeat. The direction of the variations will to some degree be set by sectional or state patterns. Many candidates are able, however, to buck trends which go against them; others are unable to benefit even when such trends are favorable.

The seniority of the candidate is a slight advantage, but like the state trend it is no guarantee of success in bettering group average performance even when that is extremely high. One may surmise that the important element that remains is the candidate's ability to campaign hard and win district votes by his own efforts.

The major conclusion in relation to voting behavior is that the competitive pattern of the district has an effect on voter motivation. It may be surmised that it strengthens one of three types of motivation latent in indifferent voters. Whether this is party, issue or candidate partisanship has not been determined. Further survey research needs to be directed to voters in these districts.

A second finding is that motivational patterns among voters vary significantly with the election. There is a suggestion in the gross tabulations of 1940, 1944, and 1948 that generally this pattern is based heavily on party identification, and that the Eisenhower elections are an unusual phenomenon. This surmise is consistent with the observation that the great Eisenhower presidential victories were only weakly reflected in GOP congressional fortunes. Whether the Eisenhower elections announce the beginning of a new period dominated by a different pattern of voter motivation or whether the nation will return to something more closely conforming to the heavy party identification patterns of previous elections, it is still too soon to say.

METROPOLITAN AND OUTSTATE ALIGNMENTS IN ILLINOIS AND MISSOURI LEGISLATIVE DELEGATIONS[1]

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Rural overrepresentation and metropolitan underrepresentation in state legislatures have long been standard targets for the criticisms of students of state and local government. As Murray Stedman, for example, puts it, "Rural minorities control many state legislatures and thereby penalize urban majorities. The virtual serfdom of the urbanite to the rurally controlled state legislatures in many areas is a recurrent plaint in the writings of political scientists."[2] Commenting on the tendency of state legislators to form blocs reflecting individual localities and their local and regional interests, Alfred DeGrazia concludes that "every American state with any considerable urban population has undergone protracted conflict between rural and urban blocs, often regardless of party lines."[3] Textbooks on municipal government, and state and local government, universally condemn urban underrepresentation in state legislatures and say, or imply, that the result is consistent defeat or frustration of urban interests in the legislative arena.[4] My purpose here is to introduce a note of factual skepticism into a portion of the discussion.

The literature on "urban-rural" conflict does not proceed from a precise definition of what is "urban." The census definition, as places of 2,500 or more population, and the fringe in metropolitan areas, has not been adopted; nor does "urban" mean all incorporated places. If either of these definitions were used, many state legislatures now called rural-dominated would have to be classified as urban-dominated on the basis of the percentage of members from districts in which a majority of the population resides in urban places.[5] The "urban-rural" division has instead been characterized usually as a division between the large metropolitan areas and the rest of the state. Thus "urban-rural" conflict is perceived as New York City against upstate New York, Philadelphia and Pittsburgh against outstate Pennsylvania, Chicago against downstate Illinois, St. Louis and Kansas City against outstate Missouri, and Los Angeles and San Francisco against the rest of California.

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[1] I wish to express appreciation to the Committee on Political Behavior of the Social Science Research Council for a grant-in-aid which made it possible to observe and interview the 1957 sessions and members of the Illinois and Missouri General Assemblies, and the collection of much of the data analyzed in this paper. The Council is not responsible for the findings or conclusions of this paper.

[2] Murray S. Stedman, Jr., "American Political Parties as a Conservative Force," *Western Political Quarterly*, Vol. 10 (1957), p. 395.

[3] Alfred DeGrazia, "General Theory of Apportionment," *Law and Contemporary Problems*, Vol. 17 (1952), p. 261.

[4] For example, see: C. M. Kneier, *City Government in the United States*, rev. ed. (New York, 1947), ch. 6; S. A. MacCorkle, *American Municipal Government and Administration* (Boston, 1949), pp. 52–54; C. F. Snider, *American State and Local Government* (New York, 1950), pp. 169–172.

[5] For example, before the 1955 Reapportionment Act in Illinois, and at a time when the Illinois Legislature was characterized as rural-dominated, 53 per cent of the Senators and Representatives came from districts in which more than half the population resided in a city or cities of 10,000 or more. Fifty-seven per cent represented districts in which more than half the population resided in a city of 5,000 or more.

The argument in the literature on "urban-rural" conflict accordingly may be summarized in the following propositions: (1) there are metropolitan and non-metropolitan interests, distinguishable and incompatible; (2) metropolitan legislators will forward metropolitan interests, non-metropolitan legislators will forward non-metropolitan interests; (3) since non-metropolitan population is overrepresented, non-metropolitan interests will prevail; and (4) if a redress of numerical representation to favor metropolitan areas is brought about, as it should be, then the outcome of this conflict will be reversed and metropolitan interests will prevail.

This study attempts a partial exploration of the alignments within and between metropolitan and non-metropolitan legislative delegations. The voting behavior of the metropolitan delegations and other members in the Illinois and Missouri General Assemblies is examined in order to determine the frequency and intensity of conflict between the two groups. Five biennial legislative sessions were chosen for the analysis, from 1949 through 1957. The thesis of this study is that genuine metropolitan against non-metropolitan conflict in the Illinois and Missouri General Assemblies is rare, and that most of the conflict surrounding legislative consideration of metropolitan problems arises from intra-metropolitan party disputes, central city-suburban antagonisms, or factionalism within the metropolitan majority party. So the success or failure of metropolitan delegations in their legislative objectives usually depends on the degree of agreement between metropolitan parties or factions, or between central city and suburban legislators, or both, rather than on the hostility or callous disregard of non-metropolitan legislators toward metropolitan problems.

Illinois is an example of what V. O. Key terms a "unimetropolitan" state,[6] and is frequently selected to demonstrate the frustration of metropolitan interests in a rural-dominated legislature.[7] Cook County comprises most of the Chicago urbanized area and accounts for 52 per cent of the Illinois population, but in the sessions of the Assembly from 1949 through 1955 held only 37 per cent of the House and Senate seats. Legislative reapportionment in 1955 gave Cook County 51 per cent of the House seats, while continuing the control of the Senate in areas outside Cook County. Until 1957, 54 of the 57 Cook County House seats and 18 of the 19 Senate seats were held by legislators whose districts were wholly or substantially within the city of Chicago. Consequently the whole Cook County delegation is treated here as the metropolitan delegation in the analyses of the sessions through 1955. The 1955 reapportionment produced districts either wholly within or wholly without Chicago, and this is reflected in the 1957 analyses by the use of the Chicago delegation as the metropolitan delegation, and the exclusion of the greatly enlarged suburban Cook County delegation. The area wholly outside Cook County, often referred to as "downstate," is treated as the non-metropolitan delegation.

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[6] V. O. Key, Jr., *American State Politics* (New York, 1956), p. 234.

[7] See Kneier, *op cit.;* Snider, *op. cit.;* Benjamin Baker, *Urban Government* (Princeton, 1957), pp. 325–328; Gordon E. Baker, *Rural versus Urban Political Power* (Garden City, 1955), pp. 15–19.

Missouri is a "bimetropolitan" state with two geographically polar but politically similar cities, St. Louis and Kansas City, containing 36 per cent of Missouri's population. Suburban St. Louis County contains another 10 per cent of the population.[8] St. Louis City holds 11 per cent of the House seats and Jackson County, most of which is in Kansas City, holds 8 per cent of them.[9] In this study the three Missouri metropolitan delegations are consequently the St. Louis City delegation, the Jackson County delegation, and the two of these combined. All areas outside of St. Louis City, St. Louis County, and Jackson County are treated as non-metropolitan.

The recorded roll-call vote is used in this analysis to determine the positions taken by legislators, and to uncover group conflict. The organization and conventions of these two legislatures operate to produce a large number of roll-calls each session, and to permit a small minority to force floor action and a roll-call vote on most measures. Observation of the Assemblies and interviews with members have led the writer to conclude that any notable amount of legislative conflict, including that between metropolitan and non-metropolitan legislators, will produce contested roll-calls at some stage of legislative action. Based on their studies of the Illinois and Missouri Assemblies, W. J. Keefe and G. D. Young comment that the roll-call is a proper criterion for measuring attitudes on legislation and that most of the legislation deemed important will receive some sort of floor action.[10] Numerous other studies of legislative behavior in both national and state governments have relied heavily on roll-call analysis.[11]

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[8] It should be noted that while Chicago is part of Cook County, St. Louis County and St. Louis City are separate and independent areas and governments. The latter exercises both municipal and county powers. No state legislative district is in both St. Louis City and St. Louis County.

[9] In the Missouri House each county has at least one seat, but a multiplier effect in the apportionment formula written into the Constitution gives increased representation to heavily populated counties—not, however, in direct proportion to the population of the county. Thus, St. Louis City has 22 per cent of the population and 11 per cent of the seats, Jackson County 14 per cent of the population and 8 per cent of the seats. The Missouri Senate is reapportioned decennially on the basis of population. At present St. Louis City and Jackson County contain 36 per cent of the population and hold 32 per cent of the Senate seats.

[10] W. J. Keefe, *A Study of the Role of Political Parties in the Legislative Process, Illinois General Assembly* (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Northwestern University, 1951), pp. 73-74. See also Keefe's "Parties, Partisanship, and Public Policy in the Pennsylvania Legislature," this REVIEW, Vol. 48 (1954) p. 450, in which roll-call analyses are used. G. D. Young, *The Role of Political Parties in the Missouri House of Representatives* (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Missouri, 1958), pp. 86–92. Dr. Young (D-Howard County) was a member of the Missouri House in the 1955 and 1957 sessions.

Roll-calls which occurred during the ten-year period totalled 14,052 in the Illinois House and Senate and 4,989 in the Missouri House.[12] Each of these 19,041 roll-calls was examined for the presence of conflict between metropolitan and non-metropolitan legislators. Most roll-calls were unanimous or nearly so; hence for purposes of analysis a group of roll-calls showing substantial conflict was selected. These "contested" roll-calls show at least 15 per cent of the membership on the losing side of the vote in Illinois, and 10 per cent in Missouri. This reduced to 3,662 the number of roll-calls to be analyzed for voting cohesions of party and geographical groups. High speed data-processing equipment facilitated the tabulation and correlation of the more than 500,000 individual legislator votes cast.

Tests of cohesion here are based on the percentage of the full membership of the elected delegation which took the majority position of the delegation on any given roll-call. Except for comparative data this test of "absolute cohesion" is used throughout. For example, if 100 seats are held by Democrats and if 67 Democrats vote "yes," the Democratic cohesion on that vote would be 67 per cent, regardless of the number of Democrats who vote "no" or who are absent. This test retains the simplicity of a single, easily understood expression useful in identifying groups in conflict, without adding the other dimension of intragroup cohesion which is not the main concern in most of the analyses and which may be handled by manipulations of the absolute cohesion test when necessary.

I. CONFLICT BETWEEN METROPOLITAN AND NON-METROPOLITAN LEGISLATORS

Among the conditions necessary to support the traditional argument are that non-metropolitan legislators in "rural-dominated" legislatures vote together solidly, that they are opposed by a solid metropolitan front, and that in the ensuing conflict metropolitan legislators end up on the losing side. In the following sections the voting behavior of Illinois and Missouri legislators will be examined to determine the frequency of these three requisite voting patterns.[13]

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[11] M. Jewell, "Party Voting in American State Legislatures," this REVIEW, Vol. 49 (1955), p. 773; W. Lockard, "Legislative Politics in Connecticut," this REVIEW, Vol. 48 (1954), p. 166; A. L. Lowell, "The Influence of Party Upon Legislation," *Annual Report of the American Historical Association*, Vol. 1, 1901; D. MacRae, "Relation Between Roll Call Votes and Constituencies in the Massachusetts House of Representatives," this REVIEW, Vol. 46 (1952), p. 1046; Julius Turner, *Party and Constituency* (Baltimore, 1951).

[12] While thousands of roll-calls occurred in the Missouri Senate over the five-session period, few demonstrated enough conflict to be subjected to the analyses made of other roll-calls in this study. The conventions of the Missouri Senate apparently operate to reduce recorded conflict. Committees function more meaningfully in the Missouri Senate than they do in the House, and since roll-calls are more difficult to take than in the House much more of the Senate business is conducted by *viva voce* or show-of-hands votes. Undoubtedly the size of the group (34) facilitates pre-voting compromise and consensus. An examination of the contested roll-calls which did occur in the Senate suggests that there was no more, and possibly less, metropolitan conflict than data included here indicate for the House. This is substantiated by George D. Young in "The 1958 Special Session of the Missouri General Assembly," *Missouri Political Science Association Newsletter*, No. 3 (May, 1958), p. 3.

1. *Non-metropolitan legislators seldom vote together with high cohesion against metropolitan legislators.* Table I contains data showing the degree of non-metropolitan opposition to metropolitan delegations voting with high cohesion in the 1949–1957 sessions.

Over the five-session period in the Illinois House which produced 7,186 roll-calls no instance of conflict pitted more than 90 per cent of the metropolitan delegation in opposition to more than 90 per cent of the non-metropolitan delegation. In the Illinois Senate two instances of conflict in this degree occurred during this period. Fifteen cases of conflict to the extent of 80 per cent on each side were found in the Illinois Senate, but twelve of these took place in the 1955 session when 89 per cent of the metropolitan delegation was Democratic and 94 per cent of the non-metropolitan delegation was Republican. If this session is excluded, the other four Illinois Senate sessions and the five Illinois House sessions produced only six instances of metropolitan against non-metropolitan conflict at the 80 per cent degree of cohesion. When the test is lowered to 67 per cent cohesion in conflict between delegations, seven cases are found in the Illinois House and 28 in the Illinois Senate. But 24 of these Senate roll-calls occurred in the 1955 and 1957 sessions when over 80 per cent of the Democrats

TABLE I. NON-METROPOLITAN OPPOSITION TO METROPOLITAN DELEGATIONS VOTING WITH A COHESION OF 67 PER CENT OR MORE: 1949–1957 SESSIONS

	Illinois				Missouri House			
	House		Senate		St. Louis		Kansas City	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Non-metropolitan opposition was 67% or more	7	3	28	12	2	—	0	0
Non-metropolitan opposition was less than 67%	239	97	208	88	509	100	561	100
Totals	246	100	236	100	511	100	561	100

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[13] In order to give concrete meaning to "support" or "opposition" in this study, a delegation is considered to have voted with a high cohesion if the absolute test showed a percentage of at least 67 or more. Most of the findings are presented on the basis of this definition, but findings for other degrees of cohesion are included for purposes of comparison. A vote on which less than half of the delegation was in agreement must be eliminated on the basis that a minority expression should not be imputed to the majority. On the other hand, to demand a cohesion of 100 per cent would eliminate all contested roll-calls from the analysis. Interviews with observers of the Assemblies indicated that, if anything, this 67 per cent level of significance may be too low.

were metropolitan and over 80 per cent of the Republicans were non-metropolitan. During the five Illinois House sessions, only three instances of conflict involved a combination of more than 67 per cent of both metropolitan Democrats and Republicans in opposition to more than 67 per cent of the non-metropolitan legislators.

The most striking finding for Missouri is that during the five-session period the metropolitan delegations were never opposed by as much as 90 per cent of the non-metropolitan legislators, and that only St. Louis City was met with as much as 67 per cent opposition from the non-metropolitan delegation. This occurred twice over the ten-year period. Neither the Kansas City group nor the combined St. Louis City-Kansas City group was opposed by as much as 67 per cent of the non-metropolitan legislators from 1949 through 1957. Missouri non-metropolitan legislators were practically never united on contested roll-calls. During the five-session period in Missouri, the non-metropolitan legislators voted with a cohesion of 67 per cent or more on 89 (4%) of the 2,047 contested roll-calls, and with a cohesion of more than 80 per cent on only three. At no time did non-metropolitan solidarity reach the 90 per cent degree of cohesion. This is partly due to the close party division within the Missouri non-metropolitan delegations in contrast to Illinois non-metropolitan delegations which were more politically homogeneous. In the Illinois Senate, where most non-metropolitan members were Republicans, the non-metropolitan delegation voted with a cohesion of 67 per cent or more on 34 per cent of all contested roll-calls during the five-session period. The margin of Republican control of the non-metropolitan delegations in the Illinois House was less marked, and these delegations voted with a cohesion of 67 per cent or more on only 10 per cent of all contested roll-calls. Thus it appears that the degree of cohesion in non-metropolitan delegations is mostly governed by the extent of party division within these delegations.

The data also suggest that a further reason for the absence of conflict between metropolitan and non-metropolitan legislators is the unwillingness of non-metropolitan Democrats to vote against metropolitan Democrats. Using roll-call votes on which the metropolitan delegation voted with a cohesion of 67 per cent or more, a support-opposition score was obtained for each Illinois legislator by substracting the number of times he voted against the delegation from the number of times he voted with it. Practically all legislators in the quartile of the highest opposition to the metropolitan delegation are non-metropolitan Republicans, with non-metropolitan Democrats clustering in the two quartiles of lowest opposition. Support-opposition scores were obtained for the three-member House districts by summing the scores of the three members. Results of the analyses of House and Senate districts using the Spearman rank order correlation significant at the .01 level indicate a positive correlation between: (1) degree of opposition of Senators and of House members of the same party from the same area; (2) opposition to the metropolitan delegation and degree of "Republicanism" of the district as measured by the proclivity of the district to elect Republican legislators. Each non-metropolitan district sent at least one Democrat to the House, and in each case the Democrat had a score showing higher support of the metropolitan delegation than did his Republican colleagues from the same district. Some of the implications of these findings are discussed in later parts of this paper. The support-opposition scores of legislators from Illinois downstate urbanized areas throw interesting light on the hypothesis that the common problems faced by cities throughout the state may lead legislators from these different cities to work together. Although there are wide variations in voting behavior of legislators from urbanized areas outside of Chicago, those legislators are distinguished neither for support of, nor opposition to, the Chicago delegation. Finally, it should be noted that some Republican legislators from Chicago and Cook County are included in the quartile of highest opposition to the Chicago legislators who constituted the cohesive group.

Evidence of the refusal of Missouri non-metropolitan Democrats to vote against their urban colleagues is provided by analysis of their responses on the 166 roll-calls which elicited high cohesion in the combined St. Louis City-Jackson County group in 1957. A majority of the non-metropolitan Democrats voted with the metropolitan Democrats on 149 (90 per cent) of these roll-calls, and against the metropolitan Democrats on only one roll-call. A majority of non-metropolitan Democrats voted against St. Louis City Democrats on only three roll-calls and against Kansas City Democrats on only one roll-call. Thus, when Democrats hold a substantial number of non-metropolitan seats and refuse to vote against their metropolitan colleagues, conflict is avoided.

In summary, these findings show that metropolitan and non-metropolitan delegations in the Illinois and Missouri Assemblies seldom vote solidly against each other, and that metropolitan against non-metropolitan conflict in this sense seldom occurs.

2. *The metropolitan legislators usually do not vote together with high cohesion.* Table II contains data on the voting cohesion of metropolitan delegations during the five-session period.

In Illinois during the ten-year period studied, metropolitan delegations

TABLE II. VOTING COHESION OF METROPOLITAN DELEGATIONS ON CONTESTED ROLL-CALLS: 1949–1957 SESSIONS

Metropolitan Cohesion	Illnoios				Missouri House			
	House		Senate		St. Louis		Kansas City	
%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
91 or more	12	1	20	3	60	3	23	1
67–90	234	24	216	34	451	22	538	26
less than 67	738	75	395	63	1,536	75	1,486	73
Totals	984	100	631	100	2,047	100	2,047	100

TABLE III. FREQUENCY OF METROPOLITAN DELEGATIONS VOTING WITH PREVAILING AND LOSING SIDES OF CONTESTED ROLL-CALLS, WHEN DELEGATION COHESION WAS 67 PER CENT OR MORE: 1949–1957 SESSIONS

	Illinois				Missouri House*			
	House		Senate		St. Louis		Kansas City	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Prevailing side	222	90	162	69	396	85	474	89
Losing side	24	10	74	31	70	15	56	11
Totals	246	100	236	100	466	100	530	100

* Losses in this table have been adjusted to account for later actions of the Assembly which reversed metropolitan losses. In Missouri it is common for several attempts to be made to pass legislation. This pattern of action is not found in Illinois.

voted with a cohesion of more than 90 per cent on 32 contested roll-calls (2%), more than 80 per cent on 163 (10%), and 67 per cent or more on 482 (30%).[14] On 70 per cent of all contested roll-calls the metropolitan delegations voted with a cohesion of less than 67 per cent. During this period in Missouri the same pattern is evident, although in 1957 metropolitan cohesion of 67 per cent or more was about five times more frequent than in the other four sessions. During the ten-year period in Missouri the metropolitan delegations voted with a cohesion of 91 per cent or more on less than 3 per cent of all contested roll-calls, and with a cohesion of 67 per cent or more on less than 30 per cent of the roll-calls. It is notable that the two metropolitan delegations, St. Louis City and Kansas City, voted with a combined cohesion of 91 per cent or more on only 4 of the 2,047 contested roll-calls, indicating that wholehearted joint action by these two groups seldom occurred. The metropolitan delegations were not in the habit of voting solidly on issues inciting conflict in the legislature.

3. *The metropolitan legislators were usually on the prevailing side when they voted together with high cohesion.* Table III contains data on the positions of metropolitan delegations when they voted with a cohesion of 67 per cent or more.

During the five-session period in Illinois the metropolitan delegations voted with a cohesion of 67 per cent or more on 482 roll-calls and were on the prevailing side of 384 (80%). Three-fourths of the losses occurred in the Senate where party division within the metropolitan delegations confused high Democratic cohesion with high metropolitan cohesion.

Because of the unique system of cumulative voting in the election of each

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[14] The relatively higher incidence of voting cohesion from 67 to 91 per cent in the 1955 and 1957 sessions of the Senate may be accounted for by the fact that Democrats comprised 83 per cent of the Chicago delegation in 1957, and 89 per cent in 1955. In all other House and Senate sessions, some Republican votes were needed to push delegation cohesion above 67 per cent. The 1955 and 1957 Senate data reflected party conflict.

Illinois House district's three-member delegation, House districts, with few exceptions, elect two members of the majority party in the district and one member of the minority party.[15] Thus, although Chicago is a Democratic stronghold, in no session did the Republicans have fewer than 36 per cent of the House metropolitan delegation seats. A roll-call reflecting a cohesion of 67 per cent or more in the metropolitan delegation necessarily included both Democrats and Republicans. This situation makes it possible to examine the success of the metropolitan delegation when it not only voted with a high cohesion (67% or more) but also with substantial support from both parties within the delegation (at least 51% of each party group).

On 168 of the 984 contested roll-calls during the five-session period, the Illinois House metropolitan delegations voted with high cohesion and with intra-delegation bipartisan support. The delegations were on the prevailing side of 153 of these roll-calls (91%). On 10 of the 15 losing roll-calls the metropolitan delegation lost by one vote at a time when 17 members of the delegation were voting against the delegation majority position.

The metropolitan delegation in the Illinois Senate included enough Republicans in 1949, 1951, and 1953 to make feasible an analysis of roll-calls on which the test of cohesion (67% or more) also included the requirement that at least 51 per cent of each party group voted with the delegation position. Under this redefinition the delegations were on the prevailing side of 89 roll-calls (95%) as compared to 71 roll-calls (76%) when the requirement was simply a cohesion of 67 per cent or more.

The total losses under the two definitions of high metropolitan cohesion must be viewed in relationship to the total of 14,052 roll-calls during this ten-year period. The Illinois House and Senate metropolitan delegations lost on 98 (seven-tenths of one per cent) when the test of cohesion was 67 per cent or more of the delegation, and on 71 (five-tenths of one per cent) when the test of cohesion was 67 per cent or more of the delegation including at least 51 per cent of each party group. It is notable that the Illinois metropolitan delegations lost on only three out of 14,052 roll-calls when they voted with a cohesion of more than 90 per cent.

During the five-session period the Missouri metropolitan delegations were on the prevailing side of more than 85 per cent of the roll-calls when they voted with a cohesion of 67 per cent or more. As the cohesion of the delegation increased, the number of losses decreased until at the 90 per cent degree of cohesion St. Louis City was on the losing side of five out of a total of 938 contested roll-calls, Jackson County was on the losing side of four, and the combined St. Louis City-Jackson County group was on the losing side of only one. Put in another way, the Missouri metropolitan delegations were practically never on the losing side of a roll-call vote when they themselves were highly united. The relatively greater success of the Missouri metropolitan delegations was partly due to the fact that they were primarily Democratic and were operating in a Democrat-controlled chamber, while the Illinois metropolitan delegations were primarily Democratic but were operating in Republican-controlled chambers. The partisan composition of the Illinois metropolitan delegations also influenced the pattern. As demonstrated above, it was possible by controlling the intra-delegation party variable to bring the Illinois patterns more into line with what was found in Missouri.

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[15] For analyses of the cumulative voting system and its political implications see George S. Blair, "Cumulative Voting," this REVIEW, Vol. 52 (1958), p. 123; and Charles S. Hyneman and J. D. Morgan, "Cumulative Voting in Illinois," *Illinois Law Review*, Vol. 32 (1937), p. 12.

In sum, metropolitan delegations voting with high cohesion are seldom on the losing side of roll-calls, and as delegation solidarity approaches 100 per cent it is virtually certain that the delegation will be found on the prevailing side of the vote.

II. INTRA-METROPOLITAN POLITICAL DISPUTES AND CONFLICT OVER METROPOLITAN LEGISLATION

If conflict in the legislatures of Illinois and Missouri seldom follows metropolitan against non-metropolitan lines, the frequency of party conflict in these legislatures clearly indicates that party loyalty exerts a much stronger influence than geography on legislative behavior. The ratio of party votes to metropolitan against non-metropolitan votes ranged from 77:0 to 13:1. While party votes accounted for as much as 5 per cent of all roll-calls in Illinois, and 8 per cent of all roll-calls in Missouri, clear-cut metropolitan against non-metropolitan votes never exceeded 0.2 per cent of all roll-calls in either state. How, then, is legislative conflict over metropolitan problems generated?

An examination of the behavior of metropolitan legislative delegations on matters relating to the metropolitan area suggests that most conflict over city legislation comes from the city itself. Political power struggles go on in large cities and legislators reared in these struggles behave in the legislature just as they behave in city politics. Three examples of these struggles were found in Illinois and Missouri: intra-metropolitan party competition; central city-suburban conflict; and factionalism within the metropolitan majority party.

Chicago: intra-metropolitan party competition. Data on the frequency of votes showing high bipartisan cohesion and partisan conflict within the Illinois House metropolitan delegations of 1955 and 1957 suggest two significant patterns. First, metropolitan Democrats and Republicans were in conflict more often than all Democrats and Republicans in the chamber. Second, metropolitan Democrats and Republicans were more often in disagreement with each other than in agreement. Conflict within the metropolitan delegation was common during the consideration of city legislation. The behavior of the 1957 House Chicago Democrats and Republicans on 32 bills applicable only, or primarily, to the Chicago metropolitan area illustrates the lack of unity on metropolitan legislation. The metropolitan party groups opposed each other on 40 (85%) of the 47 roll-calls taken on these bills, and voted together with a cohesion of 67 per cent or more on only 2 (5%).

The past five sessions of the Illinois Assembly have produced numerous bills introduced by Chicago and Cook County Republicans to embarrass or damage the Democratic-controlled Chicago administration. Conversely, Chicago Democrats have introduced bills to consolidate their political advantages against Republican incursions. The non-metropolitan response to such measures tended to be partisan, producing chamber party votes rather than a division between metropolitan and non-metropolitan legislators. In a number of cases, however, the non-metropolitan legislators adopted a wait-and-see policy, refusing to take sides in an intra-city fight. Several non-metropolitan legislators have said in interviews that they are willing to support Chicago legislation on which both metropolitan parties agree, but are themselves unwilling to settle intra-metropolitan political disputes. It was a rare occasion when legislation supported solidly by both metropolitan parties failed to pass.

S. B. 310 in the 1957 session provides a good example of intra-metropolitan conflict in the Illinois legislature. This Chicago Republican bill proposed to restore a tax rate limit for the City of Chicago after the 1955 session had failed to place limits on how much money the city administration could take from the taxpayers. Such a limit would not only impose an important financial restraint on the Democratic city administration, but would also carry the implication that the incumbents could not be trusted to act according to the best interests of the people of Chicago. The bill passed the Senate on a straight chamber party vote, the Chicago and Cook County Republicans lining up with non-metropolitan Republicans against Chicago and non-metropolitan Democrats. The House Municipalities Committee reported the bill with a "do not pass" recommendation and Chicago House Republicans attempted to revive it by moving to overrule the Committee recommendation. In the ensuing debate the House Majority Whip, a Chicago Republican, accused Chicago Democratic legislators of political treachery in failing to keep 1955 promises to continue the tax limit under which Chicago had been operating until that time. Two bills had been introduced in 1955 by Chicago Democrats to continue this limit, but both bills were allowed by their sponsors to die on the calendar. The Majority Whip charged that without the tax limit "the taxpayers will be at the whim and caprice of the City of Chicago, and the taxpayers of Chicago deserve the protection of a limit." He further argued that

> the people will be at the mercy of a city council controlled by the city administration and that the 'home rule' argument that Chicago should not be limited by the legislature is an attempt to take the lid off the property tax, contrary to the historical practice in the state of Illinois.

The House Minority Leader, a Chicago Democrat, countered that "we (sic) of Chicago have treated our taxpayers fairly" and accused the Chicago Republicans of unfair and dilatory action. The debate on the House floor was entirely between Chicago Democrats and Republicans. The vote which defeated the motion to overrule the "do not pass" recommendation illustrates both internecine metropolitan party behavior and the tendency of non-metropolitan legislators to line up along party lines or to ignore intra-metropolitan disputes. Chicago Democrats and Republicans voted solidly against each other, the non-metropolitan Democrats voted with Chicago Democrats and the non-metropolitan Republicans with Chicago Republicans, and a small but decisive number of both non-metropolitan Democrats and Republicans abstained from voting. The silence of 21 non-metropolitan legislators killed Chicago Republican chances to restore the tax limit when the motion fell 18 votes short of the required constitutional majority.

Other 1957 measures sponsored by Chicago and Cook County Republicans to damage or discredit metropolitan Democrats by transferring the quarrel to the state legislative arena included the abolition of the Chicago Department of Public Welfare and removal of its functions to a Cook County agency more amenable to Republican control, the alteration of Chicago aldermanic structures and election procedures to enable increased Republican political opportunities, and a change in the method of filling vacancies in the Cook County Board of Commissioners to protect Republican representation on the Board.

When legislative reapportionment is viewed in terms of this intra-metropolitan political struggle, it becomes doubtful whether correcting urban under-representation will necessarily make the city's lot in the state legislature an easier one. The 1955 Reapportionment Act in Illinois produced a new metropolitan power alignment which may not augur well for Chicago. The heaviest gains in seats were made by the suburban Cook County area, a Republican stronghold. Under this new arrangement the net gain in 1957 House seats over 1955 (old apportionment) was 5 per cent for Chicago and Cook County Democrats and 9 per cent for Chicago and Cook County Republicans, and the party division within the Chicago and Cook County delegations remained about the same as in 1955. Chicago and Cook County Republicans enjoyed a 17 per cent gain in Senate seats in 1957 while the Democratic groups suffered a 7 per cent loss. These Republican gains were accounted for largely by the addition of several House and Senate seats in Republican suburbia. The suburban gains are likely to be permanent in both chambers for two reasons: first, further reapportionment of Senate seats can be accomplished only by constitutional amendment; second, the pattern of urban growth suggests that the area of the state most likely to gain in seats as the House is reapportioned decenially will be the Republican suburbs of Cook County. If it is true that the strongest opposition to Democratic Chicago comes from Chicago and Cook County Republicans acting in concert rather than from non-metropolitan legislators, then Chicago may actually be in a weaker legislative position after than before reapportionment. Redress through fundamental changes in political loyalty in Republican suburban Cook County and downstate areas would seem remote.

Furthermore, it is interesting to speculate how far the sharp increase in metropolitan Republican seats may encourage these enemies of the Chicago city administration to appeal many of the intra-city and county power struggles to the state legislative forum. The Chicago and Cook County Republican gain in 1957 House seats was 9 per cent of the total seats, more than offsetting a non-metropolitan Republican loss of 6 per cent, and the Senate gain of the same group was 17 per cent as compared to a non-metropolitan Republican loss of 9 per cent. If Chicago and Cook County Republicans have enjoyed a corresponding increase in power within the Republican legislative parties, it is reasonable to conclude that they will be in a better position than before reapportionment to line up non-metropolitan Republican colleagues in the harassment of Chicago and Cook County Democrats who speak for City Hall.

Finally, political scientists have often proposed "home rule" as a solution to the problems of the big city in the state legislature, although many of them have thought that unless "fair representation" was first achieved the solution could never be pushed through. Paradoxically, the reapportionment which many counted on to make possible subsequent grants of power to Chicago may instead have created a political situation making the likelihood of such grants even more remote. The Republicans of Chicago and their allies across the city limits in suburban Cook County may have permanently increased the strength of their opposition to giving their political enemies more autonomy in the operation of Chicago city government. With their greater legislative power resulting from reapportionment, metropolitan Republicans may effectively veto ambitions for home rule powers.[16]

St. Louis City and St. Louis County: Central city-suburban conflict. Although the scarcity of Republicans in the Democratic St. Louis and Jackson County delegations precludes statistical analyses to indicate intra-metropolitan conflict, evidences of other conflict may be adduced. It is a commonplace in the Missouri Assembly that the bitter opposition to St. Louis City bills comes from the suburban St. Louis County delegation, a majority of which is Republican. For example, it was largely through the efforts of the Republican Minority Leader, a St. Louis County Republican, that St. Louis City bills were contested in the 1957 session. While this was no doubt partly an attempt to discomfort the St. Louis City Democratic administration, it was also an expression of grievance against the St. Louis City earnings tax which requires suburbanites employed in the city to contribute to the city treasury. Any legislation which would cause added expense to the city was met with opposition from St. Louis County and from whatever non-metropolitan Republicans the County legislators could enlist.[17]

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[16] Edward D. Banfield has pointed out the inherent political difficulties of metropolitan area organization stemming from control of the central city and the suburbs by two different political parties. "The Politics of Metropolitan Area Organization," *Midwest Journal of Political Science,* Vol. 1 (1957), p. 77. He states that "it seems likely that the central cities will become more and more Democratic" and that "the Republican suburban vote has in general suffered little from the increase in population." As a result "these facts suggest that for many years to come it will be difficult or impossible to integrate local governments where the two party system operates" because "in effect, advocates of consolidation schemes are asking the Democrats to give up their control of the central cities or, at least, to place it in jeopardy." It may be that Banfield's argument can be broadened to say that the same forces which bring the central city Republicans and the suburbs into collision with the Democrat central city administration in metropolitan area organization can be expected to appear in legislative consideration of expanded "home rule" powers for the central city.

The penchant of St. Louis County legislators for opposing St. Louis City in the legislature is further illustrated by their behavior on the 31 contested roll-calls involving 1957 legislation relating to St. Louis City. More than 67 per cent of St. Louis County legislators opposed more than 67 per cent of the St. Louis City legislators on 25 (81%) of these votes, and the two groups were in moderate conflict on 3 (10%) more. The two groups voted together with a cohesion of 67 per cent or more on only one roll-call.

Kansas City: Factionalism within the metropolitan majority party. The power relationship between City Hall and the city's legislative delegation has much to do with the delegation's behavior. The Democratic Mayor of Chicago exercises firm control over the Chicago Democrats in the Illinois Assembly. As one Chicago House Democrat put it to the writer in 1957: "a telephone call from Mayor Daley can control 40 of the 42 Chicago Democratic votes in the House." On the other hand, Kansas City's administration has little, if any, control over the Kansas City delegation. These legislators emerge from factional battles within the Jackson County Democratic party, which was largely cut off from Kansas City municipal government by reform groups and nonpartisan municipal elections. The Kansas City delegation is without leadership, and each legislator owes loyalty only to the faction locally responsible for his election. The leaders of the city administration, a mayor and a city manager, have nothing to do with the nomination and election of the city's legislative delegation and exercise no control over the delegation's behavior. It is not uncommon to find Kansas City legislators working against legislation urged by the Kansas City administration or sponsoring bills opposed by the administration. For example, of ten bills opposed by the administration in the 1957 session, eight were sponsored by Kansas City Democrats, and several bills urged by the administration found little or no support in the city's legislative delegation.

On a continuum of city administration control over the city's Democratic legislators, Chicago would be placed at the extreme of strong control, Kansas City at the extreme of weak control, and St. Louis somewhere in between. Observations of the behavior of these urban delegations suggests that as city hall control of the legislative delegation becomes stronger, the climate for treatment of city bills in the legislature becomes more favorable. Since both the Illinois and Missouri Assemblies included a substantial number of non-metropolitan Democrats, and since these Democrats demonstrated their willingness to "go along" with metropolitan delegations, the city administration with no control over city legislators was in a weak position to further metropolitan legislative interests. In the case of Kansas City, "nonpartisanship" in city government may nurture a condition in the selection and control of the legislative delegation which operates against city interests in the state capital.

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[17] An example of the opposition of St. Louis County to the St. Louis City earnings tax is provided by a series of 18 House votes on H.B. 50 (1951) which authorized extension of the tax. St. Louis City and St. Louis County delegations were in high opposition on 12 roll-calls, in moderate opposition on 3 roll-calls, and in agreement on 3 roll-calls. Ten of the roll-calls were chamber party votes under the definition of 67 per cent of the elected party groups in opposition to each other, and fifteen were chamber party votes under the definition of 80 per cent of the voting members of the party groups in opposition to each other.

The reaction of non-metropolitan legislators to controversial city legislation in Missouri is much like the reaction found in Illinois: they either vote along party lines, or hold aloof from the conflict. George D. Young reported that "emergency" legislation put before the 1958 Special Session by the Governor at the request of the St. Louis and Kansas City administrations failed because of opposition from metropolitan legislators. For example, the St. Louis administration proposal for an increase in the earnings tax levy was opposed by virtually all of the St. Louis County delegation and many of the St. Louis City legislators. Young concluded that "In the House the difficulty in passing city legislation does not come from rural members but from members of the city's own delegation . . . *it is almost invariably true that if the city's delegation is united upon a measure it will be accepted by the entire General Assembly.*"[18]

III. CONCLUSION

This analysis suggests that the traditional belief in bitter conflict between metropolitan and non-metropolitan areas in the state legislature must be rejected for Illinois and Missouri, at least at the roll-call stage. The following findings support such a conclusion:

1. Non-metropolitan legislators seldom vote together with high cohesion against metropolitan legislators.
2. Metropolitan legislators usually do not vote together with high cohesion.
3. Metropolitan legislators are usually on the prevailing side when they do vote together with high cohesion.

A different type of conflict emerges in which political factors within the metropolitan area determine the fate of city legislation. The city's bitterest opponents in the legislature are political enemies from within its own walls, and those camped in the adjoining suburban areas. Non-metropolitan legislators have demonstrated their willingness to cooperate in the solution of metropolitan problems when metropolitan legislators can reach agreement on the solutions, and have demonstrated equally that when metropolitan political groups bring their disputes to the state legislature, non-metropolitan legislators will usually divide along party lines if they are attentive to the dispute at all. If metropolitan areas are to have party systems it is likely that metropolitan legislators will carry their political disputes with them to the state legislature where many metropolitan problems are agitated. Furthermore, it is likely that the city's success in the state legislature will depend on the ability and the inclination of metropolitan parties to resolve differences on policy before putting their case before the state.

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[18] George D. Young, "The 1958 Special Session of the Missouri General Assembly," *Missouri Political Science Association Newsletter,* No. 3 (1958). My emphasis.

INTER-PARTY COMPETITION AND PRIMARY CONTESTING: THE CASE OF INDIANA*

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The significance of inter-party competition for variations in electoral behavior has recently been recognized in a number of political studies. The objects of this article are, *first*, to refine the concepts of safe and competitive electoral districts, and *second*, to replicate some propositions relating inter-party competition to the number of contestants in primary elections in Indiana.

I

Most preceding studies of inter-party competition have examined behavior in large electoral jurisdictions, rarely one smaller than a congressional district and often an entire state. Generally they have examined behavior relating to a single office, usually the governor's or a congressman's, and have assigned every electoral-situation[1] to either a "safe" or an "unsafe" category. They have varied in the tests applied to differentiate the latter. Most tests have determined safeness on the basis of one election; they have differed in the selection of that election and in the size of the majority thought to indicate safety.

The analysis presented here differs in method in three respects. First, it rejects a two-way division of electoral jurisdictions or situations, and seeks instead to establish a clearer differentiation between the undeniably safe and the undeniably highly competitive by recognizing three categories: periods safe for a party, periods of high inter-party competition, and periods unclassified or transitional. Second, the classifying test takes into account the degree of inter-party competition over a substantial period of time and so sets a value on a time element only implicit in other studies. Third, electoral behavior relating to three public offices is correlated here.

Primarily this study seeks to ascertain and put some measure on the relationship between the degree of inter-party competition and the tendency of men and women to try for a party's nomination. It goes, therefore, to the state of mind in an electoral jurisdiction during the period immediately prior to the day of a primary election. The identification of differences in such periods and the consequent classification of nominative-situations must be based on circumstances, ascertainable to the student, which can reasonably be regarded as indicators of more diffused and hidden facts which potential aspirants would take into account in deciding whether or not to try for a nomination. Like previous studies, this one relies wholly on the party vote in past general elections as the indicator of this probable state of mind.[2] A prime question, consequently, is the period of time, preceding the primary election to be scrutinized, which should be taken into account in classifying nominative-situations as competitive or safe. For how many years back do potential aspirants for a nomination examine and heed the party's success or failure in prior efforts to capture the office on general election day?

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[1] Throughout this article we use the term "electoral-situation" to mean simply one general election for one office in one election jurisdiction. "Nominative-situation" means one primary for one office in one election jurisdiction; so for each electoral-situation there are two nominative-situations, *i.e.*, one primary for each major party. In some cases the election jurisdiction is a county, in others two or more counties joined by law for the election of an office such as state senator, state representative, or prosecuting attorney.

In previous studies, only secondary importance has been attached to the *number* and *continuity* of wins in distinguishing safe from competitive districts. The late Julius Turner's notable article,[3] for instance, relies exclusively on the distribution of the vote between parties in a single general election. He classified a district as safe for a party for a particular office in a given general election if it turned out that the party's candidate received 60 per cent or more of the total vote in that general election. But in order to give the outcome of a general election such significance for contesting in the preceding primary, a potential candidate evidently must have available not later than the final day for filing in the primary some indicators of the disposition the electorate will conclusively reveal only on general election day; and those indicators must have become so clear and reliable by the final filing day that he can rest on them in deciding whether to try for the nomination. On Turner's test, for example, the 15th judicial circuit in Indiana was safe for the Democratic party for the office of prosecuting attorney in the 1930 election, for the Democratic candidate won in November with 60.6 per cent of the total vote. Yet the Republican party had taken that office in each of the three preceding elections. Can we safely presume that the signs of a Democratic turn were so apparent by filing time in April? Similarly, by Turner's test the 55th circuit was not safe for the Republicans in 1954, since the Republican candidate received only 58.4 per cent of the total vote in the general election. Yet the Republican party had held that office without interruption since 1924, had won more than 60 per cent of the vote in each of the seven immediately preceding elections (1940 to 1952), and had taken it unopposed in five of those seven elections. Can we doubt that the signs available at filing time in the spring of 1954 pointed as surely to victory for the Republicans in the 55th circuit as in 1930 for the Democrats in the 15th?

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[2] This of course is only one guide, and a crude one, to probable interest in a party's nominations. But it sets some outer limits and is justified, in the minds of the present authors, because it greatly narrows the area which must later be explored by more costly field inquiry into other relevant factors such as the availability of financial and organizational support.

[3] "Primary Elections as the Alternative to Party Competition in 'Safe' Districts," *Journal of Politics*, Vol. 15 (May 1953), pp. 197–210.

These two cases are not typical of the experience examined in this study, but are cited as dramatic examples of the unreliability of a test that rests on the outcome of a single general election. Too many factors affect that event. A long series of elections, all won by a small but stable margin (say, 52 per cent of the votes) will probably look to the practical politician like a better indicator of victory in the upcoming election than one or two upsets interrupting a period of superiority by the other party, even if the one or two wins be by comfortable majorities.

Recent studies by Key, and by Ranney and Kendall, classify safe states on the basis of the average per cent of the general election vote over a period of twenty to forty years.[4] Such a length of time surely provides sufficient perspective for observing continuity. Indeed, forty years may be much too long. Candidates and electors are more likely to consider recent than ancient history in assessing the outcome of the next electoral-situation. In any case, interpretations based on an average of the vote over a substantial period of time are of limited value for predicting what will happen in the election just ahead, because long-run averages do not give sufficient weight to variations in trend which may characterize the final part of the period. For example, a jurisdiction that went Democratic in three elections by large majorities, and then went Republican by small margins in the next two, may be called safe for the Democratic candidate in the sixth election under the Key and Ranney-Kendall formulae.

To identify electoral-situations which appear undeniably safe for a party, and others which appear undeniably competitive, we examined the outcome of Indiana general elections for three offices from 1926 to 1954. Electoral-situations were classified in "safe periods" and "competitive periods," determined by the number and continuity of wins for each party. The size of the majority was taken into account in making marginal decisions on whether to put a particular case in the unclassified group or in one of the stable classes, safe or competitive.

Our examination yielded tests, now to be detailed, which we used in this study of Indiana, fixing for each electoral jurisdiction for each office a period called safe, competitive, or unclassified. Each jurisdiction is treated as an individual unit, apart from state-wide trends, and each office is considered over a period of time. Our tests for prosecuting attorney and state representatives are listed first; a brief statement about additional tests for the office of state senator follows.

Criteria of Safe Situations. All the following tests in a particular house of representatives district or prosecuting attorney circuit must be met in order to consider an electoral-situation *safe:*

1. The same party must have won at least five consecutive general elections. When such a series is found, the remaining tests are applied.

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[4] V. O. Key, *American State Politics: An Introduction* (New York, 1956), p. 99; Austin Ranney and Willmoore Kendall, "The American Party Systems," this REVIEW, Vol. 48 (June 1954), pp. 477–485.

2. The district is regarded as in a transitional status during the first two elections in the series, unless, in either of these, one party did not contest for the office; if so, the second election in the series is counted as the first election of the safe period. Once the safe period sets in, the succeeding election years in which the party wins are called safe for that party with the exception of the last win in the series. Whether the last win in the series also is to be treated as safe is determined by the next test.
3. If the dominant party in the series of wins receives 60 percent or more of the vote in the last election, that election is called safe. If it gets less than 55 percent, the election is unclassified. If it gets between 55 and 60 percent, reference is made to the winning percentage in the immediately preceding election: if more than 60 percent of the vote was received in that election,[5] the last election is called safe; otherwise it is regarded as unclassified.
4. After all house and prosecuting attorney elections have been so classified, the two offices are compared to see whether the safe elections occurred simultaneously. If for any election day a county was found by the foregoing tests to be safe for a party for one of the two offices, but not for the other office, then that county was put in the unclassified category for both offices in that election.

Criteria for Competitive Situations. To determine model *competitive* electoral-situations for house districts and prosecuting attorney circuits, the following criteria were adopted:

1. A competitive period consists of at least three consecutive elections. Each party must have won at least one election in the series.
2. A competitive period ends when any party wins a fourth consecutive election.
3. When a district passes from the category of safe for one party into the unclassified status, it remains there until the party that previously was subordinate has won two elections during a period of four elections. If the second win for the subordinate party is followed by three elections which meet the first test, this election (the second win) becomes the first election in the competitive period.
4. Simultaneous contests for house and prosecuting attorney in the same county need not both be competitive in order that one may be so designated.

Similar sets of criteria were also applied to general elections for the state senate. The four-year term for that office produced fewer elections than for the other offices, which have two-year terms, and required changes in the tests. Three consecutive wins in a senate race, constituting a twelve-year reign over a given electoral jurisdiction, were considered as significant as a five-election ten-year dominance in a house or prosecuting attorney jurisdiction. Model senatorial safe electoral-situations were identified by reference to simultaneous elections for the house and prosecuting attorney. When the outcome in the senate contest differed from the results in the house and prosecuting attorney contests, the senate race was considered unclassified. No senatorial electoral-situation was regarded as safe for a party, that is, unless the simultaneous contests for prosecuting attorney and house of representatives were also safe for the same party. However, for competitive situations the outcome of the senate contests did not need to agree with those for the other two offices.

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[5] This seemed necessary because, conceivably, after a series of safe wins by the dominant party, a low percentage of the vote in the general election by the same party might be reflected in increased contesting in the subordinate party.

II

Indiana provides an appropriate setting for studies employing these tests of electoral behavior since it casts an unusually large vote at general elections and exhibits vigorous state-wide competition between its two major parties. In the five presidential elections from 1932 to 1948 its average vote for president was 75.8 per cent of the citizen population over 21, compared to the national average of 58.4. Frank Munger's description of Indiana's two major parties as "strong, virile, well-disciplined and evenly matched,"[6] is borne out by a variety of indexes of inter-party competition.[7]

The elections for the three offices of state senator, state representative, and prosecuting attorney, for a period of fifteen consecutive elections (1926–1954), provided the major source of data for the remainder of this study. Indiana's 50 senators are elected from 44 districts; half are chosen in any one election and the other half two years later. The 100 members of the house are elected biennially from 75 districts. The boundaries of all legislative districts, both senatorial and house, remained unchanged between 1926 and 1954. Although there are 82 prosecuting attorney circuits, each filled biennially during the period studied, only 57 are used in our analysis because 25 were redistricted between 1926 and 1954.[8] Filling all these offices involved a total of 2,722 electoral-situations and twice as many (5,444) nominative-situations. For the senate there were 746 electoral-situations; for the house, 3,000, and for prosecuting attorney, 1,698. Of the total number of electoral-situations considered (2,722), 52.9 per cent (1,439) were classified as either safe or competitive. These are the model situations.

The period 1926 to 1954 from which these data were taken was marked by successes for both parties; the Republicans enjoyed a slight predominance as the state-wide major party. For the three offices studied, every election year provided at least twelve safe elections for each party and at least eight model competitive elections. The whole period revealed 1,179 (or 43.3 per cent) safe situations, 456 (16.8 per cent) of them for the Democrats, and 723 (26.6 per cent) for the Republicans. There were 260 (9.6 per cent) competitive situations, in which the Democrats edged the Republicans by winning 133 to 127; and 1,283 (47.1 per cent) were transitional or unclassified.

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[6] *Two-Party Politics in Indiana* (Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University, 1955), pp. 6–7.

[7] Key, *op. cit.*, p. 172; Ranney and Kendall, *op. cit.;* Joseph Schlesinger, "A Two-Dimensional Scheme for Classifying the States According to Degree of Inter-Party Competition," this REVIEW, Vol. 49 (December 1955), pp. 1120–1128; C. S. Hyneman, "Tenure and Turnover of the Indiana General Assembly, II," this REVIEW, Vol. 32 (April 1938), p. 317, footnote 26.

[8] The 57 districts used in this analysis contained 67 counties. The 25 excluded districts contained 29 counties, mostly rural: fourteen were in the lowest quartile for density (that is, most rural), nine in the second quartile, four in the third, and two in the fourth (most urban). One would expect this rural bias in redistricting because counties with small populations are much more likely than large ones to be joined in multi-county circuits.

Since we could not apply our definitions of model safe and model competitive to redistricted counties for this office, we cannot classify the electoral-situations for prosecuting attorney in these counties. We can tell in an approximate way what we are excluding by looking at simultaneous legislative contests. One hundred eighty-five simultaneous house contests were Safe Republican, 58 were Safe Democratic and 15 were Competitive. Apparently, these excluded situations should not bias our study.

III

V. O. Key has observed that "the extent to which a party's nominations are contested in the primary by two or more aspirants depends in large measure on the prospects for victory for the nominee in the general election."[9] He finds a tendency for primary-contesting to be keener in the dominant than in the subordinate party. As the chances for a general election victory decline, a party's primary is likely to draw fewer candidates until "a great many nominations go by default" in districts in which a party's cause seems virtually hopeless in the general election. This is not necessarily what students of party behavior might expect. Indeed, an alternative hypothesis might predict fewer contests in the primaries of the dominant than of the subordinate party, since it seems reasonable to suppose that a dominant party, sustained by the fruits of victory, will develop an active and strong party organization capable of controlling entries to the primary. One might expect the party machinery to manage the primary and take care that the organization's man is unopposed, lest the party be divided by internal struggles.

The proposition that more contestants enter the primary of the dominant than of the subordinate party is confirmed by the line labeled "All Jurisdictions" in Table I. On the average, nearly one more contestant (2.31) files for the one than for the other (1.39). Further examination of the table reveals that the dominant party has more primary competition than the subordinate for each of the three offices and three types of electoral jurisdictions. Whether the jurisdiction consists of a single county or several, whether it elects one member or more than one, primary-contesting is more vigorous in the dominant than in the subordinate party. Clearly this phenomenon cannot be dismissed as a peculiarity of any one office or any particular type of jurisdiction.

It is also interesting to note the relative uniformity in the average total number of contestants in safe periods (1.82) and in competitive periods (1.98). The available supply of candidates entering both primaries, that is, does not depend significantly on the competitive character of the succeeding general election. The averages for the two parties combined in safe electoral-situations vary little from the averages for the two parties combined in competitive electoral-situations. This consistency holds for all offices and types of electoral jurisdictions, except for single-county multi-member jurisdictions, of which there seem to be too few for statistical significance. In other words, there appears to be a stable pool of would-be office holders for each position, regardless of the outcome of the general-election. The expected outcome only distributes the pool between the two party primaries; it does not determine the size of the pool.

A significant problem for study is the relation of the degree of inter-party

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[9] *American State Politics*, p. 172. Key based his generalization on study of elections for the state house of representatives in Missouri (1942–1950), Indiana (1948–1950), and Ohio (1948).

TABLE I. AVERAGE NUMBER OF CONTESTANTS IN PRIMARY ELECTIONS, INDIANA, 1926 TO 1954, BY SAFE OR COMPETITIVE CHARACTER OF THE ELECTORAL PERIOD

	Average Number in Two Parties Combined				Average Number in Safe Periods	
	All Primaries	In Safe Periods	In Competitive Periods	In Unclassified Periods	Dominant Party only	Subordinate Party only
All Jurisdictions	1.89	1.82	1.80	1.98	2.31	1.39
Prosecuting Atty.	1.45	1.33	1.61	1.51	1.67	.81
House	2.11	2.04	2.03	2.18	2.53	1.65
Senate	1.98	1.93	1.66	2.27	3.38	1.50
Prosecuting Atty.						
Single County Circuits	1.47	1.34	1.63	1.54	1.87	.81
Multi-Co. Circuits	1.23	1.16	1.42	1.23	1.53	.79
House						
Single-Co. Single-Mem.	1.62	1.54	1.78	1.67	2.01	1.06
Single-Co. Multi-Mem.	3.17	3.34	2.42	3.16	3.89	2.79
Multi-Co. Single-Mem.	1.51	1.37	1.74	1.63	1.76	.98
Senate						
Single-Co. Single-Mem.	2.10	1.91	—	2.29	2.09	1.72
Single-Co. Multi-Mem.	3.36	4.11	—	2.90	5.00	3.23
Multi-Co. Single-Mem.	1.63	1.49	1.66	1.76	1.88	1.10

competition to the development of organization in dominant and subordinate parties and to the electoral activity of the two parties. The data in this article must be considered against the fact that the Republican party was, for most of the period examined, slightly predominant as a state-wide party, and against the fact that both the state-wide dominant party and the state-wide subordinate party were dominant and subordinate in different districts at the same time, and in the same districts at different times.[10] Our data do not carry forward an analysis of the relationship of inter-party competition to party organization and to party activity, but they do tell us to what extent nominations are contested in primaries, and from that we may infer something about organization activity and suggest hypothetical relationships worth further inquiry.

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[10] Thirteen jurisdictions moved from safe for one party to safe for the other party during the period 1926 to 1954. Eight were house districts; one was a senate district; four were judicial circuits electing prosecuting attorneys. Six of the shifts were from Safe Republican to Safe Democratic; seven were from Safe Democratic to Safe Republican. In every case at least five years intervened between the last electoral-situation that was safe for one party and the first electoral-situation that was safe for the other party.

Some noteworthy variations in primary-contesting between the two parties may cast light on the character of party organization in Indiana. (See Table II.) First, the Republicans contest "All Nominative Situations" at a higher rate than Democrats in all but two kinds of jurisdictions. The exceptions are single-county, multi-member jurisdictions for the senate, and multi-county, single-member jurisdictions for prosecuting attorney; but the number of such jurisdictions is too small to be statistically significant.

TABLE II. AVERAGE NUMBER OF CONTESTANTS PER PRIMARY ELECTION SITUATION, BY PARTY, CLASSIFIED AS TO SAFE OR COMPETITIVE CHARACTER OF THE GENERAL ELECTION: ALL JURISDICTIONS, INDIANA, 1926–1954

	All Nominative Situations	Compet. Nom. Sits.	Safe Nom. Sits.		Uncl. Nom. Sits.
			Dem.	Repub.	
Three Offices					
Democrats	1.79	1.75	2.90	.94	1.88
Republicans	1.98	1.86	2.00	1.92	2.04
Prosecuting Attorney					
Democrats	1.33	1.57	1.91	.68	1.46
Republicans	1.57	1.65	1.08	1.80	1.56
House					
Democrats	2.03	2.01	3.32	.62	2.11
Republicans	2.19	2.05	2.37	2.63	2.25
Senate					
Democrats	1.86	1.39	2.99	1.02	1.90
Republicans	2.10	1.93	2.11	1.82	2.26

By and large, then, more Republicans have participated in primaries than Democrats over the whole period. This finding is consistent with the proposition that the dominant party experiences greater primary-contesting than the subordinate, for the Republican party was, more of the time than not, the statewide dominant party. It is reasonable, therefore, that Republicans in general should usually be more optimistic about elections than Democrats, and turn out in larger numbers as candidates.

On the other hand, this is not the only reasonable expectation. If Republican party county organizations were tightly controlled in Indiana, and desired to avoid public intra-party strife, such heavy primary-contesting as Table II illustrates might be surprising. Indeed, Key noted that in some safe districts in Missouri, a primary contest did not regularly occur; and when one did, he thought it indicated that the party organization "either is not strong enough to prevent occasional serious challenge to its man . . . or perhaps . . . used the primary to settle its internal disputes."[11] In either case, in those Missouri safe districts apparently the organizations did not usually welcome primary contests stirring disunity in the party. In Indiana, where Republican primary contesting is consistently heavy, we should not infer that the leadership necessarily encourages candidates. Perhaps it does; or perhaps Republication aspirants run in spite of the party organization's preferences. At any rate they run, and the inference one draws is of a party organization that does not ordinarily attempt to manage the primaries and does not as a rule use the direct primary only as a facade for giving legitimacy to a decision reached elsewhere at another time by another "electorate."

As further evidence that primary-contesting varies between parties, note in Table II that Democrats contest Safe Democratic districts more vigorously (2.90) than Republicans contest Safe Republican electoral-situations (1.92). And the Democrats contest primaries in Safe Republican districts much less (.94) than Republicans contest primaries in Safe Democratic districts (2.00). These two relationships held for each office separately, as indicated in Table III, as well as for the three offices combined. They also apply to all types of jurisdictions, although for reasons of space we have reproduced only one sub-table of Table II. (See Table III, below.) Speculation concerning why Democrats contest their party's safe electoral-situations more than the Republicans contest theirs, and why Democrats are more reluctant than Republicans to enter the safe districts of the opposition, centers around two possible explanations.

The first explanation consists of three factors: the *loci* of Democratic strength, the effects of urbanism, and possible differences between multi-member and single-member jurisdictions. We examined 568 multi-member electoral-situations, of which nearly twice as many were Safe Democratic (156) as safe Republican (80). In multi-member house and senate jurisdictions the average number of candidates per primary election is approximately twice as high as in single-member jurisdictions (see Table I, row "All Primaries").

Multi-member jurisdictions are urban constituencies, and it could be, therefore, that Democratic primary-contesting is higher in Safe Democratic situations partially because more of these occur in multi-member (*i.e.*, urban) jurisdictions. The hypothetical explanation is then as follows: the greater tendency of Democrats to contest in districts safe for Democrats than for Republicans to contest in districts safe for Republicans is a reflection of the uneven party distribution of multi-member districts.

To test this hypothesis we have separated the single-county, single-member jurisdictions from Table II. By this separation we can determine whether these two relationships also occur in relatively rural areas. These findings are reported in Table III and reveal that even in single-county, single-member districts Democrats contest Safe Democratic situations at a higher rate (2.08) than Republicans contest Safe Republican situations (1.89). Likewise, Democrats compete in Safe Republican situations (.84) much less than Republicans enter the safe districts of the opposition (1.29). Both these relationships occur for each of the three offices separately as well as for the three offices combined. They cannot therefore be attributed to the fact that Democrats were stronger in urban, multi-member jurisdictions where the party drew a large number of primary contestants who distort the state-wide averages.

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[11] *Op. cit.*, p. 181.

There is a second possible explanation. Consider first the apparent tendency of Democrats to contest Safe Democratic seats more vigorously than the Republicans contest Safe Republican situations. The years with the largest number of Safe Democratic electoral-situations were 1934 and 1936, and the greatest number of Safe Republican electoral-situations occurred in 1944 and 1946. The years in which the Democrats were the more successful party coincided roughly with the years in which the largest number of candidates sought public office. Conversely, as the Republicans became predominant, the number of candidates in both parties declined. This is illustrated in Figure 1. The total number of primary candidates in 1934 and 1936 was 1,569, whereas in 1944 and 1946 there were 1,306 primary candidates, 17 per cent fewer. Thus the historical period may explain why Democrats, usually in the minority, appear to have contested their safe seats more vigorously than the Republicans. When the Democrats were the "safest" was when candidatures were unusually numerous, and the number of Democratic primary contestants was thereby swollen.

TABLE III. AVERAGE NUMBER OF CONTESTANTS PER PRIMARY ELECTION SITUATION, BY PARTY, CLASSIFIED AS TO SAFE OR COMPETITIVE CHARACTER OF THE GENERAL ELECTION: SINGLE-COUNTY, SINGLE-MEMBER JURISDICTIONS ONLY, INDIANA, 1926–1954

	All Nominative Situations	Compet. Nom. Sits.	Safe Nom. Sits.		Uncl. Nom. Sits.
			Dem.	Repub.	
Three Offices					
Democrats	1.41	1.58	2.08	.84	1.57
Republicans	1.71	1.76	1.29	1.89	1.69
Prosecuting Attorney					
Democrats	1.33	1.59	1.92	.70	1.47
Republicans	1.61	1.67	1.06	1.85	1.61
House					
Democrats	1.46	1.53	2.33	.98	1.64
Republicans	1.77	2.03	1.38	1.93	1.70
Senate					
Democrats	1.86	—	2.31	1.06	2.03
Republicans	2.34	—	2.38	1.88	2.55

The elections of 1934 and 1936 were held in depression years; those of 1944



FIG. 1. Number of primary contests for three offices, Indiana, by party, 1926–1954.

and 1946 fell in the late war period. Figure 1 shows that between 1926 and 1954 the number of primary contestants for these three offices was highest in 1932 and 1934, and declined during the war. It seems likely that public office-holding is one of the occupations that has greater attractiveness when there is a surplus of labor than when manpower is at a premium.[12]

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[12] We are indebted to Professor H. V. Thornton, Director of the Bureau of Government Research at the University of Oklahoma, for supplying us with the following table which illustrates a similar tendency for "bad times" to draw a larger number of primary contestants than prosperous times. Note that Thornton shows that the post-war period, 1947–54, did not draw more primary candidates than the depression. Our Figure 1 shows a pick-up in the number of primary contestants in the post-war years. One might explain this in terms of a "pent-up" demand for office on the part of ambitious veterans who were unable to seek office during the war; but this still did not equal the demand during the depression.

NUMBER OF PRIMARY CANDIDATES FOR OKLAHOMA EXECUTIVE AND JUDICIAL OFFICES

	1930–37	1947–54	Total	% of Total	
				'30–37	'47–54
Total Number of Candidates	495	268	763	65	35
Democrats	344	211	555	62	38
Republicans	128	56	184	70	30
Independents	23	1	24	96	4

Time may also explain the other relationship, *i.e.*, that an average of one more Republican contests Safe Democratic elections (2.00) than Democrat contests Safe Republican elections (.94). The period of greatest Democratic success roughly coincided with the period when public office was most sought after, thus encouraging Republican candidates into Safe Democratic territory. As Republicans regained predominance, fewer Democratic candidates were available to contest Republican strongholds.

It is less easy to explain the differences in primary-contesting between Indiana parties than to identify their occurrence. We have suggested two hypotheses. They by no means exhaust the range of possibilities. Other lines of inquiry deserve investigation, including more direct and intensive study of party organization, the proclivity of incumbents to seek re-election, and careful scrutiny of personalities and issues by study of local and county history. We do not contend that any one explanation alone is sufficient to account for the relationships observed. Our present belief is that these explanations and perhaps others probably supplement rather than supplant each other.

IV

This article, based on data drawn from a competitive political system distinguished for its high degree of political participation, offers two contributions to the literature of political behavior. First, it presents conceptually refined criteria for isolating model safe and model competitive electoral-situations. Second, it lends empirical confirmation to seven propositions concerning electoral behavior. These may now be summarized. Our major findings, those for which we have offered substantial confirmation, are designated by numerals; explanatory hypotheses or propositions with lesser degrees of confidence, are designated by letters. Although as Dr. Johnson complained, "In all pointed sentences some degree of accuracy must be sacrificed to conciseness," a terse inventory will summarize this study and perhaps provide hypotheses for further testing in other political systems:

1. More candidates enter the primary of the dominant party (*i.e.*, the party most likely to win the subsequent general election) than enter the primary of the subordinate party.
2. The total number of contestants in the primaries does not vary with the competitiveness of the general election; however, the prospective outcome does distribute the candidates between the parties (Proposition No. 1).
3. The state-wide subordinate party contests its safe jurisdictions more than the state-wide dominant party contests its safe jurisdictions.
   a. This cannot be attributed to the fact that the subordinate party is dominant in more urbanized areas than rural.
   b. The attractiveness of public office-holding increases as the supply of available labor increases.
   c. War creates a "pent-up" demand for public office which results in a decline in the number of candidates during the war and an increase after the war.
4. More candidates of the state-wide dominant party enter primaries in safe jurisdictions of the subordinate party than candidates of the subordinate party enter safe jurisdictions of the dominant party.

TRENDS AND VARIATIONS IN THE TWO-PARTY VOTE: THE CASE OF MICHIGAN*

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Wayne State University

This study aims to analyze some features of voting behavior in a particular state party system and to illustrate new methods of analysis of election data. In this paper we use the gross election statistics for Michigan counties and cities to relate recent voting trends to the ecological characteristics of counties and to investigate the effect of certain variables on voting in cities.

A closer scrutiny of Michigan election results is warranted at this time because major interest groups in this state no longer place a high premium on "keeping out of politics." Traditionally, interest groups in American state and national politics are supposed to avoid any open and continuing commitments to particular party organizations or factions. Labor and business groups in Michigan, however, skirting the Taft-Hartley and corrupt practices acts (which purport to limit union and corporate political activities), have either modified or abandoned their past policies in this respect.[1] The Michigan CIO fully accepts a partisan role and since 1948 a liberal-CIO coalition has controlled the Democratic party organization.[2] For some years now the coalition has made an impressive showing in a state once staunchly Republican.[3] G. Mennen Williams has won an unprecedented six successive gubernatorial elections, and since 1957 all the eight state-wide elective administrative offices have had Democratic incumbents.

Republicans, on the other hand, have not run for cover; they still control the State Senate and hold one-half the seats in the House. Furthermore, there is always the prospect of the capture of the executive offices in the next election. Paralleling labor's open identification with the Democrats, business groups, particularly those associated with General Motors and Ford management, have become involved in the internal politics of the state Republican party organization.[4] Such changes in the voting patterns and party organizations raise important questions for political scientists.

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* We wish to thank Professors Leon D. Epstein and V. O. Key, as well as several Wayne colleagues, for their helpful criticisms and suggestions. We alone, however, are responsible for all interpretations and any errors.

[1] See Nicholas A. Masters, "The Politics of Union Endorsement of Candidates in the Detroit Area," *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, Vol. I (August, 1957), pp. 136–150.

[2] Stephen B. and Vera H. Sarasohn, *Political Party Patterns in Michigan* (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1957).

[3] V. O. Key throughout his analysis of party politics in American states classifies Michigan as a "sure" Republican state. This classification, however, is based on long term data and Key does note that Michigan politics are undergoing a change. *American State Politics: An Introduction* (New York, 1956).

[4] The 1955 and 1957 Republican state conventions have been marked by floor fights over the state party chairmanship in which General Motors and Ford managements were reported to have backed opposing candidates. *Detroit News*, February 20, 1955 and February 9, 1957.

The study is divided into two distinct parts. The major questions in the first part can be stated quite simply: Have the new or more overt party alignments produced any unusual voting patterns? More specifically, do voters in rural areas show a reluctance to vote for the candidates of a party that is closely identified with a politically active labor organization? Corollary questions follow: In this type of party situation, have the Democratic and the Republican strongholds shifted? To what extent is either party gaining or losing in various types of counties within the state?

In the second part of our analysis, we ask what accounts for the voting differences among cities within the same and different size classifications. Does the size of the place in which voters reside account for the variation in the two-party vote among Michigan cities, or is it necessary to examine other variables to explain what occurs?

I. VOTING TRENDS IN MICHIGAN COUNTIES

For our purposes, Michigan's eighty-three counties were classified into six county types—urban, farm-urban, farm, mineral, forest upper, and forest lower. These county types were determined on the basis of the dominant type or types of economic activity, or, in the absence of a dominant economic activity, on the basis of a geographic section of the state.

Counties having 5,000 or more production workers employed in manufacturing, or in which the value added by manufacturers exceeds fifty million dollars, are defined as urban counties; or, if the value of farm products sold is more than ten per cent of the value added by manufacturers, as farm-urban counties.[5] Following this definition, thirteen counties were classified as urban and seven as farm-urban.

Counties not meeting the above criteria and in which the value of farm products sold exceeds five million dollars are defined as farm counties. Twenty-one counties fall in this class.

Counties having one thousand or more persons employed in mining are defined as mineral counties.[6] Four met this criterion. A fifth was added because mining was found to be the dominant type of economic activity, although fewer than 1,000 persons are engaged in mining. All five mineral counties are located in the upper peninsula.

These four county types account for forty-six of Michigan's eighty-three counties. The remaining counties were classified on a simple geographic basis, *i.e.*, as in the upper or lower peninsula, and designated forest lower and forest upper, as types. The term *forest* has no precise statistical meaning here and merely signifies cut-over areas.[7]

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[5] U. S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, *Census of Manufactures, 1954*, State Bulletin MC-121, Michigan (Washington, 1957); *1954 Census of Agriculture*, Vol. I, Part 6, Michigan (Washington, 1956).

[6] U. S. Bureau of the Census, *U. S. Census of Population: 1950*, Vol. II, *Characteristics of the Population*, Part 22, Michigan, Chapter B (Washington, 1952).

[7] The counties falling in each type are listed as follows: *Urban* (13): Calhoun, Genesee, Ingham, Jackson, Kalamazoo, Kent, Macomb, Midland, Muskegon, Oakland, Saginaw,

In measuring voting patterns and party strength in various county types, the votes cast for the Republican and Democratic gubernatorial candidates in each of the biennial fall elections from 1948–1958 are used.[8] A drawback of this measure is that it may exaggerate slightly the strength of the Democratic party, for any increase in Democratic strength so reflected may rest on a foundation no more nor less substantial than the personal popularity of G. Mennen Williams. The trends over six elections in the percentages of the two-party vote received by the candidates for governor in the different types of counties are shown in Table I.

In addition, we analyzed the variances to determine whether voting within any particular county type could be meaningfully differentiated from voting in the other types. Our hypothesis was that the total variance in voting percentages among the county types was significantly greater than the total variance in voting percentages within the county types for each election. The results of the calculations support this hypothesis well beyond the .01 level of confidence.[9]

The figures in Table I show the very narrow margins by which the Democratic candidate won the 1950 and 1952 elections compared with his large pluralities in the 1954 and 1956 elections. As expected, the urban county type consistently produces the highest percentage of Democratic votes. But Table I also draws attention to the fact that the Democrats find considerable support outside the highly urbanized areas. Mineral and forest-upper county types show clear Democratic majorities. Furthermore, in the 1954 and subsequent elections the Democrats have received a higher percentage of the two-party vote in the farm, farm-urban, and forest-lower county types than at any time prior to 1954, though Republican majorities are found in these types, which include most of the "outstate" counties in the lower peninsula.

Certain limitations attend the use of the percentage figures. For one thing,

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Washtenaw, Wayne; *Farm-Urban* (7): Bay, Berrien, Lenawee, Monroe, Ottawa, St. Clair, St. Joseph; *Farm* (21): Allegan, Barry, Branch, Cass, Clinton, Eaton, Gratiot, Hillsdale, Huron, Ionia, Isabella, Lapeer, Livingston, Mason, Montcalm, Newaygo, Oceana, Sanilac, Shiawassee, Tuscola, Van Buren; *Mineral* (5): Gogebic, Houghton, Iron, Keweenaw, Marquette; *Forest Lower* (27): Alcona, Alpena, Antrim, Arenac, Benzie, Charlevoix, Cheboygan, Clare, Crawford, Emmet, Gladwin, Grand Traverse, Iosco, Kalkaska, Lake, Leelanau, Manistee, Mecosta, Missaukee, Montmorency, Ogemaw, Osceola, Oscoda, Otsego, Presque Isle, Roscommon, Wexford; *Forest Upper* (10): Alger, Baraga, Chippewa, Delta, Dickinson, Luce, Mackinac, Menominee, Ontonagon, Schoolcraft.

[8] Except for 1958 returns, all election statistics were obtained from the *Michigan Manual* (Lansing: Secretary of State, biennially). Returns for the 1958 election were obtained directly from the Elections Division of the Secretary of State's Office.

[9] The F values for the respective elections are: 1948, 13.41; 1950, 20.26; 1952, 24.43; 1954, 17.88; 1956, 16.70; 1958, 16.74 where $F\alpha.01$ $(n_1=5,\ n_2=80)=3.25$. The importance of the analysis of variance test can hardly be over-estimated in this instance since it indicates that the county type classifications are more than mere artifacts. We also calculated the coefficients of variation for both parties by county type in each election; but the results of this latter analysis were inconclusive.

TABLE I. DEMOCRATIC AND REPUBLICAN VOTE FOR GOVERNOR, AS A PERCENTAGE OF THE TOTAL TWO-PARTY VOTE, BY COUNTY TYPE: MICHIGAN, 1948–1958

Election Year	Percentages by County Type and Party												State-Wide Percentage		Democratic State-Wide Plurality
	Urban		Farm Urban		Farm		Mineral		Forest Lower		Forest Upper				
	D	R	D	R	D	R	D	R	D	R	D	R	D	R	
1948	58.8	41.2	34.9	65.1	35.8	64.2	52.3	47.7	38.0	62.0	52.6	47.4	53.9	46.1	163,854
1950	54.7	45.3	39.1	60.9	34.2	65.8	52.5	47.5	36.3	63.7	52.0	48.0	50.1	49.9	1,154
1952	54.8	45.2	38.9	61.1	32.9	67.1	50.1	49.9	32.8	67.2	51.2	48.8	50.2	49.8	8,618
1954	60.1	39.9	45.5	54.5	39.5	60.5	60.2	39.8	44.2	55.8	57.3	42.7	55.8	44.2	253,008
1956	58.5	41.5	43.8	56.2	40.5	59.5	57.7	42.3	43.0	57.0	55.0	45.0	54.8	45.2	290,313
1958	57.3	42.7	41.3	58.7	37.1	62.9	57.1	42.9	40.6	59.4	55.0	45.0	53.1	46.9	147,344

they fail to indicate the voting magnitudes in each county type. Furthermore, a candidate's percentage is a result not only of how many of his adherents turn out to vote for him, but also of the turnout for the opposing candidate. Percentages are of limited value, then, in showing how the Democratic and Republican candidates are faring from one election to another.

A different measure of party competition within the county types can be derived from the use of semi-logarithmic graphs. On these graphs (Charts I and II) are plotted the aggregated votes cast in each county type. Attention is directed to the comparative slope of the lines representing the proportionate changes in each party's vote for the six successive elections. The distance separating the lines for each county type indicates the degree of competitiveness in each election. For example, the slight tendency of the Democratic and Republican lines to converge in the urban county type between 1956 and 1958 indicates the closer competition occurring in that county type in the later election.

The striking feature shown by the charts is the nature of voting competition in the county types in the off-year elections, 1950, 1954, and 1958. In 1950 a curious reversal of traditional Michigan voting patterns occurred. In this year and in the subsequent off-year elections the absence of a presidential race did not automatically spell defeat for the Democratic gubernatorial aspirant. Prior to the formation of the coalition in 1948 the Democrats, dominated by the so-called old guard and noticeably lacking in organization, had had to depend on the coattail effects of national victories to carry them into statewide office. From 1900 to 1948, Democrats had won the governorship only four times, in 1912, 1932, 1936 and 1940—all presidential years. The first off-year election victory of the century for the Democrats is difficult to explain from our data. Election analysts attributed it to the heavy labor support in urban areas, but the slope of the lines shown on the graphs between 1948 and 1950 reveals that the Democrats suffered their heaviest voting losses in the urban and farm-urban county types. In any event, the election was so extremely close—the Democratic state-wide plurality being only 1,154 votes—that any generalization from these data would be suspect.

The slope of the lines between 1952 and 1954 indicates that the Democrats turned out nearly the same number of voters in both elections, whereas the Republican vote dropped off sharply from the presidential year turnout. In the 1954 election, the Democratic urban vote, as can be seen from the graphs, nearly equaled the state-wide Republican vote. The Democrats enjoyed their most favorable competitive position in this off-year, widening the gap in all the county types where they had had a majority and narrowing it in those in which they had been in the minority. No simple explanation for this electoral decision comes to mind, but among the factors that might be suggested are: a decline in farm prices, a recession and unemployment in the state, and the renovation of the state Democratic party organization, highlighted by the personal popularity of the incumbent governor.

The results of the 1958 election reflect still a different competitive situation.



CHART I. Number of Votes Cast for the Democratic and Republican Candidates for Governor in Michigan, State-Wide and in Urban, Farm-Urban, and Forest Upper County Types, 1948–1958.



CHART II. Number of Votes Cast for the Democratic and Republican Candidates for Governor in Michigan in Farm, Forest Lower, and Mineral County Types, 1948–1958.

Table I shows that Williams' plurality in 1958 was considerably smaller than in the two previous elections. Post-election commentators, anxious to explain the statistically improved Republican showing at the polls (as reflected in the vote for governor), assumed that a low voter turnout in the urban areas, particularly in Wayne County which includes Detroit, together with a high turnout in the "out-state" rural areas, were the key factors. The charts provide a convenient and accurate means of testing the validity of these explanations. They show that Democratic voters in *urban* counties turned out in fewer numbers in 1958 than in 1956, but at approximately the same strength as in 1954. The severity of the 1958 recession's impact on Michigan did not, as some expected, drive Democratic voters to the polls in greater numbers than in the previous off-year election; they already controlled the state government. Only in a minor sense can the decline in strength of the Democratic party be attributed to off-year apathy.

Can the better Republican showing in 1958 be attributed to a resurgence of strength in the traditionally Republican "outstate" areas? While the Republican candidate improved the party's 1956 percentage of the vote in sixty-nine of the eighty-three counties, these percentage gains did not represent any substantial increase in the aggregate vote. The largest Republican gains came in the *urban* county type where Democratic pluralities of approximately 310,000 in 1954 and 380,000 in 1956 were reduced to 239,000 in 1958. Republicans, then, helped themselves most on a state-wide basis when they dented the Democratic pluralities in urban counties. Here, where the recession was most felt, they were the "outs."

The incontestable conclusion drawn from these data is that the close and open association of organized labor (the CIO) with the Democratic party has not deterred voters in traditionally Republican sectors from casting their ballots for the Democratic gubernatorial candidate. Yet this conclusion dwindles in significance when the standard and well-known explanations for Democratic success in Michigan are cited. One is the personal popularity of the incumbent governor; the other is the extensive organizational effort of the party as evidenced by the more vigorous and coordinated assault on local offices and increased campaign activity in the outstate areas over the last few years. That the Democratic outcome in 1958 was more a party than a personal victory is shown both by the fact that two candidates for state-wide offices out-polled Williams on the ticket, and by the increased number of Democrats in the lower house of the state legislature.

II. VOTING PATTERNS IN MICHIGAN CITIES

In the second part of our analysis, we attempt to assess the importance of certain variables affecting voting behavior in Michigan cities. Among these the size of the place in which the voter resides has frequently been singled out as significant. In a study of voting in Wisconsin cities Leon D. Epstein found differences in the voting patterns between large (over 50,000) and medium-sized (10,000–24,999 and 25,000–49,999) cities: the percentage of the two-party vote cast for the Wisconsin Democratic gubernatorial candidates from 1948 to 1954 was about ten points lower in the medium-sized than in the large cities. In the absence of readily available occupational breakdowns to explain this, Epstein states that "it is tempting to speculate on the possibility that the difference in voting between large and medium-sized cities is a function of total size."[10]

Our attention in this Michigan study focused on the 1950 gubernatorial vote in eighty-four cities over 5,000. We tried first to determine whether differences in voting patterns existed between large and medium-sized cities but found it impossible to use the aggregate Democratic or Republican votes cast in all cities within a population class as a sound basis for comparisons. Wide variations in the Democratic or Republican percentage of votes cast emerged among cities within the same size category. The extent of the variation is indicated by Table II. Here the number of cities occurring in five percentage-point ranges are shown; the ranges refer to the proportion of the two-party vote received by the Democratic candidate for governor in 1950.[11] The misleading character of the average percentage based on aggregate votes cast in all cities in a population class is best illustrated by the distribution of cities in the 5,000–9,999 class. The Democratic candidate received 42.1 per cent of all votes cast in these cities. Yet only one of the thirty-four Michigan cities in this size category actually had a percentage that fell in the same 5-point range as this average figure. In six cities the Democratic percentage was under 30.0 . In three it lay between 65.0 and 69.9 per cent. One city gave over 70.0 per cent of its vote to the Democratic candidate. We concluded that the size of the place was an inadequate variable to explain voting patterns in Michigan cities.

TABLE II. PERCENTAGE OF THE 1950 TWO-PARTY VOTE FOR THE DEMOCRATIC CANDIDATE FOR GOVERNOR: MICHIGAN CITIES OVER 5,000, BY POPULATION CLASS

Population Class	Number of Cities	Average Dem. Per cent of All Votes*	Number of Cities Within Each Percentage-Point Range									
			Under 30.0%	30.0–34.9	35.0–39.9	40.0–44.9	45.0–49.9	50.0–54.9	55.0–59.9	60.0–64.9	65.0–69.9	70.0% and Over
Over 50,000	10	58.8				4	2	1	2	1		
25,000 to 49,999	10	52.3			3		5			1		1
10,000 to 24,999	30	44.4	3	4	5	4	5	4		2		3
5,000 to 9,999	34	42.1	6	3	10	1	6	3	1		3	1

* Per cent of aggregate two-party vote cast for the Democratic candidate in all cities in the population class.

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[10] "Size of Place and the Two-Party Vote," *Western Political Quarterly*, Vol. 9 (March, 1956), pp. 138–50. See also his *Politics in Wisconsin* (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1958), pp. 57–76.

[11] The figures for 1950 are used in order to get consistency with the remainder of this analysis and correspondence with 1950 census data. A breakdown identical to Table II was performed for the 1956 gubernatorial vote and revealed similarly wide variations within the size categories.

What other factors might account for the observed differences among cities within the same and different population classes? A number of variables could be suggested, among them the ethnic composition and religious character of the city, the educational and income levels of its population, its geographic location, and the composition of its labor force. In this study we analyzed the effect of the last of these.

Our hypothesis was that a substantial part of the variation in the party percentages of the vote in Michigan cities could be explained in terms of the differences in the occupational structure from one city to another. More precisely, we expected to find a positive correlation between the percentage of a city's total labor force composed of managers, officials, and proprietors and the percentage of the two-party vote received by the Republican candidate for governor. We expected to find a similar correlation between the percentage of a city's total labor force composed of laborers, operatives, and kindred workers, *i.e.*, unskilled and semi-skilled, and the percentage of the two-party vote cast for the Democratic candidate for governor. The assumption is, of course, that people falling within these respective occupational classifications have constituted the hard core of each party's vote. Since quantitative voting and census data are available, a statistically precise formulation can be given to these relationships, and the methods employed may be relevant to other election studies.

We calculated linear correlations between the percentages of the total labor force in each of the two occupational classifications according to the 1950 census, and the corresponding percentages of the two-party vote received in that year's elections by the gubernatorial candidates in each city.[12] The correlation coefficient and the linear regression line for each party's vote were computed for all 84 municipal units over 5,000. In addition, separate coefficients were calculated for cities in three population classes—5,000–9,999; 10,000–24,999; and over 25,000. For each coefficient of linear correlation the coefficient of determination was also derived, by squaring the former statistic. The results of these computations are presented in Table III.

In Michigan cities over 5,000, the Republican vote (as a per cent of the two-party vote) correlates .77 with the percentage of managers in the total labor force. For the Democratic vote the correlation with the percentage of laborers is .68. These coefficients are relatively high and both are statistically significant at the .001 level of confidence. They indicate that these occupational classifications in Michigan cities account for a substantial percentage of the variation in the party vote. The extent to which occupational groupings account for the variations in the respective party vote is shown by the coefficients of determination, expressed in percentage terms. For example, the .77 coefficient of correlation between managers and the Republican vote for governor signifies that 59.3 per cent of the variation in the Republican vote can be explained in

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[12] Occupational and labor force data were obtained from U. S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, *U. S. Census of Population: 1950*, Vol. II, *Characteristics of the Population*, Part 22, Michigan, Chapter B (Washington, 1952).

TABLE III. COEFFICIENTS OF CORRELATION AND DETERMINATION: PERCENTAGE OF MANAGERS IN THE TOTAL LABOR FORCE WITH 1950 REPUBLICAN PERCENTAGE OF TWO-PARTY GUBERNATORIAL VOTE; AND PERCENTAGE OF LABORERS WITH DEMOCRATIC PERCENTAGE OF THE SAME TOTAL VOTE: MICHIGAN CITIES OVER 5000, BY POPULATION CLASS

Pop. Class	No. of Cities	Managers and Republican Vote		Laborers and Democratic Vote	
		Coefficient of Correlation	Coefficient of Determination (×100)	Coefficient of Correlation	Coefficient of Determination (×100)
5,000– 9,999	34	.78	60.7%	.69	46.9%
10,000–24,999	30	.79	62.2	.79	62.4
25,000 and over	20	.75	56.6	.82	66.8
All cities	84	.77	59.3	.68	46.2

terms of the ratio of the managerial group to the total labor force. The remaining 40.7 per cent is attributable to other variables.

The magnitudes of the coefficients of determination (59.3 per cent and 46.2 per cent) are noteworthy, because they show both the substantial influence of the occupational variable on each party's vote, and also the extent to which other factors enter. Clearly, neither party's vote is the product of a single occupational or "class" factor.

Two observations are warranted by a comparison of the correlation coefficients. The higher over-all coefficient for the Republican vote, as well as its consistency within the three size categories, suggests that people in the managerial group tend to vote Republican in the same degree regardless of the size of city they live in. On the other hand, the coefficients for the Democratic vote show that laborers are distinctly less inclined to vote Democratic in small cities than in large. Particularly noteworthy is the high correlation between laborers and the Democratic vote in cities over 25,000. The much lower correlation coefficient in cities under 10,000 suggests that the labor vote in the smaller places is interfered with by factors not present in the larger cities. Very likely one of the most important of these intervening variables is the role of union political organization in the larger cities, often absent in the smaller ones.

Through the calculation of the regression lines for each party's vote (by the least squares method) it was possible to obtain indications as to other potentially important variables affecting voting behavior in these cities. The expected percentages of Republican and Democratic votes in each city were calculated on the basis of the regression line equations.[13] We then examined the most deviant cases, which we construed as those cities in which the actual percentage was more than five percentage points above or below the expected percentage. These out-of-line cities were tabulated by the county type in which they were located. The results of the distribution are presented in Table IV.

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[13] The equation giving the expected percentage of the Democratic vote based on the percentage of laborers in the total labor force was $Y = 13.67 + 1.16x$, where Y is the expected percentage of the two-party vote received by the Democratic candidate for gover-

When we recall that Republican strength is concentrated in the farm-urban, farm, and forest-lower county types and that the Democrats are in a majority in the other types, the tabulations take on special significance. For example, the twenty cities in which the actual percentage of the Republican vote was more than five percentage points *below* what we would expect on the basis of the percentage of managers in the labor force were all located in urban, mineral or forest-upper county types, *i.e.*, predominantly Democratic areas. All twenty-two cities in which the Democratic vote deviated *above* the expected percentages were similarly situated. While the pattern of the deviations for "Republican above" and "Democratic below" is by no means so clear-cut, there is sufficient evidence to conclude that areas of party dominance and/or geographic

TABLE IV. DISTRIBUTION OF MICHIGAN CITIES DEVIATING MORE THAN FIVE PERCENTAGE POINTS ABOVE OR BELOW EXPECTED PERCENTAGES (BASED ON OCCUPATIONAL COMPOSITION) OF 1950 GUBERNATORIAL VOTE FOR REPUBLICAN AND DEMOCRATIC CANDIDATES, BY COUNTY TYPE

Party Vote	Urban	Mineral	Forest Upper	Farm Urban	Farm	Forest Lower	Total
	(D)*	(D)	(D)	(R)	(R)	(R)	
			(number of cities)				
Republican							
Deviations above[a]	9	1		7	5	4	26
Deviations below[a]	15	1	4				20
Democratic							
Deviations above[b]	18	1	3				22
Deviations below[b]	4	2		7	5	3	21

[a] Deviates more than five percentage points from the expected percentage based on the percentage of managers in the city's labor force.

[b] Deviates more than five percentage points from the expected percentage based on the percentage of laborers in the city's labor force.

* Letters in parentheses indicate the party dominant in the county type.

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nor in 1950 and x is the percentage of the total labor force constituted by laborers in 1950. The equation $Y=29.87+2.58x$ describes the regression line relating the Republican vote to the managerial classification, where Y equals the expected percentage of the two-party vote received by the Republican candidate for governor and x is the percentage of the total labor force composed of managers in the same year cited above. Substituting the known x in both equations for each of the cities in our study, it was possible to calculate the expected percentage of the vote (Y) received by each of the candidates and to compare it with the percentage actually received.

location are additional variables influencing the gubernatorial vote in Michigan cities.

These results must be viewed in the light of several important limitations. Only one election, and the votes for one state-wide office, are studied. The same analysis applied to other years and to the votes cast for other state-wide offices would enrich the data, but this is beyond our present scope. Also, the occupational figures used are dated, being based on the 1950 census. We have attempted to overcome this by using 1950 voting results. A similar analysis for later years encounters the lack of reliable current census figures. Still another limitation is that our analysis considers the statistical effect of only one variable, although we suggest the influence of some others. Undoubtedly, multiple correlation analysis, with several variables, would be appropriate if measures of the latter were available. Finally, some recognition must be given to the peculiarities of the Michigan voting and party situation. Other states have their own special characteristics. Similar analyses in other states, however, could lead to more precise statements and comparisons of inter-state voting differences.

III. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

In the first part of our analysis we classified Michigan counties into six types and examined the voting trends in each type. On this basis we were able to identify the ecological areas of Republican and Democratic strength, as well as to measure the degree of competition between the parties within each area and the state. Contrary to what is commonly supposed, we found that voters outside the industrialized areas have not bolted the Democratic party because it has become closely and openly identified with organized labor groups electioneering in the Detroit area. In fact, the Democrats have increased their vote in all areas throughout the state in recent years. The conclusion we draw from this is that the two parties are too firmly established in American state politics to cause voters to desert either party in wholesale lots because of a reshuffling of party control.

The yield from our study of voting trends is modest since perhaps no more than one segment of a cycle has been scrutinized. But the techniques used here may have a wider applicability. In brief, we have attempted to show that it is possible to develop a firm basis for describing shifts in party strength and voter cleavages that cut across the traditional urban-rural division so frequently used in analyzing voting trends.

The second part of our analysis focused on vote variations within urbanized areas, cities over 5,000. Our finding was that the size of place in which the Michigan voter resides is not a reliable guide to his voting behavior. We have shown instead that a large part of the variation in the two-party vote in a city can be explained in terms of its occupational composition, although a multiple correlation analysis would be needed to assess the additional variables known to influence voting behavior.

POLITICAL PARTIES AND DECISION MAKING IN THREE SOUTHERN COUNTIES*

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Many modern theorists of political parties see the party system not only as an adjunct to democracy but as a necessary precondition of it. In an almost complete reversal of classical doctrine, these theorists argue that competition between parties, preferably two, is the very life blood of democracy.[1] This paper attempts an evaluation of this thesis, which may be called the "organizational theory" of democracy, as it applies to conditions in three counties in a southern state.

Three cases do not warrant conclusions extrapolated beyond our data, for any truly rigorous evaluation would require more cases in more different types of situations. This limitation particularly holds for extrapolations to national governments, since we can not assume that parties operate similarly at all levels. However, the choice of three units of local government makes possible a more intensive coverage of the events, men and patterns of politics. Furthermore, they are sufficient for present purposes, for if the organizational theory is to be accepted as completely explanatory, it should apply to all cases. Otherwise it must be viewed as partial, limited to special cases, in need of further elaboration and refinement, or, at worst, incorrect.

In this context my aim is to question the thesis as a general theory of democracy. In every respect the one county of the three which corresponds almost ideally to the model of two-party competition shows the least popular and electoral participation in decision making. The other two counties, both variants of the one-party southern system, consistently exhibit more. On the evidence here, the organizational theory of democracy over-emphasizes the importance of electoral competition among well organized political parties, to the neglect of other conditions. Among these neglected conditions are (a) the involvement of public discussion of current issues in electoral contests, (b) the degree to which the political organizations that compete for the vote are also important participants in the decision-making process, (c) the closeness of the party competition, and (d) the relation of parties at one level of government to parties at other levels.

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[1] Cf. Joseph Schumpeter, *Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy* (New York, 1942); E. E. Schattschneider, *Party Government* (New York, 1942); Committee on Political Parties, American Political Science Association, "Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System," this REVIEW (Supplement to Vol. XLIV, No. 3); Alexander Heard, *A Two-Party South?* (Chapel Hill, 1952); Anthony Downs, *An Economic Theory of Democracy* (New York, 1957). These works are not all equally explicit in the statement of the theory, but all in varying degrees accept it, particularly those of Schumpeter and Downs.

I. THE PROBLEM

The controlling assumption of the organizational theory is that organized activity is fundamental to modern political conditions, even though organization may lead to oligarchies. The theory makes no attempt to deny oligarchy and the existence of ruling elites. Rather it focuses on the potential divisions in the elite and looks to competition for votes as the regulative principle. The words of Schumpeter are as illustrative as any:

> We now take the view that the role of the people is to produce a government, or else an intermediate body which in turn will produce a national executive or government. And we define: the democratic method is that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people's vote.[2]

To accomplish this goal Schumpeter indicates that the individuals competing for votes and power will be divided among themselves into organized parties each striving to control government. Without competition, as in a one-party system, the electorate lacks choice and then there is no democracy. With too much competition, as in a multi-party system, either no stable government is possible or the choices made by the public become confused, distorted, even transformed in the parliamentary trading. So, according to the theory, parties (or factions) are not to be regarded as malignant tumors in a democratic polity, as they were in much early democratic theory. Rather, they are seen as the necessary structural mechanism through which democracy is realized, with the number of parties and the nature of competition being the chief regulative principles.[3]

Since this theory is based on the connection between democracy and parties, to evaluate it we must develop some standards other than electoral competitiveness. In turn we must put these criteria into hypotheses which are implicit in the theory and which must hold in our three cases if the theory is to be accepted as fully explanatory.

A first standard for judging the theory is that the men who actually make public decisions should hold this privilege primarily because of their success in electoral competition. At the minimum this requires a close connection between those who have power[4] and influential persons in the political parties. At the maximum, according to the theory, it means that those who make public decisions would not have that power if they had not been electorally successful. That is, persons who participate in the decision-making process must be *electorally dependent.* Otherwise, party competition would be of little value, for the ability to take part in making decisions could be retained regardless of the outcome of elections.[5] Putting this criterion in terms of the requirements of the organizational theory we have the first of two formal hypotheses: *The proportion of electorally dependent persons participating in the making of important public decisions is more likely to be greater in an area of high party competitiveness than in an area of low party competitiveness.*[6]

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[2] Joseph Schumpeter, *op. cit.*, p. 269.

[3] Perhaps the most explicit definition of democracy in terms of parties is that by Downs. In serial order he lists eight conditions which must be present to qualify a government as democratic. Five of these have parties as their central concern; two deal with the citizen as a voter; and a final one specifies periodic elections "which cannot be altered by the party in power acting alone." Anthony Downs, *op. cit.*, pp. 23–24.

The relationship between general power and political influence can also be investigated by ascertaining the proportion of the politically most influential persons who participate regularly in making important decisions. Obviously, there must be some proportion of such persons, for otherwise electoral success would bring no increments in general power; and we should also expect to find this proportion larger in a two-party system than in other systems if the organizational theory is operative. Although this proportion will be investigated, it is a less discriminating test of our hypothesis. For instance, the politically influential persons may all gain in general power and yet be relatively unimportant if there is a large number of persons who are powerful and who do not owe their positions of power to politics. Also, these same persons may not be electorally dependent for their power.

A second standard then is that persons who make decisions should be held accountable for their actions through the electoral process. If, after a decision is reached, the persons responsible for it are accountable for their actions in elections, then the electorate is placing a control on the decision-making process. The public may not participate directly in the making of decisions, but by approving or disapproving the candidacy of men who have made the decisions the public is holding a weapon of control over the men of power. This standard can be phrased as the second of our formal hypotheses: *Participants in the making of*

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[4] We take power to mean the ability of a person to move other persons, goods, and services toward a desired goal involving the change, interpretation or maintenance of policy, defined as an agreed upon means of allocating goods, services, personnel and values in a given social structure. So defined, power can be viewed as a series of relations among persons and can thus be described structurally. For a concise but thorough discussion of this view of power, see Floyd Hunter, *Community Power Structure* (Chapel Hill, 1953), ch. I.

[5] Obviously we need not maintain that this requires every man of power to be a successful competitor for the vote, but it does mean that a goodly proportion of those who participate in decision making owe their participation, directly or indirectly, to the electoral process.

[6] It must be noted that this and the other formal hypotheses are not to be taken in their present form as hypotheses descriptively oriented to a specific body of data. Their translation into empirically more concrete statements is undertaken in the analysis of the data.

important public decisons are more likely to be held electorally accountable in an area of high party competitiveness than in an area of low party competitiveness.[7]

A third criterion, namely governmental responsiveness, is also desirable, but it was abandoned here for lack of data. Defensible indicators of responsiveness would have required *inter alia* an investigation of the attitudes of the general population, and we were in no position to obtain such data on all counties. Another aspect of the project from which this study stems did involve a survey of the general population, but it was focused on citizen participation in politics rather than on attitudes, and it was not made in our two-party county.

II. THE SETTING AND METHOD

To gain information we selected three counties in a southern state with two main criteria in mind. First, the counties selected should be as similar as possible in population size and composition, economic base, and other social and demographic measures. Second, each county should be as different as possible in the form and the competitiveness of its political parties. With a practical limit of three counties, the most desirable combination would have been a two-party county, a one-party, bi-factional county, and a multi-party county.

For our two-party type we selected a county here given the fictitious name of Lincoln. During the last three decades each party has held office in this county at various times, the Republicans a few times more than the Democrats. The strength of each party has been so consistent that only twice in that period has the winning party amassed more than 55 per cent of the vote and never more than 60 per cent. Structurally, Lincoln's parties are strong "organization" parties. In both, and especially among the Republicans, the ideas of organization support, regularity and party loyalty are most important. Neither is without internal factions, but the close co-operation and careful organization found on both sides during elections greatly overshadows intramural squabbles. Of the two, the Democrats are more subject to primary fights, a condition undoubtedly related to the fact that their party is dominant in the state. Statewide primary contests for Democratic nominations bring their divisions within Lincoln. For local office, primary contests are much fewer.

Of all three counties, Lincoln corresponds most closely to the ideal type sought in each instance. In fact, it would be hard to conceive of a governmental unit that more clearly approximates the model of a competitive politics with regular contests between two well organized, highly disciplined parties. If any county system is to operate according to the organizational theory of democracy, it should be this county.

A second county, here christened Bryan, is a fair example of the one-party, bi-factional type, although its type-correspondence is less accurate than Lincoln's. It is completely dominated by the Democratic party. Not since 1944 has the Republican party even named any candidates for local office. Republican candidates for the presidency have won a few votes, but never more than a quarter of the vote since the 1920s.

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[7] This hypothesis should be viewed as one aspect of popular control of policy making. Almost all democrats since the Eighteenth Century—be they classicists, republicans, populists, parliamentarians, or organizationalists—have held that the actions of policy makers should be reviewed by the general public.

Internally, the Democratic party of Bryan County was divided into two warring factions during the period studied. Prior to 1948 the county had been almost completely dominated by a group headed by the county's representative to the state legislature. In addition to his political positions, Mark Kenyon (all names are fictitious) was the president of the county's only bank and the president of its largest manufacturing plant. Primary contests were few, and either were won easily by the group's candidate or, as happened in some races for minor offices, were left open to the voters, with none of the contenders receiving the "blessing." In 1948, the Kenyon group was given a mild challenge, and two years later the challengers defeated Kenyon in a very close race; the victor, Horace Riley, won by 13 votes. The new faction won other seats in that year but did not make a clean sweep. In 1952 their victory was almost complete. In 1954, the last year for our data, the Kenyon faction was able to make a few gains, but in the all-important contest for representative Riley defeated his old adversary.

The conflict between the two groups did not always result in high correlations among the votes received by candidates of the same faction. However, our interviews with members of both factions, revealed clearly that each group concerned itself with planning slates of candidates, arranging for financing, using precinct workers for the candidates with the proper blessing, and using governmental offices and access to push their programs. This is in part explained by the almost unique position of the state representative, for in this county, unlike the other two, the state law gave him the prerogative of filling several important offices in the county, including the school board.

For an exact correspondence to a two-party, bi-factional county type the vote should follow a more clear-cut pattern. However, for our purposes this divergence did not seem crucial because the organizational theory makes the existence of some form of planned co-operation determinative rather than the exact nature of the voting pattern. For the theory, the important factors are strong party organization, internal co-operation, and an intense will to defeat the opponent. These were in great supply in Bryan County.

Since there was no multi-party county in the vicinity, the best available alternative type seemed to be a one-party county characterized either by many factions or by the absence of any real factional divisions, along the lines of "friends and neighbors" politics.[8] Our third selection, Jefferson County, is a moderately good example of this latter type. The Democratic party is dominant, for no Republican has held a major county office for more than thirty years.[9] There are no Democratic factions to compare with the two in Bryan

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[8] *Cf.* V. O. Key, Jr., with the assistance of Alexander Heard, *Southern Politics* (New York, 1949), pp. 37–41.

[9] The county surveyor is a Republican and has held that office for many years. The Democrats do not seem concerned about this and they hardly need to be since the position plays an inconsequential role in the determination and execution of county policies.

County, and most candidates run their campaigns on an "every-man-for-himself" basis. Congeries of candidates tend to polarize around a town-country split, but on the crucial test of campaign co-ordination the congeries are not factions. In an earlier day this individualistic type of politics had not prevailed, and a group representing almost all sections of the county had predominated. After two decades this group's fortunes declined in the 1930s and by World War II it was of no consequence, largely because of its own decline in vigor. The war period was politically quiet; most incumbents were returned, usually without opposition. Immediately following the war, political activity increased. Although every serious candidate insured himself of some campaign organization and although for each election *ad hoc* liaisons came into being among two or three candidates, there was no evidence of organized factions concerned with most county offices over a period of several elections.

As in Bryan County, the voting pattern in Jefferson runs partially contrary to what might be expected from this picture. During the county's intense interest over school construction (1947–1952), those who strongly favored the issuance of bonds received votes in inverse relation to those strongly opposed, but candidates without a record on that issue obtained votes in accord with the pattern of "friends and neighbors." No evidence of the general cooperation found in organized factionalism was uncovered.[10]

A comparison of votes in recent presidential elections in the counties, presented in Table I, overestimates the regular Republican strength in all counties. In the one-party counties local Democratic candidates almost always fare better than their presidential counterparts. In Jefferson, for instance, the Democratic candidates for county supervisors received 83 per cent and 76 per cent of the vote in 1948 and 1952 respectively. Even in Lincoln, presidential returns overestimate the Republican appeal, for Republicans lost in 1946 and split with the Democrats in 1950. Furthermore, in presidential years local offices in the two-party county have been won by the party carrying the county for the national ticket; however, the percentage for that party's local candidates has always been smaller than the winning percentage for its presidential candidate.

As might be expected the percentage of citizens who vote is much higher in Lincoln than in the one-party counties, being almost twice their proportions, and approximately the same as the national average. A comparison of turnout percentages for local offices is unrewarding because of the differences in individual circumstances. This is so for the primaries too, though one trend in voter turnout for Democratic primaries is noteworthy. In Bryan, prior to the period of study, the percentage remained rather stationary at approximately 15. Since 1948 the percentage has consistently risen until 1954, when 24 per cent of the population went to the polls. This increase corresponds almost exactly with the development of the factional struggle.

Data on parties, factions, political personalities and election campaigns made up the first category of data gathered. A second category concerned the

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[10] A more complete analysis of these seemingly incongruous findings and of the several dimensions of factionalism is undertaken in an article presently being prepared by the writer.

TABLE I. DEMOCRATIC PERCENTAGE OF TWO-PARTY PRESIDENTIAL VOTE IN THREE SOUTHERN COUNTIES, 1940–1952

	1940	1944	1948[a]	1952
Lincoln	55	45	44	42
Bryan	88	80	86	76
Jefferson	77	69	66	57

[a] The meaning of the two-party vote is slightly misleading, for the Dixiecratic and Progressive candidates received almost 10 per cent of the total vote in Jefferson and approximately 5 per cent in Jefferson. In Lincoln their vote was only one per cent, very possibly the result of the strong notions of party loyalty.

power elites in each county. The identification and description of the power elite was based largely upon questions posed to informants about the more influential men in the area. The usual question went something like this: "Who are the more influential men here in public affairs; that is, men who can swing the most weight and influence other people to get in behind a project?" More detailed knowledge on rankings of different persons in the elite and on their areas of interest and influence was obtained by questions eliciting individual activities and interests.

A third category of data dealt with important decisions, particularly one issue in each county. The close study of a single issue not only served to bring to light many of the practices and processes of decision making and to aid in determining the degree to which political organizations participate in the process, but also served as a means of testing a static conception of the power elite against an action situation.

The selection of a single issue for study was based on several criteria. (1) Some final, or at the minimum some tentative, resolution of the decision must have been achieved. (2) It should have been as recent as possible. (3) It should involve some issue of material importance to many people and be widely perceived as being important. (4) Its resolution required the consideration and action of some governmental agency.

The best fit of the issues selected was in Jefferson where a county bond proposal was chosen. The only criterion on which it was shaky was its lack of immediacy, since the bonds had been approved in a special election three years previous to data gathering. In Lincoln, the principal drawback to the issue selected, another bond election, was that it concerned only one segment of the county, a school district comprising approximately one-third of the population; however, this followed a proposal for a county-wide program which county officials had rejected. The issue studied in Bryan, an attempt to get a new bank chartered, met three of the criteria very well, but was lacking on the fourth point. No local government action is required to secure a bank charter, although a state agency must give its approval; but as the issue progressed local officials and the county's representative to the legislature formally took an interest in the case.

The data were gathered almost completely through personal contacts with residents of the counties. Newspapers and other printed sources were seldom helpful. The most useful data came from conversational and unstructured interviews. All forms of schedules and note-taking during the interviews were kept at a minimum, on the assumption that more formal methods might set an inquisitorial mood and preclude getting the kind of data desired.

The selection of informants was also informal, by a process best described as crescive or "snowballing." Starting with persons known to be influential, the interviewer got leads to others. As more names accumulated, future choices could then be made on existing judgments of influence and of the type of information that might be gained from any one man. This step-by-step technique is in contrast to several recent studies of local elites which have used the more formal procedures of sampling organizational leadership, judges, rating panels, and structured schedules.[11] In one county, Lincoln, it was possible to compare the results of the two techniques, for a survey had been conducted there for another study approximately one year before our data-gathering began. Of the thirteen persons we identified as the top men of power, nine were among the top men in the previous study. Among the four who appeared on the earlier list but not the later, one had left town and another had gone into retirement. The two lists agreed on the three top men. Because of the saving in time, the increased flexibility in interviewing and the greater range of information that can be elicited, the "snowball" technique presents a viable alternative to more elaborate and costly methods.

III. THE ELECTORAL DEPENDENCE OF DECISION MAKERS

If our first formal hypothesis is to hold, three things must occur: (1) Persons with electoral success or political influence must participate in the making of public decisions, *i.e.*, at least a minimum congruence must be found between the electoral and the decision-making processes. (2) In this congruence some decision makers must owe their place in the power elite to electoral success and not to other forms of power.[12] (3) The proportion of such electorally dependent men in the power elite should increase as party competition increases and it should be greatest wherever two parties of nearly equal strength fight for every vote.

On the first point we find that in each county at least half of the very top men of power were heavily involved in the political affairs of their respective counties. Not all of these were office-holders, but each as a candidate or as an adviser participated in electoral campaigns, in planning party strategy and affairs, or in dispensing political plums and punishments. Although the differences among the counties on this point are not great, it is interesting to note that in Jefferson, the non-factional county, all seven of the top men of power were participants in political activities.[13] In the other counties the proportion was slightly less: in Lincoln eight of thirteen men were involved in politics, and in Bryan eight of ten.

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[11] For a detailed description of these techniques see Floyd Hunter, *op. cit.*, Appendix.

[12] A positive answer on at least two of four sources of data, including either (c) or (d) below, was used as the minimum for establishing electoral dependence: (a) Estimates of the power source of an individual by respondents; (b) the political contacts and "capital" used or required in furthering a person's view of a major public issue; (c) the overlap between a person's rise to a position of general power and his career, if any, in political influence; (d) the possibility that a person's position of power was or could be affected by the outcome of elections.

Turning to the second and third points, we found only thirteen men in all three county elites primarily or partially dependent on their electoral success for their participation in decision making. All seven top Jefferson men were among these, but only two of the thirteen in Lincoln and four of the ten in Bryan. This pattern is definitely at variance with the expectations of the organizational theory, which would pick Lincoln, as the county of greatest electoral competition, to show the greatest electoral dependence of power elite.[14]

When we look at the proportion of politically influential men who are members of the top power elite, we find the pattern similar though perhaps not so extreme. In Jefferson, one of eight top politicians was not adjudged a member of the power elite; in Bryan two of ten; but in Lincoln seven of fifteen. Among these seven from the two-party county so excluded were the chairmen of both parties and a former chairman of the Republican Party who was chairman of the board of supervisors.[15] As previously noted this ratio is not as discriminating a test of the organizational theory as the ratio of politically dependent persons in the power elite. When the two are coupled, and when both tests lead to the same conclusion, the figures assume more importance. The inference is the stronger because in Bryan and Lincoln most of the politically most influential men who *were* members of the power elite were *not* electorally dependent. No matter from what perspective the proportions inside the power elites of the three counties are viewed, the same conclusion is indicated: the organizational theory of democracy has not been an adequate predictor of the data.

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[13] In order to make the lists for each county as comparable as possible, no *a priori* number was stipulated. Instead the men of power were listed roughly in order of their power, and the cut point was made at the most significant break in the list. Consequently, a different number of men in each county were listed as members of the power elite.

[14] Obviously no incontrovertible conclusions can be drawn from such small numbers; however, the reliability of the pattern can perhaps be increased by noting its stability when different cut points in the membership of the power elites are used. If, instead of making the cuts where a "natural" break was indicated, we take an arbitrary figure, say 15, essentially the same pattern is found. The actual figures are (with the politically dependent persons listed first) two and thirteen for Lincoln, five and ten for Bryan, and eleven and four for Jefferson. These figures when placed on a contingency table yield a chi square of 11.70, significant at the .01 level of probability with two degrees of freedom. On the other hand, if the number actually used in Jefferson, seven, were made the limit for the others, then there would have been no electorally dependent men in the power elite of Lincoln County. There are no chi squares for this latter cut-point and the originals for the values are too small to permit analysis of contingency.

[15] The notion of political leader excludes the politician who is electorally successful for administrative posts for himself but who otherwise is not viewed as being influential in politics. Only if he successfully used this skill in aiding other candidates, in winning posts other than the routine ones, or in shaping party affairs would he be considered a political leader.

IV. ELECTORAL ACCOUNTABILITY

The concept of accountability in democratic institutions has to do ultimately with the degree to which decision makers are controlled by the electorate and the closeness of fit between decisions reached and decisions desired by the public. Any thorough analysis of accountability would require data on the public's knowledge of the ways of decision making and on its ability to reward or punish, and hence, detailed information on the thinking and actions of the general citizenry. Lacking this, we must use indirect indicators.

The first two indicators have to do with the relation between decision making and political organization: according to the organizational theory, the political organizations involved in electoral contests must also be involved in decision making. A coalescing should occur between the two, for otherwise a change in party control may have no effect on the structural bases of decision making. We should therefore expect political organizations to be more frequently the channels of decision making in an area of strong party competition than elsewhere.

On this, our data are neither thoroughly in line with the theory nor directly counter to it. Bryan County, the one-party, bi-factional type, showed an almost complete overlap between decision making and political organization. No major decision has been reached in recent years except through one of the factions. On the question of a new bank the struggle came to be almost a direct conflict between the two factions. Few sources of political influence, whether in the county, in the state or in Washington, were left unused. In other cases most of the men who worked together to bring about the resolution of some public issue were the same men who worked together in politics. At the other extreme was the two-party county, Lincoln. On no important issues were the parties the means of creating policy or "selling" it to the public. Somewhere in between was Jefferson, the non-factional or multi-factional county. The patterns of organization in the decision on school bonds were largely *ad hoc,* but there were indications that relationships established during past campaigns were used. Whatever the exact appraisal, it is clear that the connection between the two in Jefferson was neither so strong as that in Bryan nor so weak as that in Lincoln.

A second indicator of political accountability is the concern for the possible effects of a decision on future electoral chances. If, as the organizational theory holds, candidates seek the vote in order to govern, it hardly seems possible they could do so without also being concerned over the potential effects of a decision on future elections. Were we to argue differently, we would have to make one of several assumptions: (a) that elected officers do not make important decisions and do not as candidates have to make this calculation; (b) that once power is gained it is permanently retained; or (c) that persons who participate in making such decisions are motivated solely by "God, country and humanity," with no overtones of personal gratification. Since the first two assumptions violate the premises of the organizational theory and since the third is hardly realistic, the original argument is preferable. We would expect, therefore, that concern with the electoral effects of a decision would be greatest in areas of strong party competition and weakest in areas without such competition, with the proviso that this concern must be positive, not negative, *i.e.*, if the concern is only a means of escaping a decision of any sort, then the presence of that sort of concern is not necessarily an indicator of accountability.

If we look only at the positive side of this in each county, we get the same pattern shown on the previous indicator. In Lincoln County there was practically no attempt in election campaigns to discuss any issues other than those which had hardened through the years as expected arguments between old friends. In Bryan each of the two factions in the Democratic Party staked its past and furture on issues which had just been decided or were in process of resolution. In a number of important ways, the dynamism behind some of the decisions was specifically based on their estimated effects on future elections. One such case was the backing given by one faction to an attempt to get a second bank in the county in order to cut into the economic power of the opposing faction. Several numbers of the Riley faction admitted that they were working for a new bank in hopes of reducing the power of Kenyon.

Although the position of Jefferson is again between the other two, one of the clearest examples of using an issue for future electoral gain occurred in that county. The leading opponent of the school bond issue was undoubtedly motivated by a desire to solidify his standing with the rural segment of the population. Later, when the bond issue had losts its saliency, the same man brought forth a proposal to change the composition of the county's governing board in a way most favorable to rural areas.

Looking only at the negative aspect of this concern we find a great deal of it in the two counties with strong political organizations and a lesser but still discernible amount in Jefferson. In this latter county several of the county officials whose home is in the county's largest town were very careful to insure that all sections were given some plum in the school bonds even though the largest portion was slated for the largest town. This was done both as a means of getting a favorable vote from the county and in hopes of not being labeled in future elections as anti-rural. Fellow townsmen active in the decision but not involved in county politics were opposed to this dispensation.

In Bryan the negative concern of the two factions is part of the mutually interdependent pattern of decision making, campaigns and electoral success; but in Lincoln it appears as one more way in which future elections are made more predictable. To escape the unknown future effects of an existing issue, the parties simply refrain from any position and thus absent themselves as participants in decision making. An example of this has been a long-standing desire on the part of some to have a general revision of property valuation policies. Since one result would almost certainly be a higher tax bill, neither party has been willing to shoulder the responsibility, even though several of the top leaders of both parties agree that some revision is necessary. At the end of the data collection period it was learned that several industrialists, all members of the power elite, had changed from opposition to support of the idea, and that they were organizing a movement to make the question one of civic necessity above politics. If successful, this would follow the pattern set by the issuance of school bonds.

A third indicator of accountability is the degree to which issues relative to current public decisions are involved in election campaigns. If the public is holding its elected officials responsible, it hardly seems possible that some evidence of this should not show up in campaigns. Such evidence may appear in the form of (1) election campaign discussions of important public decisions and (2) a pattern of voting which would indicate that citizens who are for or against a given decision reward those candidates who follow their position and punish others. For the most clear-cut evidence of accountability, both types of evidence should be present.

In Bryan County both are present, the former more so than the latter. From the inception of the bi-factional split, every election has reverberated with arguments over public decisions, particularly when the leaders of each faction were up for election. Also, when the factional leaders were opposed, the pattern of voting followed expected lines, and when shifts occurred they could readily be matched to current public decisions. The most spectacular shift was seen in four precincts which lost local schools because of the action of Horace Riley. In 1950, when he was first elected, these precincts gave him majorities. In 1954, after his decision removing schools from the precincts, all four voted for Kenyon, the same man they had voted against four years earlier. All other precincts except two maintained their allegiances unchanged.

In Jefferson County, public discussion of issues was less vocal. A patterned form of voting occurred with great precision in regard to the one predominant issue of the day and many candidates were affected by it.

In Lincoln, there was neither any real campaign discussion of immediate issues nor any pattern of voting which would reflect such interest. A consistent voting pattern along party lines was apparent but it remained unaffected when the issues changed. Year in and year out the election "issues," if they can be called such, remained the same. For the Republicans these "issues" were excessive spending by the Democrats, rural virtues against the sin of the city, low taxes, honesty and efficiency in government. For the Democrats the "issues" were state and local progress, scalawagism, low taxes, honesty and efficiency in government. The almost total lack of current issues is well illustrated by the absence in the 1952 election of any discussion, pro or con, of the recently approved outlay of one million dollars for school construction. In the words of one respondent, that had been "a matter of public concern and politics just did not have anything to do with it."

No matter which of the three indicators of electoral accountability is used, the organizational theory of democracy is found wanting. When the results on both dependence and accountability are joined, then the lack of the expected phenomena in the two-party county becomes undeniable. With Lincoln County consistently low on all counts, it is hard to escape the conclusion that a two-party system is no assurance of democratic governance.

V. ISSUES, PARTIES AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE

Contrary to the expectations of the organizational theory, our data point to a striking hiatus between electoral contests and decision making in a strong two-party county. The problem is to locate those elements in our counties which may account for the discrepencies. Such attempts can best be viewed as the delineation of some limiting elements in the theory.

Issues: Past and Present. Perhaps the most noticeable contrast, other than in the party balance, between the politics of Lincoln County and the other two is the lack of concern for current issues. In Bryan and Jefferson counties school bonds, school reorganization, economic conditions, the structure of local government were all live questions, widely discussed in primary campaigns. In Lincoln the only "current" issues discussed were such sterile matters as tax policy (no matter which party was "out," it claimed that the "ins" were taxing too heavily for the real needs of the county) and the general "tone" of the parties. The epitome of this form of campaigning was the important place in the Democratic campaign of 1952 given to an increase in the monthly salary of the chairman of the county board of supervisors to $200.

Decision makers and party politicians alike bolster this almost playful approach to elections by insisting on labeling any important question as above politics, something "to be decided strictly on its civic merits." So whenever such a question arises, a pattern already exists of keeping it away from the very channels which legally are charged with the responsibility of resolving it. The non-political decision makers, undoubtedly within some limits, can create the policy alternatives regardless of the party fortunes of the moment.

Another important element in the pattern is the rigidity in party identification. The party balance is not something recent in origin, but has its roots in the Civil War. The divisions created then have led to traditions still alive. In Samuel Lubell's phrase,[16] we find a "politics of revenge," with Republicans and Democrats in 1954 voting for and against Abe Lincoln's ghost as much as for or against any present local candidate.

The implications of issueless politics for the organizational theory are important. It is true that the theory professes interest in the question of current issues, but their importance is not so much denied by the theory as it is neglected.[17] Schumpeter put it this way:

> For all parties will of course, at any given time, provide themselves with a stock of principles or planks and these principles or planks may be as characteristic of the party that adopts them and as important for its success as the brands of goods a department store sells are characteristic of it and important for its success. But the department store can-

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[16] Samuel Lubell, *The Revolt of the Moderates* (New York, 1956), ch. 3.

[17] This stricture does not apply to Downs whose entire theory is based on the flow of information regarding wants of the citizens and the policy position of the parties.

not be defined in terms of its brands and a party cannot be defined in terms of its principles.[18]

Schumpeter is right in saying that a party cannot be defined solely by the issues it espouses, but he is wrong in assuming that parties are always concerned with purveying "principled goods." All parties may adopt some principles, but the question is not so much whether they adopt any but whether those they do adopt are actually related to the policy issues of the day. To continue his analogy, parties may stock goods that once were fresh and then never change them just as many general stores in rural areas still sell the goods of the past while the supermarkets in the town get the trade. Republicans and Democrats in Lincoln County are country hucksters for the principles of yesteryear; the top men of power are the supermarkets of today concerned with issues concerned with the present.

Corporations and Community. If power is most easily and frequently seen in social structures organized for purposive action, then any concern with the relation between power systems and politics must take into account "non-political" power centers. If the legally designated institutions of government and their appendages (parties and factions within parties) are the only large-scale organizations in an area, then the organizational theory might stand in no need of change. If such institutions are the only major ones, then they are the only major channels for acquiring power. On the other hand, if there are other large systems of organized power, then it seems probable that the nature of the party system itself may be less crucial in determining the nature of politics.

A comparison of the counties on this point shows a distinct difference between Lincoln and the other two counties with lesser differences between the latter. In Jefferson the only large organization is a state institution which has little need to look to county government. For the rest of the county, the governmental system is the only major organization of power. There are a number of small and independently owned manufacturing plants.[19] The result is that there are few avenues for a rise to public notoriety other than through politics, and, except for the state institution, no organization or concentration of wealth sufficient to give any one or few men positions of power well insulated from electoral changes.

Bryan has a larger concentration of organizational power because of the size of the manufacturing plants and the interlocking family connections of plant and land owners. However, there is a large agricultural element comparatively independent of this concentration, and it was on this base that the Riley faction built its initial victory. Since 1950 several business elements have drifted to its support, and the power of the "old order" had been sufficiently split so that county government was providing a strong counterweight to the factories.[20]

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[18] Joseph Schumpeter, *op. cit.*, p. 283.

[19] Manufacturing accounts for nearly 50 per cent of the labor force in Lincoln and approximately half that in Jefferson and Bryan. Agriculture accounts for about 45 per cent in Bryan and about half as much in the other two.

Lincoln has a higher proportion of manufacturing, distributed among numerous plants, large and small. But with only four families controlling a major proportion of the manufacturing investment, this county is much more subject than Jefferson and Bryan to organized power outside of government. Of the thirteen men in Lincoln's power elite, seven come from these four families. Of the remaining six, three are industrialists who, by Lincoln standards, possess considerable economic holdings. So we find ten top men of power intimately connected with large economic organizations which they control, as compared to none in Jefferson and three in Bryan. Under these conditions we might have found the expectations of the organizational theory borne out if Jefferson with its wide dispersion of power had been the two-party county and Lincoln the one-party, multi-factional county.

The burden of this contention is that a general theory of political activity, such as the organizational theory, can not limit itself to a consideration of those institutions which are ostensibly political, for they act not in a vacuum but as part of a larger system. In our three counties it is entirely possible that the crucial conditions accounting for the political variations lie outside these ostensibly political organizations. If this is true, then any model of democratic politics must return to the ancient Greek concept of the *polis*. In that concept the entire community was seen as a system, a conception quite similar to much recent functional theory in sociology and anthropology.[21] This outlook is in contrast to the essentially atomistic conception of society developed by Downs, wherein the political institutions take their cues from a calculus based on a host of separate actions by a host of independent voters.[22] His model fits quite admirably the Jefferson scene, but in Lincoln these conditions are not present. In our society with its increasingly organized character, Lincoln is probably more typical than the "yeoman's democracy" of Jefferson.

A Frozen Equilibrium. It is possible that the very strength and closeness of the party competition may contribute to the exclusion of issues from elections and of elections from decision making. From the viewpoint of party leaders, a definite stand may always lose more votes than it gains. They must be very careful of their public actions, for even the slightest shift of public sentiment in such a close balance can be ruinous. The principal answer given by Downs to this problem is the growth of overlapping party policies leading to moderate positions by both contestants.[23] Although this conclusion is more clearly indicated by his previous reasoning than any other, a policy of "no policy" as in Lincoln, might be just as logical.

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[20] This should not be taken to mean the demise of the "old order" as an indpendent source of power, for they still remained capable of winning public office and were able to thwart through their political and economic connections the attempt to gain a new bank in the county. Like the Populists of the Midwest, the "new Order" discovered that political power does not immediately supplant other sources of power.

[21] For a recent statement of the functional position, *cf.* Robert K. Merton, *Social Theory and Social Structure*, revised and enlarged edition (Glencoe, Ill., 1957), ch. I.

[22] With only a few exceptions, as in his concern with producers and consumers (pp. 253–259), the model is almost a replica of the free market of the classical economists. The mirror-like desires of the party politicians replace the price system as the regulator. Anthony Downs, *op. cit.*

From the viewpoint of the decision makers, the close party balance may increase their desire to limit the scope of party politics. This conclusion is indicated if we can assume three things: (a) that predictability is desirable in planning future policy and in maintaining present ones, and (b) that a politics which frequently swings from one party to another is fundamentally unpredictable unless (c) the unpredictability is limited to changes in office holders all of whom hold the same views or are willing to allow others to cope with the problems that matter. If the party victors held real power and were subject to almost certain replacement in two or four years by another party committed to other views, predictability might well vanish. The present power holders in Lincoln do not face this prospect.

Local Politics—National Parties. A final factor which may be related to our findings is the effect of federalism. As previously noted, swings in local party strength in Lincoln are closely related to shifts in local sentiment toward national candidates. Under the New Deal, the Republicans were unable to win any offices; from 1944 until the end of our data gathering in 1954 they were in the ascendency though not as powerfully so as the Democrats had been earlier. It might be that what happens in the White House and in Korea is as important for local Lincoln candidates as anything they can say or do themselves.

If this is so, then perhaps the two parties must assume something of the posture of the national parties. With a dominant position set from above, they may possess considerably less freedom of action than the individualistic political organizations of Jefferson or the two factions of Bryan. In the latter counties, local contests are not unaffected by other politics, but connections with other factions are considerably more tenuous than those of legal parties. It may be, therefore, that we can expect the organizational theory of democracy to hold only when, among other conditions, the unit of government and the local parties have a significant degree of independence from outside interference or identifications.

VI. CONCLUSION

Our evaluation of the organizational theory of democracy can now be summarized in one sentence: A competitive electoral process *may* contribute to democratic practices in decision making, but it is no assurance that it *will*. The tentative character of this assertion is not only necessitated by the small number of cases. It is also required by the chicken-and-the-egg nature of the problem. In the web of non-political decisions, a politics of revenge, an issueless party competition, and a separation of politics from power, the point of origin of the interdependence is unclear. The mutuality appears inevitable, but the difficulty in ascertaining primary causation does not lessen the importance of the condition.

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[23] *Ibid.*, esp. chs. 6–8.

Perhaps a starting point to enter the web is the question of coalescing the party and governmental systems with the power system. This question is suggested for it tends to summarize several of the other conditions, and it is a question which has largely been overlooked in the organizational theory. There, the coalescing is variously seen as the end result of competition between two nearly equal, well-integrated parties,[24] or as an implicit assumption in the definition of democracy as a certain type of party system.[25] Seldom does it enter as a proposition to be demonstrated; more often it is there only tacitly, neither explicitly recognized nor purposively evaluated.

In many studies which focus not on party systems but on the general distribution of power this assumption is not made, and instead we often find an error in the opposite direction. Authors of this persuasion frequently assume that the form of electoral competition does not fundamentally affect the decision-making process or the distribution of power.[26] At the present moment, it appears impossible to choose between either position in the argument over the effect of parties on the distribution of power. A sounder position seems to be one which keeps the question open, to take it as a proposition to be demonstrated in each governmental unit studied.

To this we add a final plea: The student of party structure and systems must not forget that politics still is and always will be a matter of choosing among policy alternatives from different and conflicting value positions. To forget this is to retreat from the dynamic understanding of politics to limited static analyses.

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[24] Joseph Schumpeter, *op. cit.;* Committee on Political Parties, American Political Science Association, *op. cit.;* Alexander Heard, *op. cit.*

[25] Anthony Downs, *op. cit.*

[26] Two recent works typifying this orientation are C. Wright Mills, *The Power Elite* (New York, 1956), and Floyd Hunter, *op. cit.* Of the two, Mills is much more concerned with the assumption and strives much harder to demonstrate the irrelevance of party politics.

COMMUNICATIONS

ON McCLOSKY'S "CONSERVATISM AND PERSONALITY"

The title of McClosky's essay in the March, 1958 issue of this REVIEW, "Conservatism and Personality," suggests that one must go deeper than politics in order to understand politics, and I have no quarrel with this notion. But I would quarrel with the direction he takes in order to enhance our understanding of political phenomena in general, and conservatism in particular. He extracts seven tenets of "conservatism" from the writings of "acknowledged conservative spokesmen," and these tenets provide the basis for a questionnaire designed to measure the strength of "conservative" belief in his respondents. The crucial question is whether this questionnaire is capable of adequately identifying the conservative elements in the population. Not only would the questions have to distinguish between liberals and conservatives but, since both liberalism and conservatism presuppose a concern for the political sphere, they would also have to separate the non-political or a-political elements in the population from the political. If the questions do not perform this latter function, the non-political or a-political categories could easily become confused with the conservative viewpoint. This is what has happened here, I believe, and McClosky has taken Burke out of context to secure this result.

The kinds of individuals, or more particularly the kinds of personalities, who scored high on the "conservative" scale, according to McClosky, come from the uneducated, psychologically maladjusted and backward elements of the population. Now I had always understood conservatism to be essentially a political phenomenon, and I had gathered from reading McClosky's essay that his understanding was the same; but his respondents, if his characterization is correct, are non-political or a-political individuals. Consider for a moment these backward, uneducated, psychologically maladjusted individuals saying: "I prefer the practical man anytime to the man of ideas" and then consider Edmund Burke making the same remark. McClosky's people are simply displaying their anti-intellectual biases, while Burke is making a careful criticism of the French reformers who, during the period of the French Revolution, were "forming everything into an exact level, and (proposing) to rest the whole local and general legislature on three bases of three different kinds: one geometrical, one arithmetical, and the third financial; the first of which they call the basis of territory; the second, the basis of population; and the third, the basis of contribution." In short, Burke saw French politics treated as a problem of geometry, to be worked out on general principles, altogether disregarding the traditions and unique circumstances of the nation; he was opposed to the kind of politics offered by political speculators who attempted to reconstitute government on a logical and symmetrical plan. The difference between the thinking of those individuals whom McClosky questioned and the thinking of Burke is the difference between stupid prejudice and sound practical judgment.

Again, consider these same individuals saying: "I'd want to know that something would really work before I'd be willing to take a chance on it" or "It's better to stick by what you have than to be trying new things you don't really know about," and then consider Burke or other conservative politicians making the same remark. Finally, consider these individuals agreeing that "the heart is as good a guide as the head" and then take Burke's position on this matter. If Burke were to make a statement of this sort, as he undoubtedly did, it would come not from an anti-intellectual bias, but from an abhorrence of the French theorists who "never see any way to their projected good but by the road of some evil." "Their humanity is at their horizon—and like the horizon, it always flies before them." "These philosophers consider men in their experiments no more than they do mice in an air-pump or in a recipient of mephitic gas." Or Burke's willingness to place the heart above the head might characterize his position in defense of the American colonies in their quarrel with England. He argued that the colonists were free Englishmen and that they ought to be treated accordingly even if the mother country did possess a legal right to tax her colonies. "The question with me is, not whether you have a right to render your people miserable, but whether it is not your interest to make them happy. It is not what a lawyer tells me I may do, but what humanity, reason and justice tells me I ought to do. Is a politic act the worse for being a generous one?" McClosky has failed to consider sufficiently that his respondents might have adopted some of Burke's sentiments, but for entirely different reasons.

McClosky does concede the possibility that "dissimilar influences" may have motivated "informed, upper status conservatives," on the one hand, and "uneducated conservatives of low status," on the other. The level of education may have determined how sophisticated their conservative outlooks might be, but the personality factor, he contends, has remained constant in conservatives of all levels, and this is the crucial consideration in the formation of the conservative outlook (pp. 43–44). My point is this: the difference between the answers which Burke might give and those which the positive scorers on McClosky's questionnaire gave is *not* the difference between enlightened and unenlightened conservatism at all; it is rather the difference between conservatism and something of a decidedly unpolitical character. The background characteristics of these individuals which have been furnished for us conclusively show that they are anything but political in their orientation. McClosky has overlooked or ignored the considerable segment of the population which is a-political or non-political even though his observation that all persons who scored low on the questionnaire may not be liberals (p. 44) should have led him in that direction. Within the context of this study, he has obscured the distinction between certain uneducated (and perhaps psychologically maladjusted) elements in the population and those individuals with genuine conservative political preferences, a group which is, I believe, extremely rare in American society. McClosky does in fact concede the rarity of conservatism in America when he remarks that Americans have been more exposed to a liberal than a conservative tradition (p. 39), and he cites Louis Hartz's *The Liberal Tradition in America* as an authoritative study on this subject. But McClosky fails to mention the fuller Hartz thesis that the phenomenon of liberalism is essentially related to the absence of an aristocratic order; or to turn this around, that the phenomenon of conservatism is related to the presence of an aristocratic order, because mention of this would not have lent credence to the conservatism-personality relationship. And, even more important, McClosky's recognition that Americans have been more exposed to a liberal than to a conservative tradition suggests that the influence of tradition is stronger than that of personality in the formation of political preferences.

McClosky claims "scientific validity" for his thesis (p. 29). But has it really been demonstrated, or has it merely been postulated under the impulse of a specific value premise of his own asserting liberalism as a political virtue? He does not say much about this explicitly. He is less concerned with political preference as such than with different ways in which political preferences, beliefs and affiliations can be studied (p. 28). But it is revealing that he constantly identifies the "conservative personality" with such pejorative expressions as "obscurantist," "undesirable," "alienated," "authoritarian," "inflexible," "mystical," "uninformed," "backward elements of the population," "spiritual violence," "less intelligent," and "poorly integrated psychologically." Moreover, when speaking of education in the United States, he declares: "Education trains people in some measure to demand greater precision in speech and thought, to be more open-minded and tolerant, to be intellectually flexible and receptive to scientific modes of discourse, to reject mystical or non-natural explanations, and so on" (p. 41). Education, that is, promotes open-mindedness, tolerance and flexibility, and these for McClosky are traits of the "liberal personality." His thesis that there is a connection between conservatism and personality is therefore a part, or a consequence, of the more comprehensive view that regards liberalism as a political virtue, and the propagation of liberal virtues as the ultimate solution to the political problem.

The positive or "conservative" answers to McClosky's questions obviously place a heavier reliance on authority, political or otherwise, than the negative or "liberal" answers. He has indicated, moreover, that those who gave positive answers belong, for the most part, to the more ignorant segments of the population, and that those who gave negative or "liberal" answers come from the more intelligent. However, all that these questions might actually be doing is distinguishing, not between ignorance and enlightenment, but between two kinds of ignorance: ignorance which is accompanied by reverent assent (characteristic of those who gave positive answers) and ignorance which is accompanied by the suspense of assent or by doubt (characteristic of those who gave negative answers). The latter kind of ignorance, which Rousseau was quick to discern in the Age of the Enlightenment, may be the ultimate result of the "scientific" effort which McClosky finds associated with liberalism.

McClosky might have gained a much clearer understanding of conservatism, as a political phenomenon, by studying the political careers, memoirs and other writings of Metternich, Castlereagh, Talleyrand, Disraeli, and Bismarck, not to mention Burke. But instead he chose to rely on interpretations provided by "acknowledged" conservative authorities which are necessarily secondhand and too often subject to distortion. It takes only one glance at his seven tenets of "conservatism" to see that he has relied upon essentially "doctrinized" versions of the conservative political mood, and that this doctrinization is primarily the work of armchair "neo-conservative" interpreters. Near the beginning of his essay, he observes that political science has given less attention to the relation of personality to politics than it deserves (p. 29). But his study as it stands has if anything demonstrated the tenuousness of the personality-politics relationship and, as I see it, has added no "new dimension" to our understanding of political phenomena (p. 29). The nature of conservatism, I would suggest, becomes more clearly discernible through the study of political history than through the study of personality. The study of political history will show, among other things, that political preferences are fashioned by many forces, among which personality may sometimes be a factor, and even an important factor, but that indeed all kinds of personalities have become conservatives, or even liberals for that matter.

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REJOINDER TO KENDALL AND FRISCH

TO THE EDITOR:

Of the critical comments addressed to my article in this and a preceding issue of this REVIEW, one, I think, merits serious attention. The others arise from selective reading or misunderstanding, and may be disposed of quickly, to wit:

1. The claim alleging a significant distinction between political and nonpolitical conservatives is not supported by the facts. Politically active conservatives, we find, differ from liberals in essentially the same ways that inactive conservatives do.

2. Nowhere in the article is Edmund Burke described as having the personality characteristics of the conservatives we have studied. I cannot even guess how Burke would score on most of our scales; and since the question will forever remain unanswered, I can see little purpose in debating it.

3. One critic takes issue with the findings on grounds that people may hold the same sentiments for different reasons; that personality is only one of several factors influencing political preference; and that people of diverse personalities have become conservatives. All these observations, however, are volunteered or discussed in the article itself on pages 28, 29, 39–40, 43, 44–45.

4. The terms (pejorative or otherwise) which describe the characteristics of liberals and conservatives are, in reality, not mine but those of the respondents themselves. By their answers to the hundreds of attitude, trait, and value ques-

tions employed in the research, the respondents have, so to speak, drawn their own profiles. My prejudices, though real, have little to do with the matter.

The one issue that deserves to be taken seriously is the question of *validity*. Are we in fact measuring conservatism and, if so, of what sort? Obviously, this question is too complex to be settled quickly. Here I can only anticipate the comprehensive analysis of the problem to be presented in future publications.

Attitude scaling does not require that scale items be explicit statements of the doctrines the items are designed to measure. This possibility is, I suppose, difficult to grasp, and I can readily understand why critics, unfamiliar with the techniques of attitude measurement, may be confused about it. Extremely effective scales have been constructed using "subtle" or "indirect" items that bear only slight face relation to the values being tested but that discriminate empirically.

In building the conservatism scale, we first abstracted the values repeatedly expressed by acknowledged conservative philosophers and statesmen, including Disraeli, Burke, *et al.* and then proceeded to restate them in various forms, shadings, and degrees of intensity in the hope of capturing as many facets and subtleties of conservative doctrine as possible. The items used in the final scale were selected not so much for their specific face content as for their power to rank respondents from high to low in the same order they would have been ranked by the original and more varied set of items.

The items we selected, however, happen to have a high degree of face validity as well, and under test conditions were easily identified as conservative values by politically informed subjects. Moreover, they satisfied the requirements of "internal consistency" and "reproducibility"—important criteria of validity. In short, the items possess the characteristics of a true scale, sorting people reliably, along a single dimension, and over a wide range of intensities.

The fact that the items do not have the same meaning for all men and that respondents may have different reasons for answering an item in the same way is a valid but not fatal objection. It is, after all, a central purpose of this research to discover *why* people respond to the items as they do—why, in other words, some people score as conservatives and others do not. This question doubtless will be settled by empirical research, not by rhetoric or point-scoring.

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CRITICAL NOTE

DIFFICULTIES IN T. D. WELDON'S POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY

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T. D. Weldon's *The Vocabulary of Politics*[1] is one of those unusually useful books whose contribution derives precisely from its failings. This sort or merit, as a matter of fact, is particularly noticeable in a number of books written in the current philosophical vogue of the ordinary language school. It is a quality very much to be prized, because it serves to fix unmistakably clear-cut doctrines as plausible and attractive, but inadequate or mistaken, alternative solutions for certain persistent philosophical problems. To say this is to say that such doctrines enjoy very much the same sort of status that many of the contributions of classical philosophy possess.

I shall confine my discussion of the weaknesses of Weldon's account to those matters that belong to the very dim region in which political and legal and moral philosophy merge. It is here that Weldon's clarity is at its best and, therefore, on the thesis proposed, that the inadequacy of his own view is most illuminating.

I

Weldon invites us[2] to distinguish between "puzzles," "problems," and "difficulties." The distinctions are important because, as he sees it, determining political policies has to do primarily with resolving difficulties (p. 75), and the confusing of difficulties with either problems or puzzles leads to what he is pleased to label an "intellectualist fallacy," the sort of thing that is exhibited in the liquidation of the kulaks for the sake of eliminating would-be obstructions to Soviet social engineering (p. 82). His tactic here, as throughout the volume, is to elucidate ordinary usage; in this respect, his distinctions seem rather reasonable. But what Weldon fails to notice, an oversight that costs him much of the force of his analysis and exhibits, by the way, the inadequacy of defining philosophy as the mere elucidation of ordinary meanings, are the implications of treating puzzles, problems, and difficulties as sub-species of a common genus. Let me list some of his clarifying statements:

> A puzzle is deliberately made up and there is usually one way and only one way in which it can be solved correctly (p. 75). Puzzles are fabricated and have correct answers; difficulties occur and have to be surmounted. They do not have answers right or wrong, for they are not that sort of thing (p. 76). [problems] are not set by anybody, but they have answers (p. 80).

There are superficial resemblances that have undoubtedly encouraged Weldon to compare these notions. But the fundamental difference between puzzles and problems, on the one hand, and difficulties, on the other, seems (from the above quotations) to lie in this: the former are capable of being so formulated that propositions offered in solution may be tested as correct or incorrect; the latter are not to be viewed as so formulable. This at least is the sense of Weldon's first remarks about difficulties. He is, however, interested in turning our attention to the "menace" of over-zealous economic planning, social engineering, and the like. And we see from his account in this context that he has inadvertently shifted the meaning of "difficulty." He observes:

> If theoretical puzzle-solving fails to deal with difficulties because of refractory human behaviour there is always a temptation to do what the engineer does to the scenery rather than to admit that the puzzle-solving was *inappropriate* or was on the *wrong lines*. If the Jews or the kulaks are or appear to be the obstacle, one can liquidate them in the hope that when they are out of the way the theory will work after all (p. 82).

There is no question that, here, Weldon means to say that proposed solutions for given difficulties may be incorrect (I have italicized the relevant words). In what sense, therefore, are difficulties to be distinguished from puzzles and problems?

The answer, inaccessible to Weldon for a number of reasons, betrays the fact that his humane instincts have outrun the prejudice of his philosophical system. If we allow "difficulties" to stand only for complications, tensions, conflicts actually experienced or encountered, we cannot be said to solve difficulties (in the sense of the other terms) for the trivial reason that a difficulty is *not yet* formulated as a problem and only problems can be solved. Either we *have* a difficulty or we *do not have* it; either we *solve* a problem or we *do not solve* it. If problems and puzzles are sub-species of the genus, questions, difficulties (on this view) are not. But then, why is not the formulation of a difficulty merely a problem? If it is merely a problem (or a puzzle), reference to the corresponding difficulty is merely a way of drawing attention to the poignancy of human decision-making; it has no theoretical importance. If, on the other hand, the formulation is different from a problem (or a puzzle), Weldon has failed to provide us with an adequate table of the types of question-answer relations for the very issues he himself raises.

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[1] Penguin Books, 1953.

[2] Ch. 3, §7.

I submit that if we press Weldon's reasons for demurring against such resolutions of difficulties as are illustrated by the liquidation of the kulaks or the Jews, we shall find that the following objections are intended: (a) the problems that are the alleged statements of the difficulties encountered are not "well-formulated"; or (b) even if the problems are "well-formulated," the solutions are "inadmissible," "inappropriate," "improper," "wrong." I do not think that these objections are really distinct. In their most important usage, they refer to moral, or legal, or politically traditional considerations that impose palpable limits on the formulation of an admissible political problem or its solution. We must be honest here. It is surely possible to formulate a problem of socializing farms, corresponding to some vague "difficulty," whose successful solution does entail the liquidation of the kulaks. What we really mean to say is that we cannot endorse a political problem as a legitimate problem if it goes counter to the sense of the restrictions mentioned, nor can we endorse a ventured solution for a political problem if it suffers from the same failing. That is, if we wish to identify, on the illustrations afforded, a set of questions corresponding to difficulties and distinct from problems and puzzles, we shall find the likeliest candidate in questions about the *status* of formulated problems and puzzles and the *status* of their successful solutions. Given any difficulty, which is really a vaguely defined sense of dislocation, tension, conflict, we can formulate a problem which imputes to it (but surely does not discover in it—this being a question-begging maneuver) a goal for the energies enmeshed and we can set about solving that problem. *Given* the bare problem, we can judge the correctness of any solution that would attempt to meet it; but we mean to ask as well, in the context of political activity, whether we *ought* to accept such a problem for our immediate energies or, accepting it, whether we *ought* to admit any merely successful solution to be a legitimate solution. This is obviously the point of Weldon's unwillingness to accept the gross tactics of liquidation and at least a part of the meaning of the misleading label, "intellectualist fallacy." What we might mean by "ought" and "status" and "legitimate" must as yet remain vague because Weldon fails altogether to broach here, in an open way, the relevant questions. It is enough to see that the third sort of question identified as difficulty is addressed, in a challenging way, to matters of appraisal. What we require, if the solving (rather than the resolving) of difficulties is to be treated as a sub-species of the genus, questions (that includes puzzles and problems as well), is a determinate procedure for appraising in a relevant way both problems and their solutions.

II

Several independent, but not unrelated, ambiguities about the technique of elucidating ordinary usage appear in Weldon's analysis of political terms. He says that to define, in the sense of "to give the ordinary use of . . . ," is "to give instances of sentences in which the relevant word is used and thereby clear up its logical function." (p. 23) This seems straightforward enough. But we soon discover that Weldon means not merely to *elucidate*, in the sense of "give the ordinary use of . . . ," but also to *rule* on the admissibility or meaningfulness of the ordinary uses of words. Thus he says:

> Consider . . . the words 'ghost' and 'devil.' They resemble 'phlogiston' and 'ether' in that some of their uses have now disappeared. We no longer employ them as our ancestors did because we have discovered other and more satisfactory methods for explaining the occurrence of diseases, floods, neurotic affections, and hallucinations. But they are not dead in the sense in which 'phlogiston' and 'ether' are dead, since some people still claim to have a use for them. It is therefore important to notice what can profitably be asked about them, and this is not 'Do ghosts or devils exist?' but 'What are, or are alleged to be, the phenomena which we need 'ghost' and 'devil' to describe or explain, and which we cannot satisfactorily describe or explain without them or their synonyms?' (p. 25).

Surely, Weldon is right in advancing, as a philosophical concern, the question of the cogency or defensibility of any ordinary use of words; in fact, the elucidation of words could reduce otherwise to a mere study of the frequency of ordinary usage. But the way in which he has reformulated the questions concerning ghosts and devils would allow us, in principle, to recover even "dead" words like "phlogiston," should a telling problem force us in the future to speculate in this direction. The mere decay of use is not philosophically significant, however, suggestive, just as the mere vigor of continuing use lacks any philosophical force. The study of ordinary usage may well be a pre-condition for philosophical analysis; it is not a substitute for it.

III

I come now, by this roundabout route, to another, more profound ambiguity that directly affects the analysis of political terms. On the issue of ruling among uses, Weldon offers the following:

> Verbal usage is stable because the *objects* and *situations* with which people are confronted and which they need to *describe discuss*, and *alter*, are also fairly stable . . . there is no single test which will decide whether a word like 'State' is being correctly used, and the same is true of 'justice,' 'temperance,' and the rest. The position is rather that at any given time there is a number of tests, and it is not necessary that all of them should be passed. . . . Thus a particular piece of legislation may be *correctly* described as 'just in that it places financial burdens on those who are best able to carry them, but unjust in that it penalizes those who have in the past been provident and thrifty as compared with those who have been careless and extravagant. (p. 29).

I have italicized the significant words. Ruling among the ordinary uses of words, without intending to establish unique meanings, is relatively easy when the words are to be applied to palpable and experienceable "objects and situations." The word "State" presents no theoretical complications beyond those that attend the use of the word "wristwatch." Even if, as he says, it is not necessary that all the tests of correct usage apply in any case, it would seem that Weldon supposes that the tests are substantially of the same sort, a measure of convenience in referring to actual "objects and situations." Now, he mentions (in the quotation above) words like "temperance" and "justice" in the company of "State," though it is clear that one cannot rule on their use in the same way as on the use of "State" and "wristwatch." There are simply no "fairly stable . . . objects and situations" to point to when one refers to justice or temperance, "and the rest." What one intends ordinarily in using such terms is an appraisal, and not a description, of "fairly stable . . . objects and situations." Appraisal concerns an ordering of preference or value-status among "objects and situations" that occur or exist and not a description of what merely does occur or exist. If we construe them in this way, the ordinary use of appraisal-words would seem to be of quite doubtful value on the sort of rule that would be called into play in adjudicating among the uses of "ghost," "phlogiston," "State," and "wristwatch." Or, if one insisted that appraisal-words are to correspond with actual appraisal-activities, either we should have no basis for distinguishing between appraisal and description or we should have no way of distinguishing between ruling among the uses of appraisal-words and merely persuading others to persist in, or change, their habits of appraisal. In a fairly obvious sense, there are no appraisals to discover; we make appraisals. But the things to be appraised are truly discovered. Hence, the rules by which we might judge the "correctness" of appraisal-terms would differ seriously and fundamentally from the rules applied to description-terms. Weldon does not enter into the matter here.

IV

Weldon's therapeutic intentions extend, again by way of a revealing oversight, to the problem of political standards and measurement. Ostensibly, he wishes to expose "the illusion of absolute standards" in politics for what it is, an illusion.[3] But in drawing a parallel between the problems of measurement in physics, say, and politics, Weldon has carelessly treated the two as basically similar. Now, there are, to be sure, areas of similarity; political measurement need not reject the advantages of whatever discipline in measurement the physical sciences have managed to develop. But the question remains whether or not *kinds* of measurements are called for in politics for which there are no suitable parallels in the physical sciences. If such differences arise, then the philosophical grounds for the cogency of measurement in politics and in the physical sciences will also differ. Grossly stated, in the physical sciences we are interested in measuring-rods that give us apparently consistent readings in repeated measurement and that give us readings translatable into those of other independently applied and apparently also consistent measuring-rods. If we say that A is taller than B, presumably any suitable measuring-rod will record what we ordinarily mean by "taller than" and the findings of one rod will be translatable into the findings of another. "Taller than" is a relation that can be discovered by inspection; it is not an appraisal-relation, in the sense in which "appraisal" has already been employed. This is why translation is possible. But if I ask whether one State is more just or liberal than another, I cannot translate the findings on the basis of one political measuring-rod into those formed from another. Moreover, we expect this sort of conflict in politics and we do not expect it in physics. The order of height can be discovered, however conventional the units by which we express it; the order of justice cannot be discovered but is created only by our mode of appraisal. Or, we may say, given a criterion of justice, we may discover the measure of justice of particular things; but we cannot appeal back to the actual justice, the discoverable property logically prior to our stipulated criterion, by which to correct discrepancies in measurement due to the use of our criterion—as we can in comparing heights. We can only appeal back to the discoverable and describable properties that we have *independently* decided to appraise in a certain way.

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[3] Ch. 1, §3.

The point of this quarrel leads us back to the issue at stake in the previous three objections. The criteria for judging the adequacy of standards in the physical sciences have to do typically with the reliability of findings on the procedures recommended. It makes no difference what properties are to be measured, because the properties are fundamentally discoverable; the only considerations are *procedural.* But in political disputes, though the reliability of measurement is also at stake, we find that it is precisely the choice of standards of appraisal that receives the greatest attention and is open to the greatest dispute; that is, the questions have to do with what we *stipulate* as the criterion of appraisal itself. Now, although Weldon is absolutely right in exposing "the illusion of real essences,"[4] the question suggests itself whether there may be grounds, resembling the grounds for judging the adequacy of physical standards of measurement, for judging the cogency of the criteria that we stipulate for political appraisal. The question may at least be formulated, though Weldon does not address himself to it here in any way.

V

Weldon does, later, speak of the logical status of appraisals and, in particular, of political appraisals. But, again, his own discussion inadvertently identifies the unsolved problems. Suppose, he asks, we make such a statement as "X is important" (p. 155; the words "good," "right," "better," "free," and the like may be treated much as "important"), what do we mean to say? Consider his answer:

> Three points deserve attention. (1) Such phrases always refer to a person or a group of people. (2) They assume some context. (3) They are 'more or less,' not 'either . . . or,' phrases. A typical complete question is 'How important is it to you that you should go to London to-morrow?' and a proper answer is 'It is fairly important. I have an appointment with my dentist and he is going away for his holiday on the day after to-morrow; but it is not vital.' (p. 155)

I believe Weldon's point (2) holds a decisive clue; (3) merely refers to the problem of vagueness, and (1) sets reasonable, but very gross, limits to the use of the term (and similar terms). The logical condition for appraising something antecedently describable is to place it in an appropriate context. To do so is to provide for "relevant reasons though not deductive proofs for the correctness" of our decision (p. 156). This seems eminently fair. Of course, if we ask why our reasons are relevant, in what sense do they support the appraisal, we must let the cat out of the bag. Because, if we stipulate a goal for decisions in a given context, if we inspect the context to "see" what it is we want to achieve, we can appraise the decisions accordingly; but Weldon himself has freely acknowledged, and quite properly, that

> there is *no comparable method* of confirming 'Parliamentary Government is a good political institution.' We do not know how to complete 'The aim of political institutions is to . . . ' in the same way as we can complete 'The aim of doctors is to . . . ' or 'The aim of fullbacks is to . . . ' (pp. 161–162; italics mine).

This is really an extremely neat restatement of the problem of Plato's *Republic*, the distinction between royal art and such arts as medicine and pilotship; but it is not a solution. In contexts relevant to the first sort of art, we dispute about the goals themselves (preempting attention directed to disputes about mere means); in those of the second sort, the goals are more or less apparent and agreed upon, so we dispute chiefly about the adequacy of means. Problems of the first sort may, of course, always intrude upon those of the second. The question then is, are there any plausible grounds for weighing the cogency of proposed goals offered as a basis for appraisal? From a logical point of view, Weldon's example about the dental appointment may be formulated thus: "*If* . . . dental appointment, then . . . to London is important," where the dental appointment fixes the goal in the context. But in political appraisal what we seem to be involved in may be formulated thus: "*Since* . . . is a political goal that is good, . . . ought to be done," where the goodness of the goal depends on an antecedent criterion of the properties candidate goals would have to exhibit to qualify as good goals. In the first case, *given* a criterion of appraisal, say, facilitation of a certain end, we can appraise candidate decisions. In the second case, we wish to go beyond mere appraisals of the first sort and appraise instead the very criteria of appraisal. We are not in any vicious circle here because the grounds for the "goodness" of an action are logically distinct from the grounds for the "goodness" of a rule for determining good actions. It may suffice to note here that Chapter 7 of Book I of the *Nicomachean Ethics* is occupied with this matter precisely. Weldon does not pursue it.

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[4] Ch. 1, §2.

VI

I should like to expose one final, complex ambiguity in Weldon's discussion. Toward the end of his book, he announces: "Now it is clear that 'Is the British legal system a good institution?,' 'Is it superior to that of the U.S.S.R.?' are not philosophical questions." (p. 175) That he does not mean to say that these are meaningless questions is clear from the remarks that immediately follow as well as from his earlier dicta that "appraisals are empirical judgements made by individuals" and that "it is an abuse of language to say that appraisals are simply statements of baseless prejudices." (p. 170) Let me add a further admission that concedes at a stroke much of what has already been demonstrated:

> It is not the case that political institutions can always or usually be completely appraised in the language of means and ends. This, however, does not make them exceptional since the same characteristic is found in esthetic creation. (p. 170)

Now, if we understand the notion of appraisal with all of the difficulties disclosed, we must see that appraisals are empirical only in the sense what they appraise are empirically describable. We must decide how to appraise things, especially where they cannot "be completely appraised in the language of means and ends," where we cannot pretend merely to "discover" the appropriate goal in the context of our activities. But if this is so, why are our appraisals not "baseless prejudices?"

To see how completely Weldon's analysis fails at this point, we need only examine the following, addressed to our question, and, interestingly enough, expressed in a way that recalls C. L. Stevenson's distinction between disagreements in belief and disagreements in attitude:

> But what is to be done when disagreements occur? Fortunately *we are not destitute of resources*. I can draw your attention to points *you may have missed*, and we can both study the works of professionals and improve our *knowledge* of the actual situation by the *ordinary methods* of research. Certainly there are *limits* to this process, but it is *not nearly as* barren or unprofitable as it is often supposed to be. (pp. 170–171; italics mine)

The "limits," obviously, are precisely those that distinguish between description and appraisal. On this basis, again as in Stevenson's account, there is no procedural way to distinguish between merely *persuading* another to make certain preferences and *confirming* an appraisal as such. We may ask again why our appraisals are not "baseless prejudices."

Weldon himself offers a very interesting list of "tests" failing which "any set of institutions . . . is *prima facie* a bad one. . . ." (p. 176), presumably in the troublesome sense that is analogous to esthetic appraisal. He hedges considerably about these tests (p. 176) and in a way that is highly ambiguous:

> . . . this is my personal view, or *prejudice* if that word is preferred. It has *nothing philosophical* about it and may be rejected by anyone who *disapproves* of it. I suggest, however, that anyone who does reject it should offer an alternative and *at least equally usable* set of tests (p. 176; italics mine).

We seem to be invited to conclude that, although appraisals are not "baseless prejudices," the criteria of appraisal are. It is also not clear whether when someone "disapproves" of our criteria, he is merely expressing his prejudice or has "relevant reasons" for disapproving. The whole discussion is disingenuously complicated by Weldon's insistence on a deliberate, but unexplained, play on Mill's notorious use of the word "desirable." In any case, the term "usable" would appear to invite us to consider initial philosophical grounds for the cogency of candidate criteria; but if this is so (note the phrase "at least equally usable"), Weldon's own "prejudice" does have philosophical implications. To return then to the first remark with which I began this objection, even if the "goodness" of "the British legal system" is not itself a philosophical question, the "goodness" of Weldon's criteria for judging (in part) the "goodness" and "badness" of such institutions as "the British legal system" is indeed a philosophical question.

It is the question that we have tracked through Weldon's entire text and found unexamined. And it is, in fact, one of the most crucial questions that moral, legal, and political philosophy have yet to address themselves to in a convincing and fruitful way.

RESEARCH NOTES

THE *RICORDI* OF GINO DI NERI CAPPONI

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The *Ricordi* of Gino di Neri Capponi are a short political tract which so far has been neglected by political scientists. In a little-known document, they were published for the first and only time in the 18th century by Ludovico Antonio Muratori in his *Rerum Italicarum Scriptores;* but they were bundled together with a group of small chronicles by the same author and thus lost their real identity. They became a secondary historical source rather than a primary political text. Appended is the first translation into English.[1]

Gino di Neri Capponi the Elder acquired fame and reputation as a soldier, administrator, and diplomat. Born in Florence about 1350 of a most noble and ancient lineage ("di nobilissimo et vetustissimo casato"),[2] he took an active part in the political life of his city. A close friend of Maso degli Albizzi, he stood by his side during the internecine strifes of Florence, thus becoming one of the leaders of the *popolo grasso,* the optimates, against the *popolo minuto,* workers and unskilled artisans. As an Albizzi partisan, Gino had been directly involved in the Revolt of the Ciompi in 1378, and only with the comeback of the optimates was he able to regain his status and politican position. The writing on the Sollevazione de' Ciompi generally attributed to him is an excellent example of direct historical reporting, though its authorship is by no means definite.

In the war against Pisa he shared with Maso degli Albizzi the responsibilities of *campo* commissioner, and as governor of the captured city in 1406 he gave a lasting example of moderation and competence. To his tenure as camp commissioner and governor is tied his diplomatic activity. He was ambassador to Genoa, which city he drew into an alliance against Pisa, and after the capitulation of the latter city he was sent as legate to Paolo Guinigi, lord of Lucca, to discuss the status of the Pisan exiles who had sought shelter in Lucca. He also acted as War Commissioner to Arezzo in 1409 during the war against Ladislao, King of Naples, and his efforts kept Arezzo loyal to Florence. In 1411 he was once more given ambassadorial rank when he was dispatched by the Signory to escort Pope (or Antipope) John XXXII through Tuscany on his way to Rome. Two years later, again with the rank of Ambassador, he journeyed to Venice to offer the *bons offices* of Florence to the Venetians in their conflict with Emperor Sigmund. His military and diplomatic achievements made him one of the most respected elder statesmen of his times, and his advice was constantly sought by the Signory, parties, and private citizens alike. He died May 19, 1420, in the house of his birth, leaving unfinished his *Commentarii dell 'Acquisto di Pisa,* which were completed by (and are at times attributed to) his son Neri.

Gino has been mentioned as the author of the *Ricordi* by his illustrious 19th-century namesake and descendent who wrote of him at length and with justifiable family pride (in the first volume of his *Storia della Repubblica Fiorentina*), but who overlooked or missed their real importance.[3] Father Giulio Negri,[4] in his extensive catalogue of Florentine writers, praises Gino di Neri as the author of the *Commentarii* and of memoirs concerning his diplomatic experiences in Genoa. He asserts that Gino's work was interrupted by his death and that his *Commentarii* were brought to conclusion by his son Neri, but he is silent on the subject of the *Ricordi*. A more recent scholar, Ida Masetti Bencini,[5] published his correspondence with the Florentine Signory dealing with his work in Pisa and his embassy to Paolo Guinigi, but, while full of references to other writings of Gino, her essay makes no mention of the *Ricordi*.

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[1] See Appendix. We translate *Ricordi* as "Maxims". The *Ricordi* were published in the vol *xviii* of the *Rer. Ital. Script.* together with other Capponiana, namely the correspondence and the *Commentarii.* Scaramella, "*Questioni varie intorno alle cronache capponiane pubblicate dal Muratori,*" *Archivo Muratoriano* VII (1908) 307–325, writes (p. 312): "I speak not of the *Ricordi* of Gino, who died in 1420, which for their brevity and their singular value seemed destined to immediate diffusion, yet they appear only in codes of the XVII and XVIII century." The Central National Library of Florence, however, has the original, or oldest, mss. of the *Ricordi,* on which this translation was made (pp. 34, 35 and 36, recto and verso of the Miscellanea, Fondo Magliabechiano, Class XXV, 22). The Library has also other manuscripts of the *Ricordi,* Fondo Capponi 237, pp. 959 to 971, and Fondo Nazionale, II, 4, 399, both of which are of far later date. See *Nota sui Cronisti Gino e Neri Capponi* (our writer and his son, who had a hand in the *Commentarii*) in "Annales de la Faculté de Lettres de Bordeaux," *Bulletin Italien,* Tome V, no. 1 (1905), p. 66.

[2] *Degli Scrittori Fiorentini,* opera postuma del Padre Giulio Negri Ferrarese, della Compagnia di Gesù. Ferrara, per Bernardini Pomatelli, Stampatore Vescovale (1722), p. 236. Gino is usually called Gino di Neri Capponi il Vecchio or il Seniore. Since Gino and Neri were ever-recurring surnames of the Capponi family, most of the Capponi who were not Gino di Neri were Neri di Gino.

[3] Even Gino Capponi, proud as he was of his ancestor, failed to recognize the value of the *Ricordi.* In fact Tommaseo, *Dizionario della Lingua Italiana,* Torino, UTET

Yet the *Ricordi* belong to the great political literature of the times. They contain *in nuce* what Machiavelli and Guicciardini wrote three and four generations later. This of course does not mean that Machiavelli and Guicciardini followed the trail blazed by Gino, or that they sought inspiration in his writings, or that their thought is but an instance of platitudinous plagiarism. It means only that the political ideas and systems which were to be expounded later by the major Florentine thinkers were already part of the culture of the times. In fact, Guicciardini mentions and quotes Gino's *Ricordi* as a most sharp and pointed comment on the relationship between morals and politics.[6] John Morley is right when he sees the crux of Renaissance political thought in this effort to rend asunder morals and politics, religion and worship, and he is right too when he sees its precise and curt statement in the few words of Gino's *Ricordi* quoted by Guicciardini.[7]

In fact, the *Ricordi* contain a number of elements worth emphasizing. The first is the idea of a maxim of behavior, of a political tenet, aiming not at moralizing principles but at practical occurrences. The view that political experience can and should be reduced to rules is usually attributed to Machiavelli,[8] yet the *Ricordi* are nothing but this. They are not canons of ethics or moral apothegms such as antiquity had produced in great profusion, or practical tenets of moral conduct and fatherly advice such as Bicci de' Medici, to cite one among many, left his children. They are empirical and practical rules of effective political behavior in which the relationship between behavior and results is presented as being free of ethical content. In this the *Ricordi* have much more than the title in common with that *opus* of Guicciardini, which may have bored the literary reader throughout the centuries but which has charmed the politico.[9]

A most important and novel element is the deliberate integration of personal experience with general principles, and to this we can relate Gino's indictment of the priests and of their influence on government. In indicting not merely a clerical or pro-clerical government but the priests as an order or a tribe, Gino is a forerunner of Machiavelli, of Guicciardini, and even of Savonarola.

The concept of war as a facet of politics, which seems so striking and novel in the *Prince*, is already clear and obvious in Gino's thought. In fact, captaincies, field battles, and long wars are considered phases of public life. This is one of the crucial points of Renaissance

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1929, Vol. III, page 241, quotes the XIX century Gino Capponi's *Proverbi Toscani* as the proverb "vivano le foggette e muoiano le berrette" (death to the hoods and long live the caps), adding that "it was in Florence the war cry of the bourgeoisie against the simple people, and the contrary was shouted a few years later." No reference is made to the *Ricordi* by Tommaseo.

[4] *Op. cit., loc. cit.* Gino di Neri il Seniore is mentioned as the writer of his own deeds in the war against Pisa, and his diplomatic skill at Genoa and his magnanimity as administrator of Pisa after the conquest are praised.

[5] *Alcuni Documenti su Gino Capponi il Vecchio per Ida Masetti Bencini*, Rivista delle biblioteche e degli Archivi, no. 1–2, Anno xxiii, vol. xiii, Florence (January–February, 1912), pp. 1–20.

[6] Guicciardini: *Dialogo del Reggimento di Firenze*, a cura di Roberto Palmarocchi, Bari, Laterza (1932), p. 162. "E pero' scrisse Gino tuo bisavolo in quegli ultimi *Ricordi* suoi che bisognava fare de' Dieci della guerra persone che amassero piu' la Patria che l'anima perche' e' impossibile regolare e' Governi e gli stati tenendoli nel modo si tengono oggi, secondo e' precetti della legge cristiana." ("That is why your great grandfather Gino wrote in his *Ricordi* that the Ten of War should be men who cared more for their country than for their soul, because it is not possible in this day and age to rule domains and states according to the precepts of the Christian law.")

[7] Morley's Romane lecture on Guicciardini, published in *Miscellanies*, 4th series (Macmillan and Co., London, 1908) is a discourse containing a large number of quotes from Guicciardini's own pages. It revolves around the point mentioned in note 6.

[8] *Cf.* in particular the introduction to the *Discourses* and the comparison of the science which Machiavelli aimed at creating with medicine and jurisprudence.

[9] Guicciardini, who seldom if ever has been praised for his literary virtues (*cf.* de Sanctis, *Sotria della Letteratura Italiana*, Morano, Napoli, 6th printing of the stereotype edition, Vol. II, p. 94; and for earlier testimony, Giambattista Corniani, *I Secoli della Letteratura Italiana*, Turin, Cugini Pomba, 1855, Vol. II, pp. 319–320, and the abundant references therein), was a favorite with Count Cavour, with Chancellor Bismarck, and with Leopold von Ranke, who admired his political acumen not only as historian but as public official. *Cf.* Mosca, *Storia delle Dottrine Politiche*, Bari, Laterza, 1948, chapter on "Guicciardini e i Machiavellisti Pratici": also Morley, *op. cit., loc. cit.*

political thought. When Machiavelli indulged in a lengthy treatise on the *Art of War* he wrote a political treatise, but to us it seems an abstract military *opus* because we do not see warfare in that light. We accept Machiavelli or Guicciardini on diplomacy but not on war, yet, historically speaking, the misconception is ours and not theirs. The reasons why war has changed values are too manifold to be discussed here. It may suffice to say that Gino di Neri Capponi saw as a continuum what Machiavelli needed to reassert as such, and what in later centuries von Clausewitz reasserted once more. To be sure, Clausewitz did not invent the principle of basic continuity between war and politics; he only restated it because by his time the concept of politics had been so far dissociated from the military by analysis that it needed a new garb. Gino had been both a soldier and a politico, and, as he reveals in these lines, he drew no boundary between the two activities which he considered to be merely different phases of the same enterprise. To be Camp Commissioner or to be Ambassador to Genoa were two different ways of achieving the same goal, the capitulation of Pisa.

To this concept we may tie the concept of power. Whether dealing with a *condottiero,* with a field battle, or with a neighboring lord, or with the position of his party within the city and of his family within the party, Gino integrates the forces he saw. The policy of cautious alliances and self-reliance of the city is paralleled by the power of the Signory toward the *particulari* (private individuals). The status of the Commune in its foreign relations is affected by the same forces which affect its authority at home. Just as the power of the Commune toward foreign states is determined by its sword, so the power of the Signory is determined by its lordship over the citizens. The political world of Gino is a world in which values are determined by the possibility of their practical enforcement. This subtle and prudent play of equilibrium considers no other virtue than the positive political worth of the optimates. It is not force that Gino deals with, but something akin to it and yet transcending it. Were we to use a Platonic or an Aristotelian terminology we would think nor merely of κρατος, that is, an idea of power that needs constant definitions and ever-changing qualifications, but a pure form of it to which we should add the concept of εξουσια, the potential and actual capacity to act.

In the *Ricordi* this concept seems imbued with positive moralizing principles only because Gino, as befitting a man of high rank and high estate, draws no lines between family affairs and public life. These pages are not as it may seem at first glance a medley of rules for political behavior and of advice on good family management, but a whole, an entirety, which we may see as such only after due consideration, because we have been taught to separate and dissociate values which were once united and understandable only because united. Once we learn to read these lines thinking of the Florence of the last years before the Medicis and not of the city often considered the historical laboratory of contemporary formulae, we can see that the unity of family management and city rule was a reality which has been lost perhaps because we have lost the faculty of looking at life as a unity.

Gino is an early humanist. He states with a candor equal to his depth of thought that he has found more satisfaction in forgiving than in achieving revenge. But such an invitation to the stern kindness of the Gospels is neither stern nor kind nor evangelic. It is fatherly advice, implying wisdom rather than saintliness, and based on personal experience rather than on theological command. Gino has obviously tried both forgiveness and revenge. If he finds the former more satisfactory than the latter, it is because of pragmatic considerations rather than because of badly assimilated religious readings. No longer is forgiveness a divine command, nor is revenge as yet (as it will be with Machiavelli) a device of government and politics. Both are subjective experiences; their roots are not in theology nor their bloom in expediency. They are but happenstances of the conflicts which man cannot ignore or neglect, and which he must solve in the light of his own trials and errors. Life is still so much a unity that forgiveness is set up in contraposition to revenge in the same manner as a cautious war is set up in contraposition to a field battle, and as rule by the prudent to rule by the ignorant.

Throughout his own bouts with the vicissitudes of life Gino maintained enough serenity so as not to have his experiences blur his common sense or to have set prejudices pitted against his experiences. He knew that the wheel of fortune cannot be spiked or controlled by a set of rules. There is no science enabling man to plan man's affairs, and there is no *corpus* of practical tenets to transform the unevenness of fortune into an even-flowing stream of events which man can direct according to his own lights to his best advantage. Gino, though a successful soldier and diplomat, rejects the possibility of a science of war and of diplomacy. Patience, rather than plans or systems, can tame Fortune, and it is vain to try to bend her to our will with other means which, by being out of our grasp, end by enlarging and amplifying her role. In fact this whole tract can be considered a pragmatic lesson on how to face the unevenness of human events: man must take such unevenness for granted and root his acts in wisdom and prudence; such virtues are reached through integration of one's own experiences, among which are those which others integrated and to which we may be privy. Hence the reliance on friends, relatives and neighbors and the value of their amity and counsel. The caprices of life are not to be controlled by trying to render them objects of conscious and deliberate manipulations, but they are to be accepted with courage and wisdom. Against their blows Gino recommends loyalty, with all it demands and all it offers.

Appendix

The *Maxims* of Gino di Neri Capponi—formulated in his old age when confined at home by the disease of which he died in the year 1420 (perhaps earlier):

* * *

The Commune of Florence shall hold fast against its foreign enemies as long as it relies on its sword. It will achieve supremacy if it never allows any private citizen, or family, or group of relations to wield greater power than the Signory.

Avoid the rise of vicious or ignorant men, for their reputation is damaging and their capacity for evil is great. Offices would multiply and the State would see its authority vanish.

At the time of the conquest of Pisa the leaders of that city saw that, with the growth of personal power, the power of the State declined. The conquest, however, was accomplished by people whose aim and purpose was the common good.

Appoint as the Ten of Balia men of wisdom and temper, more interested in the welfare of the Commune than in their own good or in their soul.

Beware of mercenary captaincies of too high cost and of all excessive expenditures. A foremost principle is that they must never become matters of politics.

Win your pleas according to justice whether they are established by the city or by the guilds, and see that prohibitions are enforced.

No major or even current mercenary captaincy is to be entrusted to a citizen or to a neighboring lord, unless under the pressure of the direst necessity.

He who fears war too much will find that war goes to him and pursues him right at home. So long as it is possible, it is far wiser to rely on words than on swords.

Great power and in particular the power of the leading citizens commands no loyalty when not accompanied by money or wealth.

Avoid entanglements with the priests for they are the scum of the earth. Do not bother with Churches unless for purposes of sacraments and divine offices.

I found much more satisfaction in forgiving than in achieving revenge.

A divided and disunited Church is good for our city and for our freedom but contrary to the good of the soul. You must not work toward such division and disunity, but let nature take its course. If possible, see that the Church is interested only in matters spiritual. Otherwise it would mean sacrificing their unity and the friendship of the Pope to our interests. Do not ever oppose such friendship because there is nothing we can achieve without the amity of the Church.

Every lord, no matter how weak, is an enemy when close enough to us, unless he chooses to be our friend because of his own interest. Take care not to enter any deals with such people, because they would gladly place a knife at your throat and would sell and barter you and your assets. Thus avoid such dangers as the undertaking of a war because nobody ever knows how a war may end.

Avoid field battles, because men of arms are like hares who love to go fast. Victory is to be sought in the passing of time and not in good fortune at the right moment, or in being powerful by being lucky the day of the battle. No one can say that victory is certain before the battle is over, because no matter what advantages a side has won, it is still exposed to a thousand dangers.

To besiege cities or large territories is too dangerous an enterprise in proportion to the results it may bring about.

Do your share to keep the family united as long as it is possible so that you can share the estate while keeping its unity, thus improving your status. In dividing the goods, you, Neri, hold on to the house in Florence regardless of cost.

Respect the eldest to survive as if he were a father. It shall be his task to settle decently everybody's estate.

Be careful with your expenses because spending beyond possibilities gives birth to endless evils.

The coat of arms to which I have the privilege of being entitled has been left through deed by Niccolo' Tinucci.

Should you be in litigation or suffer damages, make your case strong before the Magistrate and remember to be broad in your attitude and follow the advice of your friends.

Cultivate ties of friendship with relatives and neighbors in all matters, and help your friends not only at home but even when they are forced to leave the city.

I have seen our city ruled by mature people.

When I was a child and I finished grammar school, about 1363, I remember that grammar-school children, upon leaving the classroom, shouted "Long live the caps," that is, "Long live the worthy and gentle folk," and "Death to the hoods," which meant the unskilled artisans and citizens of low estate. In 1378 the saying was reversed.

They were shouting "Long live the hoods and death to the caps." At that time Piero di Filippo degli Albizzi was the leading citizen of Florence, powerful with the Church and with the city government. A friend presented him with a box for sweets inside which there was a large and well-modeled spike. Many citizens who were dining with him thought it meant that he had to drive the spike into the wheel of things. In fact, as a consequence of the changes which overtook the government, he, together with many other citizens, was beheaded. Upon these events Mr. Tommasso di Marco Strozzi and Mr. Giorgio Scali became rulers, but within forty months Mr. Giorgio Scali was beheaded, Mr. Tommaso and all his descendants forced into exile, and Mr. Benedetto degli Alberti, who had risen to power, was condemned to exile. The government which followed was a government of tradesmen and journeymen; no party won unless it was the party of a wool weaver or of a spice dealer. The result was that no tradesman or journeyman seemed fit to rule. If he was a wool weaver, people said that it was his task to go and weave, and if he was a spice dealer, he should have held fast to his pepper-grinding chores. In a few days the Alberti family, who were tradesmen, became aristocrats, and the Ricasoli's and others of gentlemanly rank were forced to low condition.

Concluding my thoughts on government, I say that you must get along with those in power and give your aid to the rulers, because it is far better to have a powerful state than a series of pointless popular leaders. For the good of the city, it is better to have a huge lamb rather than a lion; for many are those who know how to lead a lamb while nobody has either the practice or the courage to deal with lions, and he who has not, cannot. Among the men who are now in power, favor Bartolomeo Valori, Niccolo' da Uzzano, Nerone di Nigi. Follow them in matters political and in what concerns your estate and seek their advice.

SOME OBSERVATIONS ON MEMBERSHIP FIGURES OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION*

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Until recently, it has been almost as difficult to obtain precise, comparable membership figures for the various major territorial units of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) as to obtain from published Soviet sources population statistics for the political-administrative areas of the USSR. Now both types of data are again available, though still not always as detailed as Soviet area students would like.

The Soviet Union in the middle of 1956 resumed publication of population statistics.[1] These are only official estimates pending a new census to be taken throughout the USSR in January, 1959. Nevertheless, they are useful. In the latter part of 1957, for the first time in many years, information appeared on the exact number of Communists belonging to the republic party organizations of all fourteen *national* union republics.[2] These data appeared in a somewhat unlikely source, in the *Ezhegodnik Bol'shoi sovetskoi entsiklopedii, 1957* (1957 Yearbook of the Great Soviet Encyclopedia)[3] rather than in a Communist party report. For twelve of the fourteen republics, the figures are for virtually the same date—December 31, 1956, or January 1, 1957. In the remaining two instances, the Armenian SSR and Uzbek SSR, membership data are given for January 1 and July 1, 1956, respectively.

Several analyses of interest both to the political scientist and to the general student of USSR history and institutions can be made of these membership and population statistics, with the use of such other scanty data as are available.

The total membership of the CPSU on February 1, 1956, was 7,215,505.[4] The total membership of the fourteen national union republic party organizations for the 1956 and January 1, 1957 dates given in *Ezhegodnik Bol'shoi sovetskoi entsiklopedii, 1957* amounts to 2,257,362. Thus, in 1956, around thirty per cent of the total number of Communists in the USSR belonged to the fourteen national union republic party organizations. In comparison, nearly forty-four per cent of the USSR's population are citizens of these republics. The approximately seventy per cent of CPSU membership not included in the fourteen national union republic party organizations in 1956 must have belonged to territorial party organizations within the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (RSFSR) or to special party units in bodies such as the army and navy.[5]

In the case of seven of the national union republics, it has been possible to obtain precise membership statistics not only for the last day of 1956 or the first day of 1957 but also for September 1, 1952 (the eve of the XIX Congress of the CPSU). Thus, for these seven republics, one can work out the rates of membership growth over an identical time period

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[1] For 1956 population figures on the union republics of the USSR, see, among others, USSR, Tsentral'noe statisticheskoe upravlenie pri Sovete ministrov SSSR [Central Statistical Administration of the Council of Ministers of the USSR], *Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSSR; Statisticheskii sbornik* [The National Economy of the USSR; Statistical Compilation] (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe statisticheskoe izdatel'stvo, 1956), p. 18.

[2] The USSR is comprised of fifteen union republics. The fifteenth, and the largest territorial and population unit of the USSR, the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic, is considered a confederation rather than a *national* union republic and, therefore, does not have its own, unified republic party organization. Instead, Communists of this republic belong to one of the many component territorial or special party organizations within the RSFSR. Since February, 1956, these various party organizations have been under the immediate direction of a special bureau in the Central Committee of the CPSU, but no figures have been given in Soviet sources, so far as the writer can determine, on the number of Communists under this bureau's authority.

[3] *Ezhegodnik Bol'shoi sovetskoi entsiklopedii, 1957* [1957 Yearbook of the Great Soviet Encyclopedia] (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe nauchnoe izdatel'stvo "Bol'shaia sovetskaia entsiklopediia," 1957). See the sections on the Communist party in the articles on individual national union republics.

[4] *Pravda*, February 17, 1956.

[5] CPSU statutes specifically remove army and navy party units—and in practice also party units in certain of the quasi-military forces of the USSR—from the direct jurisdiction of republic and other territorial party organizations. See *Ustav Kommunisticheskoi partii Sovetskogo soiuza* [Statutes of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union] (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe izdatel'stvo politicheskoi literatury, 1956), Art. 64.

* The present article grew out of a study in progress on the Communist party in the Latvian SSR. The author gratefully acknowledges assistance received in this larger study from Columbia University's Research Program on the History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

TABLE I. MEMBERSHIP GROWTH OF THE NATIONAL UNION REPUBLIC PARTY ORGANIZATIONS IN THE USSR

Area	Time Period[1]	Membership[2] at Start of Time Period	Membership[2] at End of Time Period	Average Absolute Monthly Increase	Average Monthly Rate of Increase %
Azerbaijan SSR	52 months (9/1/52–12/31/56)	111,697	125,895	273	0.24
Georgian SSR	52 months (9/1/52–1/1/57)	173,298	191,439	349	0.20
Kazakh SSR	52 months (9/1/52–1/1/57)	231,610	269,294	725	0.31
Kirghiz SSR	52 months (9/1/52–1/1/57)	46,267	53,287	135	0.29
Latvian SSR	52 months (9/1/52–12/31/56)	42,030	53,948	229	0.54
Lithuanian SSR	52 months (9/1/52–1/1/57)	36,693	42,229	106	0.29
Ukrainian SSR	52 months (9/1/52–1/1/57)	777,832	988,143	4,044	0.52
Subtotals for above republics	52 months (9/1/52–1/1/57)	1,419,427	1,724,235	5,862	0.41
Armenian SSR	84 months (1/1/49–1/1/56)	61,245	69,263	95	0.16
Belorussian SSR	95 months (2/1/49–1/1/57)	110,160	160,117	526	0.48
Estonian SSR	12 months (1/1/56–1/1/57)	22,524	25,800	273	1.21
Moldavian SSR	Maximum:[3] 48 months (1/1/53–1/1/57)			158	0.44
	Minimum: 36 months (12/31/53–1/1/57)	35,662	43,222	210	0.59
Tadzhik SSR	12 months (1/1/56–1/1/57)	35,124	39,052	327	0.93
Turkmen SSR	12 months (1/1/56–1/1/57)	37,488	39,344	155	0.41
Uzbek SSR	6 months (1/1/56–7/1/56)	150,200	156,329	1,022	0.68
Entire Soviet Union	40 months (10/1/52–2/1/56)	6,882,145	7,215,505	8,334	0.12

of fifty-two months. This has been done in Table I. Material has been added to the table showing the rate of party membership growth in the other seven national union republics and in the USSR as a whole for greater or smaller time periods than this fifty-two months.

One of the noteworthy facts emerging from such an analysis is the wide variation in rate of party membership growth among the national union republics. If the membership figures provided by the sources are valid—and there is no strong reason to believe otherwise—the party organizations of certain union republics, such as Latvia, Moldavia, and the Ukraine, have been increasing their numbers at more than twice the rate of those in areas such as Armenia and Georgia. Even more striking is the fact that the rate of membership growth for all fourteen of the republic party organizations was greater—usually substantially greater—than for the Soviet Union as a whole. Since the difference between the figure for the increase in membership of the entire CPSU and the figure for the growth of the national union republic party organizations represents the growth of the special party organizations and those of the RSFSR, it seems very probable that the latter two have been adding to their membership totals at a markedly slower pace than the union republic party organizations—at so slow a pace as to bring down significantly the rate of increase for the Soviet Union as a whole. Such a conclusion appears inescapable despite the fact that the membership statistics for four of the republics cover only a short period of time.[6]

Three possible reasons for these trends in party membership growth present themselves. The least plausible is that the inhabitants of the RSFSR and the servicemen in the Soviet army, navy, and similar organizations have been, to a far greater degree than their brethren in the fourteen union republics, reluctant to join the party. The other two, more probable, explanations—both of which may be true—are: (1) that the CPSU has deliberately limited additions to its membership lists in the RSFSR and perhaps also in military organizations in an attempt to facilitate an increase in the proportion of CPSU members from the ethnic minority regions; and (2) that the party organizations of the national union republics are growing substantially through the transfer of party members[7] from the RSFSR and by the addition of Communists demobilized from military units.

The proportion of republic party organization membership to total population of the national union republics and the proportion of CPSU membership to the population of the entire Soviet Union are presented in Table II.

The distribution of republic party organization membership strength within the individual national union republics shows even greater variation than the growth rates of the party organizations. The proportion of Communists in republic party organizations to total population is, for example, three times greater in the Georgian SSR than in the Lithuanian SSR.

Within the Soviet Union as a whole, 3.6 per cent of the total population of 200,200,000

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[6] In 1956, these four republic party organizations accounted for less than four per cent of the total membership of the CPSU.

[7] The statutes of the CPSU provide for such transfer of membership when Communists move from one area to another. See *Ustav Kommunisticheskoi partii Sovetskogo soiuza* (1956), Art. 8.

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Sources of data:

Bol'shaia sovetskaia entsiklopediia (2d ed.; Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe izdatel'stvo "Bol'shaia sovetskaia entsiklopediia," 1949–57), articles on the various republics.

Ezhegodnik Bol'shoi sovetskoi entsiklopedii, 1957, articles on the various republics.

Bakinskii Rabochii [Baku Worker], September 24, 1952; *Pravda Ukrainy* [The Ukrainian Pravda], September 25, 1952; and *Zarya Vostoka* [Dawn of the East], September 18, 1952, as given in Leo Gruliow (ed.), *Current Soviet Policies* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1953), Vol. I, pp. 80, 56, and 68, respectively.

Pravda, October 9, 1952, and February 17, 1956.

[1] When a source does not cite the exact date within a month, the first day of the month has been used.

[2] Includes both full members and candidate-members.

[3] Source states only "in 1953."

TABLE II. PERCENTAGE OF USSR UNION REPUBLICS' POPULATIONS BELONGING TO REPUBLIC COMMUNIST PARTY ORGANIZATIONS, 1956

Area	Population[1]	Per Cent Belonging to Republic Party Organizations[2]	Area	Population[1]	Per Cent Belonging to Republic Party Organizations[2]
Armenian SSR	1,600,000	4.3	Latvian SSR	2,000,000	2.7
Azerbaijan SSR	3,400,000	3.7	Lithuanian SSR	2,700,000	1.6
Belorussian SSR	8,000,000	2.0	Moldavian SSR	2,700,000	1.6
Estonian SSR	1,100,000	2.3	Tadzhik SSR	1,800,000	2.2
Georgian SSR	4,000,000	4.8	Turkmen SSR	1,400,000	2.8
Kazakh SSR	8,500,000	3.2	Ukrainian SSR	40,600,000	2.4
Kirghiz SSR	1,900,000	2.8	Uzbek SSR	7,300,000	2.1

Source: *Ezhegodnik Bol'shoi sovetskoi entsiklopedii, 1957*, articles on the various republics.

[1] Population figures are the official estimates of April, 1956.

[2] The figure for party membership used in working out this percentage is taken from the third column of Table I ("Membership at End of Time Period").

were Communist party members in 1956.

Table III ranks ten national union republics for which republic party organization membership growth rates can be figured for a time period longer than a year; among these, with the exception of Lithuania, there is something resembling an inverse relationship between the proportion of republic party organization membership to total union republic population on the one hand and the rate of membership growth on the other. Thus, it seems that the CPSU has been engaged in an effort to build up party membership strength in those national union republics where it has been weakest. This might be accomplished through the induction of new members from the local population and also, as already noted, through the transfer to the republic party organization of significant numbers of non-native Communists.

TABLE III. RANKING OF TEN NATIONAL UNION REPUBLICS BY PROPORTION OF REPUBLIC PARTY ORGANIZATION MEMBERSHIP TO TOTAL REPUBLIC POPULATION AND BY RATE OF MEMBERSHIP GROWTH

Per Cent of Total Republic Population Who Are Members of Republic Party Organization		Average Monthly Rate of Republic Party Organization Membership Growth	
Georgian SSR	4.8%	Latvian SSR	0.54%
Armenian SSR	4.3	Ukrainian SSR	0.52
Azerbaijan SSR	3.7	Belorussian SSR	0.48
Kazakh SSR	3.2	Moldavian SSR	0.44[1]
Kirghiz SSR	2.8	Kazakh SSR	0.31
Latvian SSR	2.7	Kirghiz SSR	0.29
Ukrainian SSR	2.4	Lithuanian SSR	0.29
Belorussian SSR	2.0	Azerbaijan SSR	0.24
Lithuanian SSR	1.6	Georgian SSR	0.20
Moldavian SSR	1.6	Armenian SSR	0.16

[1] The alternative figure of 0.59 for the Moldavian SSR, given in Table I above, would lift this republic to the top ranking in this column.

The republic party organization of Lithuania, however, has grown at a slower rate than might have been expected from the general trend.

A clear indication of the role of transferred Communists in strengthening republic party organizations appears in the figures for the Ukrainian SSR. Here the number of full members of the republic party organization at the beginning of 1957 was greater than the combined total of full and candidate-members one year earlier.[8] The statutes of the CPSU provide for a one-year term of candidate membership.[9] Therefore, if no members are transferred into a republic party organization, the number of full members at any one time should be, at the maximum, the number of full members plus the number of candidate-members a year earlier. Deaths, expulsions, and transfers out, as well as failure of some candidate-members to advance to full membership status, would, of course, usually mean a less than maximum gain. Yet, in the Ukrainian SSR party organization, the number of full members at the beginning of 1957 was almost 16,000 greater than the combined total of full and candidate-members one year earlier.

The *Ezhegodnik Bol'shoi sovetskoi entsiklopedii, 1957* also presents data which make it possible to derive the average number of republic party organization Communists—both full and candidate-members—belonging to the basic party unit, the "primary party organization" (ppo), in ten of the national union republics at the beginning of 1957 and in the USSR as a whole in February, 1956. Table IV presents this information. Here, too, there is noticeable variation among the republics, and comparison with the datum for the USSR as a whole indicates that the average ppo in the RSFSR and in military units must be much larger than those in the national union republics.

TABLE IV. AVERAGE SIZE OF PRIMARY PARTY ORGANIZATIONS IN TEN USSR UNION REPUBLICS

Area	Average No. of Communists per Primary Party Organization	
Azerbaijan SSR	19.2	End of 1956
Belorussian SSR	14.4	
Estonian SSR	*ca.* 13.6	
Kazakh SSR	20.2	
Latvian SSR	14.8	
Lithuanian SSR	12.3	
Moldavian SSR	15.8	
Tadzhik SSR	19.0	
Ukrainian SSR	18.7	
Uzbek SSR	*ca.* 18.8	(July, 1956)
USSR as a whole	*ca.* 26.2	(February, 1956)

Source of data: *Ezhegodnik Bol'shoi sovetskoi entsiklopedii, 1957*, articles on the various republics and on the USSR as an entity.

The number of party members represented by the delegates sent from an area to the congresses of the CPSU often has not corresponded with the number of members in that territorial party organization in those instances where that latter figure is known. Instead, the delegates have represented the equivalent of a greater number of Communists. The reasons for this are these: (1) The Communists in Soviet military and quasi-military party organizations are not, as already noted, directly subordinate to republic party organizations and, therefore, are not ordinarily included in their membership totals, even though the military party unit may be stationed within the territorial boundaries of the republic. (2) The number of members in the special party units, however, is a factor in determining the size of a republic's delegation to CPSU congresses, and the special units do take part, along with the republic party organization, in electing the delegation.[10]

Some idea of the ratio of Communists in a republic party organization to the total number of Communists in a republic can be gained from an analysis of membership and delegate statistics for the Ukrainian SSR, the second largest population unit in the USSR. This information is presented in Table V. Complete data have been obtainable in regard to full party members only, as distinguished from other Communists who have only candidate-member status in republic or special party organizations.

A similar analysis of membership and CPSU

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[8] "Ukrainskaia sovetskaia sotsialisticheskaia respublika" [Ukrainian SSR], *Bol'shaia sovetskaia entsiklopediia* (2d ed.), Vol. XLIV, p. 104, and "Ukrainskaia sovetskaia sotsialisticheskaia respublika," *Ezhegodnik Bol'shoi sovetskoi entsiklopedii, 1957*, p. 208.

[9] *Ustav Kommunisticheskoi partii Sovetskogo soiuza* (1956), Art. 18.

[10] *Pravda*, August 20, 1952, and July 14, 1955.

TABLE V. RATIO OF FULL PARTY MEMBERS IN REPUBLIC PARTY ORGANIZATION TO TOTAL NUMBER OF SUCH COMMUNISTS IN UKRAINIAN SSR

Time	No. Represented at CPSU Congress	No. in Republic Party Organization	Approximate Proportion of Full Party Members Located Within Republic Who Belonged to Republic Party Organization %
Eve of XIX CPSU Congress (October, 1952)	765,000[1]	676,190[2]	88.4
Eve of XX CPSU Congress (February, 1956)	955,000[3]	838,300[4]	87.8

[1] *Pravda*, October 9, 1952.

[2] *Pravda Ukrainy*, September 25, 1952, as given in Gruliow (ed.), *Current Soviet Policies*, Vol. I, p. 56.

[3] *Pravda*, February 17, 1956.

[4] "Ukrainskaia sovetskaia sotsialisticheskaia respublika," *Bol'shaia sovetskaia entsiklopediia* (2d ed.), Vol. XLIV, p. 104.

delegation figures for the Latvian SSR—one of the more recently incorporated areas of the Soviet Union—shows that in some parts of the USSR the proportion of full party members in a republic who are on the membership rolls of the republic party organization may be noticeably lower than in the Ukrainian SSR. It has been possible to obtain specific figures showing both republic party organization and delegation size for the Latvian SSR only for the time of the XIX Congress of the CPSU. On the basis of these figures, it can be deduced that in the fall of 1952 about sixty-eight per cent of the full party members in the republic belonged to the republic party organization, and the remaining thirty-two per cent to special party units.[11] An estimate of party membership in the Latvian SSR for the time of the XX Congress of the CPSU based on available data together with an interpolation of growth rate suggests that in the forty-month interval between the congresses the proportion of full party members who belonged to the republic party organization may have risen to somewhat over seventy-five per cent of all full members in that republic,[12] which is still definitely below the figure for the Ukrainian SSR.

The greater percentage of special party organization members in the Latvian SSR may indicate that the ratio of military and quasi-military personnel to civilian population has been significantly higher than in the Ukrainian SSR, or it may be that the Soviet leadership has purposely arranged for the military and quasi-military forces in that recently absorbed Baltic state to contain a greater than average proportion of Communists. Such action would both add to the general party membership strength in that area and would permit a closer surveillance of the loyalty of the military and quasi-military forces themselves.

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[11] *Pravda*, October 9, 1952; I. A. F. Bumber and P. M. Alampiev (eds.), *Latviiskaia SSR; Ocherki ekonomicheskoi geografii* [Latvian SSR; Studies in Economic Geography] (Riga: Izdatel'stvo Akademii nauk Latviiskoi SSR, 1956), p. 98; and "Latviiskaia sovetskaia sotsialisticheskaia respublika" [Latvian SSR], *Bol'shaia sovetskaia entsiklopediia* (2d ed.), Vol. XXIV, p. 331.

[12] *Sovetskaia Latviia*, January 20, 1956; "Latviiskaia sovetskaia sotsialisticheskaia respublika," *Ezhegodnik Bol'shoi sovetskoi entsiklopedii, 1957*, p. 148; and "Latviiskaia sovetskaia sotsialisticheskaia respublika," *Bol'shaia sovetskaia entsiklopediia* (2d ed.), Vol. XXIV, p. 331.

TEACHING NOTE

THE EFFECT OF THE INTRODUCTORY POLITICAL SCIENCE COURSE ON STUDENT ATTITUDES TOWARD PERSONAL POLITICAL PARTICIPATION*

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In its analysis of the introductory course in *Goals for Political Science*, the APSA Committee for the Advancement of Teaching some years ago reported almost universal endorsement of at least one objective—"training for citizenship." Sharp differences divided the profession, however, as to the pedagogical means to that end. A majority felt that a better understanding of governmental institutions and political processes would produce more sophisticated, and hence better, citizens. But to other political scientists good citizenship does not exist *in vacuo;* it implies active personal political participation. They felt, therefore, that the introductory course should be "organized and conducted for the sole purpose of developing effective, participating citizens." Some political scientists even contended that "preparing students for participation in politics should be a primary objective of every American college." The courses favored by these last two groups reflected the belief that "book learning" alone is not sufficient to arouse interest in political participation. Rather, traditional library and classroom work should be supplemented by direct student contact with politics, politicians, and party organizations.[1]

The effectiveness of courses designed to improve student understanding of political institutions and processes can be satisfactorily measured by the traditional course examinations. But evaluating courses which seek to develop effective, participating citizens is more difficult. The ultimate criterion of effectiveness must be actual participation in political affairs. Since candidacy for office, active work within a party organization, or even voting, normally do not occur until after the student finally leaves college, only a study of later political behavior can pass final judgment on the participation-oriented introductory courses. Nevertheless, given the importance of the issue, it is remarkable that the APSA Committee found so little evidence of any effort to evaluate these courses, or even to develop satisfactory testing instruments.[2]

Until data permitting the correlation of undergraduate exposure to participation-oriented introductory courses with subsequent adult political behavior become available,[3] alternative methods of evaluating these courses must be employed. One such is a measure of the impact of various types of introductory courses on student *attitudes* toward participation. Expressed attitudes do not correlate perfectly with immediate overt behavior, and may be an even less dependable basis for predicting future behavior. These limitations notwithstanding, it seems reasonable to assume that undergraduates who express favorable attitudes toward personal political participation are more likely to play an active political role in later life than their fellow students who manifest indifferent or unfavorable attitudes.

This article reports a three-year study which sought to determine what changes in student attitudes, if any, toward personal political participation were produced by several kinds of introductory courses in political science. We shall first describe the nature of these courses; second, the attitude measure; third, the results obtained; and last, the implications of these findings.

Nature of the Courses. Four kinds of introductory political science courses were studied—one standard and three participation-oriented offerings. All four met for three hours weekly in sections small enough to permit considerable student discussion. With a single exception, all were taught by faculty members of professorial rank. Students were undergraduates at New York University's Washington Square College, a great majority of whom live in the New York metropolitan area.

Given in 1953–56, the standard course (designated No. 1 in the Table below) was the established two-semester introduction to government then required of almost all students

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* The authors are indebted to the Maurice and Laura Falk Foundation for its financial support of the Research Project in Political Motivation, of which the study here reported is a part.

[1] Report of the Committee for the Advancement of Teaching, American Political Science Association, *Goals for Political Science* (New York, 1951) pp. 169–219.

[2] *Ibid.*, pp. 205–207.

[3] The Political Motivation Research Project has in its files data which, it is hoped, will make such a follow-up study possible within a few years.

TABLE I. EFFECT OF STANDARD AND PARTICIPATION-ORIENTED INTRODUCTORY COURSES IN POLITICAL SCIENCE ON STUDENT ATTITUDES TOWARD PERSONAL POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

Year	Course	N (cases)	N (sections)	Average Initial Score	Average Final Score	Difference	Critical Ratio*	P†
1953–54	No. 1 (standard)	60	2	72.48	72.13	−.35	.31	.76
	No. 2 (P-0)	17	1	76.12	74.24	−1.88	.75	.45
1954–55	No. 1 (standard)	95	3	70.78	72.03	1.25	1.41	.16
	No. 2 (P-0)	45	2	69.33	70.51	1.18	.83	.40
1955–56	No. 1 (standard)	24	1	74.08	74.88	.80	.33	.75
	No. 3 (P-0)	22	1	64.86	70.27	5.41	2.04	.04
	No. 4 (P-0)	35	1	68.94	71.31	2.37	1.06	.29

* The critical ratio is "a measure of statistical significance or stability, of how likely it is that the obtained statistic is materially affected by chance. The most commonly used is the C R of a difference. A difference is usually regarded as not sufficiently stable unless the C R is about 3.00." It is computed by dividing the difference (between initial and final scores) by the standard error of the difference.

† The P column is "a measure of the risk that the value of a statistic is affected by chance." A P value of .01 or .05 is usually regarded as a reasonable minimum, indicating that the obtained result would be likely to occur by chance (due to variations in sampling) only one or five times in 100, respectively. Horace B. English and Ava Champney English, *A Comprehensive Dictionary of Psychological and Psychoanalytical Terms* (New York, 1958).

other than those who enrolled in the "integrated" social science sequence described below. Fundamentally traditional in approach, it placed a major stress on American government, with some attention devoted to political theory and foreign political institutions. The same syllabus and textbooks were used in all sections, although the instructors were permitted (and exercised) considerable latitude in developing the material and in assigning additional readings.[4]

The three participation-oriented courses had a number of common features. All were components of an "integrated" three-semester social science sequence which covered psychology, sociology, economics and political science. In each, approximately twelve weeks were spent in the formal classroom presentation of the political science segment of the sequence. Another common feature was the effort made in all three to expose the students to practical politics and practicing politicians. Prominent public personages and local Democratic and Republican party officials discussed their experiences with the students. Other politicians, including members of the United States Congress, recorded interviews for use during class hours. Students were urged to participate in workshops of the local Citizenship Clearing House and, for the benefit of those who could not attend, the more important proceedings were tape-recorded. In addition, arrangements were made for course members to work actively during election campaigns with party organizations of their choice, although, unfortunately, not everyone was able to do so.

The differentiating characteristics of the three participation-oriented courses were as follows: Course No. 2, given in 1953–55, was concerned almost exclusively with American government.[5] Course No. 3, given in 1955–56, placed major emphasis on political science rather than American government materials.[6] Course No. 4, also given in 1955–56, used the same materials as No. 3. But in No. 4 a deliberate and sustained attempt was made by the instructor and by visiting guest speakers to stress the desirability of active personal political participation. No similar "selling" attempt was made in the standard course or in the other two participation-oriented courses.

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[4] The textbooks used in the standard course were Ferguson and McHenry, Roche and Stedman, and the volume of readings edited by Harvey, Skinner, Somit, and Nealon (brought up to date by more recent materials). Supplementary readings assigned by section leaders ranged from Barth, *The Loyalty of Free Men*, to Koestler, *Darkness of Noon*, and Orwell, *1984*.

[5] The text was Burns and Peltason. Additional readings were assigned from Riordon, *Plunkitt of Tammany Hall*, Lubell, *The Future of American Politics*, and the volume of readings by Bishop and Hendel.

Attitude Measurement. To measure student attitudes toward personal political participation, a 22-item Likert-type scale was devised,[7] which is reproduced in the Appendix. The favorable extreme was defined in terms of participation in the affairs of a political party, rather than purely individualistic political activity, consonantly with the general position of those who advocate training for political participation. Responses to a five-point scale for each item (Strongly Agree, Agree, Undecided, Disagree, Strongly Disagree) were scored from 1 to 5, the highest score representing the most favorable attitude toward participation. The possible range of scores thus runs from 22 to 110, with the mid-point of 66 indicating an undecided or neutral position. Davis discrimination indices were computed and were considered sufficiently high to warrant retention of all items.[8] The test-retest reliability of the scale was determined for five groups ranging in size from 17 to 95 students. The reliability coefficients obtained (.694; .750; .689; .834; and .704) indicate adequate consistency of measurement for a comparison of group scores.

The validity of the Likert-type attitude scale has been repeatedly demonstrated by obtaining scores differing in the expected direction from groups known to hold contrasting attitudes. The setting in which the instant study was conducted and the subject-matter of the scale were considered favorable for eliciting candid responses. As an additional check, independent estimates based on detailed personal interviews were made of the attitudes of twenty-two students. These estimates corresponded closely with the students' attitudes as measured by the scale.

Results. Average group attitude scores for each type of course are indicated by year in Table I. In each case the average initial score was obtained by administering the scale at the beginning of each course. The scale was again administered at the end of the second semester of the standard course and at the end of the third semester of the participation-oriented courses. Two generalizations are suggested by these data.

First, it is quite apparent from Table I that at the outset of all four courses the typical student attitude toward personal political participation was close to the neutral or indifference point represented by a score of 66. For no group during any year was the average initial score higher than 76.12. A clearly favorable attitude as measured on the scale requires an average score of approximately 90.

Second, no significant change of attitude was produced by any of the courses. The criterion of statistical significance here is the usual .01 level of confidence. Only in one case, course No. 3, was the difference between the average initial and average final scores sufficient to reach significance at the .05 level. And in this instance, as can be seen from Table I, the average initial score (64.86) was appreciably lower than the average initial score for any of the other groups studied over the entire three-year period, whereas the average final score for course No. 3 was well within the range of the other average final scores.

Conclusions. Only future research can establish whether the findings of this study would be duplicated at other educational institutions. It is quite possible, for example, that the results obtained were significantly influenced by the prevailing climate of opinion during 1953–56, by the nature of Washington Square College as an educational institution, and by the socio-economic, religious, and regional composition of its student body.

Nevertheless, many political scientists will probably not be surprised to learn that repeated measurements of student attitudes reveal general indifference toward personal political participation. Undergraduates might well be expected to mirror the apathy of their elders toward politics, evidenced by widespread disinterest in civic affairs, poor voting turnout, and the unfavorable opinions of politicians so often noted by commentators on the American political scene. This reflection of adult attitudes was in fact further demonstrated, in the larger study from which the data here presented were drawn, by an indifferent attitude toward politicians and a low level of interest in political news.[9]

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[6] Readings were drawn from Gettell, *Political Science*, Ebenstein, *Man And The State*, Appleby, *Big Democracy*, and Bishop and Hendel.

[7] A somewhat similar scale was independently devised by the staff of the Ben A. Arneson Institute of Practical Politics at Ohio Wesleyan University in an attempt to measure the extent to which students' college experiences affect their attitudes toward practical politics. See Ruth M. Larson and Chester O. Mathews, *Changes in Students' Attitudes Toward Practical Politics Over a Four-Year Period* (Delaware, Ohio, 1958). None of the Institute's work seems directly comparable with the study here reported.

[8] The Davis discrimination index is a linear scale from 0 to 100. See Frederick B. Davis, "Item Analysis Data: Their Computation, Interpretation, and Use in Test Construction," *Harvard Education Papers*, No. 2 (Cambridge, 1946).

Student disinterest in personal political participation is but one aspect of our findings. No less important are the data which challenge the frequent assumption that the participation-oriented introductory course so alters student attitudes as to stimulate increased political participation in later life. It cannot be concluded from the results of the present study that all participation-oriented courses fail in their goal. However, it does seem clear that future claims for them must be demonstrated rather than assumed.

Appendix

PERSONAL POLITICAL PARTICIPATION ATTITUDE SCALE

Directions

This is not a test, but a request for your honest opinion on the subjects indicated below. Read each statement carefully. To indicate your opinion, circle the word or phrase on the answer sheet that describes your opinion most accurately. When you have finished, please look over the paper to make sure you have recorded your opinion for all of the statements.

1. I like to discuss, with people I know, recent or proposed actions by our city officials.
2. I pay very little attention to speeches and decisions by the Governor and other state officials.
3. I am intensely interested in discussions as to the merits of the policies advocated by the President and other members of the national administration.
4. I would like to run for the position of United States Congressman.
5. I would not care to be a member of the State Legislature.
6. I would like to run for the job of City Councilman.
7. I can't imagine myself ever being a candidate for any political office.
8. I have no hesitation in letting my acquaintances know my opinions about political parties and candidates.
9. I don't see any reason why I should keep my political views a secret from my business associates, present or prospective.
10. I think that I could make a useful contribution to good government by taking an active role in that political party which best represents my ideas.
11. Even though I think a given candidate should be elected, I would be unwilling to speak in his behalf before a group of people.
12. I do not think I would contribute money to help a candidate or political party win an election, even if I favored that candidate or party.
13. I would voluntarily give some of my spare time during election campaigns to work for the political party that I favor.
14. I would not risk jeopardizing my position with a future employer or business associates by running for public office on a political ticket.
15. I would like to be elected to an office in which I could exercise some influence on important government policies and decisions.
16. I would not regard it as a worthwhile achievement to be elected to a political office, even if I felt qualified for that office.
17. It would be against my principles to do the things that seem necessary in order to be elected to a public office.
18. It is my intention to be independent in politics, rather than a regular supporter of any organized political group.
19. I would run for office on the ticket of some independent or nonpartisan group, but would not run for office under the sponsorship of one of the regular parties.
20. I do not feel that I have the personal qualifications for a successful career in politics.
21. A citizen should be willing to run for public office if numerous responsible and public-spirited citizens urge him to do so.
22. I regard many public questions as so important that I intend to give active support to parties and politicians who favor the same policies that I do.

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[9] The three scales used to measure (1) attitudes toward politicians, (2) interest in political news, and (3) attitudes toward *personal political participation* were largely independent instruments. Their intercorrelations, based on a sample of 354 students, were as follows: attitudes toward politicians and interest in political news ($r = .141$); attitudes toward politicians and attitudes toward personal political participation ($r = .177$); interest in political news and attitudes toward personal political participation ($r = .202$). These results are not dissimilar to those in a recently reported study, where students at the University of Western Australia selected from a list of 84 adjectives best describing the politician the following five: ambitious, argumentative, power-seeking, talkative, and evasive. See K. F. Walker, "A Study of Occupational Stereotypes," *Journal of Applied Psychology*, Vol. 42 (1958), pp. 122–124.

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BOOK REVIEWS

Harlan Fiske Stone: Pillar of the Law. By Alpheus T. Mason. (New York: The Viking Press. 1956. Pp. xiii, 914. $8.75.)

"I often wonder whether people at large will ever grasp what is going on in the work of our Court," Stone confessed to John Bassett Moore after serving on the Supreme Court for five years. All such doubts would have been completely dispelled had he lived to read Alpheus Thomas Mason's *Harlan Fiske Stone: Pillar of the Law.* Adjudged by the American Library Association to have been "the most distinguished book of 1956 in History and Biography," it won for the author the Association's $5,000 Liberty and Justice Award. The biography deals with every facet of Stone's life, including his tastes in wine, art, and travel, but more than three-fourths of it is concerned with his work as a judge.

While everyone has recognized the book's high merits, some reviewers have questioned its method. Professor Mason has been attacked for revealing too much—making intimate disclosures of judicial squabbles when some of the participants are still living. One is tempted to suggest that these critics have chosen to treat as a grave defect what is probably the book's chief value and unparalleled contribution. Ultimately, however, something Paul A. Freund said in justification of another book will serve as the best answer: "There are also the claims of history, the interest of a succeeding generation in understanding, judging and profiting from the deliberations of their predecessors which for valid reasons were veiled when they occurred."

It is safe to predict that henceforth no serious-minded student of the Supreme Court—be he historian, political scientist, or biographer—will be able to discuss the crucial two decades of Stone's tenure without relying heavily upon Professor Mason's painstaking record of the period. For the book is not merely the life story of an important public figure; it is also an extraordinarily detailed and vivid portrait of the inner life of the Court as a functioning institution.

When in the summer of 1950 Professor Mason agreed to do the biography, Mrs. Stone gave him "unrestricted" access to the Chief Justice's personal correspondence as well as his private and public papers. This collection, the fortunate biographer reports, included "a formidable mass of Supreme Court documents—slip opinions in various stages of preparation, memoranda to and from members of the Court, and Stone's own record of the manner in which certain crucial decisions were hammered into shape."

So deft and faithful is Professor Mason's use of these materials that over and over again the narrative takes on qualities of genuine excitement. The interplay between ideas and personality in the process of collective decision is etched with such perception and clarity that a new dimension seems to have been added to the analysis of constitutional interpretation. Professor Mason penetrates behind the veil of judicial impersonality without ever descending into the mire of personal irrelevancies. Always in the forefront of his exposition are the issues at stake in the particular controversy, but we are enabled to see all the elements involved in their resolution—the intellectual tug of war, the efforts to persuade and dissuade, the give-and-take of compromise. Perhaps more than any other study of the judicial process this book documents and authenticates what Justice Frankfurter has called "the agony of judicial duty," especially in the realm of constitutional adjudication.

Of course, both the man and the epoch forming the subjects of this biography combined to produce an ideal vehicle for dramatic history. Harlan Fiske Stone served on the Court a little over twenty-one years—as an Associate Justice for sixteen and as Chief Justice for five. It was Calvin Coolidge, his Amherst classmate, who placed Stone on the Court in 1925 and Franklin D. Roosevelt who elevated him to the center Chair. Thus his service on the Supreme Court coincided with a period of sharp judicial conflict and fundamental shifts in constitutional doctrines—not to mention the repercussions of depression, war, and political ferment.

Coming to the Court with the "taint" of Wall Street, Stone soon allied himself with Holmes and Brandeis in many of the constitutional battles that beset the Court in the 1920's. In the 1930's his voice was raised in emphatic protest against narrowly conceived interpretations of the powers of government—national and state—to cope with pressing social and economic problems. Roosevelt and the other defenders of court-packing found Stone's words grist for their mill, much to his discomfort. But Stone was fated to preside over the reconstructed Court, and in the conflicts that developed among the new Justices—"my team of wild horses" he called them—the erstwhile liberal dissenter found himself at odds with both the growing conservatism of an Owen J. Roberts and the unorthodox tactics and attitudes of the Court's new liberal faction.

"About all I can do in my remaining years," Stone wrote to Learned Hand early in 1945, "is to try to make apparent some of the things that in the days of yore made the Court great. But I confess I am very lonesome." Now cast in the role of a carping conservative, he was essentially a tragic figure, unable to "control" his Court. Professor Mason's forthright discussion of Stone's troubles and failings as the Court's titular leader certainly supports his conclusion that "those qualities that make for greatness in a judge are no sure index to success as Chief Justice."

Writing to congratulate Stone at the time of his original appointment to the Court, Thomas Reed Powell expressed the hope that "you will be the medium by which those of your colleagues who need it will get more of the skepticism of Mr. Justice Holmes and more of the realism of Mr. Justice Brandeis. But we learn from the biographer that at first Stone was attracted to the "solid virtues" of Taft, Van Devanter, Sutherland, and Butler and that he distrusted Brandeis, "whose elaborately documented opinions seemed to him unduly ostentatious." A conservative in politics and jurisprudence—counsel for big business and friend and admirer of Herbert Hoover—he shared many of the economic and social views of the Court's "right wing."

The evolution of such a man as a liberal jurist is therefore one of the most intriguing questions that can be raised about Stone, and it must be noted that

Professor Mason sheds considerable light on the metamorphosis. But Stone's initial years on the Court manifested more than capacity for intellectual growth. There is little doubt that the social obtuseness and rigid dogmatism of some of his colleagues served to move him ever closer to Holmes and Brandeis and later Cardozo. Even more decisive an influence may have been his increasing awareness that the reactionary brethren were misapplying their function as constitutional judges. "I always felt," he said of Van Devanter many years later, "that he conceived it his duty to declare unconstitutional any law he particularly disliked, which to my mind is a fatal way of interpreting an instrument of government which must envisage the possibility of difference of opinion about social and governmental questions." No wonder his resistance to sterile formulas and the indulgence of personal predilections started so early, a resistance that reached its climax in his ringing denunciation of the abuse of judicial power in his memorable dissent in *United States v. Butler.*

Stone's deep attachment to the canons of judicial self-limitation did not keep him from assigning to the judiciary a positive duty of safeguarding the fundamental liberties of the American people. Both his theory of political restraints and the distinction he drew between regulation touching commercial affairs and restrictions on the rights of minorities were well devised to buttress his conception of the Court as the "palladium" of freedom. In the interest of these principles he was quite willing to stand alone, as he demonstrated in the first flag-salute case. Speaking of Justice Frankfurter's earnest intramural efforts in this case to get Stone to remain true to his own counsel of restraint, Professor Mason records Stone's angry comment that "any 'vulgar intrusion of law in the domain of conscience' . . . imposes on the Court a larger responsibility than in legislation dealing with the control of property."

Stone lived to see practically all of his dissenting views embodied in prevailing opinions. Yet his years of vindication were also the years of greatest frustration and even despair. Professor Mason has devoted a substantial part of his monumental biography to an exploration of this paradox, and he has given us infinitely more than an expert survey of cases and juridical doctrines.

Step by step and by adhering to the simple and straightforward technique of allowing the chronological sequence to convey the panorama of changing issues and personnel, Professor Mason has succeeded in presenting a picture of the roots of judicial strife that is a real *tour de force.* It is one of the most meticulous and incisive diagnoses of the impact of human character and clashing social ideals that is available in the literature on the Supreme Court. But the whole book is a triumph of creative scholarship that should serve as an inspiration and a challenge to all scholars.

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Polity and Economy: An Interpretation of the Views of Adam Smith. BY JOSEPH CROPSEY. (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. 1957. Pp. xiii, 101. Guilders 9.50.)

Any teacher or serious student of economic or political thought must have felt the need of a scholarly and analytical treatment of the moral and political ideas of the professor of moral economy who became the effective founder of the branch of knowledge called "political economy"—a designation later replaced by the shorter one, "economics." The book under review is an excellent performance for meeting this need. It will hardly close the subject—indeed, it should provoke further study and publication dealing with Smith and his antecedents and followers; but it answers in reasonably satisfactory fashion the main historical questions raised by Smith's writings and sheds light on those of a more substantive character. One thinks of *das Adam Smith Problem* exploited by some German writers, the alleged contrast between the views of human nature found in the main published books respectively of the moral philosopher and the economist: *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*, 1759, and *The Wealth of Nations*, 1776. The author does not, indeed, discuss this topic nor go into the development of Smith's thought in his later life; that history he may have deemed adequately treated elsewhere, perhaps in Cannan's Introductions and Notes to his editions of Smith's *Lectures* and *The Wealth of Nations*.

We are told (Introd., p. vii) that "it is part of the purpose of this essay to show that [Smith] conceived his economics within a framework of moral theory according to the fashion of his predecessors since . . . Greece." The predecessors named are Spinoza and Hobbes, the latter receiving the main emphasis. This promise seems to be inadequately fulfilled, but not very germane to the main purpose of the book. What we get is a well-documented study of Smith's ideas on moral theory—chiefly from his *Theory of Moral Sentiments*—and of his political position and philosophy, especially with respect to economic relations, based on both books (and in part on the *Essays*). The work would at best be hard to review briefly, and a brief review is made "impossible" by the absence of any index, and by a Table of Contents that merely lists a Preface (p. v), an Introduction (pp. vii–xi), and three chapter titles. The first of these, "The General Foundations of Smith's System," fills fifty-six of the book's hundred and one pages; the second, on "Freedom, History and the Commercial Order of Society," covers thirty-one of the remaining forty-six. Chapter III (thirteen pages), "The Problem of Smith's Intention," contains the main practical conclusions, to which the bulk of the book is essentially introduction and background.

Respecting Smith's philosophy, the central fact is his conception of Nature and the natural, in which, as Mr. Cropsey reiterates, there is no place for moral virtue. Moral virtue is defined in terms of "passions," as embodying propriety and merit, especially the capacity to sympathize with and approve the feelings and acts of others—the final criterion of right and wrong (pp. 12 f.). A later treatment of Smith's treatment of virtues, in terms of the "cardinal" four (pp. 37 ff.), is unclear, but so is that of Smith—and of everyone else, inevitably, as far as this writer knows and can judge. Cropsey begins in his Introduction to emphasize Smith's final moral-political objective, which is to defend "civil and ecclesiastical freedom" (p. xi); and this thesis is elaborated in the last two chapters. More stress is laid on opposition to ecclesiastical power. This view is well documented; but a thing that has especially impressed me in *The Wealth* *of Nations* is the little space devoted to this theme, in comparison with the continual attack on state action; also the little historical reference to medieval Europe in comparison with reference to classical antiquity and the then-recent centuries in the West—the "mercantilistic" epoch. It is noteworthy, too, that the whole discussion of religion is incorporated in that of education. In politics, Smith is shown to favor "republicanism," i.e., constitutional government on the pattern of Britain at the time—or even more that of "Holland," as having more freedom of trade. There should be a hereditary executive and limited suffrage.

In a book with this title, by a political scientist and presumably intended primarily for that profession, the economist does not expect a close analysis of Smith's economic system or critique of his policy of market freedom. Smith did not use the term "*laisser-faire*," and he recognized many grounds and occasions for governmental action in the economic field. He made scathing remarks about "commercial society," showing that he had no idealistic illusions about it. An economist reviewer may perhaps remark that it is over-generalization to say that Smith held that "the distribution of value in a . . . commercial society is determined by the bargaining power of the parties . . . " (p. 75). The following statement, inferring the view that "wages, profit and rent are . . . conventional . . . " can be defended, but many "theories" can also be documented in Smith. Not, however, the principle now recognized as self-evident, that market competition divides a joint product among complementary agents producing it on the basis of the contributions of small increments of each to the total result. It took the "best minds" in political economy itself a good century to begin to grasp this principle—and a further generation or two to incorporate in into an intelligible economic system. Smith and his "classical" followers had no explanation of distribution as the pricing of productive services. Such tardiness in seeing the obvious is rather the most important lesson to be learned from the study of the history of economic thought.

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The King's Two Bodies: A Study in Mediaeval Political Theology. By ERNST H. KANTOROWICZ. (Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1957. Pp. xvi, 567. $10.00.)

Professor Kantorowicz has written a great book, perhaps the most important work in the history of medieval political thought, surely the most spectacular, of the past several generations. Here, in superbly designed chapters based upon the best scholarship in every field even remotely concerned with the Middle Ages, is the development of the theory and symbolism of the early national states from the eleventh to the sixteenth centuries. Some, prejudiced against the theoretical approach, may consider his treatment too conceptualized. I think not, for he is constantly in touch with the events of his period and aware too of all methodological proprieties.

The early chapters establish the problems and the plan of the study. Kantorowicz starts with the Tudor mystic fiction of the "King's Two Bodies," discusses this difficult distinction between the royal body-natural and body-politic and the latter's special eternal status, and sets out to discover its medieval antecedents. Then, illustrating a principal theme, the transfer of theological and ecclesiastical qualities and symbols to the secular power, he sketches the movement of the term "*corpus mysticum*" from Christian Society to the Church to the State. Brilliant in this opening section, and indicative too of his range, is the interpretation of Shakespeare's *Richard II* against the concept of a "royal Christology."

The argument of the book is developed in several long and complicated chapters, in which we first return to the eleventh century. At that time Kantorowicz finds the king's duplication of persons not founded on Law or in a constitution, but rather on Grace, in Theology. By the thirteenth century, however, a "theocratic-juristical" idea of government has replaced the earlier "Christological-liturgical" one, largely as the result of the revived legal studies. The legists cited the Bible through the *Corpus Iuris*, called themselves "priests of the law of justice," and in very many ways contributed to the "new holiness of the state." Finally in this chapter, "Law-Centered Kingship," Kantorowicz discusses the concept of the fisc both in the continental jurists of the Roman and Canon laws and in Bracton, showing the relationship of the fisc to the eternity of the state and to the process of its hallowing.

He next elaborates on the corporational aspects of the medieval state, giving a more detailed analysis of "*corpus mysticum*" to show how the term came ultimately to designate the Church as a "body politic" and how this theological concept was arrogated by secular powers. Then, after a discussion of the relationship of State to Law, Kantorowicz turns to the glorification of the new states in terms of such notions as "*Patria*" and "Die for the Fatherland." He begins the next chapter, "On Continuity and Corporations," with a very stimulating account of the philosophical concept of time, "*aevum*," revived in the thirteenth century, and draws its implications for the political abstractions then being made immortal by the jurists. This done, he discusses the three factors that combined to create the fiction "The King never dies": the everlastingness of the dynasty, the corporate quality of the crown, and the immortality of the royal "*dignitas*." The treatment of *dignitas* is very fine and exemplifies his success in finally clarifying terms long used with imprecision.

Dignitas creates a new series of problems and relationships: the symbolic phoenix and the state, the "equiparation" of God and *dignitas*, the significance of the royal effigy for the eternal monarchy, and others. In his concluding chapters, Kantorowicz brings it all together with particular reference to England, whose special development he ascribes to the existence and function of Parliament; he presents a masterly interpretation of Dante's social and political ideas; and he tentatively rejects the possibility that the "King's Two Bodies" had its origin in ancient as opposed to medieval thought.

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The American Cause. By Russell Kirk. (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company. 1957. Pp. vii, 172. $3.50.)

Kirk believes that most Americans today cannot defend their ideas and interests against "the grim threat of collectivism." For proof of this "perilous condition," he points to the behavior of American prisoners of the Korean War. He begins his grim account with quotations from a memorandum prepared by the Chinese Communist "Chief of Intelligence" in Korea, reporting to Communist headquarters in Peiping the findings of his "re-education and indoctrination program for American prisoners." "The American soldier," the Communist indoctrinator said, "has weak loyalties to his family, his community, his country, his religion, and his fellow soldiers"; his "concepts of right and wrong" are "hazy"; he has "little knowledge of American political history and philosophy" and of American "safeguards to freedom"; etc. Kirk says that this "hostile judgment" has been "confirmed, in substance," by the findings of the American military officers who later investigated repatriated prisoners (Department of the Army, Pamphlet No. 30–101, 1956) and by the report of a Senate sub-committee based on the Army reports and its own extensive hearings (Senate Report No. 2832, 84th Congress, 2nd Session). Kirk paraphrases the latter report as concluding that "failure of our educational system to provide proper instruction in history, politics, economics, and other subjects was a principal cause of the bewildered and shameful conduct of the majority of American prisoners."

Regarding such conduct as symptomatic of a general decline in American intellectual and moral valor, Kirk offers his book as an effort to recover for Americans the long-run beliefs that "secure our order, our justice, and our freedom." "That a nation has prospered a great while—that it has been orderly and wealthy—is one very good proof that its ideas have been sound and true." And our sound moral, political, and economic ideas—if they are to be properly understood and faithfully followed—must be felt as basically religious beliefs. They are, according to Kirk's interpretation, founded upon beliefs in the fatherhood of God and the brotherhood of man.

Kirk offers corrections for what he believes to be prevalent present-day misconceptions about democracy and civil liberties. Our Constitutional founders did not intend to establish a "pure" democracy or a "classless" society. The "aristocracy" they rejected was essentially that of hereditary titles and privileges. "Classes," they understood, are inevitable—in the sense of natural groupings of citizens according to their varying abilities and services. They understood the need for political leadership by men of superior intelligence, education, and political acumen. They therefore balanced the influence of superior wealth, professional achievement, and intellectual force with the influences of free popular opinions, mixing democracy and aristocracy, with safeguards against abuses from either source. Moreover, they did not, Kirk says, intend to established a "centralized democracy." They set up our federal system, wherein "forty-eight sovereign States" allot to a central government powers that they may withdraw. "Strictly speaking, we do not have a national government." Moreover, our guarantees of rights and freedoms were not intended either to establish unlimited rights or to prohibit all governmental supports for our freedoms. We have never had unlimited freedom of speech and assembly. Although our principles require "complete toleration of religious beliefs," including "toleration of disbelief in religion," they do not require attitudes of "indifference" to religion. The Constitutional prohibition of "an establishment of religion" was not intended to bar governmental aid to religion.

Kirk's discussion of our economic principles is devoted chiefly to praise of our "free economy" of "private enterprise" and "freedom of competition." Our economic freedom, he declares, supports all our other freedoms—"bound together inseparably" with our political freedom, and "not altogether separated" from "freedom of religious opinion." In a pragmatic mood, he gives concrete details of benefits resulting from the "instinct for competition," strongest in our abler and "more energetic men and women," to show how well our free economy works in maintaining "previously unknown" standards of comfort and luxury; he also points to our lavish public and private expenditures for education, our generous private provision for hospitalization and health insurance ("alternatives to socialized medicine"), and our "great private endowments for the advancement of culture." We have not solved all our problems; he lists our needs to decentralize and humanize mass-production and to attract better educated businessmen and more responsible labor leaders. He thinks we should rely mainly on "moral checks" to restrain "vicious competition" and on the "instinct of charity" to impel action (preferably by private or local government agencies) to help those who, because of natural handicaps, genuinely need help. He warns against the devices of "zealots" who, speaking in the name of "social justice," really advocate a "regimented," "servile," "totally planned" economy, in which "all people" are to have "equal share in the world's goods." He finds it necessary to tell us that "pure equality" is "impossible."

The last two chapters describe and refute Communist attacks on our system: our "materialism," "crass concentration on private profits" gained from "labors of the poor," our "imperialism," and our general cultural decay. Any readers who have serious doubts as to our superiority, in policy and doctrine, to the Communists should be helped by Kirk's comparisons. This reviewer, however, has doubts about the justice and usefulness of some of Kirk's other comparisons and appraisals.

Kirk does not take time to point out that our free economy has required various sorts of governmental aids and restraints to keep it stable and efficient; that, from colonial times on, we have had a "mixed economy," with changing mixtures; that demands for governmental intervention have come from various groups of energetic citizens, speaking variously in terms of special practical needs and of general principles of social justice, and from our ablest statesmen, from the beginnings of our national independence—none demanding, however, a totally planned economy or an equal sharing of goods for everybody.

This reviewer believes that Kirk should reconsider his confident judgments (judgments which he represents as fully borne out by the Army and Senate sub-committee reports) on the conduct of the majority of imprisoned American soldiers in Korea. The reports do, indeed, agree that the Communists did not employ systematic physical torture and that they had considerable success in extracting information and making prisoners obey orders. However, the reports also in general agree that the indoctrinators used "harassment" and threats and that their methods were based generally on "the idea of progressively weakening" the prisoner's physical and moral strength." The Senate sub-committee's general judgment on the soldiers seems significantly different from the judgments cited and warmly endorsed by Kirk. It admonishes itself and others against over-assured judgments on the prisoner's conduct: "It is important to note that the type of behavior of accepting a reward in return for cooperation with the enemy, or collapsing in the face of the enemy's blandishments and coercion, did not take place in the middle of a metropolis like Washington, but in the environment of deprived, physically sick conditions in the Korean prison compounds." This seems a better judgment than Kirk's sweeping condemnations—which are hardly needed as introduction to "an honest description" of traditional American beliefs about freedom and order and justice. This is not to say that there was nothing seriously wrong in the soldiers' responses and nothing seriously wrong in our national failure to prepare them to resist the indoctrinators by defending our convictions and interests with clear understanding and a strong will. But Kirk seems excessively selective in identifying our special sinners and their sins. He places the responsibility chiefly on our teachers. The Senate sub-committee places primary responsibility on our "parents, churches, and schools"; and perhaps we should also include, in such lists, our journalists and public speakers, and our authors and reviewers of books.

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The Reichswehr and the German Republic, 1919–1926. BY HAROLD J. GORDON, JR. (Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1957. Pp. xvi, 478. $8.50.)

German Rearmament and Atomic War: The Views of German Military and Political Leaders. BY HANS SPEIER. (Evanston, Ill.: Row, Peterson and Company. 1957. Pp. xiii, 272. $5.00.)

The German military continues to fascinate scholars of recent history and students of the contemporary political scene. *The Reichswehr and the German Republic, 1919–1926* is an important addition to the diverse literature already available on the military aspects of the Weimar experiment with democracy. Mr. Gordon has done an impressive piece of research, utilizing various captured German documents and much supplementary material, including the papers of the former Defence Minister, Otto Gessler, who recently published his memoirs in West Germany, to describe the build-up of the Reichswehr and the interrelationship of military and political institutions during the formative years of the Weimar Republic. In addition to presenting new evidence about the transformation of the Imperial Army and Free Corps into the Reichswehr, the author gives stimulating new interpretations of certain historical incidents, such as the Kapp *putsch* and the mobilization of irregulars against the Poles in Upper Silesia.

It is unfortunate that the author did not pay more attention to the illegal rearmament, an important aspect of the Reichswehr's early development on which he could undoubtedly have shed more light with the materials to which he had access. The Reichswehr's collaboration with the Red Army, for example, is virtually ignored; and what the author does have to say about it is greatly simplified. For one thing, there is evidence that this collaboration was not initiated by Enver Pasha "acting on behalf of Leon Trotsky" (p. 344), but earlier and by the Germans. Secondly, although Mr. Gordon rightly asserts that Chancellor Wirth was informed about the secret collaboration "and that no steps were taken without the consent of Wirth or his successors" (p. 345), it would have been relevant to note that President Ebert was not informed and that the initial negotiations were carried on by the German military without the knowledge of the government.

Mr. Gordon's most important contribution is on the subject of Reichswehr relations with the parties and government. No student of Weimar can afford to ignore the excellent presentation of a wealth of new documentation in these chapters. Whether or not he agrees with the author's controversial theories about the role of the officers in Weimar is another matter. Mr. Gordon's "tentative judgment" is "that the government of the Republic and the Reichswehr were able to cooperate" (p. 430). This conclusion is opposed to the stress on the disruptive role of the Reichswehr in Weimar by other scholars, notably in the works of John W. Wheeler-Bennett. Mr. Gordon's theory seems to be based partly on an undisguised admiration of General von Seeckt, the brilliant and indefatigable architect of the Reichswehr, and on a cool contempt for Philipp Scheidemann and other Majority Socialist leaders who distrusted Seeckt and his officers. Thus, while faithfully recording the personal feud between Seeckt and Stresemann, the author does not cite some of the evidence of the Reichswehr's interference in the conduct of foreign policy, as when it intercepted the Foreign Ministry's in- and out-going messages by tapping the cable lines. Of course this could not have been construed as an example of Reichswehr-government cooperation. Admiration for Seeckt also seems to interfere when, after mentioning "two glaring instances" of Seeckt's trespass into the political realm, the author comments: "It is regrettable that his [Seeckt's] record, which is in many ways so brilliant, should be marred by these two foolish and futile ventures into political activity which betrayed his essential political naïveté and undermined his moral position" (p. 359). Others have interpreted Seeckt's manoeuvre for the post of Chancellor and his attempt to gain the Presidential nomination as revealing his real purpose: namely, to overthrow the Republic when the military establishment was prepared to seek revenge for its defeat.

The charge that Philipp Scheidemann "sabotaged" the effort to achieve a positive reform of the military system with his Reichstag speech in December

1926 is unfair. Had he not spoken as he did, the Majority Socialists would have become part of the Reichswehr's conspiracy with the nationalists and industrialists to circumvent the armaments restrictions imposed at Versailles. Mr. Gordon has constructed a powerful case for his theories, but the Majority Socialists' view that the officers were hostile to the establishment of a peaceful democratic Republic had greater merits than would appear from this account.

Twenty years after the downfall of Weimar yet another German army was being created. Defeat, the development of atomic weapons, and the evolution of new military doctrines had drastically reduced Germany's military importance. Germany could no longer hope to achieve her aims through independent efforts; she became dependent for her security upon alliances, chiefly with the United States. Nevertheless, the military traditions of the past cannot be ignored altogether. The beliefs and opinions of Germany's former military leaders, many of whom are men of outstanding intellectual capacity, have continued and will continue to play a role in the growth of the Bundeswehr and in the development of the Federal Republic's strategic concepts.

One of the most important contributions of Hans Speier's "German Rearmament and Atomic War" is its revelation of the views of many of Germany's former officers who are still influential today. Speier has applied a variety of social science techniques, such as interviews, polls, conferences, to bring to light the private views of the members of the former military class, as well as of current political leaders, on the issue of German rearmament and on the prospects and shape of war in the future. These techniques are not new, but it is rare to find them applied by a scholar of distinction who has a broad range of experience in the field he is investigating. The result is an intensely interesting book, which integrates the information gained from interviews held over a three-year period (1952–1955) with international events since the war, and which culminates in a discussion of the requirements of Western strategy and political policies if the Federal Republic is to remain a full cooperating partner in NATO.

Mr. Speier's review of the course of German rearmament is concise and illuminating. One of his most important points is that the Germans fear that the United States will lapse into a policy of coexistence with Soviet Russia, thus frustrating the Federal Republic's aim of German reunification. West German spokesmen rarely voice this fear publicly, but it is there nevertheless. As the author points out, "it is not possible to say that the difference between private and public opinion on political issues is greater in Germany than it is elsewhere, but students of the German political scene are well advised not to take publicly stated German views as being a necessarily reliable indication of the opinions that Germans hold in private" (p. ix). This sound advice is born out by the contrast between the public declarations of the Bonn government and the private views of politicians and military figures whom the author quotes.

In the concluding chapter of this study there is a skillful examination of the strengths and weaknesses of the Western military coalition as seen from the German point of view and in the light of American security requirements. The author brings to bear the views of those with whom he has discussed West

German rearmament on the changing needs of Western defense as a whole in resisting communist military attacks and political blandishments. A strong case is made for giving NATO's European members a tactical nuclear weapons capacity in order to maintain the coalition, and this is followed by a most interesting discussion of the size of military forces required for a graduated defense capable of countering any kind of communist attack. In this connection the author quotes, with evident approval, a former German general who called atomic weapons "the Maginot Line of the unwilling taxpayer and *bon vivant* in which he seeks to take shelter in order to avoid sacrifices." Perhaps, then, General von Seeckt's highly mobile, professional army equipped with the most modern weapons is a prescription also in the atomic age.

GERALD FREUND.

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Organized Business in France. BY HENRY W. EHRMANN. (Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1957. Pp. xx, 514. $7.50.)

The politics as well as the history of France have always exercised an attraction for American and British writers that is only partly explained by the pleasures of visiting that country for the purpose of research; and the fruits of their study go some way to repaying the debt that they owe respectively to de Tocqueville and Elie Halévy for their interpretations of their own society. Until recently, however, they have been too much influenced by the preoccupation of Frenchmen themselves with exclusively political questions, and their own predilection for the republican and revolutionary side of the debate.

Professor Ehrmann's enquiry into the organization and activities of French business thus represents a venture into relatively uncharted territory, and scholars will be the more gratified by the authoritative nature and the balanced judgment of the resulting work. The enquiry was guided, as the author states in his preface, by the methods and results of studies of pressure groups in the United States, and brief but illuminating comparisons are made throughout the book. The materials used, in the form of business journals, publications of the Economic Council, and business men's memoirs, proved more abundant than one might at first suppose, but the author supplemented them with numerous personal interviews. The result of this research is an invaluable study of the organization of business interests and the part business men play as an influential group in society, and a shrewd analysis of the attitudes of organized business to the principal issues of economics and politics.

In general, employers' organizations were of slow growth in France before 1945. Prompted into existence by the government in 1919, the CGPF met the constant resistance of a peasantlike passion for secrecy amongst French business men, a paternalistic attitude towards their own plants, seeing no need for an overall organization, and hostility towards the large firms that provided the leadership. The shock of the strikes of 1936 and the Matignon agreements provided the second stimulus for development; but it was the hothouse of the Vichy *régime* (to which the great majority of business men were sympathetic) that brought the full development of organized business in close cooperation with the government, as well as the full flowering of those more extravagant ideas, conceived by acute technical minds lacking in political judgment. The more exotic growths of the Vichy *régime* were cut back by the cold winds that blew from de Gaulle ("I haven't seen any of you gentlemen in London") but the organizational structure provided the foundation for rebuilding in the post-war period.

As Professor Ehrmann comments, the influence of St. Simon gave a peculiarly French interpretation to European corporatist ideas; but he also shows how little the outlook of organized business corresponds to that of St. Simon's class of industrial rulers. Nor has the economic liberalism of the Manchester School had many supporters in France, and the author's comment that "the state . . . directs far less than it protects" could be applied to any period since from the *ancien régime* on. Such protection business men have always demanded as of right, and under the influence of "economic malthusianism" have sought—successfully—to shield from competition the less efficient and less productive firms.

Yet the importance of organized business in French political and social life is determined not by its own shortcomings, but by the absence of any opposing force strong enough to control it. It is difficult to find a "countervailing force": the labor movement is divided, its strength dissipated and its sympathizers alienated by the pursuit of Communist policy. As the author states in his conclusion, "political stability is related everywhere to the ability of groups active in the society to compose their differences. The attitude of the groups will in turn depend largely on the degree of consensus which obtains in the community. In France social and political values, aspirations and ideologies have been so divisive for so long, that there has rarely existed substantial agreement on the 'rules of the game' determining the administration of the *res publica.* A political vacuum has resulted into which the interest groups have extended their activities and their intransigeance, while the machinery of the state has veered uneasily between collaboration with and submission to the groups."

With a few important exceptions, Professor Ehrmann's work provides little ground for an optimistic view of organized business in France, but its purpose is to provide explanation and understanding rather than praise or prophecy. The result is an outstanding contribution to the literature on contemporary France.

WILFRID F. KNAPP.

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The Politics of German Codetermination. BY HERBERT J. SPIRO. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 1958. Pp. xii, 180. $4.00.)

Codetermination: Labor's Middle Way in Germany. BY ABRAHAM SHUCHMAN. (Washington, D. C.: Public Affairs Press. 1957. Pp. viii, 247. $4.50.)

In Germany much more than in the United States labor-management relations are based on legislative enactment and the conflicts between unions and employers' associations are fought out in the political arena. It is therefore not surprising that our limited literature on codetermination should now include two books that place much emphasis on political thought and the political process.

Labor participation in managerial decision-making is now more extensive in West Germany than in any other country. Even during the Weimar era, German labor won the right to send two representatives to the boards of directors of most corporations. After World War II, this right was re-established in expanded form, and in the steel and mining industries it has been been carried even to the point where labor has equal representation with ownership on the board of directors and has a preponderant voice in the selection of one member of the managerial board.

The present volumes, although their titles give some indication of similarity, are quite different in character. The study by Dr. Spiro of Harvard's Department of Government is primarily an analysis of the immediate developments that led to the postwar legislation on codetermination in the steel and mining industries and the effects of this legislation. It is based on extensive field work regarding the actual operation of the laws. He introduces the ideological background of codetermination only to the extent that he believes it has influenced significantly the controversies about the enactment and operation of these laws. Dr. Shuchman of the Economics Department at Queens College, on the other hand, is primarily concerned with the ideology of joint control. His field work apparently consisted primarily of interviews with union leaders regarding what might be called "the theory" of codetermination; these were obviously supplemented by voluminous library research. His book contains a thorough summary of the present laws but little material on their operation.

Going back to the Frankfort constitutional convention of 1848–49, Dr. Shuchman traces the German evolution in employee participation and in the accompanying ideology. The exposition is a skillful blending of political and economic history with the main lines of development in reformist thought. The postwar introduction of codetermination is then traced and analyzed in detail. The reader should perhaps be warned against some tendency to exaggerate the extent of the support for codetermination, as witness the omission of Papal misgivings in describing the position of the Catholic Church. Shuchman's final section consists of eight chapters, in which he analyzes the rationale of the union program for "full codetermination": i.e., for the development of a complete structure of joint labor-ownership bodies at all levels of the economy to effect democratic economic planning through the reorganization on a bi-partite basis of the Chambers of Commerce and Industry, of Agriculture, and of Handicrafts and the expansion of their control functions, and through the creation of regional and national industry councils and state and national economic councils. The final chapter presents a brief critique of this rationale.

The author has done a remarkable job of bringing together the relevant statements of many labor and political leaders. He does, of course, oversimplify the picture when he attributes all of these views to "the unions." Also, he attributes to German reformist thought much more practical significance than does the reviewer. This is evident, for example, when he states that "the pattern of worker participation proposed by the unions . . . [is] almost certain to be practiced in its entirety whenever the SPD governs the Federal Republic. . . . " This assertion seems improbable: there is no clearly defined program; if there were, it would probably be substantially modified before the SPD becomes the majority party; even if it remained static, German Socialists have in the past been reluctant to introduce sweeping changes when they had the power; and even if they had the determination, the realities of the legislative process would probably force substantial compromise.

The Spiro volume is an analysis of the interplay between German politics and codetermination. It is a "case study in contemporary West German politics" and "applies a new method to the study of politics," being "focused from a particular interest in the value of individual responsibility as a common denominator on which most contemporary Western political philosophies could agree."

In the opening chapter the author formulates a kind of theoretical framework for his study.

The reviewer, unversed in the refinements of political theory, hesitates to comment on this framework. He considers it the least satisfactory section, but believes that it does not detract from the value of the remainder of the volume. The origins of codetermination in the steel and mining industries and its political history are traced in illuminating detail. The provisions of the Codetermination Act of 1951 are summarized, the major problems are analyzed, and the actual operation is pictured with the aid of numerous specific illustrations. In his concluding chapter, the author judges that codetermination has had only minor economic effects. In the sociological area it has improved the attitudes of many management officials toward the employees, increased the self-confidence of labor representatives, and perhaps augmented the worker's feeling of responsibility. In the political sphere it has influenced political thought and goals, and has made possible the rebirth of the unions as a united movement rather than as the politically differentiated federations of the pre-Naziera. Regarding codetermination primarily as a procedure for policy-making, the author concludes that there has been much more change in the nature of the procedure and in the locus of responsibility than in the nature of the decisions.

This stimulating book is only slightly marred by the occasional too-literal translation of certain phrases and especially by the undue weight attached to these literal meanings. For example, the author believes that the labor-management relationship is seen by Germans as involving more strife than by Americans, as witness the continual German references to the "labor struggle" and their lack of a good phrase for "labor relations." An equally strong case could be made for the contrary conclusion, as witness their continual reference to "the social partners," whereas we speak of "the parties."

To turn finally from the substance to the form, this reviewer begs leave to plead for the desegregation of footnotes in scientific volumes. He believes that most readers of these books will want to see each footnote either from interest or from curiosity. Yet the Harvard Press relegates them to the end of the book and the Public Affairs Press to the end of the chapter. The latter further hampers the spirit of inquiry by using reference numerals so minute that they should be found only on occulists' charts. And it has made the chase still more sporting by omitting two footnotes entirely and misnumbering two others. Lest some readers might miss the game by ignoring the footnotes, it has occasionally misplaced, omitted, or duplicated entire lines in the main text. This is a welcome substitute for the more trite type of typographical error, which seldom requires any ingenuity of the reader who wants to decipher the true meaning.

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The Politics of Israel: The First Decade of Statehood. BY MARVER H. BERNSTEIN. (Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1957. Pp. xiv, 360. $6.00.)

Israel, it is safe to say, has aroused more comment than any other emergent state of the postwar period. The favored topic has been politics. The mountains of articles and books, in many languages, on the political aspects of life in Israel are for the most part of dubious worth, except for persons pursuing or evaluating partisan politics. The occasional piece that merits close reflection has dealt with a selected fragment of the subject, such as the judiciary or the legislature or the constitutional setting.

For these reasons, Marver Bernstein's book is highly welcome, since it is the most comprehensive and systematic study of government and the political process in Israel that has appeared in any language, including Hebrew. This is remarkable in many respects, for the author seems not to have used a single Hebrew source. Normally the failure to consult the most significant written records—the parliamentary proceedings, the laws, and the endless party debates in broadsheets and brochures, in the periodicals and the press—would have constituted sufficient grounds for questioning the quality of the study. In this instance, however, the failure has been offset by the availability of many of these sources in partial or full English translation and by the author's opportunities during periods of prolonged residence in the country to discuss politics with multi-lingual Israelis in all walks of life. The importance of Bernstein's work clearly lies, not in his having examined the field exhaustively, but in his having tried to tell the story whole; now that he has shown the way, much more can be done in exploring and exploiting the rich and varied Hebrew sources.

The Politics of Israel is the product of solid scholarship. Bernstein's sympathy for the state is tempered at all times by searching criticism. His sense of symmetry is well illustrated in his over-all estimate of Israel politics. He finds that in Israel "the basic freedoms of the individual are not enshrined in fundamental laws. Organized religion intrudes excessively in politics and secular affairs generally. Partisan politics itself pervades daily life. And the military requisites of national security remain a potential threat both to individual freedom and to rational economic development." But at the same time he points out that "the nation's political institutions are democratically organized and operated, and its political processes are open and free. The great freedoms of individual thought and expression are cherished resolutely and sustained by a continuing commitment to the rule of law. The intellectual climate is dynamic and even turbulent."

The Zionist and mandatory political heritage receive hasty treatment, as do the multiple party and electoral systems. So, too, do the problems of local government and Israel's welfare services. But this does not diminish the value of the work, for the author manifestly has focused on the instruments of central government. He has addressed himself primarily to explaining the nature of Israel's democracy, how it functions and how it is administered, devoting some space along the way to Israel's quest for economic independence and to its planning and financing of development. The most original and incisive chapters, by far, appraise the budget-making process, the office of the state comptroller, and the civil service. Nor is this surprising, for Bernstein's apprenticeship in Israel took place in the comptroller's office, which he served as consultant.

The book's major shortcomings are essentially those of omission. How the local Arabs fit into Israel's body politic deserves more than a few scattered references. The Arab citizens, it is true, form a relatively small minority. But they live in the land and have in many subtle and overt ways affected the spirit and the structure of its politics. Similarly, while the state's external economic policies are given the thoughtful consideration that they demand, the formulation and conduct of Israel's external political policies are mentioned only in passing.

Despite these omissions, Bernstein has managed to integrate wide-ranging materials into a readable, informative, and reliable survey of Israel's first decade, striking a happy balance between description and analysis. The book should thus appeal to the non-specialist no less than to the student of comparative politics and area concentration.

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The Transfer of Power in India. BY V. P. MENON. (Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1957. Pp. 543. $8.50.)

The transfer of power from British to Indian and Pakistani hands on August 15, 1947, must be considered one of the great events of the twentieth century. As a symbol, this act marks the end of an era, not only for the British Indian Empire, but for the external control over colonial territories in the western world as a whole. Remnants of old regimes remain, especially in Asia and Africa. But they will soon disappear, not least of all because of the whiplash of Indian opinion encouraging self-determination in these territories.

V. P. Menon, Constitutional Adviser to the Governor-General of India from 1942 to 1947, and from 1917 closely associated with constitutional developments in India, has chosen to concentrate on a critical portion of the Indian story: from 1939 to 1947. After outlining "in dreary detail" (the author's own correctly-chosen words) the historical background of the transfer of government from the East India Company to the British Crown and the gradual development of constitutional government in India through the Act of 1935, Mr. Menon commences his detailed narrative of events from the outbreak of World War II to partition, independence, and the aftermath. Indeed, "detail" is the word to describe the week-by-week—sometimes day-by-day—chronicle that the author has compiled so meticulously from a tremendous range of evidence. Considering the fact that much of the material used will have been classified and will not be available to scholars for twenty years or more, *The Transfer of Power in India* will be for some time an indispensable work of reference for all those interested in the war years leading to independence. For this reason, we are to be thankful that Mr. Menon did not choose the path of straightening out the kinks of the endless debate, but rather chose to plod on, through major and minor controversies alike, to the ends of accuracy that he sought. But his method and his style unfortunately will restrict a reading of this book by the number of students of politics that the subject deserves.

By the early years of World War II, the big question in India concerning independence was "when." But gradually, as it became clear that the transfer would be soon, the question was complicated by the Muslim League's demand for Pakistan. From 1942, when the possibility of partition was inserted in the Cripps proposals, not "when," but "to whom" and "how" became the appropriate queries. The book under review, better than any other published to date, presents a systematic outline of the bitter dispute between the Muslim League and the Indian National Congress that ultimately resulted in the concession of Pakistan and the partition of the Indian subcontinent into two parts. Menon's discussion of this dispute is not strictly impartial, for the author does not hide the fact that, in his personal capacity, he would have favored a united India with necessary safeguards of provincial or state autonomy to Muslim-majority areas. But it was Menon, the civil servant, who devised the first drafts of a workable scheme for partition when other proposals were floundering in London and in New Delhi.

One cannot avoid being struck by the pettiness of legalistic argument and the lack of broad understanding that characterized so much of the political debate in India during the war years. At least this is the impression left after a reading of this book. V. P. Menon has underscored this atmosphere throughout, not by intent, perhaps, but by his insistence on giving the details of the arguments, interminable as they seemed to be, between the various parties and in the context of war-troubled times. The leaders of the Congress and the League alike come off a definite second-best to the British rulers and their associates in the Secretariat, in apparent clarity in aim and singleness of purpose. This is a reasonable conclusion to reach on the basis of the case as presented by Mr. Menon. But it is not the whole story.

The author hews so closely to his line of constitutional analysis that certain political questions are given less than adequate treatment. To Mr. Jinnah and the Muslim League, the objective from at least 1942 was Pakistan. As the years passed towards 1947, the aim became an obsession with Mr. Jinnah and an imperative for the League. All the maneuvering for position on specific issues amounted only to tactics leading towards a set strategic objective: Pakistan. Perhaps more important, by 1946 it had become abundantly clear that, in fact, the bulk of the articulate Muslims in India favored Jinnah's plan for a separate Islamic state of Pakistan. This fact, made obvious by the results of the elections of 1946, was the fatal, crushing blow to the Congress which had struggled for a united, independent, and secular state. From its beginnings in 1885, and with patience and tact, especially under Gandhi's leadership after World War I, the Congress had fought not only for independence, but also for communal understanding and political unity. In most of the historic meetings in the 1940's it was the late Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, President of the Congress and a learned and highly respected Muslim, who spoke for the Congress, in his person emphasizing the Congress aim of union among the various communities in India. But it was by then too late. The last crucial test given to the Congress was the formation of the ministries in Congress-majority provinces in 1937. Adequate provision then for coalition governments with Muslim League members in Congress cabinets—accepting the confusion that intra-Cabinet discord would have brought—might have been a sufficient concession to convince Mr. Jinnah and his followers of the fruitfulness of trying an experiment with a united India. But the Congress chose instead to insist on party discipline and party solidarity in the face of the League's demand. It would appear that in this case a worthy ideal of communal unity had, in fact, obstructed the path to a workable political agreement between an overwhelmingly Hindu majority and a ninety-million-member community of Muslims far too proud—and strong—to be subjected to minority status.

Partition coming with independence was a tragedy in Congress terms. It indicated the practical failure of a social policy that sought unity in the diversity of Indian life. Partition was the heartbreaking conclusion of over sixty years' efforts in an opposite direction. Independence thus came as a mixed blessing. It is understandable that the leaders of the Congress, remembering the efforts of thousands of earlier workers, at home and abroad, would have fought to the end for the unity ideal. But by so doing, and in failing to assess the depths of Muslim insecurity within a broadly Hindu society, they helped to create the conditions in the end that resulted in the transfer of millions of people from their homes and in death to hundreds of thousands in an unprecedented holocaust of communal frenzy. In fairness, it must be said that the major thrusts against accord came from the Muslim League and especially as a result of the iron will of Mr. Jinnah in his unswerving demand for Pakistan. Mr. Menon's book may be said to be a story of a tragedy for India, and one of fulfillment for Pakistan. The consequences of this difference in assessment of the facts of independence remain to haunt the relations between the two countries.

The period between 1939 and 1947 is of critical importance in the constitutional history of India. Mr. V. P. Menon has provided us with a valuable account of these times, and he has furnished ample evidence of the strength of character of Lord Louis Mountbatten and a long line of British rulers whose names do credit to the British period of rule in India. Later students, however, will do well to consider more acutely the social history of the nationalist movement in India that was, after all, the most significant reason for the decline in British capacity to continue to rule. In this respect, the real hero of independence, for Pakistan as well as for India, was Mahatma Gandhi, with the hundreds of Congress (and opposition) leaders who devoted their whole lives to the cause. The hero of partition and of Pakistan was Mr. Jinnah. For the bases of these assertions, one must look elsewhere, as well as to *The Transfer of Power in India.*

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International Equilibrium: A Theoretical Essay on the Politics and Organization of Security. BY GEORGE LISKA. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 1957. Pp. 223. $5.00.)

This study was apparently stimulated by the "greater debate" between realists and idealists, which the author, however, regards as theoretically sterile. For him, power, morality, and the national interest are more or less empty concepts, which in their isolation do not get us very far. In looking for a "theoretical model" that could embrace all important aspects and manifestations of international relations but could also "throw additional light on the reality with which it deals," Liska introduces an equilibrium theory, which is not a descendant of the classical balance of power but stems from Schumpeter's economic methodology. Multiple equilibrium in international relations is regarded both as an existing tendency and as a theoretical norm that helps us to assess the actual process. It can be stable, unstable, or progressive.

It is a merit of this essay that it does not exhaust itself in methodology but—unlike several recent proposals for charting the jungle of international relations—tests theory by applying it to reality. It takes the history, the present condition, and to a certain extent even the future of international organization and by using "institutional equilibrium" as its pivot, examines various systems of international order as to their structural equilibrium, the commitment of the member states, and their functional and geographical scope.

In laying out his course, the author constantly fears that he might become addicted to one particular viewpoint, but he finds his equilibrium theory a "most convenient unifying concept" for including every aspect and emphasis. Convenient it may be, but as he must have been at pains to keep his study within the covers of a relatively slim volume, he apparently performed masterpieces of condensation, often to the detriment of clarity. In his concluding chapter he expresses his hope that he succeeded in steering clear of "the Scylla of traditional realism . . . and the Charybdis of apolitical sociologism and legalism." In this he succeeded. But by covering considerable ground with the help of an exceedingly intricate compass, he led his reader through many a foggy sea and exposed him to a whirlpool of jargon and to deceptive currents of wishful thinking—though most of the latter cases have been labeled as such.

In the course of this difficult journey, Liska makes many profound observations and brings together a multitude of theoretical and factual material of the kind that cannot but stimulate specialists to further thought. Much of what he says on the classical balance of power, on collective security, on the nature of international organizations, on regionalism, and on the interplay of universal and regional international organization is true and cogent. Much of it has been said before; some of it, however, is new, not so much in substance but rather in particular context or juxtaposition or in subtlety of formulation.

Apart from exceptional erudition, displayed without pretense, one finds here a first-rate theoretical mind at work. Often, indeed, one wishes the author had been less systematic and, if one dares to say so, less scientific. Though his factual illustrations show that he is thoroughly familiar with the reality of world politics (he worked for several years in the Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs), his passion for theorizing at times raises some of his themes to such high planes of generalization that they lose color and shape without a proportionate gain in clarity. It is a real world, undoubtedly, but one observed from a bird's eye view.

When descending from these dizzy heights, the author is not always fortunate in his examples. Similarities between the Little Entente and the Arab League are anything but convincing, though both admittedly belong in the category of regional organizations. Whatever parallels there may have been between the Korean War and the Guatemalan *coup*, they do not seem very significant.

One of the book's strong points is the sensitive and admirably objective treatment of the relationship between great and small powers as affected by various kinds of international organization.

Perhaps, less might have been more. The application of such a complex "theoretical construct" to only one historical period, in greater detail and in a less condensed manner, might have been more rewarding as an object lesson in effective theorizing and in shedding new light on actual phenomena. As it stands, Liska's study is one of the most difficult works in the field. The less advanced student lacks equipment, the practitioner of international politics has no time to fathom the meaning of the author's involved, though logical, thinking and his heavy, though correct, style. To do justice to the book's sound but complex conclusions would alone necessitate three times as much space as was allotted to this reviewer.

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The United States Attorneys General and International Law. By David R. Deener. (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. 1957. Pp. xi, 416. 26.50 guilders.)

This is an unusual book, which international lawyers and others will read with interest. After 150 pages devoted to analyzing the role of the Attorney General as a legal adviser in the constitutional system of the United States, the author devotes some 230 pages to a detailed consideration of the Attorney

General's opinions that have dealt with problems of international law. All of this is in the context of the author's analysis, in the brief Introduction and in the Conclusions, of the realist school in political science and that school's views about the place of international law in the whole scheme of international relations.

Professor Deener takes off from a statement by the United Nations International Law Commission that "the efforts of legal advisers are necessarily directed to the implementation of policy." His study of one particular legal adviser, namely, the Attorney General of the United States, leads him to conclude that this statement is too broad a generalization. There are examples that sustain this "realist" view but many others that disprove it. Since the writing of this book, Professor Deener's thesis has found much supporting data in Lord McNair's three-volume edition of the opinions of the law officers of the British Crown. But Professor Deener is careful to point out that other legal officers of the United States Government also advise on questions of international law; in particular, the Legal Adviser of the Department of State has recently testified that his Office is "the focal point within the United States Government for international legal question" (p. 147). There is a collection of the opinions of the Legal Adviser and his predecessor, the Solicitor, of the State Department, but it has never been published. Professor Deener notes that the published collection of the opinions of the Attoney General is by no means complete. We are therefore still dealing with fragmentary evidence, but this latest contribution is a welcome addition to the sources that must be consulted as one continues to study the actual role played by the legal factor in international relations.

The first part of this book draws heavily on such previous studies as those of Langeluttig and Cummings and McFarland in portraying the role of the Attorney General throughout American history. Extensive use is also made of memoirs, biographies, and collected letters and papers. Especially valuable are letters to the author from former government legal officers. The arrangement of the material by chapters results in a certain amount of repetition, but it is not excessive. The reader is given a good picture of the extent to which Presidents and Department heads and other federal officers have sought the opinion of the Attorneys General and of the amount of weight that such opinions have carried. The author concludes: "Within the executive branch, the opinions of the Attorney General are not merely 'abstract essays.' Insofar as department heads are concerned, they possess a *de facto* force, and the advice they contain is usually followed. Insofar as other administrative agencies are concerned, the authority of opinions varies" (p. 117). But courts and the Congress do not attribute to them any conclusiveness. Are the Attorneys General inspired by a judicial spirit or are they merely used to provide supporting arguments for policies already determined upon by the President or other officers of the government? Professor Deener shows that no categorical answer is possible; examples both ways are given. Specifically in regard to matters of foreign policy, the author's detailed study shows that Attorneys General have given opinions on "almost every topic within the scope of the law of nations." By and large, the opinions stand up with the writings of leading publicists as sound statements of the law; in many, but not all, instances the views expressed have been confirmed by national or international courts. "Clearly," Professor Deener concludes, "the body of opinions on international law does not represent distorted interpretations and applications of the law, as might be implied by the statement of the International Law Commission" (p. 386).

It is not possible in this review to mention the variety of international law situations dealt with by Attorneys General. Many of the opinions are familiar, like that of Attorney General Harmon on the diversion of water from international streams. A number of them are quoted in Moore's *Digest* and some in Hackworth, but Professor Deener reveals a wealth of material that has not been generally utilized. In many instances, he supplies interesting surrounding data on the history of the case and, where pertinent, usually shows the aftermath in terms of Congressional, judicial, or diplomatic action. But, as is true of the important McNair volumes, one is at times left wishing for a more complete picture of the extent to which policy flouted or followed the law.

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Power and Diplomacy. BY DEAN ACHESON. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 1958. Pp. x, 137. $3.00.)

Russia, the Atom and the West. BY GEORGE F. KENNAN. New York: Harper and Brothers. 1958. Pp. ix, 116. $2.50.)

Acheson's Clayton Lectures at the Fletcher School registered his continued belief that the sincerity and implacability of the fully avowed Soviet determination to extend the communist system throughout the world and to frustrate the building of any other made it both silly and dangerous to keep demanding that they show "sincerity" in any common purpose with the West and futile to place credence in their agreements, which they would interpret as mandates to do what they wished. We must accordingly build a workable free world system before the Soviet Union would equal our productive capacity—some time before 2000 A. D. There must be military force to counter any force "used against us and our interests, or against the interests of our allies, or the interests of other nations whose independence is important to us." Western Europe could not defend itself and must be held at any cost. The Soviet Union could control it and intended to; only a strong NATO, including West Germany, could prevent its success. The idea of German neutrality was an illusion, since our withdrawal would "indicate to the Russians (and to ourselves) an abandonment of any intention to dispute the position as an issue of survival." The Soviet Union "will invariably probe points of weakness." Conversely, the Soviet Union could not withdraw behind the River Bug until evolution had proceeded further in both East Europe and the Soviet Union.

A month after the Acheson lectures, Kennan began his famous BBC lectures calling for disengagement from Germany. He held that, since our demands for Germany must seem to the Soviet leaders to require "an unconditional capitulation" of Russian interests in the German question, we should stop pushing them against a closed door. Also, an indefinite continuation of the current situation might well compel the East Germans and Europeans to make a final adjustment to their lot. He doubted that we would stay in Germany forever: "It expects too much, and for too long a time, of the United States, which is not a European power." He challenged the ideas that no obligations could be laid on a united German government and that a withdrawal of forces on both sides would put us at a hopeless military disadvantage. Such thought overrated the likelihood of a Soviet effort to invade Western Europe, exaggerated the offensive value of the satellite armies, failed to take into account all the implications of the ballistic missile, and seriously underestimated the advantages to Western security of a Soviet military withdrawal.

Kennan remembered our highly vulnerable position in Berlin, the danger of new revolts in East Europe, and the great powers' obligation to do something to loosen the Central European tangle. Some price would have to be paid in any solution, such as the acceptance of socialization in East Germany. But he could not see that NATO would be invalidated and could "think of no greater risk than the trend toward nuclear war on which we are all now being carried." Fully aware of the Soviet leaders' irreconcilable hostility toward the West, their constant use of lies, and their efforts to reduce us to isolated helplessness, he argued that much of this centered in Marxist-Leninist thought but did not involve "a determination to overrun Western Europe, in particular, by force of arms, as soon as military conditions might be favorable." The "overmilitarization of thinking in the West on the nature of the Soviet threat" had prevented our seeing it as mainly political. Kennan had confidence in the ability of the West European peoples to handle this danger by internal action.

The Kennan lectures had an enormous impact on thinking in Britain and West Europe, especially West Germany. I cannot recall a more effective expression of private opinion. They took hold because they showed that Kennan had moved with the times, was searching for solutions, and wanted to make peace. Nor did Acheson's angry disavowal of Kennan's proposals break their force. Most people saw Acheson as a sincere modern Metternich defending his cold war battlements.

Acheson believes that the issue is power and would use foreign aid liberally to build a free world system. Kennan questions the value of too rapid industrialization of the underdeveloped countries and would refuse to be blackmailed by threats to "go Communist." He thinks Russia ought to help and questions the fear that every Russian contact, however normal, with other peoples will be fatal to their independence. He denies that each Russian achievement is our loss. He cannot concede that we are in a desperate economic race with the Soviets. Nor would he get joy from their internal troubles.

Kennan thinks Russian industrial growth likely to taper off. Acheson suspects that automation and the power to allocate resources may keep it going. He is disturbed by the prospect that millions of fragmented decisions in our free society may gradually seal our fate, but he is sure that solutions cannot be forced from above. Kennan envisages "the coordination of the operations of great private concerns with those of government"—some centralized planning on our side. He discounts the frantic schemes for civilian defense and would give up atomic weapons rather than "flee like hunted creatures from one defensive device to another, each more costly and humiliating than the one before." Acheson thinks that if enough of us could be put underground deep enough, with "uncontaminated water and food for periods which may run into several weeks," the reduction of casualties "could well save the whole national structure from collapse, and make the risks of an attack on us far outweigh the probable gain."

The divergences illustrate the static and dynamic qualities of the two minds. Yet both agree that nuclear war would be suicidal and that the idea of limited nuclear war is a fantasy. Neither would scatter nuclear weapons further among our allies. Acheson would depend on United States-British nuclear weapons in West Europe "purely as a temporary measure . . . not a sound or safe solution." Kennan warns that our proposed missile bases in Europe would probably preclude disengagement and peace.

Acheson would never use nuclear weapons outside Europe, especially not in a limited war for Formosa. He indicates clear awareness that we are in a dangerous trap there. He asks if either Quemoy or Formosa could be defended except by a general war with China. He sees no advantages in a Chinese base on Formosa over bases on the mainland. He suspects that China may be seated in the United Nations over our opposition. He recognizes that our Formosa policy weakens our coalition, even with Japan, and concludes: " . . . We owe it to ourselves and our allies soberly and frankly to weigh the possibility that in so incendiary a situation a spark at any time could start a blaze; and the blaze might sweep far beyond the control of anyone." Doubtless Kennan would agree that the arguments for disengagement at Formosa are conclusive. Time may prove also that a favorable chance to explore disengagement in Central Europe was missed.

Both Acheson and Kennan earnestly wish to avoid a final world war. The reader may make his own choice of a road to survival between the ancient, well trodden route laid down by Acheson and the more relaxed, political, and flexible approach proposed by Kennan.

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The United Nations and Promotion of the General Welfare. BY ROBERT E. ASHER, WALTER M. KOTSCHNIG, WILLIAM ADAMS BROWN, JR., JAMES FREDERICK GREEN, EMIL J. SADY, AND ASSOCIATES. (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution. 1957. Pp. xvi, 1216. $8.75.)

This stout volume is one of seven studies planned as a comprehensive analysis and evaluation of United Nations experience. Initiated at the Brookings Institution in 1951 under supervision of the late Dr. Leo Pasvolsky, the project is continuing under the direction of Robert W. Hartley, with the benefit of continuing advice from a distinguished group of consultants, Ernest A. Gross, James N. Hyde, Joseph E. Johnson, C. Easton Rothwell, and Willard L. Thorp.

Of the seven studies projected two were published in 1955 (Leland M. Goodrich and Anne P. Simons, *The United Nations and the Maintenance of International Peace and Security;* Francis O. Wilcox and Carl M. Marcy, *Proposals for Changes in the United Nations*); volumes still in preparation are *A History of the United Nations Charter; The Organization and Procedures of the United Nations; Regional Security and the United Nations; The United States and the Future of the United Nations.*

The qualifications of the authors are impressive. Although they write in their personal capacities they have a rich experience in official posts. Since 1948 Kotschnig has been Deputy United States Representative in ECOSOC; he has long served as Director of the Office of International Economic and Social Affairs, Department of State. Green served under him as Deputy Director. Asher was a Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs and a delegate to a number of postwar international economic conferences. Brown was known for his analyses of postwar problems of international trade and foreign exchange and a notable study of American foreign assistance. Sady served in the Department of State and as Chief of the Pacific Division, Office of Territories, Department of the Interior. As might be expected, their personal contacts with programs discussed and the international and national agencies responsible for them produce sharp insights and a feeling for practical political possibilities. Yet they have succeeded in writing with detachment and balance. Although reflecting an American point of view, they exhibit candor and understanding in explaining differences of national attitude that have limited international action or forced it into unprofitable courses. Through the book runs a strong vein of common sense.

The scope of the study is in general those activities of the United Nations and affiliated agencies intended to promote economic and social cooperation, protection of human rights, and advancement of dependent peoples. Contributions of the League of Nations are summarized, and references occur to work of non-affiliated international administrative unions and of national governments. The 1079 pages of text are divided into five parts, the last a fifty-eight-page summary and appraisal by Asher based on the analysis in the first four parts. There is a documentary appendix of forty-six pages and a full index.

Part One contains four chapters by Kotschnig devoted to institutional factors. Although much detail is worked in concerning ECOSOC and its subsidiaries and affiliates, the Trusteeship Council, and operational agencies for special programs like UNRRA, UNICEF, and EPTA, the emphasis is not upon structures or procedures. Kotschnig's intent is rather to state the determinants of the organizational problem. These he finds in sharp differences in the national interests of participating states—the developed as against the underdeveloped countries, the communist as against the western bloc—and in the acute public consciousness of the role of government in economic stability and public welfare induced by the depression and World War II. These factors have produced marked differences in national attitudes about the functions to be undertaken by the United Nations, which may be differently reflected in the Assembly, ECOSOC, and technical commissions when considering policy or administrative arrangements. They affect also the extent and type of national commitments that will be made, and the area of domestic action reserved. These same themes run through the remainder of the study and are used to test the possibilities of action upon particular problems.

Parts Two, Three, and Four are the core of the analysis of United Nations programs. Part Two, by Brown, Asher, and Kotschnig, considers economic and social cooperation. It covers emergency programs of relief and rehabilitation; regulation of international trade and payments; promotion of production, investment, full employment, and economic stability; regulation of transport and communications; improvement of levels of living (health, nutrition, housing, working conditions, social security); welfare and social defense (family and child welfare, rehabilitation of handicapped persons, migrants and refugees); educational, scientific, and cultural relations; and assistance to underdeveloped countries. Part Three, by Green, on United Nations protection of human rights, considers not only the Universal Declaration and the draft Covenants but also the special conventions on genocide, freedom of information, the status of women, slavery, and prisoners of war; also the inquiries into forced labor in Russia, racial discrimination in South Africa, violations of human rights in Bulgaria, Hungary, and Rumania. Part Four, by Sady, is a review of the trusteeship system and the United Nations role in securing attention to the interests of colonial peoples.

The study is the most comprehensive and discriminating single volume covering these activities, a notable summary of experience to date and a critical appreciation of successes and failures. The writers frankly admit the failure of some programs, the insignificance or formalistic quality of others. They show the over-elaboration and disorder in structures, political pulling and hauling in planning, difficulties of coordination, unpredictable budgeting, perplexing problems in relations with member states. Yet there emerges also a picture of energy, strength of purpose, persistence in seeking solutions, genuine progress. Lights have been turned on in many dark areas. Readers may even feel a trifle dashed by the painful restraint of Asher's conclusion that "the sum total of concrete achievements . . . should afford a basis for qualified optimism about the future." The book will inevitably become staple fare for students of international organization and a standard reference manual. Clear organization, direct writing, and frequent summaries make for easy use despite its bulk

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Strengthening the United Nations. By Arthur N. Holcombe. (New York: Harper and Brothers. 1957. Pp. xii, 276. $3.00.)

World Peace through World Law. By Grenville Clark and Louis B. Sohn. (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press. 1958. Pp. xxxvi, 540. $7.50.)

These two volumes stem from a conviction of the inadequacy of the United Nations, as currently operating, to deal with the problem of peace. Both offer proposals to strengthen the organization, which their authors hope will lead to discussion and appropriate action. But there the basic similarity ends. *Strengthening the United Nations* embodies the Tenth Report of the Commission to Study the Organization of Peace (of which Professor Holcombe is Chairman) and the reports of twelve special study committees on which the Commission's conclusions are based. While far from complacent about the United Nations, the Commission rejects the thesis that the organization is "virtually useless" and suggests that "the fact that the United Nations cannot do everything that needs to be done should not be allowed to obscure the fact that it can do, and is doing, many things that are of vital importance to the peace and welfare of the world." Assuming that national states are here to stay (at least for the foreseeable future) and that a radical reorganization of the United Nations is not in the cards (at least for the present), the Commission proposes a number of ways in which the UN might be strengthened short of general Charter revision. In contrast, *World Peace through World Law* is the product of two distinguished lawyers—one long associated with the world government movement and the other a Harvard professor who is also a member of the Commission to Study the Organization of Peace—whose point of departure is that "it is futile to expect genuine peace until there is put into effect an effective system of *enforceable* world law in the limited field of war prevention." This implies "clearly stated law against violence, courts to interpret and apply that law and police to enforce it." Convinced that a detailed plan offers the best basis for discussion, the authors provide annotated texts of a revised Charter and annexes. These documents embody a plan for a limited world federation (although the authors avoid the term), which they feel is sufficiently realistic that it "*ought* to be acceptable to all nations."

Strengthening the United Nations bears the imprint of multiple authorship. Eighty-seven members of the Commission have signed the report of the Drafting Committee chaired by Quincy Wright, with Inis L. Claude, Jr., as rapporteur. The number of authorities contributing to the supporting studies is impressive but they inevitably reflect diversity of opinion and outlook. The result is a series of recommendations and studies that afford a useful basis for further cogitation but do not constitute, and are not intended to constitute, the last word on the future of the world organization.

The twenty-four recommendations of the report range from membership to disarmament and the composition, powers, and procedures of the Security Council and General Assembly. Among the more interesting recommendations are those proposing that decisions on representation be made by two-thirds of the Assembly, with binding effect on all UN organs and the specialized agencies; that Art. 2 (7) should not preclude the inscription of items on the agenda of UN organs, although it should govern activities other than debate; that rapporteurs of the Council and Assembly be used increasingly and unobtrusively to promote the settlement of disputes; that the UN should be given authority to administer areas such as Antarctica and the bed of the high seas; that a UN Development Agency be established through which national aid might ultimately be channeled; that the problem of human rights be attacked "piece-meal"; and that a program budget be set up distinct from the administrative budget. Among the more controversial recommendations is that pertaining to non-self-governing territories, in which the basic position of the newly independent states on Chapter XI of the Charter is accepted.

The jurisdiction of the world organization that Clark and Sohn would establish, preferably by revising the Charter, would be limited to "matters directly related to the maintenance of peace." In this sphere, the organization would be entitled to make law binding on both states and individuals. The use of force would be outlawed except in self-defense. Total disarmament, to be achieved over a period of twelve years, would be accompanied by the establishment of a world police force. The International Court would be given compulsory jurisdiction over legal disputes and a World Equity Tribunal, whose decisions could be made binding in certain circumstances, would have jurisdiction over disputes not exclusively legal. A World Conciliation Board would also be available. Regional courts subordinate to the world court would have jurisdiction, among other things, over individuals charged with violating the Charter or world law. The General Assembly would be the central organ of the revised United Nations, with primary responsibility for the preservation of peace. It would have power to legislate in this and related matters; its power of recommendation would encompass all matters bearing on peace or the welfare of the peoples of the world. A system of weighted voting has been carefully worked out. Members of the Assembly would initially be chosen by national legislatures but would eventually be popularly elected; they would vote as individuals. The The Security Council would become an Executive Council of seventeen members elected from and by—and politically responsible in the parliamentary sense to—the General Assemby, although certain nations and groups of nations would be assured permanent, periodic, or rotating representation. The composition of ECOSOC and the Trusteeship Council would be altered, and both would be politically responsible to the General Assembly. The distinction between trust territories and non-self-governing territories would be largely eliminated, and the Trusteeship Council would supervise the administration of the latter.

Recognizing the relationship between economic problems and political instability, the plan provides for a World Development Authority to dispose of roughly $25 billion annually. The United Nations budget, estimated at perhaps $35 billion annually, would be defrayed by national taxes earmarked for UN use; these taxes would be collected by national administrations but individuals would be liable directly for UN payments. The specialized agencies would be retained but brought under closer Assembly fiscal and other supervision. A bill of rights is designed to safeguard against UN incursion into the reserved powers of the states and their citizens (the latter, incidentally, would also be citizens of the United Nations).

This is a highly elaborate, coherent plan for a world government "with limited functions but real powers"—if one may borrow a phrase from the Council of Europe. It may well be that it "ought" to be an acceptable plan, given the dangers of an atomic era. Whether it will be acceptable, however, is open to considerable doubt in an age in which fear has not yet replaced nationalism as a force in international politics.

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Communism in Latin America. BY ROBERT J. ALEXANDER. (Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press. 1957. Pp. x, 449. $9.00.)

Recent events in Latin America have clearly indicated that the rising tide of anti-United States feeling since World War II is reaching dangerous proportions. The average American citizen has been startled; some have tended to conjure up visions of gigantic Red conspiracies, actually non-existent. Now that there is seemingly some hope that the United States government as well as the public will at last pay some heed to what has been taking place, the appearance of this study is a happy coincidence.

An accurate evaluation of Communist influence in Latin America is difficult because many governments in this region tend to apply the Communist label to any group opposing the *status quo* and, in turn, a government undertaking economic or social reforms adversely affecting powerful vested interests may be the object of similar charges. The author is particularly qualified for this task, for he has had long-continued interest in and acquaintance with Latin American labor problems and knows the area at first hand. With meticulous detail, he has given us a valuable, factual, objective, well written and well documented account of Latin American Communism, based in large part upon personal study and observation, including hundreds of interviews with important persons.

This book should serve, as intended, "both to alert and to reassure": it will allay irrational fears concerning the strength of Latin American Communism and should also arouse some public awareness of the widespread Latin American revolt against traditional conditions, now rapidly assuming all the characteristics of a true social revolution—a fact of the utmost world importance, unnoticed by the average person in the United States. With the growth of urban centers and industry, the narrow class structure of an agricultural society is crumbling over an entire continent. The oligarchical upper classes have, with few exceptions, given little attention to providing opportunities and better life for peasants and workers. A compact, highly disciplined, highly indoctrinated nucleus of Communist groups is struggling for the allegiance of the uncommitted masses—white, Indian, negro, and mestizo—who seek opportunity. The Communists have potent weapons: the tremendous appeal of economic nationalism to peoples who feel themselves victims of foreign exploitation, the need for land reform, and the plight of poverty-stricken peasants and miners.

Four factors are basic to the Latin American social revolution: there is widespread resentment against foreign ownership of key elements in the economy; the drive for economic development has become an integral part of the revolution of expectations; economic growth has hastened demands for fairer distribution of economic and political power; and there is a powerful desire among the masses for greater participation in public affairs and for the fundamental democratic freedoms. The great danger is that this revolution "might be diverted from democratic channels, that democracy might be sacrificed to achieve the other objectives." This is why the Communist movement in Latin America represents a positive menace, for Communists have been adept at capitalizing on all its components "to direct the revolution into courses which would result in the establishment of their own brand of totalitarianism." They have portrayed themselves as devoted nationalists and ardent anti-imperialists. They have strongly advocated industrialization and self-sufficiency and have helped spread the notion that big economic interests in the United States are trying to hold back Latin America's economic diversification. They have demanded agrarian reform and other fundamental changes in social relations. They have depicted themselves as supporters of democracy. "The surprising thing," as the author says, "is . . . that, in spite of the very profound feeling of revolt and change which has swept Latin America since World War I, the Communists have made comparatively little progress."

Although Professor Alexander is more concerned with exposition and analysis of facts than with developing a thesis, he convincingly argues that the main reason why Communists have not been more successful in Latin America is that they have had to compete with indigenous social revolutionary movements that have been able to capture the people's imagination and lead them through the needed changes without the price of surrendering their fundamental freedoms. He points out that, despite Latin America's vulnerability to Communism, in countries where strong and dynamic liberal movements exist Communist influence has invariably faded away. It is very obvious that wherever the masses have been offered the same advantages by a democratic party as by the Communists, they have chosen the former.

The book opens with a concise, accurate account of the background, history, and prospects of the Communist movements. Relations between Latin American Communists, the Comintern, and the Soviet Union are succinctly and clearly analyzed; a good case is made against the notion, widely entertained in some circles, that Communists in Latin America are somehow different—"indigenous social reformers" or merely "agrarian reformers." The author rightly maintains that their role can not be accurately conceived unless one recognizes that they share characteristics of Communists elsewhere and have followed, in general, the pattern of the international Communist movement. A chapter on the influence of the Communists in the labor movement demonstrates that they have achieved considerable political success wherever and whenever they have controlled or influenced important labor movements. The first part of the work ends with an analysis of the leadership of the Communist Parties and some considerations on their potential military danger to the United States.

The second part deals with the Communist movement in individual countries. Chapters on Communism in Chile and Cuba and the role of Luis Carlos Prestes in Brazil are particularly good; but the general treatment is competent and thorough and a good factual picture emerges. A few minor errors do not significantly mar the excellence of the book. One might wish that the author had analyzed other factors that, although less important than the indigenous parties, have also acted in varying degrees as barriers to Communism: e.g., the typical individualism of Latin Americans, their political idealism, and the influence of the Church.

The volume ends with a discussion of the Communist movement and United States policy and a chapter on "the right and the wrong way to fight Communism in Latin America." Professor Alexander argues that the United States errs in backing regimes devoted to preserving the *status quo* and should instead develop a positive policy of giving its utmost support to democratic elements, "no matter how much [their] economic and social ideas may differ from those which are popular in the United States." Numerous footnotes, a bibliographical note, and a good index enhance the utility of the book.

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BOOK NOTES AND BIBLIOGRAPHY

AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

The Citizen Army: Key to Defense in the Atomic Age. By Frederick Martin Stern. (New York: St. Martin's Press. 1957. Pp. xii, 373. $6.00.)

Soldiers of the States: The Role of the National Guard in American Democracy. By William H. Riker. (Washington, D. C.: Public Affairs Press. 1957. Pp. 129. $3.25.)

Planning for war in a peacetime environment has always been a difficult task for a democracy such as the United States, and modern weapons systems have complicated the task enormously. Since so much is uncertain about the conditions under which nuclear weapons might be used, and since warfare itself has proliferated such a variety of forms, even the lessons of history somehow seem inappropriate as guides to the structure of the American military establishment. No one can really say with high confidence what should be the composition or size of the three services, how much of a commitment should be made to nuclear as against the more conventional capabilities, what proportion of the forces should consist of regulars and what proportion of reserves, or how ready for combat these various components should be. Nevertheless, despite all the uncertainties that plague the policy planners, budgets must be devised, resources allocated, and forces raised, maintained, and modernized.

The propensity of American planners, particularly in the intervals between the major crises of the postwar era, has been to place growing emphasis upon military forces with nuclear capabilities, upon increasingly complex systems for the delivery of nuclear weapons, and upon relatively small, highly trained, elite forces. The trend has been toward increased firepower, reduced manpower, and high states of combat readiness in all three services.

Exactly what will be the consequences of relying so heavily upon forces with these characteristics is most difficult to foresee. But now that the United States can expect to find itself in the forefront of any future conflict almost from the day of its inception, there is a very real possibility that the sustained exercise of our military power against forces of any magnitude will require an early use of atomic weapons.

Perhaps this will be a sensible posture for the United States to maintain, but Frederick Martin Stern, the author of *The Citizen Army,* is strongly opposed to the trend in this direction. In fact, he has grave misgivings about current American military policy and argues fervently that we should reverse it in favor of a mixture of standing forces and large, well-trained reserves in the form of a citizen army. Accordingly, his book is devoted primarily to a demonstration of the merits of universal military training as contrasted with the alternatives of the large standing army and what he calls the cadre-conscript system. Only with a citizen army, he argues, can we deal effectively with local aggression, avoid the use of atomic weapons, and preserve our democratic institutions. Mr. Stern may well be right. But unfortunately for the reader, he has not systematically compared the available alternatives in terms of their costs and expected effects. Nor has he fully faced up to the complexities of modern weapons, the difficulty of reconciling a part-time army with the needs of such major commands as the Allied Forces in Europe and the Strategic Air Command, or the problem of maintaining efficient reserve forces within the peace-time environment of contemporary America. Nevertheless, *The Citizen Army* does raise forcefully the question of whether we should, or even need to, skimp as much as we are now doing on our potential for conventional warfare. As such it is a refreshing contrast to the literature which finds our military salvation primarily in atomic and thermonuclear weapons.

William H. Riker, unlike Stern, does not address himself to the problem of the composition of military force in the nuclear age. In *Soldiers of the States* he is concerned primarily with evaluating the efficiency of the federal system of government, and he regards the American experience with its militia and national guard as a case study in divided functions and joint administration. But his sketch of the process by which the National Guard evolved does suggest that the creation and maintenance of efficient reserve forces would be a more complicated and perhaps expensive task than Stern has conceded. Regrettably, Riker provides only tantalizing glimpses of the National Guard in action; he has not written its military history. But his sober if general account of the political circumstances surrounding its development represents an important corrective to Stern's somewhat uncritical enthusiasm for the citizen army.

Neither author has solved the problem of how, in the nuclear age, we can procure forces that will prove effective in emergencies, save us from too heavy a reliance upon nuclear weapons, and yet not result in overly burdensome economic, social, or political costs. Neither has pretended to do so. But, read together, both contribute to our understanding of how the United States might proceed toward the fulfillment of the responsibilities of a great power in the modern world.—WILLIAM W. KAUFMANN, *The RAND Corporation.*

Decisions about People in Need: A Study of Administrative Responsiveness in Public Assistance. BY ALAN KEITH-LUCAS. (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press. 1957. Pp. xii, 318. $6.00.)

One of the most conspicuous characteristics of modern government is the prominence of administrative power in the conduct of public affairs. Consitutional theory insists that such power remain subservient to the will of the people. But how this is to be achieved is one of the great questions of our time. Part of the task falls to the electorate, which ultimately determines what its representatives come to regard as their essential concerns. Part of the task rests with the political parties, which project their commitments into both the making and the execution of policy. Part of the task must be shouldered by the legislature, which can provide administrative agencies not only with a reasonably precise sense of direction, but also with suitable criteria to govern their operations. Part of the task is within the province of the judiciary, including administrative courts, which can enforce legal standards of responsibility. But part of the task—and a critically important part—has to be accomplished in the canons of service that motivate those exercising administrative authority. Their outlook and even their unconscious predispositions greatly influence the degree to which administration succeeds in being responsive as well as responsible.

It is the chief merit of this book to put the concept of administrative responsiveness under the magnifying glass. A professor of social work at the University of North Carolina, the author has picked as his proving ground the administration of one of the programs of aid under the Social Security Act. This is a good choice; for how the agents of government treat those in the lower economic ranges is a test of democracy. Examination of the performance of two states, including the county level, has impressed the author with the "conscientious way" in which, on the whole, the job is being done (p. 215). Such praise may appear particularly noteworthy, for the individual welfare visitors whose daily rounds are singled out for attention happen to lack professional training for social work. But it is not the thesis of this book that responsive administration gains from that type of professional training. On the contrary, the author contends that the philosophy as well as the methodology of social work hampers responsiveness in the administration of public assistance.

The hub of the argument is that the professional perspectives of social work are strongly influenced by various limiting factors. One is the individualizing case-work approach developed under auspices of the private welfare agency. A corollary is the stress on "treatment," with its frequent intrusions of the welfare visitor's corrective judgments into the lives of the client and his family. Still more important is the uneasy self-isolation of the social work profession. Suspect for its missionary zest as well as the purity of its occupational credo, it is fearful of political interference and more anxious to enlighten public opinion than to accept its guidance. So, in essence, run the inferences suggested by the author. In all these matters, however, he strives to provide a full account. He has sifted a mass of widely scattered writings from different fields within a frame of reference designed to bring into focus the several aspects of administrative responsiveness. The correlation of administrative theory with the practice of public assistance resumes a manner of study that demonstrated its value in the thirties, when the issues here reviewed first kindled controversy.

Perhaps the most important conclusion of this welcome inquiry is that a professional attitude does not necessarily contribute to administrative responsiveness; all depends on the nature of the professional attitude. The conclusion, it should be noted, is independent of one's acceptance of the author's assessment of social work, on which opinions are bound to differ. Indeed, in this respect there are striking parallels between social work and other professional fields—say, education, let alone the practice of medicine. Generally speaking, the mental world of the specialist tends to make him unresponsive to the forces that impinge upon his work from the outside. The basic remedy is seen by the author in "orientation programs" drawing upon the "philosophical and ethical backgrounds of public service" (p. 266). Something like this—aiming at a mature understanding of the larger institutional environment, political and administrative—needs to be part of the professional upbringing of all specialists, irrespective of whether their goal is public employment. On the other hand, although administrative responsiveness is stifled by a narrow professional point of view, we must not ignore the opposite extreme. All the introversion with which the social work profession may be charged seems a small thing when compared with the expert touch in catering to "the public" in the manner of the Army Corps of Engineers!—FRITZ MORSTEIN MARX, *American University.*

Six Days or Forever? Tennessee v. John Thomas Scopes. BY RAY GINGER. (Boston: Beacon Press. 1958. Pp. 285. $3.95.)

In his bibliographical notes Mr. Ginger remarks that perhaps the most enchanting feature of the Scopes case lay in its diversity, the extraordinary range of subjects it touched in some fashion. Law as symbol and as ritual; the relation of religion to education; science as liberator or scapegoat for morality; the possibilities and limitations of intelligence in politics; majority rule and scientific law; and the ultimate question of whether there is any meaning or purpose in the universe outside of Man. Just the other day a southern philosopher, Donald Davidson, said that the significance of the Scopes trial was that it raised the question of whether Man is the prisoner of the findings of positivistic science. Clearly such problems are not restricted to the American South of the 1920's. The present volume is unquestionably the most authoritative study available of the facts of the case, but it is more than this because the facts are analyzed against the background of a whole series of relevant analytical perspectives. Thus we have here a philosophical and educational document of fundamental importance to all thinking persons.

The Butler Act, making it unlawful to teach that man was descended from a lower order of animals or to contradict the Biblical account of the origins of Man, was passed in January, 1925, by extraordinary majorities of both Houses of the Tennessee Legislature. Governor Peay hesitated, but signed the measure, issuing a statement that the bill would not interfere with any teaching and that nobody believed it would be an active statute. Legal proceedings to test the validity of the law were begun mainly for commercial reasons, fostered partly for political ones. The foreman of the grand jury that indicted Scopes was an evolutionist. Most of the veniremen said they had never thought about evolution at all. The schoolboy witnesses were so reluctant to testify that they fled to the woods. Their mothers said they wanted the boys to learn about evolution. The author of the law, John Washington Butler, made the same statement about his children. Two of the jurors were reluctant to convict Scopes, and did so only after urging by the chief defense attorney. The state Supreme Court labelled the case "bizarre" and killed it by upholding the law upon appeal, reversing the trial jury's action upon a technicality, and intimating to the attorney-general that he should close the case by entering a *nolle prosequi.* Since 1925 no indictment has been brought under the law, which remains on the books, and biology textbooks containing the basic facts and propositions of the evolutionary hypothesis have been used in the high schools of the state every year since the law was enacted. John Thomas Scopes never went to jail, but conducted himself soberly, quietly, intelligently, and went north to continue his graduate education in science.

What did the Scopes trial prove, anyway? Supercilious "Liberals" who think it was a mere reflection of southern primitivism would do well to reflect upon the emergence of McCarthyism from the literate and progressive soil of Wisconsin in the 1940's. The underlying hostility and attack upon objective realism in human affairs have their counterparts in contemporary tendencies of thought, whose animus differs from the Tennessee statute only in that they do not resort to the symbolism and ritual of law to proscribe the teaching of scientific attitudes and methods. For example: the "good intentions" ethic of Billy Graham; the "success" psychology of Norman Vincent Peale; the Hutchins-Adler-Laski advocacy of return to a few clear and simple values to eliminate ideological and moral confusion; above all, the bogey-notion of science as a set of techniques and instruments inevitably reducing human beings to unthinking conformists, or dedicated to abolishing literature and the arts. The propensity to create dragons and devils and to devise simple verbal formulas whose public observance will enable virtue to triumph over evil clearly is not confined to Dayton, Tennessee, vintage 1925. Realism and scientific naturalism do not provide automatic solutions to complex problems, but they do help to guard against self-deception, cynicism, and charlatanry on the part of our leaders, as well as the universal corruptions: ignorance and pride, status and power.—AVERY LEISERSON, *Vanderbilt University.*

Wilson's Foreign Policy in Perspective. EDITED BY EDWARD H. BUEHRIG. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 1957. Pp. 176. $4.50.)

Woodrow Wilson and the World of Today. EDITED BY ARTHUR P. DUDDEN. (Philadelphia: University of Philadelphia Press. 1957. Pp. x, 96. $2.75.)

Wilson the Diplomatist: A Look at His Major Foreign Policies. BY ARTHUR S. LINK. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press. 1957. Pp. xii, 165. $4.00.)

These slim volumes derive from lectures given, respectively, at the University of Indiana, Bryn Mawr College, and The Johns Hopkins University in connection with the observance of the centennial of Woodrow Wilson's birth. This should serve as fair warning to the reader, for the mission of the lecturers, all distinguished for their study of various aspects of the former President's career, was extremely difficult to carry out satisfactorily. They were called upon to commemorate, that is, to celebrate the acts and ideas of Wilson—an obligation which, while certainly not stifling criticism, tended to over-balance if not to mute it. As lecturers, they were to hold and if possible educate their academic audiences, necessarily diminishing the content and loosening the organization of their essays in the process. Scholars one and all, they should seek to illuminate shadowy areas of an active policy-maker, but the form and forum selected for them made this perhaps the most difficult task of all. Finally, with the advantage of almost a half-century and of a large agglomeration of commentary, they were expected to evaluate the place of Wilson in his own time and also the heritage of Wilson for our time.

If the reader who is already acquainted with the main outlines of Wilson's terms as president (almost no attention is paid to his earlier activities) finds the essays unequally satisfying, if he finishes with feelings of some regret, he must keep in mind the complex task of the lecturers and the very real difference between the listening and the reading public. For the latter the chief interest in all three volumes will be, first, what do the authorities on Wilson think about his ideas and actions within the limits of their essays? Secondly and relatedly, what emerge as the features of Wilson in perspective? The reviewer found disappointingly little in the way of answers to either question; other aspects of the lecturers' mission so far intruded as to blur if not to dissolve the image.

Let the reviewer now hasten to enter exceptions to his conclusion. There are judgments by the lecturers, even those who chose to hew most closely to narrative history. Wilson was right in doing this; his character and background caused him to err in that; etc. In addition there are some efforts to place Wilson in perspective. Notable in this respect is Arthur Link's opening lecture on the "impact of leadership" in *Woodrow Wilson and the World of Today* (a peculiarly unfortunate title because it invites the very demand left most unfulfilled by the lecturers) and Sir Llewellyn Woodward's "British View of Mr. Wilson's Foreign Policy" in *Wilson's Foreign Policy in Perspective.* Most successful of all, however, perhaps because of the tidiness and clear boundaries of the subject, was Charles Seymour's lecture, in the latter volume, undertaking to reassess the role of Colonel House in the light of contemporary records and the passage of time since Wilson's death. An exception to the commemorative color of the lectures is Eric Goldman's examination of Wilson's lack of interest in the shocking deterioration of civil liberties during World War I, an essay which opens a window of a comfortable, warmed house to the chill, black wind outside.

The Link and Goldman lectures are the only ones devoted to Wilson's domestic ideas and policies. In the concentration on American foreign relations during the second decade of this century Professor Link has had the advantage of single authorship of an entire series (*Wilson the Diplomatist*). A political scientist might well wish for further, more rigorous examination of Wilsonian contributions to institutions and concepts by which political science is still being felled. The League of Nations, whether as Wilson conceived it, as constructed at Versailles, as some Senators sought to change it, as it faced the twenties without American membership, is given only passing attention. Is there a clear distinction between collective security and balance of power in Wilson's thought; if so, what was it and what was the inheritance we were left with as a result? Are we to accept the melange of idealism, nonrecognition, interventionism, and Pan-Americanism blundered into by Wilson in molding United States relations with Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean as the coherent progenitor of policies one and two decades later, and if so, which ones? The reader who wishes for more on these and other questions might justly be accused of the double crime of asking the authors to do something other than they intended and in almost all instances of asking members of one intellectual discipline to apply themselves to another. In extenuation it can only be pleaded that the titles of the volumes and the eminence of the authors encourage these perhaps extravagant expectations. One with more modest hopes will certainly find well-written, constructive lectures by all authors and substantial contributions to Wilsonian historiography by a few.—EDGAR S. FURNISS, JR., *Princeton, New Jersey.*

Foreign Policy and the American Spirit: Essays. BY DEXTER PERKINS. EDITED BY GLYNDON G. VAN DEUSEN AND RICHARD C. WADE. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 1957. Pp. xiii, 254. $3.75.)

This commemoration of the distinguished career of Professor Perkins centers on two of his leading lines of thought, the influence of public opinion on our foreign policy and revisionist writing about our wars.

On the latter, the evidence and reasoning are conclusive. Neither Wilson nor F. D. R. can be convicted of leading us into war. With respect to World War I, revisionism has been "particularly and grossly unscientific"; and it is a "bizarre theory" that Roosevelt dragged us into a useless war we did not want.

The first essay affirms "the extraordinary degree to which American foreign policy is derived from public opinion." Our professional officials seldom have the last word; the politicians do. Presidents have been powerless to withstand our moods, whether of militancy or withdrawal. They have had to wait for public opinion to crystallize and gather force before leading us into war. Our leaders can accelerate or retard a popular trend, but "the general sentiment of the people lies at the heart of every great issue." This is inevitable in a people that really believes in its right to make the big decisions. Democracy implies the right to be informed, in presidential messages and otherwise, and informed democrats could not be content to have no voice in foreign policy decisions. However, as this reviewer sees it, we have been unable to generate an effective policy for making peace after our wars or even to accept the post-war policies offered by our greatest war leaders. We have promptly turned our backs on the constructive, healing policies of Lincoln, Wilson, and Roosevelt. Is it because passion and partisanship control our minds and sources of information after each war?

The greatness of Wilson stands out strongly in these essays, above his recorded faults. Yet he was defeated and broken in making peace by "a barefaced appeal to national selfishness," and "nothing compared with the errors of the average American when it came to the discussion of the League Covenant," especially in the campaign of 1920. There is implicit recognition here that public opinion can be greatly wrong.

Professor Perkins does not challenge the role played by our cold war leaders, yet he raises disturbing questions. Before World War II ended, he cautioned that Russia would insist on her 1941 boundaries and asked if we "were going to recognize that the disposition of territory in Eastern Europe is primarily a Russian affair." He warned that we could not be "a combination of Sir Galahad and Socrates" or "take our dolls and go home" again. Coalitions could be held together only by compromise, without which the world would be "a madhouse," and "compromise is impossible if every question becomes a moral issue." In 1949 he noted that "the notion of evil genius" had largely been transferred in our minds from Germany and Japan to Russia and that this moral antagonism was "much intensified by the role of the contemporary press and radio." The essays do not go on to ask whether our capacity for moral indignation, plus a runaway arms race, may lead to a final Sarajevo or to an accidental world war, which may be our last.

There is a fine chapter on the diplomacy of William H. Seward, and the book closes with Professor Perkins's presidential address to the American Historical Association in 1956, "We Shall Teach Gladly." He was the first president ever to deal with teaching, and he did it magnificently.

The essays are filled with evidences of real maturity, well balanced judgment, fairness, and wisdom—that supreme and all too rare quality. It must be a great privilege to sit in Professor Perkins's classes at Cornell University.—D. F. Fleming, *Vanderbilt University.*

American Nationalism: An Interpretative Essay. By Hans Kohn. (New York: The Macmillan Company. 1957. Pp. xi, 272. $5.00.)

The intellectual pattern of post-war America has some interesting characteristics, particularly when it is compared with the pattern of the 1930's. The economists have put away the Marxist hairshirt and are revelling in the "great celebration" of "people's capitalism." Sectarian logomachs, instead of debating the dialectical meaning of Trotsky's "French turn," are deep in the mystical embrace of God and Conservatism. And America has been discovered, or rediscovered, and set forth for all to see as a civilization founded on pluralism and diversity, which yet has attained a high level of unity and democratic consensus.

Boorstin, Hartz, and Lerner are the leading prophets of this new Athanasian Creed, and in his latest study of nationalism Professor Hans Kohn joins their ranks. My reaction to Kohn's book parallels exactly my reaction to Boorstin's *The Genius of American Politics,* Hartz's *Liberal Tradition in America,* and Lerner's *America as a Civilization:* I found it interesting and at many points perceptive, but I simply cannot accept the major premise. My reading of American history, and of the course of current events, suggests that the common denominator that these commentators have discovered—the American dedication to the liberal, pluralistic ideal—is elusive, if not illusory.

It is obviously true that Americans come of diverse ethnic stocks and from various religious and political tradtions, and it is equally the case that we have *de facto* a pluralistic society. But the logical leap from these facts to the assumption that there is a pluralistic *telos* at work is highly questionable. These subcultures have not, I would submit, abandoned their parochial imperialisms nor their willingness to destroy the fabric of "national unity" to achieve parochial ends—there has merely been an armed truce brought about by the inability of any one group realistically to conceive of victory. And this truce has now broken down in roughly a quarter of the states: south of Mason and Dixon's Line, old Americans of unimpeachable Anglo-Saxon stock are raising the flag of rebellion in defense of what they consider to be true "Americanism."

In other words, I do not find the pluralistic dedication operating in a meaningful fashion on the basic level of American politics: the Arkansas of Faubus and the Harlem of Adam Clayton Powell seem to me to be closer to the norm: *i.e.,* seem to me to be the standard reaction of a subculture *whenever the chips are down.* Fortunately, perhaps, American politics is a conspiracy to prevent the chips from being down, and the much despised professional politician, whatever liabilities he may have, is generally an expert preventer of logical confrontations.

However, intellectuals are dedicated to this dream of unity in diversity, and since it is the intellectual, rather than Powell or Faubus, who writes the book on nationalism, the myth of *e pluribus unum* marches on. To say this is not to deny that the liberal dream is worthy of our dedication—it holds my hopes—but to insist that dreams and data should not be confused. Thus I dissent completely from Professor Kohn's judgment that "in the United States as in the mother country the growing mass democracy has remained faithful to the tradition of liberty, to the limitation of governmental authority, by whomsoever exercised, and to the protection of the rights of individuals and of minorities" (p. 19).

To concentrate on the architectonic deficiency would be unfair to Kohn, as his study is full of incidental wisdom and delightful *aperçus.* Curiously, given his acceptance of the myth of dedicated pluralism, he has an excellent section of the American Civil War and makes it clear that this bitter internecine struggle was not just an unfortunate instance of political hooliganism but a full-scale war between two nationalisms. His handling of American attitudes toward foreign affairs in the twentieth century is similarly sensitive and deft. In short, I would judge *American Nationalism* to be a good book with a bad premise—and this is infinitely better than a bad book with a good premise.—John P. Roche, *Brandeis University.*

The Bill of Rights. By Learned Hand. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 1958. Pp. 82. $2.50.)

In American jurisprudence most roads lead eventually to the problem of judicial review. Proclaiming our faith in government by the people, we resort when hard pressed to government by judges. This may be an aspect of what Eric Fromm identified as a mass compulsion to escape the burdens of freedom. Or maybe judicial review is a counterweight for an irresponsible political party system. In any event, our willingness to submit all kinds of social, economic, and political questions for "adjudication" by judges does not spring from an unmitigated history of brilliant success on their part. Judicial "settlement" of the slavery issue was a fiasco. Yet this did not prevent us a few years later from shunting to the courts the vexing problems of the American industrial revolution. Again the results, culminating in the great debacle of 1935–1936, have not kept us from seeking judicial answers to the Cold War problems of liberty, security, and racialism.

This riddle—the relationship of the political and judicial processes—was Learned Hand's subject for the 1958 Holmes Lectures at the Harvard Law School. Almost half a century on the Federal bench has left the great judge little confidence in the capacity of courts to impose Justice upon an unwilling community. He acknowledges that since a "constitution is primarily an instrument to distribute political power . . . it is hard to escape the necessity of some tribunal with authority to declare when the prescribed distribution has been disturbed." But the difficulty is that American constitutions go further. They not only distribute powers, "they assume to lay down general principles to insure the just exercise of these powers" (as in the Federal Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment). But these "stately admonitions . . . are the precipitates of 'old, unhappy, far-off things, and battles long ago,' originally cast as universals to enlarge the scope of victory, to give it authority, to reassure the very victors themselves that they have been champions of something more momentous than a passing struggle. Thrown large upon the screen of the future as eternal verities, they are emptied of the vital occasions which gave them birth, and become [not law, but] moral adjurations. . . ." Their meaning in the context of changing time and place is a matter of *law-making*, not law-finding. Democracy did not take such functions from independent kings to give them to independent judges! Moreover, in Hand's view, there is "no more persuasive reason for supposing that a legislature is *a priori* less qualified to choose between 'personal' than between economic values . . . " ; for there are no generally accepted standards to apply in either situation.

But Learned Hand's devotion to popular government is not naive. He recognizes that on rare occasions courts may properly intervene— "not indeed because the legislature has appraised the values wrongly . . . [mis-appraisal is hardly possible where there is no generally accepted standard of values] but because its action has been nothing but the patent exploitation of one group whose interests it has altogether disregarded." That is, not misappraisal but failure to appraise at all is—beside the allocation of powers—the only ground for judicial veto of statutory policy. Recognizing the risks of democracy, Chief Judge Hand is more concerned with the perils of judicial legislation. "For myself," he says, "it would be most irksome to be ruled by a bevy of Platonic Guardians even if I knew how to choose them; which I assuredly do not." Or to put it conversely: who are judges to deprive the community of the wisdom that comes with self-inflicted wounds, the strength that grows with the burden of responsibility?

One word as a post-script for those who find comfort in Hand's strictures upon the 1954 *Desegregation* cases: his bolts are directed only against the opinions (i.e., against the technique of an inexperienced Chief Justice). There is not in these lectures the faintest charge of impropriety in the Court's *decisions*. Indeed, there is a hint (doubtless not intended as such) on how the Chief Justice might better have achieved his result.—WALLACE MENDELSON, *The University of Texas.*

The Political Offender and the Warren Court. By C. HERMAN PRITCHETT. (Boston: Boston University Press. 1958. Pp. 74. $3.00.)

All students of constitutional law are indebted to Herman Pritchett for his thoughtful study of *The Roosevelt Court* (1948) and its successor, *Civil Liberties and the Vinson Court* (1954). In this small book, comprising the 1957–58 Bacon Lectures on the Constitution at Boston University, he applies his scalpel to that new and constantly growing body of law dealing with the cold-war phenomenon, the "political offender." After briefly contrasting the dominant characteristics of the Roosevelt and Vinson courts, Pritchett analyzes in turn Smith Act prosecutions, punishment through legislative inquiry, cases arising under the Federal Loyalty Security Program, and issues involving admission to the bar and passport denials. The writing is clear and the analysis is in terms that an intelligent layman might comprehend. Unlike some writing in the field, it takes positions and is illuminated by a coherent philosophy of the role of the Supreme Court.

As Pritchett views the work of the Warren Court through June, 1957 (the decisions of the 1957–58 term confirm his argument), the majority of the Court has carefully avoided head-on collisions with Congress and the executive branch by skillfully avoiding a decision on major constitutional grounds whenever statutory construction, or an insistence on procedural niceties, has made that course possible. Even the *Yates* case, hailed by many as a body blow to successful enforcement of the Smith Act, represents little more than an admonition to the Attorney General to bring his cases on evidence of something more than advocacy of abstract doctrine.

But Pritchett would not deny that critics of the Warren Court have some substance to their complaint that the Court seems determined to guard individual rights, even those of members of the most unpopular minority of our times. Carl Brent Swisher's advice that the Court should await evidence of a social consensus before intervening through law and Wallace Mendelson's warning that the Court should not isolate itself from the support of strong and influential elements of the community have not appealed to the majority of the Warren Court and have no appeal for Pritchett. He is firm in his belief that the Court "has rightly rejected such counsels of judicial avoidance of controversy." As he puts it, the Court's "primary obligation is not to avoid controversy. Its primary obligation is to bring all the judgment its members possess and the best wisdom that the times afford, to the interpretation of the basic rules propounded by our Constitution for the direction of a free society" (p. 73).

Admittedly, the Supreme Court has not withstood and perhaps cannot withstand for a long period the determined efforts of the American people, acting through their representatives in Congress and the executive branch, to treat freedom and due process as expendable luxuries in our anxious times. But the Supreme Court has its duties and the Warren Court has not shirked them. By asking Congress to state its intentions more clearly, and by requiring administrative agencies to adopt a higher standard of fairness, it has reminded these branches that ours is a constitution of rights as well as powers. It is to be hoped that on sober second thought Congress and the executive will realize that no vital interest of the United States will be endangered by a decent respect for individual rights.

This is a valuable and distinguished addition to the Bacon series and deserves wide reading.—WILLIAM M. BEANEY, *Princeton University.*

Justice Reed and the First Amendment: The Religion Clauses. BY F. WILLIAM O'BRIEN. S. J. (Washington, D. C.: Georgetown University Press. 1958. Pp. xi, 264. $5.00.)

Of the steady stream of writings concerning the Supreme Court's rulings on religious questions, those that have been authored by Catholic clergy have usually been emotional and dogmatic. They have thus advanced neither the debate nor the Catholic cause. This latest work is relatively free from such blemishes. Father O'Brien has largely succeeded in being objective, moderate, and restrained. No one would mistake his views for those of a secular thinker, yet most of his arguments are fairly and cautiously stated.

Father O'Brien espouses several viewpoints about which not all commentators will agree: he emphasizes large as against small groups and groups as against individuals; he favors federalism almost to the exclusion of constitutional limitations; he is willing to grant police and other officials wide discretion even when religious rights are involved; and he favors "churches" as against "sects" or "zealots." He has an ambiguous idea of groups: writing of the flag salute cases, he speaks of the school boards as groups but does not so regard the Jehovah's Witnesses; elsewhere he implies that seventy-six per cent of Washington bus riders are a group while the remainder are not. Further, he annoyingly equates disagreement with dishonesty where constitutional interpretations differ from his own; he sometimes cites only articles or cases that agree with his own viewpoint; and sometimes he refers to "many" writers or cases while citing only a few. He believes that religious liberty is (or ought to be) purely the concern of the states. And he is less than fair to Witnesses, who, he says, "claim a constitutional right to stir up violence and hatred in the name of religion and free speech." In addition to disagreeing with these attitudes, many critics would not accept his assumption that their disagreement stems from uncritical or dishonest research.

But perhaps major interest should center on O'Brien's interpretation of Justice Reed's opinions. As a judge, Reed was a little-known quantity; his personality did not evoke public feeling nor were his opinions storm-centers or lode-stars for other judges. Reed was his own man, with the ability and integrity to present his own views, yet these views have not been probed by commentators. The subject is thus of some interest and significance. Father O'Brien does not always avoid the danger that in attempting to discern a philosophy he will create a false consistency. Judges, obviously, are sometimes ambiguous or inconsistent, yet they and their biographers tend to read back into their opinions consonances that simply are not there. It is, for instance, difficult to square Reed's acceptance of the majority argument in the *Everson* case with his own stated views in *McCollum.*

Nevertheless, Father O'Brien capably dissects Reed's opinions, finding three basic beliefs: in pluralism, in federalism even to the disregard of constitutional limitations, and in judicial restraint even in civil liberties cases. He makes out a largely satisfactory case for the latter two, although one cannot accept his belief that only activists are "promoters of some social philosophy"; restraint can also lend itself to such a use, as Reed's pluralism would seem to demonstrate. This reviewer is, moreover, not convinced that Reed was consciously pluralist. If he was, he must have been quite naive, since the parties to court cases are usually the implicit or explicit representatives of groups; consequently groups appear on both sides of most major constitutional questions. Judges must take sides, but Father O'Brien is almost reduced to arguing, not group against individual, but large against small group: all he proves is that he and Reed believe that justice is on the side of the strongest battalions.—LOREN P. BETH, *University of Massachusetts.*

America Votes: A Handbook of Contemporary American Election Statistics, 1956–57. COMPILED AND EDITED BY RICHARD M. SCAMMON. (New York: The Macmillan Company. 1958. Pp. x, 465. $12.50.)

The second volume of *America Votes* continues the splendid features of the first one, and adds several others.

The detailed returns for general elections held in 1956 and 1957 are reported. As a novel virtue, they are supplemented by the totals cast for candidates in primary elections for President, Governor, United States Senator and United States Representative. In the previous volume, the statewide results of general elections for Governor since World War II were given; this edition adds the similar post-war vote for U. S. Senator. A map accompanies each state, showing county and Congressional district lines, and in these some technical changes have been made to bring them current. Detailed maps showing political boundaries in certain urban areas appeared in the first volume, and three others have been added this time, for Cook County-Chicago, northeastern New Jersey, and eastern Massachusetts.

The profession can draw confidence from the advances made by Mr. Scammon and his associates. It seems assured that they will continue to improve their publication to the maximum feasible within their resources. And we are all again in debt to them, the Governmental Affairs Institute, and the Stern Family Fund, whose combined efforts have successfully brought off an enterprise that seemed to others, less informed and less imaginative, a futile venture.

The Census of the United States would not make a profitable commercial operation. Yet no knowledgeable person can maintain that its value to the nation does not far exceed its cost. *America Votes*, as presently financed, must carefully consider its costs. There is consequently a close limit on the degree of expansion that is possible. The inclusion of the primary vote totals is a forward step of immense importance; but, having the final score, we also need to know who drove in the runs and in what innings—the breakdown by counties and urban voting districts. We need these data in the same systematic format and permanent form as the general election returns. To provide them would probably require twice as large a book. Until this is in some way possible, it is hoped that Mr. Scammon can devise means to make the detailed primary results accessible in convenient, though less permanent, form. As it now stands, however, *America Votes* will soon be as standard as the dictionary.—ALEXANDER HEARD, *University of North Carolina.*

The American Congress. BY ROLAND YOUNG. (New York: Harper and Brothers. 1958. Pp. ix, 333. $4.50.)

Roland Young's *The American Congress* is quite different from his previous book, *This Is Congress*, first published in 1943. The earlier work was more popular in tone, while this is designed primarily as a text. A more basic difference, however, lies in the changed attitude toward Congress. Young wrote in 1943, "Congress is poorly organized to formulate policy and not at all organized to execute policy." Now, he holds, "In general, the organization of Congress is well designed for enacting legislation but less well designed for exercising controls over governmental action and, of course, poorly designed for administering policy itself."

The reforms of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 are not responsible for his more enthusiastic picture of our national legislative body. They are hardly mentioned in the book. Rather, Young has lost the interest that he showed previously in party responsibility and somewhat greater presidential leadership. He is now far less impatient with the parochialism of Congress, and he defends this "in moderation," for "it is necessary to make certain that national policy is cogently related to local needs." He shows a more sympathetic understanding of such traditional scapegoats as the seniority system, the House Rules Committee, and the filibuster. In short, he has become more conservative in the fifteen years since he wrote *This Is Congress*.

He develops a theory of Congress that, he holds, has had less adequate treatment than "our theory of representation through political parties or of administration through bureaucracies." He characterizes Congress as a "transformer" placed between the people and the other agencies of government. In its relations with the people, he asks that Congress maintain autonomy so that it will not be dominated by particular external pressures, that it develop competence in its membership, and that it establish adequate policies and policy standards. He seems relatively satisfied with the present performance of Congress in these areas, and he suggests few specific reforms. He is most concerned with the increasing trend toward decentralization of Congressional decision-making, and he calls for an increase in corporate action.

More space is devoted to Congress's relations with other government institutions, especially with the Administration, than is usual in books on the legislative process. "The proper role of Congress," according to Young, "is to operate under the assumption that it should not attempt to gain complete mastery over the presidency or the bureaucracy nor should it permit them to establish mastery over it." It is in this portion of the book that he makes his most specific suggestions for reform. He would strengthen legislative control over government finance, for example, by adoption of a single budget bill and by making better use of the General Accounting Office. And he would have more careful Congressional control of the work of investigating committees.

This book is short, by textbook standards. It is full of interesting illustrative material and highly readable by any standards. It contains, in a research guide at the back of the book, the most valuable short introduction to legislative documents that the reviewer has seen, as well as suggested topics for student research. The book is a welcome addition to a field that is at last becoming able to boast a number of perceptive and scholarly works.—GEORGE GOODWIN, JR., *University of Massachusetts*.

Education for Planning: City, State, and Regional. BY HARVEY S. PERLOFF. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press. 1957. Pp. x, 189. $3.50.)

For several years the American Society of Planning Officials has reported twice as many demands for professional planners as the schools of planning are producing. Those who sought for a generation to gain acceptance for the role of the planner as permanent staff aide to the executive are being defeated by success: the planning consultant emerges again because thus the scarce professionals can serve clamant communities in larger numbers. Federal offers of financial aids to states for local or regional planning have led various specialists, from highway engineers to market analysts, to offer themselves as contract planners.

In such a setting, schools of planning proliferate. There are now nearly thirty in the United States and Canada, many created in the past decade. Within the year there have been organized associations of planning educators and of city planning librarians. There are many more universities that, without creating a new school, have interdepartmental programs focussed on planning; there must be many others considering offerings in the field. Those who look on planning as an aid to decision-making will recognize the leading role that political science has to play in such programs.

Dr. Perloff's meaty handbook is the indispensable reference work for any one concerned with education for planning. Indeed, since the first essay, "Education of City Planners: Past, Present and Future," appeared in the *Journal of the American Institute of Planners*, it has been the springboard for discussions in professional circles. He presents in judicious balance the various views of the role of the city planner. He believes that there is a recognizable core content to the intellectual processes in "shaping the habitat or physical environment of man." He asserts the responsibility of the university educator to assume leadership in research to advance the science of planning so that he can teach more than trade-school transmission of practical experience. He offers specific proposals for a "core curriculum."

The second essay, "Education for Regional Planning and Development," is grounded in Dr. Perloff's experience as director of the program of education and research in planning at the University of Chicago and as consultant on economic development in Puerto Rico, Turkey, and elsewhere. As director of regional studies for Resources for the Future, Inc., he has made a survey of university programs in this less clearly defined field—"the ways in which natural resources could be brought into the service of man's needs and economic development processes facilitated," not only in the United States, but in the less developed countries of the world. Here Dr. Perloff sees a different educational need—a focus for specialists in many disciplines who are ready, probably as mature men, to understand their own specialty in its relation to other bodies of knowledge. In short, an interdisciplinary program, involving team research in case studies. He offers suggestions for a "core curriculum" here, too.

As the third essay in this compact, pregnant, judicious volume, Dr. Perloff has made "A Review of the University of Chicago Experiment," in which he played a leading role. He is confident that its termination for local reasons should not "be interpreted as equivalent to failure." It was the leading program of planning education and research grounded in the social sciences, in a university without schools of architecture or engineering. And it posed some issues for planning and for the social sciences, which educators at other institutions may well ponder: how to attract "absolutely first-rate theoretical minds" to a "program that is mainly geared to professional training."—Charles S. Ascher, *Brooklyn College.*

Urban Planning and Municipal Public Policy. By Donald H. Webster. (New York: Harper and Brothers. 1958. Pp. x, 572. $6.00.)

Professor Webster has created a work of lasting value to persons who teach undergraduate courses in municipal government or in-service training courses for public officials. The typical local government text is woefully lacking in adequate materials on urban planning, particularly on the revolutionary developments in urban renewal. Further, the authors of most basic texts on planning are not political scientists, and the books are excessively concerned with technical questions which are of little significance to the formulator of public policy. The two great virtues of Professor Webster's book are that it approaches city planning not as a technic but as the key instrument creating public policy and that it incorporates examples of the most recent research and practice in its analysis of the methods of modern American planning.

Employing terminology that can be understood by political scientists and their students, the author makes no novel contribution in his necessarily abbreviated background material on local institutions, but his coverage of plan agency organization and administration brings together a range of materials not previously found in a single volume. Unlike most writers in the field, he is capable of relating comprehensive land use and transport planning to the planning of municipal protective and utility services and programs of public welfare. His handling of the methods of plan implementation evidences a close acquaintance with such techniques.

Professor Webster concludes that there is a bright future for municipal planning, but suggests that planners will have to be highly inventive in the next decades. He is insistent upon the need for comparative social science research to interpret environmental influences to the city planner and to aid in the formulation of community norms. In closing, he pleads for a more effectively integrated area and organizational structure for planning—a petition doubtless supported by hundreds of professional planners.—Paul A. Pfretzschner, *Lafayette College.*

The Sovereign States: Notes of a Citizen of Virginia. By James Jackson Kilpatrick. (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company. 1957. Pp. xi, 346. $5.00.)

The author is editor of the *Richmond News Leader* and writes here in defense of states rights. It is his contention that the American union is a union of states and not of people. From this he infers the right of the states to interpose or to nullify federal policies that threaten the rights of their citizens. His leading contention is supported by reference to the Constitutional Convention and the subsequent ratifying conventions. Numerous *ante-bellum* precedents for interposition are cited. He then traces the development of national power through post-Civil War judicial interpretations of the commerce clause and the Fourteenth Amendment. He is sharply critical of recent decisions in which the Supreme Court has reviewed and struck down various policies of the states. He concludes that now is a time for men of courage to risk interposition to protect the powers of the states and the rights of their citizens.

Urban Government. By Benjamin Baker. (Princeton, N.J.: D. Van Nostrand Company, Pp. xi, 572. $6.50.)

The principal parts of this text deal with the following: the sociological characteristics of the city; the "internal relationships" of the municipal corporation, i.e., legal status, politics, organization, and finance; "external relationships," i.e., inter-governmental relations involving cities; and municipal administration, including personnel and municipal functions. It is the author's intention to place city government in the context of urban society and to take into account the effects of urban growth. If this attempt is judged less than perfectly successful, then it ought to be noted that no one else has succeeded perfectly, either, in solving this problem, which is near the top of the agenda for students of city government. A bibliography is included.

Local Government in Rural America. By Clyde F. Snider. (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts. 1957. Pp. x, 584, $6.50.)

"This book is concerned with counties, townships, towns of the New England variety, and special districts. . . . " (p. vii). As the author points out, these units appear in urban as well as in rural areas, but his attention is directed to rural counties, townships, etc. The longer parts of this text deal with historical and legal foundations, organization, and functions. Chapters on politics, fiscal policy and administration, and reorganization also appear. The chapter on politics includes materials found in textbooks on political parties that are particularly relevant to rural America. This text is substantial, sound, intelligent, and traditional. The bibliography is outstanding.

One House for Two: A Study of Nebraska's Unicameral Legislature. By Adam Carlyle Breckenridge. (Washington, D. C.: Public Affairs Press. 1957. Pp. xi., 98. $2.50.)

This is a short study of unicameralism in Nebraska. It includes a description of the structure of the Nebraska legislature and of its processes as provided in its rules. The author also considers its personnel. He observes that their quality is obviously a matter of importance but finds no ready criteria with which to make an evaluation. Some of their personal characteristics are recorded, as well as some comments, concerning their relationships with lobbyists.

Readers seeking a clear-cut verdict on the "Nebraska experiment" will be disappointed. Breckenridge points out that it is exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, to develop and apply measures with which to judge legislative performance and production. He does note that the adoption of unicameralism in Nebraska produced no flood of reform, that the system is securely established, and that, although the system is imperfect," it is a workable and responsible device for representative government" (p. 61).

Understanding the Constitution. By Edward S. Corwin and Jack W. Peltason. (New York: The Dryden Press. Rev. ed. 1958. Pp. xiii, 228. $2.50.)

This is an up-to-date, revised edition of a book that is, essentially, the Constitution of the United States annotated. A section on the "Background of the Constitution" is included, as well as an occasional comment on nonformal aspects of the Constitution. The authors enter the *caveat* at the beginning that there are many interpretations of the Constitution. It is hardly necessary to add that their interpretation will command special respect.

A Grammar of American Politics: The National Government. By Wilfred E. Binkley and Malcolm C. Moos. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 3rd ed., rev. 1958. Pp. xvi, 806. $6.00.)

A new edition of a leading American government text. The authors follow the familiar, traditional sequence: colonial governments, constitutional convention, principles of the constitution, constitutional changes, etc., on to public policy. This text is by no means confined to the formal aspects of American politics, but includes numerous examples of what the authors call "the dynamics of American politics." Nevertheless, one will find here neither a group theory approach nor particular concern with the task of evaluation and judgment although "commentary" is offered from time to time. This book is an outstanding example of the traditional or classic American government text. Clear, judicious, authoritative; certainly one of the principal alternatives that may be considered in the selection of a textbook for the introductory American government course.

American Governmental Problems. By Willis G. Swartz. (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Company. 1957. Pp. xi, 287. $4.75.)

This new, short text employs the "problems approach." Most of the important aspects of American national government and policy are covered. The text is written in an abbreviated or outline form, and the author states frankly that it is a framework to which other materials must be added. Among the problems receiving attention are: the adequacy of our federal and presidential systems; party responsibility; nominating processes; legislative and administrative reorganization. This list is incomplete, but it should be readily apparent that these problems grow out of an effort to apply general democratic norms to the structure and processes of American politics.

SELECTED ARTICLES AND DOCUMENTS ON
AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

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FOREIGN AND COMPARATIVE GOVERNMENT

The British Commonwealth: An Experiment in Co-operation Among Nations. By Frank H. Underhill. (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press. 1956. Pp. xxiii, 127. $.2.00.)

This is the first of a series of books planned by the Duke University Commonwealth Studies Center. Professor Underhill's contribution to the series was delivered as three lectures in the autumn of 1955. To the lectures he has added an excellent brief bibliographical essay. In fact, in the compass of only twenty pages he manages to list the important writings and sources of information regarding the Commonwealth and to make useful comments on most of the items he lists. He has also elaborated and documented his text at a number of points with helpful citations.

The substance of the three chapters is conventional. The first deals with "The Second British Empire," which followed the mercantilist plantations of the eighteenth century. Professor Underhill calls this "The Liberal Victorian Empire," and gives an excellent brief account of its chief characteristics. The second chapter proceeds to an account of the development of dominion status, showing the importance of the Durham Report and the events which followed. The third brings the story down to the present time under the title, "The Second Commonwealth," and even ventures a few shrewd predictions about lines of future development.

The manner of telling the story, with accompanying commentary on the nature of the association that has grown up among the nations of the Commonwealth, fully engages the reader's attention. No startling new ideas are presented, but there are careful selections of significant and important events in the story and wise and witty comment on the factors that contributed to the present form of the Commonwealth. Sure mastery of the subject is revealed on every page.

This reviewer was reminded of Dicey's chapters on the development of law and opinion. This small book truly illuminates and displays the large subject with which it deals. Its wit, liveliness, and directness make it accessible to a student who is just beginning study of the Commonwealth; at the same time it interests a professional scholar because of the ease and grace with which a familiar subject is presented.

The Commonwealth Center at Duke University was fortunate to have Professor Underhill to inaugurate this series of lectures and books. It must have been a great pleasure to hear these lectures—it is certainly a pleasure to read them.—Philip W. Buck, *Stanford University.*

The House without Windows: France Selects a President. By Constantin Melnik and Nathan Leites. (Evanston, Ill.; White Plains, N. Y.: Row, Peterson and Company. 1958. Pp. 358. $6.25.)

This work, one of a series on French politics sponsored by the RAND Corporation, is an extremely detailed account of the unprecedented, seven-day election of René Coty to the Presidency of the Republic in December, 1953. The authors, who had been studying French parliamentary behavior since January, 1953, chose to examine the presidential election in the hope that it might help to answer two questions: how do political elites behave, and how do they arrive at decisions? The method employed was that of group research, including interviews with group secretaries, journalists, and others. The interviews were recorded for subsequent study. The presidential election was well suited to this kind of research because it provided a short-term crisis period concentrated in both time and space.

Events are described chronologically. A chapter is devoted to each of the seven days; these are followed by another chapter, "The Aftermath," a glossary of French parliamentary terms, parties, and personalities, an appendix of party and personal manifestoes, a "Guide to the 'Rules of the Game,' " and an index.

In analyzing the behavior of the participants in this election, both as individuals and as members of groups, the authors try to penetrate beyond overt activities and their rationalizations to the secret and often subconscious and ambivalent motivations of the "Congressists." Much of this analysis is not susceptible of proof, as the authors admit in their introduction, but, disdaining the macroscopy of the older political science and its gross dissection of political events, they attempt what might be called political histology, slicing their material wafer-thin and inspecting it under a microscope, often one belonging to a psychoanalyst. Perhaps this technique is not always so rewarding as the authors believe it to be. Upon examination, some of their findings seem to be either obvious or trivial or irrelevant. At the same time, the elaborate detail of the history and the analysis is, for the most part, both interesting and informative. It is probable that a number of French parliamentarians could gain insight into their own motivations and behavior patterns by reading this book. It would be interesting to have a similar study of an American presidential nominating convention, for there are some evident parallels in the strategy of groups and leaders, such as the early, stop-gap nomination of "favorite son" candidates, called "symbolic" candidates in France.

All French parties and groups are examined, with the exception of the Communists, who are omitted from the study because they employ "an autonomous system of thought" and seldom play according to the rules of the parliamentary "game." The reviewer considers the omission regrettable because it leaves a gap in an otherwise remarkably complete history of this political event. Of course, Communist behavior is mentioned when it affects the actions of non-Communist parties and politicians.

This book does not attempt to present a complete study of French parliamentary behavior, nor is it even concerned with that behavior in connection with an issue of the highest importance. The House without Windows still contains many unvisited chambers, but we must be grateful to Melnik and Leites for casting some light into one of its shadowy corners.—MORLEY AYEARST, *New York University.*

Soviet Education for Science and Technology. BY ALEXANDER G. KOROL. (New York: John Wiley and Sons and The Technology Press of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology; London: Chapman and Hall. 1957. Pp. xxv, 513. $8.50.)

When the Soviet Union startled the free world in 1957 by sending up Sputnik, almost hysterical attention was focused on the tremendous strides that the Communist land had made in science and engineering. For a time it appeared as though the United States had the poorest school system in the world, the Soviet Union the best. The report on "Education in the USSR" prepared by the United States Office of Education, which came out at just about the time of the Sputniks, served as a painful jolt to our complacency. Authoritative facts and figures seemed to point to a Russian educational mecca. At about the same time, Professor George S. Count disturbed us further with his critical analysis of Communist schools in *The Challenge of Soviet Education.*

A further and more penetrating analysis is found in *Soviet Education for Science and Technology.* Mr. Korol, a member of the Senior Research Staff at the Center for International Studies at M. I. T., is in an excellent position to tell us about the road that Soviet education is taking today. Although this volume emphasizes science and technology, it also gives a comprehensive view of Soviet education generally. It is a sober, carefully documented, and well balanced book.

The reader gets a valuable overview of the Soviet schools and colleges. The ten-year school is described in detail, as well as the organization of the technical schools. Concrete facts show that the Soviet Union is bent upon developing a top-notch program of science and engineering. The academic plan for Soviet higher education has been devised with thought and care. Educators are the elite of the land and receive far more of the national income than their American counterparts.

But it is not money that should concern us at this time, important as that is. The questions posed by Sputnik, hammered home by educators and laymen since, are simply these: Is the Soviet Union outstripping us in the technological and scientific areas of study? And, if so, what can we do about it? Mr. Korol is cautious in his approach to both these questions. The Soviet Union, he finds, has made gigantic strides in building up a sound technological program of education. But there is no reason why our educators should hide their heads in shame. We are still ahead in many areas. But the Russians started much later than we did. Shall we be able to keep ahead, at the dynamic pace that the Soviet Union is going?

Mr. Korol notes that the Soviet Union has engaged in a large-scale program to train an adequate supply of teachers. "The results of the teacher training effort have not been perfect either qualitatively or quantitatively, as Soviet official statements for foreign consumption would indicate," he writes. "Nevertheless, the gains have been impressive."

The contrast between the Soviet and American systems of education involves more than numbers. In the USSR, education has become an instrument of the state, on a par with military weapons and propaganda machinery. Young Russians are forced into those fields that the Soviet officials deem important for the USSR. At present, science, engineering, and all technical areas receive the greatest support. Quotas are set up in these fields and students are assigned to them. Such a policy is, of course, impossible in a democratic society. Perhaps that is what makes the vast educational strides now found in the Soviet union dangerous. As Mr. Korol observes, the largest single school system in the world is under the control of the Communist Party. And this school system emphasizes science and technology more than any other educational system; it concentrates almost exclusively on specialized training at vocational, subprofessional, and professional levels.

The challenge to the United States is not merely to keep up with the Soviet Union, or even to surpass it. As Mr. Korol points out, its essence is that we must not permit the "scale, character, flexibility, vigor, and quality of American education to lag behind its expanding goals and responsibilities." This can be accomplished only if the American people recognize the danger signs ahead. We cannot continue to treat education as a marginal luxury. We cannot afford to spend more money on alcoholic beverages and cigarettes than we do on education.

Here is a "must" book for all who are concerned with the continued growth of the democratic way of life. It is not an easy book to read. But then, this is not an easy age in which to live.—BENJAMIN FINE, *Yeshiva University*.

Year of Crisis: Communist Propaganda Activities in 1956. EDITED BY EVRON M. KIRKPATRICK. (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1957. Pp. xix, 414. $5.50.)

The extensive data for this very thorough survey of Communist world-wide propaganda operations in all their ramifications could be obtained only from many sources—both governmental and private—engaged in monitoring, collection, and observation. Following an examination of the various "new" aspects of the Communist line which gained currency in 1956 along with "de-Stalinization," considerable attention is given to the general theory and basic themes underlying Communist propaganda and to the organizational apparatus charged with its dissemination.

However, the bulk of the volume is devoted to a survey and analysis of Communist propaganda activities, by countries and areas, in terms of immediate goals, themes, instrumentalities, and media. Local Communist parties are surveyed in terms of their status, membership, parliamentary delegations, newspapers, publishing houses, and front organizations. One of the most revealing chapters deals with Africa and illustrates graphically how Communism is cleverly cultivating and utilizing the race issue by means of appropriate front groups. The detailed data include statistics on the volume of sales, at below cost, of Communist publications, which are often printed in the Soviet Union or in Communist China.

The events of the year under examination indicated a remarkable increase in the propaganda activities of the Peking regime as well as a stepped-up and more subtle Soviet effort. The scope of these operations embraced not only overt radio but "clandestine" radio as well (the latter in the case of the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, and Spain), in addition to the exchange of films and delegations, "cultural" exchanges, and participation on a substantial scale in international trade fairs and exhibits. Some of the auxiliary but hardly peripheral activities of Soviet Bloc diplomatic missions in such countries as Afghanistan, the Sudan, and Ethiopia and in certain Latin American countries are also examined. In the case of Latin America, these activities included the repatriation of more than 3,500 Soviet *émigrés* during 1956.

Although this volume inevitably has about it something of the nature of a chronicle, it succeeds fully in conveying to the reader the extent of this vast Communist effort at persuasion, in a year that presented the Soviet Bloc with opportunities as well as with embarrassments. The analysis of propaganda themes is particularly useful, since it reflects clearly the Communist ability to exploit fully most local issues, to conduct highly controlled "retreats," and to employ differential tactics. Adequately illustrated, this volume includes many diagrams and charts as well as photographs and reproductions of various types of Communist literature.—JOHN S. RESHETAR, JR., *University of Washington.*

Overheid en Onderdaan. BY J. J. DE JONG. (Wageningen, Netherlands: N.V. Gebr. Zomer en Keunings. 1956. Pp. 215. F. 9, 75.)

Professor de Jong, of the Free University of Amsterdam, has produced a useful and scholarly study of voting behavior, which should not be overlooked by students in this area who are interested in the comparative approach. In much the same tradition as Tingsten, but exploiting available polling and survey data on Western European voting, Professor de Jong makes a worthwhile contribution to our knowledge of the relationship between demographic and sociological factors, on the one hand, and party affiliation, on the other.

The title of the book, "Government and the Governed," is perhaps a bit misleading, although the author does begin by placing his analysis in the context of the basic theoretical problem of political relationships in the modern state. His primary objective, however, is to bring together the results of voting surveys, to analyze them comparatively, and to order his conclusions by developing generalizations and a schematic frame of reference. In this connection, his discussion of voting motivation and of party types in chapters 5 and 6 are provocative. He suggests the existence of four party types: the election and propaganda machine (such as the small conservative, liberal, and radical parties); the political machine (the larger confessional parties and the British Conservative Party); the "*strijdmachine*" or "battle machine," which seeks recognition as a fundamental subdivision of the state apparatus (most of the West European socialist parties); and the activistic "*strijdmachine*" (Communist and fascistic parties seeking a one-party state).

By far the larger portion of the work is devoted to presenting in tables the results of surveys on voting behavior, using eight different variables: religion, income, occupation, education, residence, sex, age, and motivation. The countries for which the author has data are Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Great Britain, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, West Germany, Sweden, Switzerland. The period generally covered is 1946 to 1955. In the last chapter, in addition, there are presented some extremely interesting trend data on Dutch elections, including the 1956 election.

In his synthesis of these country-by-country bodies of data, Professor de Jong presents descriptive generalizations that have comparative utility. He rejects some of the so-called empirical "findings" based on analysis of election statistics (such as that political conservatism increases with age, p. 147), as well as the general concept of the role of the voter in traditional democratic theory (p. 153). Although this is not a completely systematic study of voting behavior, it gathers together very valuable data and provides a comparative perspective that is exceedingly helpful. Translation into English of large sections of this book would certainly be warranted.—SAMUEL J. ELDERSVELD, *University of Michigan.*

The Union of Burma: A Study of the First Years of Independence. BY HUGH TINKER. (Issued under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs. London, New York, Toronto: Oxford University Press. 1957. Pp. xiv, 424. $6.75.)

Professor Hugh Tinker, Lecturer in the Modern History of South East Asia at the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, and author of the previously published *Foundations of Local Self Government in India, Pakistan, and Burma,* has advanced South-East Asian studies with a valuable and interesting survey of recent developments in Burma. This volume is in large part a product of Professor Tinker's year as visiting Professor of History at the University of Rangoon during 1954–55. His survey, except for an initial background sketch and a few later paragraphs inserted since the elections of 1956, covers the period from 1948 through 1955. It is therefore by no means limited, as an unfortunate printing error on the book's jacket would make it appear, to a study of the first year of Burma's independence.

The author has set himself the task of surveying "the whole Burmese scene," with separate chapters dealing with the varied aspects of that nation's political, economic, and cultural life, and with its foreign relations. His information, much of which is said not to have been available to the public before, "even in Burma," has been garnered from many sources: printed reports and surveys issued by the Government of Burma, newspapers (especially the *Nation*), interviews with Government officials, both in Rangoon and up-country, and talks with the "friendly and frank" peoples of Burma. There are fifteen tables presenting economic data of various kinds, two other tables showing the changing educational situation, and yet another giving figures indicating the growth of trade unions. Four maps have been provided, showing political divisions as of 1955, economic development both completed and projected, rebel-held territory in 1949, and the KMT invasion of 1953. Additional reference features include a glossary and an especially valuable section of thumbnail biographies of more than a hundred prominent men and women of Burma.

The author has disarmed criticism with disclaimers that a definitive or even objective review of the period is as yet possible. His guiding motive, he tells us, has been "to assist in keeping open the bridge between Burma and Britain." Clearly he has a great fund of goodwill for Burma. At times he seems almost too self-consciously determined to be appreciative.

It is inevitable in a work of this scope that there should be some sacrifice of depth to breadth. This reviewer found the chapters "Culture and Religion" and "Foreign Relations" least satisfactory in this respect. Tinker tells us that "the essential cultural unity of Burma is one of the principal themes of leaders in many walks of life in Burma today" (p. 165), but his discussion never really comes to grips with the meaning that this concept has for Burma's leaders or with the realities that lie behind it. The discussion of Burma's foreign relations is not without insightful comments, especially with regard to the Commonwealth and the United States, but remains otherwise on a rather superficial level. The discussion of Burma's relations with China, for example, would have gained in depth had they been placed in context with China's general policy of exploiting Buddhism in her relations with her Asian neighbors. Also, to speak of Burma's "sympathetic" relations with Yugoslavia as "strange" (p. 361) betrays unfamiliarity with so-called Third Force developments and the dynamics of Indo-Yugoslav relations.

However, these criticisms are not meant to detract from the author's achievement in providing a much needed reference work on the Union of Burma. The complexities of the contemporary situation place an impossible burden on the shoulders of any single scholar who attempts to survey "the whole scene" of any nation whatever. The real point is not that such an ambitious attempt displays weaknesses here and there, but that the author has managed to achieve so much.—MARGARET W. FISHER, *University of California* (*Berkeley*).

A History of Modern Burma. BY JOHN F. CADY. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press 1958. Pp. xiii, 682. $7.50.)

Building a Welfare State in Burma, 1948–1956. BY FRANK N. TRAGER. (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations. 1958. Pp. x, 118. $4.00.)

Until the war years, Southeast Asia was largely unknown and neglected by American scholars. Some attention was given to the Philippines, but not nearly so much as might be expected, in view of the country's connection with the United States. Since World War II, Americans have become the chief students of the region. With the political withdrawal of their countries from the region, Dutch and French scholars have regrettably tapered off their previous activities. In the meanwhile, American scholarly interest in the region has broadened and deepened.

We are indebted to Professor Cady for the first systematic political history of Burma during the last century and a half. "In this context," as the author states in his preface, "the period of British rule becomes simply another episode, though a memorable one, in an older national existence which has now reappeared. . . . " Cady treats the history of Burma during this period under four main topics: namely, old Burma and its disappearance, British colonial rule, the renaissance of Burmese nationalism, and the reemergence of independent Burma. Old Burma disappeared as the result of the feebleness and inadequacies of the Kingdom of Burma, the aggressive tendencies of a neighboring vigorous Western imperialism, and British fear of French intervention in Upper Burma. The introduction of British administration, accompanied by the investment of considerable sums of outside capital for the development of export commodities and the displacement of traditional subsistence agriculture by the commercial production of a single cash crop for export, rice, caused a rapid submergence of the traditional social and economic system. The result was increasing lawlessness and other social evils. With World War I came the rebirth of Burmese nationalism, followed by political unrest and constitutional experimentation. The nationalist trends were accelerated by the events of World War II. The most interesting part of Cady's account for the political scientist is that dealing with the still short but feverish period since national independence in 1948.

With the publication of this volume, Cady has enhanced his already substantial reputation as a scholar. The work could have been somewhat condensed without loss, but in these days of compressed publications it is a pleasure to read an uncrowded and unhurried book.

In a much smaller volume, Frank N. Trager, who was director of the United States technical assistance program in Burma from 1951 to 1953 and is now director of the Burma Research Project at New York University, examines the first decade of Burma's post-colonial economic history. The book might well carry the subtitle: a preliminary study of economic planning for an underdeveloped country.

Trager is optimistic about Burma's prospects of achieving its goal of a democratic welfare-state. In spite of severe handicaps, such as the heavy damage suffered by the country in the war and the crippling of the economic life caused by civil war, there was some formation of capital. The leaders of Burma are not dogmatic. Realizing that they had made mistakes in policy, they have modified their program. They have recharted Burma's course along more sober lines. Trager is convinced that Burma will attain her economic goals, though not so rapidly as had been at first forecast. "Burma is on the way to her Welfare State—committed more strongly than ever to the practice and profession of democracy."—AMRY VANDENBOSCH, *University of Kentucky.*

Japan Between East and West. BY HUGH BORTON, JEROME B. COHEN, WILLIAM J. JORDEN, DONALD KEENE, PAUL F. LANGER, AND C. MARTIN WILBUR. (New York: Harper and Brothers. 1957. Pp. xxii, 327. $4.75.)

Before World War II Japan, alone of the Asian countries, appeared to have achieved a successful synthesis of Western and indigenous ideologies and techniques. However, the societal tensions created by the impact of the West were never resolved. Rather, their continued existence was a major factor in the rise of the militarists, who offered a solution in the nationalism of the thirties. This road eventually brought Japan defeat, and the tensions that had been temporarily submerged in nationalism once more reasserted themselves. Overpopulation and demands of groups such as organized labor are examples of pre-war problems the Japanese still face. Defeat also brought new problems. Stripped of empire and the Chinese market, Japan must now expand her industry and foreign trade in new directions if she wishes to become an independent agent. An ideological crisis was another problem created by defeat. Disillusioned with the institutional structure of the pre-war period, many Japanese have sought a new ideological base upon which to rebuild. One important result of this search is that Japan has become increasingly subject to the pull of the Soviet bloc, especially China.

Composed of essays by six men of various disciplines, *Japan Between East and West* is an attempt to analyze the various pressures and tensions that confront modern Japan. The first essay, by Hugh Borton, gives an excellent description of the course of contemporary Japanese politics but, unfortunately, fails to discuss such important factors as party structure and leadership. The most outstanding essay is Donald Keene's "Literary and Intellectual Currents in Postwar Japan and Their Implications." He has combined an excellent style with a real perception of the tensions created by a Western intellectual tradition existing beside an indigenous one that has been strongly associated with China in the past and has become so again.

Equally perceptive in its analysis of the dynamics of Japanese Communism is Paul F. Langer's essay, "Communism in Independent Japan." He makes it abundantly clear that communism is important not because of the number of its adherents but rather as a reflection of deep-seated societal problems and the increasing attractiveness of an indigenous Asian solution as represented by Communist China. Overlapping in some areas are "Japan and the Rise of Communist China" and the appendix, "Some Findings of Japanese Public Opinion Polls," by C. Martin Wilbur. While Professor Wilbur very adequately describes the importance of China as a potential market and as a source of possible future dominance, he does not fully explain why China exerts such a strong ideological pull. The presentation of some Japanese opinion polls is an attempt to describe the latter, but this fails because the polls are not in any sense scientific and thus tend to distort rather than indicate patterns of opinion.

Although marred occasionally by the use of over-technical language, Jerome B. Cohen's essay is a fine survey and analysis of Japan's post-war struggle to rebuild her international trade. The volume ends with an excellent article by William J. Jorden on the difficulties that confront Japanese diplomacy in charting an independent course between East and West.

Taken individually, the essays have a good deal to offer to those who seek some understanding of modern Japan's problems. The volume as a whole, however, suffers from the sins of omission. The most obvious failing is the lack of any systematic analysis of social change in post-war Japan. Perhaps this is a reflection of the need for a clear definition of the major problem that is the focus of this volume. This omission makes it appear as if the topics were chosen haphazardly. Even with these failings, *Japan Between East and West* is still more inclusive than most single-author accounts of post-war Japan and to this extent exhibits the validity of the interdisciplinary area-study approach.—BERNARD S. SILBERMAN, *Tokyo, Japan.*

The Kingdom of Jordan. BY RAPHAEL PATAI. (Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1958. Pp. ix, 315. $5.00.)

Professor Patai is an anthropologist of some note, now working in Israel, who supervised the work of a Human Relations Area Files team on Jordan in 1955–57, and who has drawn heavily on that work in developing this book. It represents, summarily, a re-editing of materials that have appeared in the *Jordan* volume in the County Survey Series of the Human Relations Area Files publications, with the addition of some historical and other information that makes the book more attractive to the lay reader. There has been considerable deletion of tables, of anthropological discussion, and of research study summaries, which appeared in the HRAF publication; and there has been some rephrasing and rewording for the sake of simplification.

Forty-five pages are devoted to the three chapters on "Political Developments," "National Attitudes," and "The Framework of Government"—topics that directly concern the political scientist. The first two of these chapters are summaries of past, including recent past, political developments in Jordan, while the third discusses the governmental "framework" in six pages. There is little evidence that any laws or documents were consulted other than the Constitution and perhaps the Court Establishment Law of 1951, and there is no evidence that government officials were consulted. The various ministries and departments are barely mentioned, and the important office of the Prime Minister receives no notice at all.

While the jacket states that this is the "first full-length study of Jordan in the English language"—an assertion that might be open to dispute—the real strength of the book, as of the earlier HRAF volume, lies in its wealth of data about the family, the tribe, and the village as vital parts of Jordanian life. It is pure repetition to say that these three factors are fundamentals in Jordanian politics, and hence these data are invaluable for an understanding of Jordan's government. Scholars with access to both the original HRAF survey of Jordan and the volume under review, however, might find that the deletions and simplifications in the latter are real handicaps, and there is a question in the mind of this reviewer as to whether possession of both would be justified. —GEORGE L. GRASSMUCK, *University of Michigan.*

The Government of Nova Scotia. BY J. MURRAY BECK. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press. 1957. Pp. xii, 372. $5.50.)

This volume is the eighth in the Canadian Government Series edited by the late Professor R. MacGregor Dawson. It is the second of these to be devoted to the government of a province.

The Maritimes have tended to be left behind in the rapid growth of Canada. As a result the greatest formative influence upon their present institutions is their history. This fact leads Professor Beck to devote almost half of his study to the historical development of Nova Scotia's institutions. His first part covers the early colonial period to 1830, in which the province was established under the royal prerogative and became the first of the Canadian provinces to be granted representative institutions. The second outlines the adaptation of the colonial constitution to self-government culminating in confederation. The pattern is the familiar one of an entrenched Family Compact's grudgingly giving way to control by a government responsible to the Assembly. There is a paradoxical combination of executive dominance with extreme parochialism, as the government entrenches itself with local works.

The part of this study that holds the main interest for the political scientist is the third, which covers the contemporary government of the province. A clear picture is presented of the several institutions of government, revealing a remarkable conservatism and traditionalism. The Liberal Party has been in power for seventy of the ninety years since confederation, maintaining itself by the assiduous mending of local fences and a judicious use of patronage.

The factor that underlies the political situation in Nova Scotia is the chronic inadequacy of financial resources. Attention turns to Ottawa in the hope of securing "better terms." However, it is the provincial government and legislature that make the representations. Nova Scotia's M.P.'s take their cues from their party whips and their local constituents rather than from the provincial government. The provincial government does not lack power. Large minorities in the Assembly have built up a tradition of strong executive authority. The opposition is usually weak and ineffective, and, as in other provinces, the premier exercises the preponderant power.

The last chapter on Nova Scotia in the Canadian Federation neatly presents the problem of Nova Scotia. Central Canada determines the general policy of the federal Government, and this often militates against the interests of Nova Scotia. It must then press for compensation, without very effective bargaining counters. A small and poor community is not in a position to exert much pressure. Also, the patronage available to Nova Scotia politicians from the federal government forestalls many a protest. This situation makes for fairly deep resentments over Nova Scotia's relatively poor position in the confederation, accompanied by strong local pride.

Professor Beck's book represents a significant pioneering achievement. He has been obliged to break ground as he went by relying on newspapers, statutes, despatches, etc., almost entirely, without the guidance of secondary sources. The result is a sure-footed and thorough discussion embracing a lengthy history and an extensive analysis of institutions. One has a sense of confidence in the balance and thoroughness of the work, yet it is enlivened by fascinating accounts of interesting events and characters.—HUGH G. THORBURN, *Queen's University.*

The British Labor Movement, 1770–1920: A Political History. BY A. L. MORTON AND GEORGE TATE. (New York: International Publishers. 1957. Pp. 313. $3.00.)

Four features distinguish this British Marxist interpretation from the standard works of Beer, Cole, and the Webbs: there is a liberal sprinkling of Marxism-Leninism; the spotlight focuses on the Left; Britain's position in the world is related to the main currents of the movement; and there is an underlying thesis that backward leaders were opposed by the progressive rank and file.

The exact and full range of influence exerted by Marx and Engels and British Labor on each other has never received a full treatment. This book makes a small but pioneer effort to examine their reciprocal relationship. The role played by the Left in the hectic post-World War I period is exaggerated. Undoubtedly, it performed as an effective and aggressive "ginger" group, but it did not furnish the driving force that scored Labor's great advances. Chapter IV, "The Epoc of Imperialism," successfully roots the movement in the context of the major forces shaping the world.

The idea pervades that the rank and file stood ready to act in a revolutionary fashion after the War if only the leaders had sounded the charge. There is no evidence, however, that British Labor thirsted to spring to the barricades, arms in hand, during the 1917–1921 period. The volume covers the bitter wrangle touched off by the bolshevik issue, which rent the momentous conference of the Indepedent Labor Party in March, 1921. At that moment Ramsay MacDonald rode back into the thick of the British political wars astride his anti-communist charger.—MORTON H. COWDEN, *Columbia University.*

The Development of the Treasury, 1660–1702. BY STEPHEN B. BAXTER. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 1957. Pp. ix, 301. $6.00.)

This admirable study in English administrative history will be useful to the political scientist who is interested in the origins of the Treasury's power. In the period 1660–1702, when neither cabinet nor parliamentary government had yet arisen and the king was still the real head of the government, the Treasury emerged as a department of state and established its superiority over other departments. Curiously, this happened at the same time that it became customary to put the Treasury into commission, which divided, and therefore, might have been expected to weaken its power. Nor did the Treasury gain by reason of new grants of authority, but through a more effective use of the old. In the first place, it gained "because the king came there himself and did his business there." Secondly, the Treasury office, which included the Secretary and his clerks, grew in size and professional competence. While its earlier interventions had been haphazard, by 1702 it exerted its authority over other departments every day and in detail. So does it still today.

The Economics of Communist Eastern Europe. BY NICOLAS SPULBER. (New York: John Wiley and Sons and the Technology Press of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology; London: Chapman and Hall. 1957. Pp. xxviii, 525.)

This is a massive account of the economics of the Communist countries of Eastern Europe, excluding (for various stated reasons) Albania and Eastern Germany. It is inevitably based on officially published statistics, but the author argues convincingly that these statistics "can and should be used," in spite of their deficiences. Not least of the reasons justifying this assertion (although one not stated) is that the author's extensive knowledge of Eastern Europe generally and of his subject in particular makes possible an unusual degree of correlation and correction.

The value of the book is not solely in the factual information that it makes available, but in the analysis and discussion of growth in a planned economy, of the varying degrees of autonomy and integration in the Soviet Union, and finally of the tensions and limitations of a planned economy of the Communist type. It is a modest claim on the author's part that the work is intended "only as a point of departure"; all students of the subject will be indebted to him for such a major contribution.

Gutachten des Instituts für Zeitgeschichte. (München: Im Selbstverlag des Instituts für Zeitgeschichte. 1958. Pp. 439.)

The sections on "Dienststellen und Organisationen des Dritten Reiches," on "Polizei," on "NSDAP," and on "Paramilitarische Organisationen" (pp. 239–355) give precise details, about various agencies of the Nazi period in Germany, that have not hitherto been available. For instance, the Reichskommisar für die Festigung deutschen Volkstums was established by an Erlass des Führers und Reichskanzlers of October 7, 1939, which was never published and only referred to rather summarily in the newspapers.—J. B. C.

The Boards of Nationalized Industries. BY LORD SIMON OF WYTHENSHAWE. (London: Longmans, Green and Company. 1957. Pp. 54. 2s.6d.)

The author, a member of the Labour Party, has had about forty years experience as governing director of two private engineering firms and five years experience, 1947–52, as governing director of the British Broadcasting Corporation. He asserts that "the most important single reform in nationalized industries is that the Chairman and other members of the Board should have the same kind of experience, independence and security of tenure as is common in the best private enterprise concerns." —J. B. C.

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HIRAM M. STOUT

Washington, D.C.

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INTERNATIONAL LAW AND RELATIONS

The Challenge of Coexistence. By Hugh Gaitskell. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 1957. Pp. viii, 114. $2.50.)

Fabian International Essays. Edited by T. E. M. McKitterick and Kenneth Younger. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger. 1957. Pp. 219. $3.75.)

Probably the cause of American misunderstanding of the British point of view, as, notably, in the case of Britain's China policy, is our reluctance to listen to the exposition of her policy-makers. In the two books under review, Labour's point of view is set forth with candor and clarity. Mr. Gaitskell's Godkin lectures at Harvard University, *The Challenge of Coexistence,* were delivered at the moment of the Suez crisis and, although events have moved swiftly, it seems unnecessary for him to amend what he then said about the fundamental problem of coexistence. It is reassuring to have the leader of the Labour Party reaffirm its traditional faith in the principle of the collective system as found in the United Nations and NATO; but he warns that it is wrong to conclude that any alliance anywhere is a good thing. If we are to woo the uncommitted and underdeveloped areas, we must be ever alert to avoid the taint of colonialism. With candor, he takes issue with America's China policy and points to the agreement in both parties in Britain on the question of seating Communist China on the Security Council. The same point of view is taken, in even more forceful language, in Kenneth Younger's chapter on the Far East in *Fabian International Essays.* Younger's exposition of British policy should have a wide reading in the United States, for it bluntly attacks American idealism, party politics, the "island chain" theory, and the philosophy that war is inevitable, which is rejected in Britain. As he sees it, Britain's role in relation to the United States must be to persuade her to lengthen her perspectives in Asia, in terms, not of an early war with China, but of decades of Asian development.

The theme of both books is how best to accomplish "competitive coexistence" in such a way as to avoid World War III. In learning to live peacefully internationally, the democracies, while avoiding totalitarian communism, must bring about political freedom and self-government everywhere. Since failure to do so would result in a total loss of freedom, free society must be committed to progress or perish in the struggle. In *Fabian International Essays,* Mr. Walker, former Secretary of State for Commonwealth Affairs, recites Labour's record in the constitutional development of former colonies to nationhood within the Commonwealth; one might wish that he had been less partisan in his exposition, even though, admittedly, Conservative policy was laggard and critical. Nevertheless, the nature of the Commonwealth in all its varied character is clearly set forth in Mr. Walker's essay. In Mr. McKitterick's chapter on the Middle East, the tangled threads of a complicated story are separated and succinctly set forth. His interpretation is in a manner that gives relevance to today's news. He does not hesitate to chide his own party vigorously for its failures when in power, but here also, as in most of the essays, America's lack of a coherent policy is subject to criticism. John Strachey, former Secretary for War, contributes a chapter on "Britain's Defense Policy" and Thomas Balogh, one on the economics of the cold war. In a concluding chapter, Denis Healy writes on "Beyond Power Politics," but the chapter is hardly up to the standard of the rest of the book.

Since Mr. Gaitskell is also a Fabian, these two books have a unity. They exemplify again the debt that Labour has to the leadership in ideas that the Fabians have always given to the party. In the foreword to his own volume, as well as in the preface to the essays, Mr. Gaitskell acknowledges this debt. Recognizing the experience of parliamentary life that brings a rotation in office to the political parties, the reviewer reiterates that Americans would be well advised to become informed, through such studies as these, before Labour returns to power.—LIONEL H. LAING, *University of Michigan.*

Strategy and Compromise. BY SAMUEL ELIOT MORISON. (Boston: Little, Brown and Company. 1958. Pp. 120. $3.00.)

The strategy briefly summarized in this handy, slim volume is that of British and American leaders in World War II. The compromises were between branches of the military services, military and political purposes, and divergent British and American views.

Professor Morison states that the nucleus of this book was a lecture delivered at Phillips Exeter Academy in 1957, which, after substance had been added in lectures at Oxford, was enlarged and revised for publication. It deals with strategies proposed, modified, and adopted for defeating Germany and Japan. It illustrates at once the benefits and the difficulties inherent in combined and joint staffs where different nationalities, points of view, service loyalties, and political leanings were brought together to derive and execute an allied program for victory. This is to say nothing of inevitable clashes of personalities, which must at times have been fiery or brusque. These clashes Professor Morison handles in gentlemanly fashion.

The relationship between strategy in the Pacific and that in the European Theater is referred to frequently, and much emphasis is placed on the basic validity of decisions taken in Washington in March 1941, where, months before the United States entered the war, the combined staff conferences of the British and American military decided that if and when the United States became engaged in the war, the principal effort would be in Europe even in the event of a Japanese attack. If Professor Morison sounds critical in saying that Lord Alanbrooke "resented any American forces being sent to the Pacific" since "it would seem that he expected the Japanese to stay put until the war was over, when the Anglo-American Allies could display their entire strength in the Pacific," he more than makes amends in describing Lord Mountbatten as "one of the ablest strategists of the war in both major theatres."

Hitler left German naval strategy largely to Admiral Doenitz. Of this, Professor Morison says that the real test was the invasion of Normandy, which was not "troubled by a single U-boat until it had been going on for two weeks" (p. 35).

British memories of manpower losses in 1914–1918 produced the "British strategy of probe, jab, bomb, subvert to be followed by a final big push" (p. 27). Hence, one of the chief Anglo-American compromises was concentration in the Mediterranean in 1942–43, to be followed by cross-Channel operations in 1944.

In Professor Morison's opinion the chief American contributions to the strategy in Europe were adherence to Germany as the priority enemy, determination to invade the continent in 1944, and insistence upon landings in southern France.

Brief chapters summarize four routes that were debated for reducing Japanese military power and the running debate as to whether the Philippines or Formosa should be captured before invasion of the main Japanese islands. Hence the author concludes (p. 110): "The lesson is that in warfare no strategic principles are absolutes; that in any operation the nature of his mission should be the commanding officer's guide."—WILLARD F. BARBER, *Department of State.*

Yearbook of the United Nations: 1956. (New York: Columbia University Press. 1957. Pp. x, 586. $12.50.)

It was scarcely to be foreseen in 1946 that, a decade later, Britain and France would be using force against a member of the United Nations Organization in disregard of the Security Council's resolutions. No less striking are the institutional changes that are evident in this, the tenth in a continuing series of Yearbooks. The crisis in the Middle East provoked the creation of an Emergency Force; but, established by the Assembly rather than the Security Council and entering Egypt by consent of the Government, it bore little relation to the forces envisaged in Chapter VII of the Charter. (It fell to the Soviet Union, in its familiar role of *defensor legis*, to object that it was therefore a violation of the Charter.) Both Suez and Hungary contributed further to the transfer of activity (if not power) from the Security Council to the Assembly, which is indicated in this volume. Also indicated is the unexpected role of the Secretary-General, acting as the Organization's delegate in negotiations that at times closely resembled discussions between sovereign powers.

The Middle East and Hungary are inevitably the first topics discussed under the general heading of Political and Security Questions, where the power politics involved are translated into the cool and impartial language of parliamentary reporting. Other topics under this heading, from disarmament to Southern Africa, are of a more perennial kind. The remaining sections of Part One, relating to Economic and Social, Trusteeship and Administrative questions, as well as the account in Part Two of the specialized agencies, follow the pattern of earlier volumes, the most outstanding single development being the expansion of the Organization's Technical Assistance Program.

The whole work serves its purpose admirably. It provides a comprehensive survey of the Organization's activities, to which is added the factual information of the appendices, precise directions to the documents, and a full index. It is an excellent work of reference.—WILFRID F. KNAPP, *St. Catherine's, Oxford.*

Egypt's Role in World Affairs. BY EMIL LENGYEL. (Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press. 1957. Pp. 147. $2.50.)

This book is evidently an attempt on the part of the Public Affairs Press to add something "timely" to its list of publications. Such attempts are usually ill-advised—this one is no exception. The book is marred by countless typographical errors and other evidence of haste. Substantively, the book covers familiar ground without adding much that is new in the way of analysis or interpretation. In a summary fashion the author discusses the principal historical facts; the Middle Eastern policies of England, France, Russia, and the United States; Nasser's efforts to unite the Arab world; and the critical Arab-Israeli conflict. Whether Professor Lengyel's proposals for a "constructive American policy" in the Middle East could or should be implemented is highly debatable. Certainly, the Arab-Israeli problem is made to appear more easily soluble than it seems actually to be. There is neither documentation nor bibliography, although internal evidence suggests that considerable use was made of newspapers and other readily available sources. This book is obviously not intended for the serious student of Egypt or the Middle East. The untutored layman may find it a satisfactory introduction to a complex subject. —CARL J. SCHNEIDER, *University of Nebraska.*

Canada in World Affairs, 1949 to 1950. BY W. E. C. HARRISON. (Toronto: Oxford University Press. 1957. Pp. vii, 374. $4.50.)

Twenty-five years before the period covered in this volume, an otherwise obscure Canadian Senator originated the most quoted phrase in international affairs—"We live in a fireproof house. . . . " For Canada this is ancient history, and the years 1949–1950 were particularly important in the development of that country's commitments and responsibilities as a great power. The Dominion's foreign policy continued to be affected most closely by its membership of the Commonwealth and by the importance and power of its southern neighbor; but in none of the numerous major decisions of this climax of the cold war was its policy at variance with that of both Britain and the United States—nor was this policy seriously challenged at home. The time was yet to come when Canada would make its most original contributions to international politics as it did in 1956.

Although one could wish that Mr. Harrison's style of writing were sometimes more lively and incisive, he provides an authoritative and comprehensive account of his subject. He gives due weight to the delicacy of Canada's trading position, resulting from the disruption of a triangular exchange with Britain and the United States; and also to his country's relations with the rest of the Commonwealth and with Asia. The volumes in this series must become increasingly important with the growth of Canadian power and participation in world affairs.

The Indian Year Book of International Affairs, 1956. (Madras: University of Madras, Department of International Law. 1956. Pp. viii, 388. 10 rs.)

The fifth volume in this series includes a wide range of essays, diverse in their subject as they are varied in their length and weight.

The first half of the book is devoted to topics of international comparative law, particularly comparative constitutional law relating to India, Burma, and Parkistan. It opens with an essay on the Right of Self Defence in relation to the use of nuclear weapons, which is an admirable piece of legal construction and argument (although the author overlooks the difficulty arising from the increasingly blurred dividing line between nuclear and "conventional" weapons). Marcel Sibert lends his prestige to the volume in a scholarly article on the principle of *Pacta Servanda*, and this is followed by a well reasoned discussion on the part of K. Narayana Rao on the problem of Goa.

The second section is devoted to international affairs. It opens with a timely discussion of the problems involved in the establishment of an international civil service and includes informative essays by Dr. J. D. N. Versluys on the settlement of landless farmers in Asian Countries and by V. K. Narasimkan on the role of the Indian press in the shaping of foreign policy.

It would be impossible to comment on all the score of articles included in this collection; it must suffice to say that the volume as a whole both provides a forum for scholarly discussion of recondite topics (e. g., the legal aspects of Anglo-Mogul relations) and also offers information on matters of current importance that it is often difficult to find elsewhere.

Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1940. Volume II: General and Europe. (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office. 1957. Pp. v, 915. $4.00.)

This is the second volume to be published (Volume IV has already appeared) of documents of the year 1940, when the benevolent neutrality of the United States towards the European democracies faced the difficulties created by Nazi success in Europe. The first section relates to maintenance of American neutrality rights, efforts to repatriate United States citizens, and raw material stockpiling. Of the European countries, France naturally takes the largest share of the space, and the documents published provide an interesting commentary on the politics of collapse in that country, as well as on American policy; however, some of these have already been quoted in William Langer's book, *Our Vichy Gamble*, and they do not reveal anything substantially new. The chapters on Italy and Spain document the somewhat different policies adopted towards these countries with the common objective of keeping them from entering the war against the Allies. A few letters originating from "a former naval person" are included here, but the main body of documents concerning relations with Britain remain to be published, as do those with the U.S.S.R.

La ligne Curzon et la II^e guerre mondiale. By ROMAIN YAKEMTCHOUK. (Paris: Beatrice-Nauwelaerts; Louvain: Editions Nauwelaerts. 1957. Pp. 135.)

The Russo-Polish frontier is perhaps the only part of contemporary Europe which Lord Curzon would find in any way familiar, and it is one of the curiosities of history (attributable in part to the political longevity of Sir Winston Churchill) that a territorial division proposed in 1918 should finally be established, with but slight variations, in 1945. Dr. Yakemtchouk has provided an account of the varying status of the Russo-Polish frontier from 1938 onwards, making the claim that "le présent ouvrage n'est . . . porteur d'aucun message et son style n'est marqué par aucune publicité." It would be surprising if the treatment of a subject so controversial, and so near to the author's personal interest, fully justified this claim; but it comes much nearer to it than is suggested by the chapter heading: "L'Incorporation cavalière de l'Ukraine . . . dans l'U.R.S.S.: la parodie de plébiscite." Certainly the author succeeds in providing a valuable and convenient source book for this complex topic in its most recent phase.

Paths to Peace. EDITED BY VICTOR H. WALLACE. (Melbourne, Australia: Melbourne University Press; London: Cambridge University Press. 1957. Pp. xx, 397.)

Mr. Nehru has provided a Foreword to this group of essays, which, although it is not more than a restatement of familiar views, is much superior to many of the contributions that follow. The purpose of the book is to examine the causes of war and to offer prescriptions for its avoidance; and the editor's policy seems to be based on the assumption that any point of view must add something to the debate, however dubious its interpretation may be. This is unfortunate, since some readers may question the value of an enquiry which supposes that in 1941 "American imperialism was pressing Britain hard. Protesting friendship, she steadily ate into British overseas investments, exchanging war supplies for concessions and bases. It was this Anglo-American antagonism, as well as the direct threat of the German enemy, which pushed Great Britain into alliance with the Soviet Union" (Geoffrey Sharp, p. 82). In spite of this, several of the essays are very valuable and to be admired for their brevity of exposition (Professor P. H. Partidge on "The Conflict of Ideologies" is especially useful); but too often theoretical discussion is based on a view of the past that many historians would question.

Economic Analysis and Policy in Underdeveloped Countries. By P. T. Bauer. (Durham, N. Car.: Duke University Press; London: Cambridge University Press. 1957. Pp. ix, 145. $3.00.)

The economics of underdeveloped countries is a study that is itself somewhat underdeveloped. One of the admirable features of this book—a publication of three lectures given at the Commonwealth Studies Center of Duke University—is the clear and consequential manner in which Professor Bauer proceeds from the application of economic analysis to underdeveloped countries to a discussion of policy issues of political and practical importance. He states his own conviction of the "very wide applicability" to underdeveloped societies of economic analysis that is originally drawn from western economies; at the same time he insists on the values of direct observation to provide data that are sometimes overlooked because they do not fit the commonly accepted categories (his own comments on capital formation in agriculture are especially valuable in this respect). Professor Bauer is an admirer of Marshall, and his writing has a limpid quality appropriate to such a disciple.

Reporting the Wars. By Joseph J. Mathews. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 1957. Pp. x, 322. $6.50.)

This is an account of the treatment of war news from the time of Napoleon's despatches to the present. The author limits his attention to the acquisition, reporting, and publication of the news, with the associated problems of control and censorship. This limitation is a somewhat severe one and possibly limits the value of the book, as is obvious from the fact that only two brief references are made to the B.B.C., and neither of these comments on the exceptional role it played in the second world war. It seems unfortunate, too, that the author of a book on newspaper reporting should be so little confident in the power of the written word as to omit all account of the development of photography, both still and moving, because of the prohibitive cost of illustration. Many readers would also welcome some mention of the reporting of the Spanish civil war, especially in view of its political importance. In short, the book is to be valued as a first account of its subject; but it leaves considerable scope for further investigation in this field.

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WILLIAM H. ROBERTS

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POLITICAL THEORY, RESEARCH, AND METHODOLOGY

Karl Liebknecht: Man without a Country. By Karl W. Meyer. (Washington, D. C.: Public Affairs Press. 1957. Pp. vii, 180. $3.25.)

This political biography of Karl Liebknecht fills a gap in the early history of the split between Socialism and Communism. Though Liebknecht rose to fame at the time of World War I, nearly one third of the book is devoted to his background and earlier activities. Unfortunately, these are not related to German society or the issues dividing it. Thus, no attempt is made to analyze or explain the role of militarism in Germany or of "reformism" and "radicalism" in the Social Democratic Party. For the war and immediate post-war period, however, Liebknecht is placed more firmly in historical context.

Much is omitted from this study that might have made it a contribution of greater value to the political scientist. It is not a book on Liebknecht's political thought and, for all its heavy emphasis on his anti-militarism, tells us nothing about his views on the role of labor and the trade unions, of the party and the leadership in the proletarian revolution, and on the need for certain economic and political prerequisites for that revolution—all issues on which the various schools of Marxism parted ways. Still, we can gather from it that Liebknecht was close to the Bolsheviks in his desire to replace and end the war by class struggle and world revolution and to substitute workers' and soldiers' councils for both parliaments and trade unions. Like Luxemburg, however, he was also a believer in the spontaneous (rather than prepared) action of masses matured by "revolutionary gymnastics." Though such anarcho-syndicalist ideas underlie some of Lenin's thought, too, the elitist element of reliance on a tightly organized "shock-troop" of professional revolutionaries predominated in Leninism. Meyer is probably right, therefore, when he concludes that "Liebknecht in all probability would have strenously objected to Lenin's Bolshevism once its true nature became apparent to him."

Meyer's biography stresses Liebknecht's optimism and personal courage. His thoughts and actions, deeply influenced as they were by Russian revolutionary *émigrés* and events in 1905 and 1917, were adjusted to an environment where revolutionaries could not rely on any mass organizations. In Germany, where the workers were highly organized in trade unions and the SPD (and where the peasantry was a conservative rather than a revolutionary force), they found much admiration but very little response.

Liebknecht's revolutionary optimism and courage, coupled with lack of realism, led him finally into armed adventures that were at least partially responsible for the tragedy that overcame both him personally and the German revolution. Not only was he murdered by the representatives of the very militarism he had fought all his life; he also gave that militarism a new lease on life at the moment of its defeat by the Allies. As Meyer shows very well in his detailed description of the immediate post-war events in Berlin, by deepening the split among the socialists, Liebknecht scared their right wing, which controlled the government, into dealing with the generals, who were finally called on to crush the hopeless armed uprising Liebknecht had advocated. "Liebknecht, who tried to make the world safe for Bolshevism, helped to make Germany safe for the militarism which he vowed to destroy."—John H. Kautsky, *Russian Research Center, Harvard University.*

Restoration, Revolution, Reaction: Economics and Politics in Germany, 1815–1871. By Theodore S. Hamerow. (Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1958. Pp. x, 347. $6.00.)

The German revolution of 1848 has long been regarded as significant for an understanding of the later developments of German politics; but its significance has been hotly debated. Most interpretations suffer from an almost exclusive attention to the political issues and ideologies; the economic interpretations of Marxian historians have been distorted by attempts to fit the revolution to the Marxian pattern. Professor Hamerow's concrete, richly documented, and highly readable study explores the origins, events, and aftermath of the revolution in relation to the actual economic situation. Land-hungry peasants, in the west frustrated by population increase, in the east by the latifundia, and artisans, displaced by the machine and struggling to maintain guild control and handicraft techniques, became, with the depression and famine of the forties, the "revolutionary masses" whose violent uprisings in the spring of '48 opened the way to the temporary power of liberal leaders representing the political and economic demands of the new and old capitalist groups. Factory workers, comparatively prosperous, played no significant role. The failure of the liberals was basically due to their alienation of the masses who had carried them to power but whose demands were irreconcilable with their own. The subsequent reaction was based partly on the ability of the conservatives to develop economic policies that won peasant and artisan support. Professor Hamerow's study lays foundations for a new evaluation of crucial factors in German development. It should be important to political scientists interested in Germany and also to those interested in the assessment of Marxism or in the general morphology of modern revolution.

The Institutions of Advanced Societies. EDITED BY ARNOLD M. ROSE. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 1958. Pp. ix, 691. $10.50.)

This volume is a comparative analysis of the institutions of ten countries—the United Kingdom, Australia, Finland, Poland, Yugoslavia, Greece, Israel, France, Brazil, and the United States. An introduction by the editor presents the theoretical framework, and each country is treated in one essay. The viewpoints expressed are mainly sociological but, despite this, there is relatively little unanimity about subject matter or method and no attempt at summation of the essays or cross-cultural analysis. All but one of the essays contain an extensive and useful bibliography. Almost all of the authors live in the country about which they report; thus descriptions are "from the inside."

The essays on Finland, Yugoslavia, Poland, Greece, and Brazil are of particular interest for the non-specialist, to whom relatively little information about these countries is otherwise readily available in as compact and accessible a form. Those on the United Kingdom, by Anthony H. Richmond, and on Australia, by Ronald Taft and Kenneth F. Walker, are decriptive summaries of sociological and statistical data and are closest to fitting the framework probably intended originally by the editor. The treatment of Israel by S. N. Eisenstadt is a study in rapid social and cultural change coinciding with the assumption of political power by the Jewish community. And finally, in her competent essay on the United States, Jessie Bernard describes the transformation in this country from an economy of scarcity to one of abundance against the background of basic value themes of freedom and equality.—MONROE LERNER, *Hunter College.*

Geography in the Twentieth Century: A Study of Growth, Fields, Techniques, Aims and Trends. EDITED BY GRIFFITH TAYLOR. (New York: Philosophical Library; London: Methuen. 3rd ed., rev. 1957. Pp. xi, 674. $10.00.)

The third edition of this work, with a new essay on geography and history by H. C. Darby, provides an account of the growth of geography as a discipline, distinguishes some major national contributions to the subject, and also devotes attention to the "philosophical" problem of the importance of environment as determining ineluctably the pattern of growth of human civilization. The predominant impression which emerges from a study of the book as a whole is that of the extraordinary diversity of the subject and, as a result, its methods of study. Several of the essays are of direct interest to the political scientist, and although the late Professor Fawcett's chapter on "Geography and Empire" does not add very much that is new, there are valuable contributions in the articles on the sociological aspects of geography and on urban geography by J. W. Watson and the editor respectively. Finally, the editor provides an account of geopolitics, to which he adds his own concept of "geopacifics." This is defined as "an attempt to base the teachings of freedom and humanity upon real geographical deductions"; it is an interesting variant of scientific humanism, but students of international politics may be skeptical of its efficacy as a contribution to world order.

The Political Uses of History: A Study of Historians in the French Restoration. BY STANLEY MELLON. (Stanford: Stanford University Press. 1958. Pp. 226. $5.00.)

This adept and lively study of the various ways in which Liberals and Conservatives under the Restoration made use of history to support political controversy will be of interest to students of French political thought. Professor Mellon's materials include pamphlets, newspapers and periodicals, and the records of several significant trials as well as formal historiography.

Sales Taxation. BY JOHN F. DUE. (Urbana: University of Illinois Press. 1957. Pp. ix, 396. $5.75.)

This book is the definitive recent work on sales taxation. John Due is the leading scholar of this tax; this work is the summary of twenty years of his study, especially in the United States, Canada, and Western Europe. He reaffirms the conclusion that sales and excise taxes are usually passed on to consumers in proportion to their expenditures on the taxed articles. This refutes recent analyses, which have viewed the incidence of a flat-rate, universal sales tax as similar to that of a proportional income tax. He reviews thoroughly the experience of a number of countries with various forms of sales-tax. Three primary standards are used to evaluate the various forms: equitable distribution of the burden along individuals; economic neutrality among different business methods and among different products and services; and ease of administration, with uniform effective enforcement and low cost of compliance. The retail sales tax, Due concludes, is far superior to other forms, with only one major disadvantage, the administrative problem of collection from a large number of retailers. He rates the sales tax high in our system, behind only the income tax and the expenditure tax.

This book is highly recommended as the best existing reference on the topic. It is thorough. It is not light reading.

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NEWS AND NOTES

NOMINATIONS

The Association's Committee on Nominations invites all members to propose candidates for the elective offices of the Association, to wit: President-Elect, three Vice-Presidents, Secretary, Treasurer, and eight members for two-year terms on the Council. Suggestions and supporting statements may be sent to any member of the Committee: Kenneth W. Thompson, Rockefeller Foundation, chairman; C. Herman Pritchett, University of Chicago; George B. Galloway, Library of Congress; Thomas P. Jenkin, University of California; John W. Masland, Dartmouth College; Donald S. Strong, University of Alabama. The sooner suggestions are received the better; to be considered at all they must arrive by March 15, 1959.

PROFESSIONAL CONFERENCES

Fifty-Fourth Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association: Minutes of the Council Meeting

The Council of the American Political Science Association met at 9:30 A.M., September 3, 1958, at the Sheraton-Jefferson Hotel in St. Louis, Missouri, with President V. O. Key presiding. The following members of the Council and members-elect were present: William Anderson, Marver Bernstein, Hyman Cohen, Taylor Cole, John A. Davis, Arthur B. Dugan, Thomas H. Eliot, Ernest Griffith, Charles Hardin, Alexander Heard, Francis H. Heller, Ralph K. Huitt, Marian Irish, Paul Jacobson, Evron M. Kirkpatrick, Christian L. Larsen, Walter Laves, John D. Lewis, Harvey Mansfield, John Masland, Milton R. Merrill, Peter H. Odegard, Elmer Plischke, John Roche, Arthur Steiner, Ruth C. Silva, Carl B. Swisher, John Vieg, Dwight Waldo, Ruth G. Weintraub, and York Willbern.

Harvey Mansfield, editor of the REVIEW, reported that, within the fixed space available in four issues some 44 manuscripts were published out of the 220 submitted during the preceding year. There is a continuing shortage of top quality manuscripts, especially in the field of international relations, and he asked Council members to urge the authors of quality manuscripts to submit such manuscripts to the REVIEW. Mr. Mansfield moved that the present Board of Editors be reappointed except that Harold Stein of Princeton replace Hugh Elsbree of the Library of Congress. The motion was passed. A resolution of appreciation to Harvey Mansfield and the Board of Editors for their work on the REVIEW was passed unanimously.

Marver H. Bernstein, chairman of the 1958 Program Committee, reported that three important policy decisions had been made: (1) that the number of sessions be reduced to forty with not more than ten simultaneous panels; (2) that no person be listed to appear on more than one panel; and (3) that there be greater centralization of authority in the Program Committee for planning the panels. After lengthy discussion, it was agreed that a check would be made of attendance at all panels and especially at the Saturday morning panels.

Alexander Heard, chairman of the Nominating Committee, presented the Committee's report which was approved unanimously. The following nominees were agreed upon to constitute the slate of officers and Council members to be recommended to the annual business meeting for 1958–1959: President-elect Carl Brent Swisher (Johns Hopkins University); Vice Presidents John A. Vieg (Pomona College), Walter Laves (Indiana University); and Ernest S. Griffith (American University); Secretary, Gwendolen Carter (Smith College); Treasurer, Max M. Kampelman (Washington, D.C.); Council members, Morris W. H. Collins (University of Georgia), Charles Hardin (University of Chicago), Francis Heller (University of Kansas), Paul S. Jacobsen (Colgate University), Elmer Plischke (University of Maryland), Allan Richards (University of New Mexico), John P. Roche (Brandeis University), and Dwight Waldo (University of California at Berkeley).

Taylor Cole reported for himself, Gabriel Almond, and Earl Latham, who are the Association's representatives to the Social Science Research Council. He discussed (1) the participation of political scientists in the work of the SSRC, (2) the SSRC's awards to political scientists, and (3) the work of the SSRC in the profession as a whole. Mr. Cole called attention to the growing tendency to earmark research funds. He also pointed to the need for publicizing the work of the Social Science Research Council among political scientists.

The Executive Director, Evron Kirkpatrick, reviewed the work of the National Office. Most of these activities were reported in the minutes of the Executive Committee's meetings, which had been sent to Council members in advance.

The Council discussed the selection of a hotel in Washington for the 1959 meetings and authorized Mr. Kirkpatrick to continue negotiations with various hotels.

The Treasurer, Max M. Kampelman, was unable to be present but submitted a written report, which was distributed to Council members. Mr. Kirkpatrick pointed out that the Association ended the 1958 fiscal year with a surplus of income over expenditures amounting to $6,880.34. The 1958 budget, approved by the Council one year ago, provided for expenditures of $84,569.00 and estimated income at $83,444.00, with a deficit of $1,125.00. Actual income, however, was $93,002.16, or $9,558.16 over the budgeted estimate. This year's surplus of $6,880.34 will wipe out the Association's accumulated deficit. There was a general discussion of (1) investment policy, (2) the termination of the operating subsidy from the Stern Foundation, and (3) earmarked funds which have not yet been spent. The Council approved the audit submitted by the F. W. Lafrentz & Co., certified public accountants.

The 1958–59 budget presented provides for expenditures of $89,379.95 and estimates income at $85,160.00. This budget anticipates a deficit of $4,219.95. The budget was approved unanimously with authorization for the Executive Committee to transfer funds from one item to another.

The Council unanimously passed resolutions of appreciation to the following benefactors for grants made during the past year: The Edgar Stern Family Fund ($39,700), The Skinner Foundation ($500), The Ford Foundation ($86,370), The Poynter Fund ($1,800), C. S. Eaton ($500), The New York Times Foundation ($500), The Revlon Foundation ($50), The Woodrow Wilson Foundation ($8,000), and the Asia Foundation ($2,500).

The Council approved a motion to hold the 1960 annual meetings in New York City if satisfactory hotel arrangements can be made there; otherwise in Philadelphia.

There was a general discussion of the Association's two major proposals now pending before foundations. The proposal for experimental courses in political science at the introductory level provides for a program budget of $307,625.00 and has been submitted to the Ford Foundation. The proposal for a three-year program of regional seminars on teaching and research in political science provides for a budget of $123,125.00 and has been submitted to the Carnegie Foundation.

After a lengthy discussion, the Council passed a motion, offered by Arthur Steiner as amended by Ralph K. Huitt, that the American Political Science Association not participate with the Eagleton Foundation in a program for National Convention internships.

The Council unanimously approved the appointment of Avery Leiserson (Vanderbilt University) as the Association's representative to the Social Science Research Council.

President Key reported that the Asia Foundation had granted the Association $2,500.00 per year to be used for assisting Asian political scientists in their professional development. This program will have two parts: (1) to assist selected Asian political scientists now studying in the United States to attend the annual meetings of the American Political Science Association and (2) to help selected political scientists in Asia to join the American Political Science Association for three-year periods.

The Council discussed a possible campaign for memberships and instructed Mr. Kirkpatrick to proceed with planning and conducting such a campaign.

The Council adopted a motion that the American Political Science Association shall not follow a policy of sponsoring other associations.

The Executive Committee was authorized to negotiate with Pi Sigma Alpha, national political science honorary, concerning the possibility of publishing certain papers presented at meetings of the American Political Science Association.

Mr. Kirkpatrick reported that the Washington office could probably make arrangements to provide round-trip air transportation for groups to Europe in the summer for less than $300 per person. The Council authorized Mr. Kirkpatrick to explore this matter further with the airlines.

After lengthy discussion of the financial problems involved in publishing a new directory, the Executive Committee was instructed to keep the publication of a directory on its agenda and report on this subject to the Council next year.

The Council unanimously adopted Arthur Steiner's motion expressing the Council's appreciation to President Key for his splendid work for the Association during the past year.

The Council adjourned at 5:40 P.M.

RUTH C. SILVA, *Secretary*

Fifty-Fourth Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association: Minutes of the Annual Business Meeting

The Annual Business Meeting of The American Political Science Association convened on Thursday, September 4, 1958, at 4:30 P.M., in the Sheraton-Jefferson Hotel, St. Louis, Missouri. The meeting was called to order by President V. O. Key, who reported on the activities of the Association and its Washington office during the past year. He called attention to the work of the Vice Presidents and noted that Earl Latham had edited the Wilson papers, that Francis O. Wilcox had served on the Executive Committee, and that Cortez A. M. Ewing had represented the American Political Science Association at the meetings of the Western Political Science Association.

Harvey Mansfield, Managing Editor of the AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, reported on the REVIEW for the preceding year. He said that the REVIEW had published 44 articles, not counting the bibliographical articles, communications, and shorter research notes. Of these, nine were invited or committed. The other thirty-five were chosen from among the 220 manuscripts submitted. He reported a shortage of publishable manuscripts, particularly in the field of international relations. He concluded by expressing his gratitude to the Board of Editors for its help during the past year.

From the floor, Harvey Walker suggested that copies of the Report of the Managing Editor should be made available to the membership before the annual business meeting. This suggestion was referred to the Executive Committee for study.

Marver H. Bernstein, chairman of the 1958 Program Committee, reported for his committee and pointed out that the Committee had decided not to attempt a unified theme for the 1958 meeting and to devote more attention to the newer aspects of political science. He also asked the membership to submit suggestions for next year's program.

President Key presented the Treasurer's report for the fiscal year ending July 31, 1958 and the budget for the fiscal year starting August 1, 1958 (reported in the Council Minutes above). After a brief discussion both were unanimously adopted. Harvey Walker requested that the reports of the Treasurer and of other officers be made available to the membership before the annual business meeting. This suggestion was referred to the Executive Committee.

Mr. Alexander Heard, Chairman of the Nominating Committee, presented the Committee's unanimous nominations for officers and Council members for 1958–1959 as previously reported to the Council and published in the June issue of this REVIEW. The report of the nominating committee was unanimously adopted.

Harvey Walker offered a resolution expressing the Association's appreciation for the following gifts received during the past year: Edgar Stern Family Fund ($39,700), the Skinner Foundation ($500), The Ford Foundation ($86,370), The Poynter Fund ($1,800), C. S. Eaton ($500), The New York Times Foundation ($500), The Revlon Foundation ($50), The Woodrow Wilson Foundation ($8,000), and the Asia Foundation ($2,500). The resolution passed unanimously.

Resolutions of appreciation to the Local Arrangements Committee, the Program Committee, the Executive Committee, the Council, and the Board of Editors were also passed unanimously.

A question from the floor asked why a new directory had not been published. President Key explained the financial problems involved in the publication of a directory and said that this matter was now on the agenda of the Executive Committee. A question was also raised from the floor concerning the ownership of the Political Science Building. President Key explained the contractual arrangements between the Association and the Governmental Affairs Institute, which holds legal title to the building.

President Key turned the gavel over to

President-elect Taylor Cole, who adjourned the meeting.

RUTH C. SILVA, *Secretary*

Book and Dissertation Awards

Three major awards were made by the Association at the Annual Meeting in St. Louis. The Woodrow Wilson Foundation Award for the best book in the field of government, politics, and international affairs was divided between Henry A. Kissinger of Harvard University for his *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy* and Rexford G. Tugwell, formerly of the University of Chicago, for *The Democratic Roosevelt*. The James Kimbrough Owen Award for the most significant doctoral dissertation in the general field of state and local government was presented to Robert G. Scigliano, Michigan State University, for his dissertation at the University of Chicago on *Politics and the Judicial Process: The Michigan One-Man Grand Jury*. The Birkhead Award for the doctoral dissertation making the greatest contribution toward the understanding of the traditions, institutions, or methods of democracy was presented to Walter F. Murphy of Brookings Institution for his doctoral dissertation at the University of Chicago on *A Generation of Litigation: A Study in the Legislative Reactions to the School Segregation Decisions.*

IPSA

The International Political Science Association held its fourth triennial World Congress of Political Science in Rome, Italy, September 16–20, 1958. The new officers of the International Association are: *President*, Jacques Chapsal (France); *Vice Presidents*, D. N. Chester (United Kingdom), C. Joseph Chacko (India), Jovan Djordjevic (Yugoslavia) and Francesco Vito (Italy); *Secretary-General*, John Goormaghtigh (Belgium); *Executive Committee*, Benjamin Akzin (Israel), Th. B. Cavalcanti (Brazil), Maurice Duverger (France), Stanislaw Ehrlich (Poland), Jacques Freymond (Switzerland), O. H. von der Gablentz (Germany), Jan Magnus Jansson (Finland), Evron M. Kirkpatrick (United States), James K. Pollock (United States), and William A. Robson (United Kingdom).

The program at the Rome meeting included discussions of interest groups, executive-legislative relations, international conflicts, control of public enterprise, relations between theory and practice in political science, and local government in developing countries. The Congress was attended by about 400 political scientists from all parts of the world.

The 24th Congress of the International Federation for Housing and Town Planning drew over 720 delegates from 28 countries and international agencies to Liege, from 1–6 September, 1958. The general theme, "Man in the Region," was debated in four working groups: "The Definition of the Region," "The Implementation of the Regional Plan," "Rural Elements in the Regional Plan," and "Housing in the Regional Plan." The general reporter was E. Parent (Belgium); reporters for the several themes included J. W. R. Adams (U.K.), G. Astengo (Italy), V. Norby (Denmark), J. Vink (Netherlands), R. Puget (France) and J. Umlauf (West Germany). The name of the Federation was formally changed to "International Federation for Housing and Planning" as evidence of the increasing concern of the Federation with regional planning as well as town planning. New officers elected were: president: Jean Canaux (France); Vice-President: Carl Schweyer (West Germany); new members of the Governing Board: Eric Beecroft (Canada), Heinrich Gertheis (Switzerland), and M. Wannfors (Sweden). Dennis O'Harrow and Candido Oliveras were reelected from the U.S.A.

The next meeting of the Council was fixed for 6–9 September, 1959, in northern Italy; this is a meeting that brings together about 150 delegates. The discussion will be on Housing for the Lowest-Income Families.

The 25th Congress will be held in San Juan, Puerto Rico, 28 May–3 June, 1960. The two themes approved for report and debate are: "The Contribution of Physical Planning to Economic and Social Development" and "The Place of Self-Help and Mutual Aid in the Total Housing Program."

The U. S. participants at Liege numbered fifty, more that at any earlier Congress. Chief of the delegation was Dennis O'Harrow, ASPO. Others included: Charles S. Ascher, New York, Grady Clay, Louisville, Lawrence Cox, Norfolk, S. D. DeBoer, Denver, George Duggar, Berkeley, John R. Fugard, Sr., John D. Lange and Dorothy Gazzolo of NAHRO, Charles Haar, Harvard Law School, Theodore McCrosky, New York, J. M. Miller, Columbia University, Dorothy Schoell Montgomery, Philadelphia, Lawrence Orton, New York City, Hugh Pomeroy, Westchester County, New York, James Scheuer, New York, Lawrence Sheridan, Indianapolis, Richard Steiner, Commissioner, URA, Herbert Stevens, Cincinnati.

The sixteenth annual meeting of the Midwest Conference of Political Scientists was held April 24–26 at the University of Michigan. The attendance was 360. Featured speakers were John M. Blum of Yale University, V. O. Key of Harvard University and G. D. H. Cole of Nuffield College, Oxford University.

Newly elected officers are Jasper B. Shannon, University of Nebraska, President; Ivan M. Stone, Beloit College, Vice President; J. C. Heinlein, University of Cincinnati and Hugh E. Kelso, State University of Iowa, members of the Executive Council for three-year terms; and J. Austin Ranney, University of Illinois, member of the Executive Council for a one-year term. Francis H. Heller of the University of Kansas is the program chairman for the 1959 meeting.

The 1959 meeting of the Conference will be held at Miami University, Oxford, Ohio, on April 30 and May 1–2. The Chairman of the Committee on Local Arrangements is Joseph E. Black of Miami University.

OTHER ACTIVITIES

The State Department has announced the creation of a new program of Current Events Forums designed to enlighten student groups visiting Washington, D. C. Conducted by a global briefing officer in the Department auditorium, forums will be held on the third Wednesday of each month and are available to all groups making an advance appointment through the School Service Department of the Greater National Capital Committee, 1616 K St., N. W., Washington 6, D. C. or directly through the State Department.

A Center for Administrative Research has been established in Rome by the Graduate School in Administrative Sciences of the University of Bologna, in cooperation with the University of California. Its objectives are to stimulate, assist in, conduct, and publish studies of administrative practices and problems of Italian governmental agencies. Arrangements may be made whereby Ministries may detail one or more qualified functionaries to the Center for purposes of training or utilization of its facilities. The initial staff consists of the *Director*, Prof. Silvio Lessona, Director of the Graduate School in Administrative Sciences; the *Representative of the Director*, Prof. Federico Caffè, Professor of Economics in the Faculty of Jurisprudence and in the Graduate School in Administrative Sciences; and a *Technical Consultant*, Prof. Virgil B. Zimmermann, Professor of Public Administration assigned to the Graduate School in Administrative Sciences by the University of California. Other Staff of the Center will include personnel assigned from the School in Bologna. It will employ, or provide facilities for, other scholars and functionaries on short-term assignments or for particular projects.

For the third consecutive year, the department of political science, Wayne State University, will conduct a training program for state and local government officials of the Republic of Indonesia in technical assistance in public administration, in cooperation with the International Cooperation Administration of the U. S. Government.

Indiana University recently has been granted $50,000 by the Ford Foundation to be used over a period of approximately three years for a general study and analysis of a series of case studies on metropolitan action programs. The bureau of government research at Indiana University will convene, consult with, and help establish continuing communication among several research teams engaged in case studies of community action programs, and make a general study and analysis of these programs.

The Ford Foundation made a grant of $25,000 available to the governmental research center of the University of Kansas for basic studies in State Constitutional Revision. Walter Sandelius is conducting a "case study" of his commission while Ethan Allen is directing two studies being undertaken by Byron Abernethey.

The Brookings Institution has recently announced an expanded program of activities including (1) the enlargement of its research on public problems, primarily in the fields of economics, government, and international relations; (2) the creation of a Center for Advanced Study that will conduct conferences, seminars, and study groups on public problems and the social sciences; (3) research fellowships for advanced graduate students completing the Ph.D. in leading universities; and (4) visiting professorships for research on public problems. It proposes to construct a new building on Massachusetts Avenue (across the street from APSA headquarters) to house these activities. Toward the support of this program the Ford Foundation has recently made a grant of $6.2 million. Additional funds are being sought from other sources.

The Consular Law Society of New York City has presented its annual award for distinguished writing in international law to Oscar Svarlien of the political science faculty of the University of Florida.

New York University has established a center for international affairs and development to coordinate and expand the institution's various international study and service programs. Dr. Frank N. Trager has been named acting director of the center and professor of international affairs. The center will help organize specialized orientation and training programs for personnel in private and governmental operations related to international affairs, investigate the impact of the various cultural systems upon one another and publish appropriate material.

During a recent regular meeting, on September 30, 1958, the *Kommission für die Geschichte des Kirchenkampfes in der nationalsozialistischer Zeit* decided to call an international conference on the concerns of the commission. The conference is to take place immediately following the 1959 *Kirchentag* at Munich. The dates have been set—August 17–20, 1959—and arrangements are being made to meet in a conference center in Bavaria.

The *Kommission* is an official agency of the Evangelical Church in Germany (*EKiD*), and has since its first sitting in October of 1955 published a number of volumes of sources and contracted for several more. Chairman of the group is Professor Kurt Dietrich Schmidt of Hamburg; other members known to American scholars include Dr. Heinz Brunotte of Hannover, Dr. Wm. Niemöller of Bielefeld, Professor Ernst Wolf of Göttingen. The commission was founded to collect and evaluate basic documents in the church struggle before the death of surviving participants and the dispersion of private correspondence and records should render reliable appraisal of the evidence impossible. The founding of the agency reflects, in addition to an often expressed and long felt need in ecumenical circles, a request on the part of the *Institut für Zeitgeschichte* in Munich that both Catholic and Evangelical confessions in Germany constitute working parties to collect their own records for the period in question.

Henry J. Abraham, associate professor at the University of Pennsylvania, was a Social Science Research Council fellow in the 1958 Summer Research Training Program on the Judicial Process, held at the University of Wisconsin in Madison from July 7–August 22.

John A. Armstrong is on leave from the University of Wisconsin during 1958–59 in order to take part in the research program on the History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

Vernon Aspaturian, of Pennsylvania State University, visited the Soviet Union, Poland, and Yugoslavia in the Summer of 1958 under a Inter-University Travel Grant. In September, under a Smith-Mundt award, he became visiting professor of international relations, Institut Universitaire de Hautes Études Internationales in Geneva, Switzerland.

Robert S. Babcock, associate Professor of political science at the University of Vermont, went on leave to campaign as the Republican candidate for the office of lieutenant governor of Vermont.

William B. Ballis, professor of political science at the University of Michigan, in his capacity as Chairman of the Committee on Russian Studies directed a special summer program on Russian Studies. Special lectures were given by Richard M. Scammon, Director of Elections Research, Governmental Affairs Institute; Stuart L. Hannon, Deputy Program Director of Radio Free Europe; Harrison Salisbury of the *New York Times;* George Fischer of Brandeis and Harvard Universities; and Holland Hunter of Haverford College.

Arthur C. Banks, Jr., formerly of Morgan State College is visiting professor of political science in the graduate school of arts and sciences at Atlanta University.

Hollis W. Barber, professor of political science at the Chicago Division of the University of Illinois was visiting professor at the University of Wisconsin during the 1958 summer session.

William M. Beaney will be on leave of absence from the department of politics, Princeton University, during the academic year, 1958–59, with an appointment as Rockefeller Fellow in legal-economic history at the University of Wisconsin Law School.

Edward M. Bershtein, assistant professor of political science, Purdue University, spent the summer in New York conducting research on the civil rights movement under a grant from the Purdue Research Foundation.

Joseph B. Board has been appointed lecturer in government at Indiana University for the academic year 1958–59.

Don L. Bowen, assistant director of the American Society for Public Administration, was a visiting instructor at Utah State University during the summer session.

Ralph Braibanti, associate professor of political science at Duke University, spent the summer in England and Pakistan studying the development of the Pakistani civil service under a grant from the Social Science Research Council and the Duke University Commonwealth Studies Center.

J. Cudd Brown, assistant professor of international relations, has been appointed acting Curator of the African Collection at the Hoover Library. He will also continue to teach at San Francisco State College.

Lynton K. Caldwell, professor of government at Indiana University, at the request of the Government of Indonesia and the International Cooperation Administration, conducted a survey, planning a public administration training program for Indonesia.

Paul Camp, adjunct professor in the school of government and public administration of The American University received the Merit Citation for 1958 from the National Civil Service League in recognition of an outstanding career in the public service.

Robert K. Carr has concluded his services as general secretary of The American Association of University Professors, with headquarters in Washington, D. C. and has returned to his position as professor of government at Dartmouth College.

C. W. Cassinelli of Whitman College has been appointed visiting associate professor at the University of Wisconsin for 1958–59.

Carl Q. Christol of Southern California has a Rockefeller Foundation grant and a sabbatical for 1958–59 for a study of the judicial interests and values of selected decisions of the International Court of Justice and the Permanent Court of International Justice.

David Colvin of Montana State College is replacing Burton M. Sapin for the academic year 1958–59 at Vanderbilt University, while Dr. Sapin is on leave.

John M. DeGrove of the University of Florida has a grant from Resources for the Future for the academic year 1958–59 for half-time release from teaching duties to study the question of water resource policy and administration of the State of Florida.

Arch Dotson of Cornell University has been granted a leave of absence for the fall semester, 1958–59, to serve as chief consultant to the Comptroller of the State of New York.

Chester B. Earle of the school of government and public administration of The American University served during the summer 1958, as consultant on the social and economic costs of air pollution for the Department of Health, Education and Welfare.

Lewis J. Edinger, associate professor of political science at Michigan State University, was the recipient of an award to attend the seminar on national security policy research, sponsored by the Social Science Research Council at Dartmouth College.

Mario Einaudi of Cornell University is serving as Fulbright Professor at the University of Turin during 1958–59.

Leon D. Epstein of the University of Wisconsin is studying politics in Great Britain on a Rockefeller Foundation research grant during 1958–59.

John H. Fenton, assistant professor of political science at Michigan State University, was consultant to the Department of Finance of the State of Ohio during the 1958 summer.

Michael J. Flack during the summer of 1958 participated in the Round Table of the International Institute of Administrative Sciences at Liège, Belgium, then led a group of professors through the USSR, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Austria, Yugoslavia, and Greece. He is now on the faculty of the newly established Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, University of Pittsburgh.

Edward S. Flash, Jr. is serving as visiting professor in the department of government at Cornell University during the fall semester, 1958–59.

William V. Ford of The American University has received a Fulbright Award for advanced study with the International Union of Local Authorities in the Hague, under the auspices of the University of Leyden.

Robert S. Friedman of Louisiana State University is replacing Daniel R. Grant for the academic year 1958–59 at Vanderbilt University, while Dr. Grant is on leave with the University of Indiana bureau of public administration project in Bangkok, Thailand.

Edgar S. Furniss, Jr., of the department of politics, Princeton University, continued on leave during the first semester of 1958–59, as research fellow of the Council on Foreign Relations.

George B. Galloway served as secretary to the congressional delegation to the 47th Conference of the Interparliamentary Union which was held at Rio de Janeiro, July 24–August 1, 1958. Also in attendance were Dr. Carl Marcy, chief of staff of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and Dr. Charles J. Zinn, law revision counsel of the U. S. House of Representatives.

Herbert Garfinkel, of Dartmouth College spent the summer of 1958 at the Social Science Research Council Seminar at the Survey Research Center, University of Michigan, and is a Fellow at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences at Palo Alto for the 1958–1959 academic year.

Robert Kent Gooch is serving as acting dean of the College of Arts and Sciences of the University of Virginia during 1958–59, in the absence of Dean William L. Duren, Jr.

Morton Grodzins has been appointed a fellow at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences for the academic year, 1958–59.

Franz Gross of Bradford Junior College is one of 15 English-speaking scholars recently awarded research fellowships by the Center for Studies and Research in International Law and International Relations at the Hague.

Nathan D. Grundstein will be on leave for 1958–59 from Wayne State performing certain duties at the University of Pittsburgh.

Jerome Hall, Distinguished Service Professor of Law, Indiana University, had conferred on him the honorary degree of Doctor of Laws at the University of North Dakota on October 23.

Manfred Halpern, of the Near Eastern Division, Department of State, will be visiting lecturer in politics during the academic year 1958–59 at Princeton University.

Henry C. Hart of the University of Wisconsin is engaged in research in India during 1958–59.

Lowell H. Hattery of the school of government and public administration of the American University addressed the 1958 Round Table of the International Institute of Administrative Sciences at Liege, Belgium on June 30. The subject of the address was "The Impact of Automation on the Civil Service." Professor Hattery also served as director of the Fifth Institute on Electronics in Management, held at The American University on November 3–7, 1958.

Rolf N. B. Haugen, associate professor of political science at The University of Vermont, is serving as the executive secretary of the "Little Hoover Commission" in Vermont.

Carroll Hawkins, associate professor of political science at Michigan State University, returned this fall from Colombia where he served as distinguished visiting professor at the University of the Andes in Bogota.

Clarence J. Hein has resigned as assistant director for research of the governmental research center at the University of Kansas and will serve as visiting professor at the University of West Viriginia.

John Perry Horlacher, University of Pennsylvania, served as Chairman of the National Assembly on Mental Health Education held at Cornell University September 10–13.

Robert H. Horwitz, assistant professor of political science at MSU, has accepted a research grant from the Rockefeller Foundation and will be on leave from the University during the 1958–1959 academic year. During the 1958 summer Dr. Horwitz received a grant from the Ford Foundation, Behavioral Science Division.

Edwin C. Hoyt is serving as visiting associate professor at Hamilton College during the current academic year.

George Kahin of Cornell University will be doing research in Indonesia and administering the Cornell Modern Indonesia Project during 1958–59.

Morton A. Kaplan of the University of Chicato has been appointed visiting research associate in the center of international studies, Princeton University, and the institute of war and peace studies, Columbia University, for the year, 1958–59, and will be in residence at each University during different periods of the academic year.

Stephen D. Kertesz, chairman of the committee on international relations at the University of Notre Dame has received a Guggenheim fellowship to do research on the United Nations and NATO.

Ernest S. Lent is visiting professor in international relations for 1958–59 at Emory University.

Charles O. Lerche will be on leave from Emory University 1958–59 as visiting professor of international relations at the Universities of Stockholm and Gothenburg, Sweden, under a United States Educational Exchange Grant (Smith-Mundt appointment). This fall quarter he will teach at the Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island.

Duncan MacRae, Jr., of the University of Chicago has received a grant from the American Philosophical Society for the study of legislative representation in France.

Fritz Morstein Marx, adjunct professor in the school of government and public administration at The American University, lectured during the summer at the Universities of Freiburg, Gottingen, Hamburg, Heidelberg, and Kiel, the Academy of Administrative Sciences at Speyer, and the Institute of Social Studies in The Hague, Holland. He also spoke before groups of public officials and general audiences under American House auspices.

Alfred G. Mayer, associate professor of political science at Michigan State University, received a grant from the Inter-University Committee on Travel Grants, for a study trip to the Soviet Union during the latter part of the summer of 1958. Dr. Meyer was visiting professor at the University of Berlin during the early part of the 1958 summer.

Edward W. Mill served as a consultant to the new graduate school of public and international affairs at the University of Pittsburgh during the summer of 1958.

For the first semester of the academic year 1958–59 Malcolm Moos is on leave of absence from the Johns Hopkins University while serving as a member of the White House Staff.

Hans J. Morgenthau of the University of Chicago has been elected a member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences.

Mark Neuweld has been appointed visiting assistant professor of political science at Harpur College.

Harding C. Noblitt, professor of political science at Concordia College, Moorhead, Minnesota, was the keynote speaker at the Ninth Congressional District Convention of the Democratic-Farmer-Labor Party held at Crookston, Minnesota, on May 4, 1958.

Andrew E. Nuquist of the University of Vermont has accepted a Smith-Mundt grant under the International Educational Exchange Program of the Department of State to lecture at Iraqi universities during the academic year 1958–1959.

Robert E. Osgood of the University of Chicago has been appointed NATO professor, University of Manchester, England, for April–July, 1959.

Alfred Pelham of Wayne State University will devote a portion of his time to service as budget advisor of the University.

Austin Ranney, associate professor of political science at the University of Illinois, has been appointed associate dean of the graduate college.

Dean Henry Reining, Jr. of the University of Southern California conducted a survey of educational facilities for public and business administration in Brazil for the International Cooperation Administration during the month of June.

Landon G. Rockwell, chairman of the department of government at Hamilton College, is on a sabbatical during the current academic year. During the second term he will serve as visiting professor at the University of Texas.

Alvin Z. Rubinstein, University of Pennsylvania, carried out a research project at the United Nations and the Harvard Russian Research Center during the summer under a grant from the American Philosophical Society to study Soviet policy in the United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East.

John Russell, public administration advisor with the International Cooperation Administration, is joining the staff of the Vanderbilt University institute for economic development on a nine-months' work-training assignment, beginning September 15, 1958, as visiting lecturer in political science.

Dankwart A. Rustow will be on leave from the department of politics, Princeton University, during the academic year, 1958–59. During the summer of 1958, he carried on research in Sweden and will continue his research in Istanbul and Ankara, Turkey, during the coming academic year.

Walter E. Sandelius is serving as chairman of the Governor's Commission on Constitutional Revision for the State of Kansas. Francis H. Heller is serving as a member of the Commission while Ethan P. Allen is serving as chief consultant to the Commission.

E. E. Schattschneider was distinguished professor of political science at Michigan State University during the summer session of 1958.

Henry J. Schmandt, associate professor of government at St. Louis University, has been granted a leave of absence to serve as acting director of the Dayton, Ohio, Metropolitan Survey. His term of service continues until February, 1959, when John C. Bollens will return from teaching duties at UCLA.

John W. Schwada, on leave from the University of Missouri, has been appointed state comptroller and director of the budget by Governor James T. Blair, Jr.

George A. Shipman was on leave for the autumn quarter at the University of Washington to serve as visiting professor in the graduate school of business and public administration at Cornell University.

O. Glenn Stahl is being loaned by the United States Government from his present position as Director, Bureau of Programs and Standards, U. S. Civil Service Commission, to the United Nations to serve as special adviser in personnel administration to the Government of Venezuela for a three-month period beginning in November, 1958.

W. J. Stankiewicz of the University of British Columbia served last summer with the Government of the Province of Ontario.

John G. Stoessinger, assistant professor in the department of political science at Hunter College, spent last summer in Europe on a research grant from the Commission to Study the Organization of Peace in order to prepare a study of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

Richard N. Swift, associate professor of government at New York University, is serving in addition as visiting lecturer in political science for the academic year 1958–59 at the Yale University Graduate School, where he is directing a seminar in international organization and administration.

Joseph Tanenhaus of New York University is replacing John C. Wahlke for the academic year 1958–59 at Vandervilt University, while Dr. Wahlke is on leave teaching at the University of California (Berkeley).

James D. Teller, adjunct professor in the school of government and public administration, The American University, served this year as chairman, United States Delegation, Working Party of Technical Experts on the NATO Air Forces Personnel Classification System, in London, and as consultant to the French Air Force on personnel classification systems.

S. Sidney Ulmer, assistant professor of political science at Michigan State University, received a Social Science Research Council grant, enabling him to attend the Summer Research Training Institute on The Judicial Process at the University of Wisconsin during the summer of 1958.

Egbert S. Wengert has returned from three months as a visiting professor in the institute of public administration, Manila. He assisted the staff of the institute in the work of the first regional conference on public administration held in Manila from June 7–21. Representatives of eleven nations of Southeast Asia took part in the conference.

Norman Wengert, professor of government and politics, University of Maryland, served as visiting professor at Northwestern University for the 1958 summer session. From September 12th through September 19th, Professor Wengert also served as a member of the staff of the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, Washington, D. C.

John P. Wheeler of Hollins College has been granted 18 months leave to become director of the "State Constitutions Study Project" of the National Municipal League.

R. G. Whitesel is on leave of absence from the University of Iowa serving as coordinator for the Woodrow Wilson Fellowship Foundation.

H. Hubert Wilson will be on leave from the department of politics, Princeton University, during the academic year, 1958–59. During the summer of 1958 he travelled extensively in Europe, and will be located during the academic year in Great Britain, where he is carrying on research.

Robert R. Wilson, professor of political science and director of graduate studies in the department of political science at Duke University is on sabbatical leave during the academic year 1958–59. During the year Professor Wilson will do research in the several countries of the British Commonwealth under a grant from the Duke University Commonwealth Studies Center.

APPOINTMENTS AND STAFF CHANGES

Minoo D. Adenwalla, formerly of Kenyon College, has been appointed assistant professor of political science at the University of Missouri.

Charles R. Adrian, associate professor of political science at Michigan State University, has been appointed director of the institute for community development at the same University.

Robert E. Agger, formerly at the University of North Carolina has been appointed associate professor of political science at the University of Oregon.

William G. Andrews, of Cornell University, has been appointed an instructor at Dartmouth College.

Mr. Willard F. Barber, last year director of the department of political affairs, the National War College, is in charge of a newly inaugurated senior officers' course for highly selected senior officers of the U. S. Foreign Service, other civilian agencies, and military officers. The course, given in the State Department's Foreign Service Institute, started for the first time in September, 1958, with twenty student officers. The course is designed to give advanced training in the field of diplomacy and international affairs to officers who have shown promise of advancing towards the highest positions of policy recommendation and execution in diplomatic posts abroad, assignments to international organizations and conferences, and in the Department of State.

Robert O. Berdahl, formerly of the University of California at Berkeley, has been appointed assistant professor of social science, effective September 1, 1958 at San Francisco State College.

Francis P. Brassor, formerly director, Bureau of Management Services, U. S. Civil Service Commission, and executive secretary of both Hoover Commissions, has been appointed visiting professor in the school of government and public administration, The American University.

Richard K. Burke has been promoted to an assistant professorship at the University of Arizona.

Edward R. Cain has been appointed to the overseas program of the University of Maryland for 1958–59.

George E. G. Catlin has become chairman of the joint department of economics and political science at McGill University.

Jay H. Cerf, director, Foreign Policy Clearing House, has been appointed lecturer in the school of government and public administration at The American University.

Joe T. Chennault has been promoted to the rank of professorial lecturer in the school of government and public administration of The American University.

James B. Christoph has been promoted to assistant professor at The Ohio State University.

Peter Bruce Clark has been appointed an instructor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Chicago.

Alfred B. Clubok has been appointed instructor in social sciences and Far Eastern government at the University of Florida.

Joseph Cropsey has been appointed an assistant professor in the department of political science and in the social sciences in the College at the University of Chicago.

Frank C. Darling has been appointed lecturer in the school of government and public administration of The American University.

Morris Davis has been appointed an instructor at the University of Wisconsin for 1958–59.

Edward Dawson has been appointed instructor in government and politics at the University of Maryland for the year 1958–59.

Gottfried Dietze of Johns Hopkins University has been promoted to the rank of associate professor. During the summer of 1958 Professor Dietze was visiting professor at the University of Heidelberg.

Herbert S. Dinerstein, RAND Corporation, has been promoted to the rank of adjunct professor in the school of government and public administration of The American University.

John C. Donovan has been promoted to professor of government and chairman of the division of social sciences in Bates College. Professor Donovan resigned as chairman of the Maine Democratic State Committee on June 29 in order to serve as campaign manager for Governor Edmund S. Muskie in his bid for a seat in the United States Senate.

John T. Dorsey has been promoted to associate professor of political science at Michigan State University.

Bernard E. Dupuis has been appointed to the overseas program of the University of Maryland.

Lewis J. Edinger has been promoted to associate professor of political science at Michigan State University.

Walter O. Filley has been appointed associate professor of political science at Harpur college.

Gerald Freund, formerly of the Council on Foreign Relations, has been appointed assistant professor of political science at Haverford College.

Harry J. Friedman has been promoted to assistant professor of political science at Michigan State University.

Richard H. Frost, instructor in the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International affairs, Princeton University, has been promoted to the rank of assistant professor in the department of politics.

Stanley T. Gabis has accepted an appointment as assistant professor of political science and assistant coordinator of the Viet Nam Project at Michigan State University.

George F. Gant has become director of the Overseas Development Program of the Ford Foundation for South and Southeast Asia.

Minos Generales has been promoted to the rank of professor of political science, San Diego State College.

Victor H. Gibean has been promoted from visiting assistant professor to assistant professor at the University of Alabama.

Howard B. Gill has been appointed lecturer in the school of government and public administration at The American University. Mr. Gill will serve as director of the institute of correctional administration.

Thomas W. Gill has been appointed lecturer in the school of government and public administration of The American University.

John Gillespie, formerly director of the bureau of government research at the University of Massachusetts, has been appointed assistant to the president and secretary of the university.

Harvey Glickman has been appointed instructor in the department of politics at Princeton University.

Ralph M. Goldman was promoted to associate professor of political science at Michigan State University.

Robert E. Goostree has been appointed assistant dean of the school of government and public administration in charge of the Washington Semester Program at The American University.

Leon Gordenker, formerly of Dartmouth College, has been appointed lecturer in the department of politics at Princeton University.

William J. Gore has rejoined the faculty at the University of Kansas as assistant director for research of the governmental research center at the University of Kansas.

Wesley L. Gould has been promoted from assistant professor to associate professor of political science at Purdue University, September 1, 1958.

Richard C. Gripp resigned from his position with the federal government to accept an appointment as assistant professor of political science, San Diego State College.

Jay V. Groves has become assistant professor of social science at West Virginia Wesleyan College.

Nelson P. Guild, formerly of Penn State, has accepted a position as assistant professor at Hamilton College.

Samuel Halperin has been promoted to assistant professor at Wayne State University.

Arnold Heidenheimer has been reappointed to the department of political science at Wayne State University.

Charles M. Hersh has been appointed assistant dean of the school of government and public administration in charge of the uptown program at The American University.

Edward Heubel has been promoted to assistant professor at Wayne State University.

Walter V. Hohenstein has been appointed to the overseas program of the University of Maryland.

Frederick J. Horrigan, lecturer in government, has joined the faculty of the department of government at Indiana University after two years with the research division at the institute of public administration at Thammasat University in Bangkok, Thailand.

Franklin W. Houn has been appointed assistant professor of political science at Michigan State University.

Ronald F. Howell has been promoted from an assistant professor to an associate professor at Emory University.

A. F. Jandali has been promoted to assistant professor of political science at Michigan State University.

James Jarvis has been promoted to assistant professor at Wayne State University.

Donald Bruce Johnson has been promoted to the rank of associate professor of political science at the State University of Iowa.

Alfred J. Junz, lecturer in the department of political science, Hunter College, has accepted an appointment as senior political scientist and head of the American Section of the Hansard Society for Parliamentary Government (London).

Louis G. Kahle has been promoted to the rank of full professor at the University of Missouri. During the first semester 1958–59 he has devoted full time to his duties as regional director of the Woodrow Wilson Fellowship Program.

Robert F. Karsch has been appointed chairman of the department of political science at the University of Missouri, succeeding Martin L. Faust who requested to be relieved of the chairmanship.

C. Mansel Keene, chief, Standards Division, Bureau of Programs and Standards, U. S. Civil Service Commission, has been promoted to the rank of professorial lecturer in the school of government and public administration, The American University.

Vukan Kuic has been promoted from instructor to assistant professor at the University of Alabama.

Melville T. Kennedy, Jr., formerly on the staff of the Research Project on Modern China at Columbia, has been appointed assistant professor in the political science department at Bryn Mawr.

Morton Kroll has completed his duties as director of the Library Development Project of the Pacific Northwest Library Association; the Project, financed by the Ford Foundation, involved a two year inquiry into the organization and administration of library service throughout the Pacific Northwest. He has been appointed acting associate professor of political science at the University of Washington.

Oliver M. Lee, doctoral candidate at the University of Chicago, was appointed instructor in the department of government and politics at the University of Maryland, beginning in September, 1958.

Edward M. Levine has been promoted from instructor to assistant professor of political science at Purdue University, September 1, 1958.

Gene M. Lyons has been appointed research associate in government at Dartmouth College.

David K. Marvin, formerly of Northwestern University, has been appointed assistant professor of international relations, effective September 1, 1958 at San Francisco State College.

Eugene A. Mawhinney, chairman of the division of social sciences at Elmira College, has been promoted to professor of political science from associate professor. Professor Mawhinney also recently served as consultant to the New York Special Legislative Committee on the Revision and Simplification of the Constitution.

Herbert Maza has been appointed director of the Institute for American Universities affiliated with the University of Aix-Marseille. The Institute of American Universities has been introduced to provide a junior year abroad with American credits. The American Institute has already been approved for the GI Bill and by over 30 American colleges and universities.

Charles A. McClelland has been appointed chairman of the division of social science at San Francisco State College.

Thomas McEnroe has been reappointed to the department of political science at Wayne State University.

Theodore McNelly has been appointed to the overseas program of the University of Maryland.

Charles V. Morris has been appointed lecturer in the school of government and public administration of The American University. Mr. Morris will serve as assistant director of the Institute of Correctional Administration.

Walter F. Murphy, fellow at The Brookings Institution, has been appointed assistant professor in the department of politics at Princeton University.

Earl Nehring has joined the faculty of the University of Kansas as instructor in political science after completing his doctorate at U.C.L.A.

Frederic D. Ogden has been promoted to associate professor at the University of Alabama. In 1957–58 he was a visiting professor at the Indian School of International Studies, New Delhi.

Robert E. Osgood of the University of Chicago has been promoted to associate professor of political science.

Eugene S. Powell has been appointed to the overseas program of the University of Maryland.

O. Charles Press has accepted an appointment as assistant professor of political science and given a major assignment as subject matter specialist in the institute for community development at Michigan State University.

C. Herman Pritchett has been appointed chairman of the department of political science at the University of Chicago and Ford research professor in governmental affairs for the academic year 1958–59.

Laurence I. Radway has been promoted to the rank of professor at Dartmouth College. During the summer of 1958 he directed a seminar on national security policy research at Dartmouth, sponsored by the Social Science Research Council.

Milton Rakove of the American Foundation for Political Education has been appointed assistant professor of political science at the Chicago Division of the University of Illinois.

Maurice M. Ramsey has been named acting chairman of the department of political science of Wayne State University.

Arnold A. Rogow, formerly of the University of Iowa, has been appointed assistant professor of political science at Haverford College.

Peter Rohn has been appointed instructor in political science at the University of Washington.

C. Neale Ronning has been promoted to assistant professor in the department of politics at Princeton University.

Harold H. Roth has been promoted to the rank of professor in the school of government and public administration at The American University.

Joseph A. Schlesinger was promoted to associate professor of political science at Michigan State University.

Glendon A. Schubert has been promoted to professor of political science at Michigan State University.

Waldo Schumacher has retired. He has been a member of the faculty of the department of political science since 1923 at the University of Oregon.

George W. Shepherd, Jr. has been appointed to the department of political science at St. Olaf College.

John H. Smith, consultant to the President's Commission on Civil Rights, has been appointed lecturer in the school of government and public administration at The American University.

Colonel Russell A. Snook, training director, National Association of Chiefs of Police, has been promoted to the rank of adjunct professor in the school of government and public administration of The American University.

Nanes Specter, chief, Training and Development Division, Veterans Administration, has been promoted to the rank of professorial lecturer in the school of government and public administration of The American University.

John E. Stoner has been appointed chief of party of the Indiana University public administration contract group assigned to the institute of public administration at Thammasat University in Bangkok, Thailand.

Joseph L. Sutton of Indiana University's department of government has been promoted to associate professor.

Bert E. Swanson has been appointed instructor in political science at the University of Oregon.

John J. Teal, Jr., of Tunturi, Huntington Center, Vermont has been appointed associate professor of political science at The University of Vermont.

Arthur B. Thompson, Jr., and Robert J. Sickels have been appointed instructors in political science at The University of Vermont.

James F. Tierney, formerly assistant professor at Dartmouth College and Ford Foundation Fellow in International Relations, 1957–1958, joined the staff of Hunter College in September 1958.

Jan F. Triska has joined the department of government at Cornell University as an assistant professor.

Robert Tucker, formerly of the RAND Corporation has been appointed associate professor of government at Indiana University.

S. Sidney Ulmer was promoted to assistant professor of political science at Michigan State University.

Amry Vandenbosch has been appointed director of the newly created William Andrew Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce at the University of Kentucky. The school is established in accordance with the terms of the will of James Kennedy Patterson who was president of the University from 1869 to 1910 and who left his estate to the University for this purpose as a memorial to his son. Earnest G. Trimbe succeeds Vandenbosch as head of the department of political science.

Manfred C. Vernon has been promoted to professor at the University of Alabama.

Clement E. Vose, formerly of Bowdoin, has become associate professor of government at Wesleyan. At present he is doing research as a senior fellow in the Yale Law School under a Rockefeller grant.

F. Champion Ward, former dean of the College at the University of Chicago has become director of the Overseas Development Program for the Near East and Africa of the Ford Foundation.

Ruth G. Weintraub, chairman of the political science Department at Hunter College, has been appointed director of graduate studies in the Arts and Sciences at that institution.

Lloyd M. Wells, formerly of Southern Methodist University, has been appointed associate professor of political science at the University of Missouri.

John Westburg, who recently received his Ph.D. from the University of Southern California, has been appointed associate professor of history and government at Pan American College.

William R. Willoughby has been promoted from associate professor to full professor at St. Lawrence University.

Daniel Wit, visiting associate professor of government, has joined the faculty of Indiana University for one year after completing two years at the institute of public administration at Thammasat University in Bangkok, Thailand.

Alfred C. Wolf has been named director of the Overseas Development Program of the Ford Foundation in Latin America and the Caribbean.

John W. Wortman has been appointed to the overseas program of the University of Maryland.

Deil Wright has been promoted to assistant professor at Wayne State University.

Frederick L. Zimmermann, director of research of the New York State Joint Legislative Committee on Interstate Cooperation and associate professor of political science at Hunter College, has been promoted to the rank of full professor at the latter institution.

IN MEMORIAM

After an illness of several months, Norman Dwight Harris died on September 4, 1958, in his home in Daytona Beach, Florida. He was born in Cincinnati, Ohio, on January 25, 1870, graduated in 1892 from the Sheffield Scientific School of Yale University, and after studying a year in the University of Chicago, spent three years at the Universities of Berlin and Leipsig. In 1901, he received his Ph.D. at the University of Chicago. For the next four years, he was instructor in history in Lawrence College, Appleton, Wisconsin. In 1906 he was appointed Professor of European Diplomatic History in Northwestern University. Ten years later he organized the department of political science there and remained its chairman until his retirement in 1928.

Norman Dwight Harris had been one of the first of the young scholars to join the American Political Science Association immediately upon its establishment in 1906. In the next few years he contributed leading articles to this REVIEW and to the *Proceedings* of the Association, as well as numerous book reviews. In 1913–1916 he served as a member of the Executive Council of the Association.

Professor Harris' first published treatise appeared in 1904 under the title of *The History of Negro Servitude in Illinois*. His *Intervention and Colonization in Africa* was published in 1914, and a revised edition in 1927, while his *Europe and Asia* appeared in 1925. The two latter books introduced a new and realistic method of study of imperialism and colonialism, based on personal observation and investigation of the areas under scrutiny as well as upon complete parliamentary documentation, and were widely used as textbooks. In 1917–1918 Professor Harris served as a member of Colonel House's committee for gathering data for the Paris Peace Conference of 1919. In this period he also contributed numerous articles and reviews to the *American Journal of International Law*.

As a student, and later as a teacher, he travelled extensively in Europe (including Russia), in Africa and in Asia. During these travels he collected a large library of books and documents in the field of diplomatic history and European colonization, which he presented to Deering Library of Northwestern University.

He persuaded his father, Norman Waite Harris, founder of the Harris Trust and Savings Bank in Chicago, to build Harris Hall on the campus of Northwestern University. Completed in 1914, the Hall has ever since housed the departments of political science and history. Professor Harris also guided, for a number of years, the selection of distinguished scholars, foreign as well as American, who delivered a notable series of lectures under the auspices of the Norman Waite Harris Fund.

After his retirement from teaching he spent most of his time in France, where he served as a trustee of the American Library in Paris, until the outbreak of the Second World War. Throughout his life, he continued his assistance to Oriental students, providing scholarships for young scholars from both China and Japan.

KENNETH COLEGROVE

GRANTS FOR ASIAN POLITICAL SCIENTISTS

The American Political Science Association has received from The Asia Foundation a grant of $2,500 for encouraging closer relations between Asian and American political scientists. The funds will be used in three ways:

1) To enable Asian political scientists to become members of The American Political Science Association for a three-year period at greatly reduced rates. Membership includes subscription to *The American Political Science Review.*

> (Membership in the Association for three years and subscription to the *Review* will be only $1.00. Applicants should write directly to The American Political Science Association, 1726 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W., Washington 6, D. C. Payment may be made in UNESCO coupons or in any way convenient and acceptable under the exchange regulations of the country concerned. The privilege is extended to graduate students as well as to established political scientists.)

2) To enable libraries, university departments, and research institutes in Asia, who have heretofore been unable to do so, to subscribe to *The American Political Science Review* at greatly reduced rates.

> (The cost of a three-year institutional subscription will be $2.00, payable as above.)

3) To supplement travel expenses of Asian political scientists who are in the United States and who wish to attend meetings of The American Political Science Association. The next meeting will be held September 10–12, 1959, in the Mayflower Hotel, Washington, D. C.

> (Applicants must be at least at the graduate student level and may come from any Asian country from Afghanistan eastward. Applications should be sent to The American Political Science Association, 1726 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W., Washington 6, D. C. In his request the applicant should give his regular academic position, the nature of his study or visit in the United States, and the sum necessary for travel to and from the meeting.)

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

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